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2ABSTRACT
In 1856 Siam was opened to the world economy after 130 
years of virtual isolation from Western contact.The event was 
followed by a series of treaties with the various Western 
Powers.This resulted in the influx of Western 
capital,technology,and expertise in which the British became 
predominant.The purpose of this thesis is to examine the 
factors which determined the degree and direction of British 
economic activity in Siam between 1856-1914.This involves a 
discussion on the the Siamese perception of and response to 
the presence of the British.
Historians have discussed British economic activity in 
the context of Siam's political infrastructure and 
development.These works have contributed to an understanding 
of the Siamese response to the West.However based on Siamese 
documents,this study serves to complement previous work by 
showing the factors considered by the Siamese administration 
in formulating their response to British economic 
interests,namely the issue of economic sovereignty,and how to 
meet the demands of the British without creating hostility 
from the other rival Powers.The study is the first work to 
examine Anglo-Siamese economic relations in perspective based 
on Siamese documents.
The thesis involves a discussion on the conduct of
British enterprise in Siam and its qualitative influence on 
the Siamese economy,the relationship between the British 
government and their economic interests,the role of the 
British advisers and the Third Power in relation to the 
granting of economic concessions.The study looks at a wide 
cross-section of British economic activity in Siam,namely the 
trading houses,railways,teak and tin,showing that the presence 
of the British was part of Siam's modernisation.Evidence 
indicates that the Siamese were continuously suspicious of 
British intentions due to political and economic factors.Such 
perceptions induced the Siamese to undertake a conciliatory 
response.Despite the support from the British government,the 
framework within which British economic activity was 
undertaken prevented them from establishing a dominant 
position in the Siamese economy.
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8ANGLO-SIAMESE ECONOMIC RELATIONS:BRITISH 
TRADE,CAPITAL AND ENTERPRISE IN SIAM,1856-1914.
INTRODUCTION.
Historians have focused their attention on this era of
Siamese history in particular on the reign of King
Chulalongkorn 1868-1910.This period is crucial from two
perspectives:firstly Siam's independence was at stake;and
secondly it marked an era of modernisation.Various studies
have been made in relating British economic activity to the
reforms for modernisation.For instance N.J.Brailey and
J.A.Ramsay discussed the presence of British teak companies
in Northern Siam in the context of Siam's administrative
control.^D.Holm,in his study of the railways,concentrated on
2
the political impact of railways. I.G.Brown accounts for the
3
development of the financial infrastructure. These studies 
shows the impact of the West on Siam's administrative 
development .What historians need to understand is the role of 
Western enterprise and its political implications for Siam's
* N.J.Brailey;"The Siamese Forward Movement in N.Laos States, 
1850-92 ",Ph.D.diss,University of London,1969
J.A.Ramsay;"Development of Modern Bureaucratic Polity",Ph.d, 
Cornell U,1971.
2
David B.Holm:The Role of the State Railways in Thai 
History,1892-32 ", Ph.D.diss,Yale U,1975.
3
Ian George Brown;"The Ministry of Finance and the Early 
Development of Modern Financial Administration in Siam 1885- 
1910."Ph.D.diss,University of London,1975.
9sovereignty.Western interest in Siam as part of territorial 
expansion involved the "scramble for concessions", notably in 
teak and tin.Such economic rivalry became a prominent and 
continuous issue as economic concessions were regarded to be 
synonymous with political influence.
The most recent and relevant study on this topic is an
article by M.E.Falkus "Early British Business in 
4
Thailand". Falkus'work is the first attempt to account for the 
nature and characteristics of British economic interersts in 
pre-1930 Siam.His reliance on British Foreign Office 
despatches raises the political issues stemming from British 
economic interests.By contrast,the purpose of this study is 
to examine,through the use of Siamese documents,the factors 
which influenced the degree and direction of British economic 
activity in Siam,a non-colonised country.The study firstly 
traces the development of British economic activity in 
Siam.This involves a presentation of statistics on Siam's 
trade with the British Southeast Asian ports,the numbers of 
British vessels entered and cleared at the Port of Bangkok,and 
the numbers of British trading houses operating in Siam. 
Secondly,elaborates on the political complications arising 
from British economic interests by discussing the Siamese 
perception of and response to British economic activity in the
4
Malcolm E .Falkus:"Early British Business in Thailand" in 
British Business in Asia Since 1860.Edit.by R.P.T.Davenport- 
Hines and Geoffrey Jones.CUP 1989.
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midst of intense rivalry amongst the Great Powers.
Historians such as Cushman and Brown have asserted that
the Siamese were wary and sceptical of British economic
intentions, and anticipated any conflict with British
commercial interests in the out-lying provinces would
precipitate direct intervention from the British 
5
Government. These studies have asserted that the political 
element was primarily of a regional nature,for up till 
1909,Siam was a fragmented State,composed of semi-autonomous 
provinces in the Northern and Southern region.Such points on 
the Siamese perception of the British have primarily been 
based on observations made by contemporary British 
officials.Having consulted Siamese documents,this thesis 
intends to elaborate on the Siamese suspicions of British 
intentions,and to reveal that there were other considerations 
which influenced the formulation of the Siamese response so 
as to create a comprehensive understanding of the impact of 
the West on Siam.
The importance of British Foreign Office despatches shows 
the relationship between the government and their business 
interests in Siam.The misleading element derived from the
5
I .G .Brown:The Elite and the Economy in Siam 1890-1921,OUP 
1988.J.W.Cushman;"The Khaw GrouptChinese Business in Early 
Twentieth Century Penang",in Journal Southeast Asian Studies 
XJSEASI,Vol.17,no.1 (March 1986) pp 58-79.
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reliance on these despatches is the inclination towards the 
political threat to the regional states being the predominant 
consideration amongst the Siamese.Despatches between the 
Siamese Ministers and those of the King confirm the existence 
of such political threat,and raise two other distinct 
factors.First,was the Siamese concern of how to reconcile 
their fundamental attachment to the "Most Favoured Nation 
Clause",whereby Siam was committed to grant equal concessions 
to all Treaty Powers ,^he pressure to place the British in a 
predominant position.Second,was the question of economic 
sovereignty.The Siamese were aware of the need to encourage 
Western enterprise to overcome their economic "backwardness", 
but simultaneously to avoid the domination of Western 
capital.Therefore the importance of Siamese documents shows 
the co-existence of both political and economic 
considerations.
The presence of the British became an integral part of 
King Chulalongkorn's programme for reforms and 
modernisation.The corollary of the growth of British activity 
was the establishment of institutions to regulate and control 
Western enterprise. Historians have asserted that as the 
Siamese were in no position to challenge the British,they 
embarked upon a policy which Brown has described as "cautious
12
and restrictive".^ Siamese sources confirm that there was a 
strong element of such procedure.The Siamese administration 
endeavoured to control the presence of the British through the 
employment of foreign advisers predominantly of British 
nationality to establish the necessary institutions to 
regulate British activity.Not only did this serve to provide 
a stable environment for the conduct of business,but also 
allowed the Siamese to impose their authority thereby 
strengthening their economic sovereignty .The interesting point 
about these advisers was their attitude towards their own 
nationality which this thesis seeks to discuss.Another 
response worth considering was the political involvement of 
a Third Power,in particular Germany.Historians have described 
this as a political move,but evidence shows that there was an 
element of economic consideration.
A discussion on the issue of British economic interests 
in Siam ideally involves a quantitative account of their 
operation,a study which serves to show the development of the 
Siamese economy. Various studies have concentrated on the 
impact of Chinese capital and have overlooked the significance 
of Western capital. British economic interests were predominant 
amongst the Western powers.The British established trading 
houses and banks;were involved in the extractive industries;
 ^ I .G .Brown:The Elite and the Economy in Siam 1890-1921,OUP 
1988.
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and participated in portfolio investment.lt is important to 
show the relationship between British capital and that of the 
Chinese.The lack of archival company records has not made it 
possible to quantify the value of British investment in 
Siam.What this study endeavours to show is the qualitative 
changes brought about by the presence of British enterprise, 
and to assess British economic performance in Siam.
The structure of the thesis is divided into four
parts.The first three chapters trace the development and 
growth of British economic interests in the capital city
Bangkok.The remainder of the thesis will discuss the Siamese 
response to the presence of the British by looking at a wide 
cross-section of British activity.Chapters 4 and 5 are an 
account of the British economic movement into the autonomous 
teak region of Northern Siam.Chapters 6 and 7 discuss British 
involvement in the construction of railways in both Northern 
and Southern Siam.Chapter 8 looks at British activity in the 
tin mines of Southern Siam especially in the Siamese-Malay 
vassal States.Finally the conclusion relates the role of
British advisers,and the economic rivalry amongst the Great 
Powers to British economic activity in Siam,and assesses
British economic performance in Siam.
Sources for this particular study have primarily been 
documents from the National Archives in Bangkok,and from the
14
Public Record Office in London.The files consulted at the 
National Archives are those of the relevant government 
agencies involved in the conduct of British economic 
activity.These records comprise the administrative 
correspondence between the King (or his secretary) and the 
ministers,reports on Cabinet meetings, correspondence and 
memorandam of the various ministers which were sent to the 
Royal Secretariat.These files are primarily of the period of 
the reign of King Chulalongkorn sent to the Royal Secretariat 
and are classified as R 5 (the Fifth Reign).Other manuscripts 
include those of the Financial Advisers,and the reports of the 
Siamese Foreign Office.There are certain documents which are 
classified as confidential,and such files have been consulted 
with permission from the National Security Council.The archive 
at the Office of His Majesty's Principal Private Secretary was 
also consulted,though only one file was found relevant,namely 
that of the King's correspondence.
Sources concerning the events prior to 1856 are found at 
the National Library in Bangkok.Again these files are 
classified in accordance to the reign of the King.This study 
consulted the files of the Second,Third,and Fourth Reign and 
are thus marked R 2,R 3,R 4respectively.These documents are 
incomplete and at times illegible .The manuscripts are recorded 
on black charcoal boards written in chalk,and most of these 
records have now been microfilmed.In addition there are
15
sources from the Bangkok Times of which a complete collection 
is kept at the Siam Society. Unfortunately these were not 
available at the time of my research as they were in the 
process of being microfilmed.The Bangkok Times consulted are 
those found at the National Library,but this is a restricted 
collection dating between 1890-1900.Other Western newspapers 
in Bangkok were the Siam Weekly Advertizer and the Siam 
Mercantile Gazette.
The major problem encountered in carrying out the 
research is the lack of archival company records.Such records 
are not available for research either due to their non­
existence or simply because they have not been opened to the 
7
public. Another limitation has been the trade statistics.lt 
was not till 1890 that the Siamese Government published annual 
statistics on trade and navigation.Therefore figures for the 
earlier period are based on the East India Trade Navigation 
and the various British Consular Reports.
It is worth mentioning the value of Thai MA theses in 
undertaking the research.The various theses are of the 
empirical archival nature and limited in their scope of 
argument.But their importance is evident in facilitating the 
use of the National Archives.These theses cover a wide cross-
7
Manuscripts from the Inchcape Archive have been transferred 
to the Guildhall Library where they are not available for 
research due to reclassification.
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section of topics on Thai economic history in particular 
teak,tin,and railways,concentrating on the economic and 
social impact.What these works lack is an understanding of the 
nature of British overseas investment,and how it influenced 
the Siamese response.
17
CHAPTER I
Anglo-Siamese Economic Relations.1820-1856.
Background to the Foreign Trade of Siam.
Economic historians have established that before the 
opening of Siam to free trade in 1856, foreign trade was 
already showing signs of progress .Though thiere was no direct 
trade conducted with the West,Siam played a role in the intra- 
Asian trade.Siam served as an entrepot for trade in the South 
China Sea area,and her trade with Singapore and Penang can be 
regarded as indirect trade with the West.Th^e products traded 
between Siam and the two British Southeast Asian ports were 
transhipped to and from Europe,in particular Britain.
The debate over the foreign trade of Siam revolves round 
its importance to the Siamese economy. J.C. Intgram puts forward 
that "foreign trade appears to have been of relatively small 
importance to Siam in 1850".^This view has bieen challenged by 
Hong Lysa and J .Cushman,who have asserted tlhat foreign trade
 ^ J.C.Ingram:Economic Change in Thailand 18550-1970. 
Stanford University Press,1971.pg 29.
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2
contributed to the development of the Siamese economy. The
differing views can be attributed to the factors used in their
assessment.Ingram based his view on exports as part of total
3
production of which he found was "rather small". L.Hong based 
the importance of foreign trade on the nature of Siamese 
imports as a contributary factor to the reconstruction of the 
economy.Both arguments are based on a particular aspect of 
foreign trade rather than on trade as a whole.Though the two 
views seem directly opposed,in fact they have enough in common 
to yield concrete suggestions of Siam's importance in the 
Asian trade.
Wong Lin Ken has presented the progress of Siam's foreign
trade in the pre-Bowring era,and the events leading to the
4
Bowring Treaty,based on Straits Settlement sources. This 
section endeavours to show the extent of Siam's foreign 
trade;by discussing the system of state trading,and by showing 
the increasing integration of the Siamese economy in intra- 
Asian trade using statistics from the Burney Papers and the 
East India Statement of Trade.The second part will explain the
2
Hong Lvsa:Thailand in the 19th Century:Evolution of the 
Economy and Society. Singapore (1984).
J.W.Cushman:"Siamese State Trade and the Chinese Go-Between 
1767-1855" in JSEAS March 1981.
3
Ingram pg 29.
4
Wong Lin Ken:"Trade with Siam and Indo-China" in Journal 
Malayan Branch Roval Asiatic Society (JMBRAS1,Vol.XXXIII,
Pt.4,pp.134-149 .
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difference in attitude between the Straits'and Indian 
authority;and the political events which influenced the 
Siamese perception of the British and the response to the 
opening up of Siam in 1856.
The foreign trade of Siam during this era revolved round 
two traditional privileges:the royal rights of pre-emption and 
royal monopolies over certain export articles.The right of 
pre-emption restricted foreign merchants in the sale of that 
merchandise which the royal officials had selected. 
Simultaneously foreign traders were expected to purchase their 
goods through the royal court or senior officials.The royal 
monopoly over certain export articles was a component of this 
system and was dependent upon the Siennese taxation system 
which involved the distribution of tax farms.The duty 
collected was known as "suai",and during the Third reign 
(1826-51) the collection was applied to 38 types of 
enterprise,most of which were in the field of export 
production.^
5
Chao Phya Thiphakarawona:Phraratchaphonasawadan Kruna 
Ratanakosin Ratchakan Thi 3 (The Royal Chronicle of the Third 
Reign of the Bangkok Dynasty),pg 365-366.Thiphakarawongse 
(1812-1870) was a son of the Praklang (Dit Bunnag).He wrote 
this chronicle (and chronicles of the First,Second,and Fourth 
Reigns of the Bangkok Dynasty) during the reign of Rama V at 
the request of the King.
These chronicles were written out of his intimate knowledge 
and experience at the time,concerning the political,economic 
and social issues.
20
A number of studies have been carried out by Thai
historians on the tax farming system,one in particular by
Boonrod Kaewkanha.** Kaewkanha drew a link between the
collection of "suai" and state trading.Thai sources indicate
various occasions when the payments made for imported goods
were actually derived from the collection of "suai”.This had
become apparent during the Second reign (1814-26).For instance
in 1813 King Rama II wrote to Phya Nakornsrithamarat, the
Provincial Governor,suggesting a means of financing the
purchase of cloth at Macao;
"if there is not enough money,use the capital 
from the "suai^ collected on tin to pay for 
the purchase."
Another example was indicated in 1819 as seen in the letter 
from Muen Sakdipon to Phya Nakorn referring to the payments 
for glassware and white cloth being made from the "suai" 
collected on birdsnests. However it was during the Third reign 
that such practises were adopted on a permanent basis as 
illustrated in the following royal command to Chao Phya 
Chakri;
Boonrod Kaewkanha:"The Collection of Suai During the Early 
Rattanakosin Period 1782-1868".MA.diss.(Thai 
Text),Chulalongkorn U.,1974.
7
NL R.2 JS 1175/11 Rama II to Phya Nakornsrithamarat.Year 
1813.
g
NL R.2 JS 1181/1 Letter from Muen Sakdipon to Phya Nakon. 
Year 1819.
21
"The King (Rama III) advocated that the duty 
collected is to be used as payment to foreign 
traders on an annual basis."
The conduct of state trading was shared between the
King's senior officials,members of the royalty,and those who
were directly involved in its operations like the port
officials and the Chinese merchants.According to the Siamese
Records,the King owned 85 vessels in 1826.^^The most prominent
official involved in trade was the Praklang.This ministerial
rank supervised foreign trade and external affairs,and was
occupied by the head of the Bunnag family, Chao Phya Maha
Payurawongse (Dit Bunnag).^ In the Siamese Chronicles,Dit
Bunnag is described as possessing a warehouse in front of his
12residence by the river. John Crawfurd,a British agent sent 
to negotiate a commercial treaty with Siam in 1821,reported 
that the "Chinese and Siamese merchants were to sell nothing
g
NL R.3 JS 1210 no.210 Royal Command to Chao Phya Chakn. 
Year 1838.
10 NL R.3 JS 1188 no.18 List of Vessels,Year 1826.
^  Dit Bunnag was the Praklang 1822-51.The Bunnag Family were 
descendants of emigrants from traders of the Coast of 
Coromandel.The first Bunnag-Chao Phya Maha Sena was descended 
from Sheik'Amat,a muslim from Arabia and head of a foreign 
trading community in Ayuthaya during the reign of Ekathasarot 
1584-1603.For more details concerning the Bunnag Family see 
Constance Wilson Phd thesis:"State and Society in the Reign 
of Mongkut 1851-68sThailand on the Eve of Modernisation",pp 
71-80.
12 Prachum Ponqsawadan no.62.These are a collection of 
chronicles printed in the field of Siamese history.The 
first volume of the series appeared in 1914.No.62 deals 
with Siam's relations with the West.
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to the European trader till the Praklang shall have previously
13sold at his own price a given quantity of produce," which
practice earned him the reputation of "a keen trader rather
14than a statesman".
The Siamese trade was primarily transacted with Indians
and Chinese rather than with Westerners except for the
Portuguese from Macao.This can be attributed to the Siamese
suspicion of Western intentions;
"The Western traders tend to bully other 
nationalities,including fellow whitemen.
In a situation of conflicting interests, 
they would go as far as fighting,or even 
killing...The Chinese and Indians ,on the 
other hand,stay under the complete control 
of the King.They only seek commercial gains.
For this reason Siam prefers to trade with 
Chinese and Jndian merchants than with 
Westerners."
Amongst the Westerners,only the Portuguese traded under the 
Siamese conditions,namely the royal rights of pre-emption.Such 
a Siamese perception of Western practise was perhaps 
reinforced by the Anglo-Burmese war of 1824.Therefore when 
John Crawfurd was sent by the East India Company to negotiate 
a commercial treaty with Siam,he found their attitude
13 The Crawfurd Papers:A Collection of Official Records 
Relating to the Mission of Dr.John Crawfurd sent to Siam 
bv the Government of India 1822.pg 156.
14 John Crawfurd:Journal of an Embassy from the Governor- 
General of India to the Courts of Siam and Cochin-China.
D.K.Wyatt Edition pg 89.
15 Thiphakarawongse:Phraratchaponosawadan Krung Ratanakosm 
Ratchakan Thi 2 (The Royal Chronicles of the Second Reign).
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unfavourable to Western terms,and the following impression was
held amongst the Siamese administration;
"(The) English now come with smooth words, 
pretendingto want trade only,that in a 
little time wouldask for a factory...and 
finally that they wouldseize upon the 
country,as ^ e y  had done onvarious 
occasions."
Not only were the British terms for free trade incompatible 
with the Siamese state trading system,but the actual presence 
of the British was perceived by the Siamese administration as 
a potential threat to their sovereignty.
Siamese Trade With The British Southeast Asian Ports.
The foreign trade of Siam was concentrated at the port
of Bangkok.In 1830 Crawfurd described Bangkok as "probably
the largest Asiatic trading place in the East next to 
17Canton." Crawfurd's observation was an exaggeration and this 
can be confirmed by comparing the trade of Singapore with that 
of Bangkok.
^  John Crawfurd:Journal of an Embassy...Wvatt Edit pg 90. 
17 East India Company Minute Books:On the Affairs of the 
EIC.pct 311.
24
Table I
Comparison of Total Trade Passing Through Singapore 
And Bangkok in 1826. (Span.dollars)
Value of Singapore Trade Value of Bangkok Trade 
Import 6.8m .14
Exports 6.4m .21
Total 13.2m .36
Source:Crawfurd Papers;Journal of an Embassy..pq 537 
D.K.Wyatt edit.
Burnev Papers IV,Pt 2,pg 91.
Crawfurd believed that Bangkok would serve as the British
"emporium at the head of the Gulf of Siam" thereby securing
trade with Cochin-China and the western and southern parts of
18Asia,which Singapore was in no position to secure.
The importance of Crawfurd's observation was that Siam's 
trade was increasing.According to the trading figures of 1826- 
31 presented by Henry Burney (a British envoy who concluded 
a commercial treaty with Siam in 1826) in 1843,the value of 
total trade passing through the port of Bangkok shows an 
increase.
Table II
Abstract Statement Of The Annual Imports And Exports 
To And From Siam 1826-1829. (thousand dollars)
1826/27 1827/28 1828/29
Import 148 211 281
Export 219 131 366
Total 367 342 648
Source:Burnev Papers IV.2 pg 91.
18 Crawfurd Papers :A Collection of Official Records. . . ,pg 164.
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The year 1828/29 indicates a marked rise which is 
reflected in the Siamese trade with the British Southeast 
Asian ports of Singapore and Penang.
Table III
Trade Of Siam With Singapore And Penang 1828/29.
Singapore Penang
Export 771 216
Import 167 96
Total 938 312(thous.rupees)
Source:Burnev Papers III.l pg 187
224.5 Company Rupees=100 Span.Dollars.
The trade with Penang was conducted from Pangna in Southern
Siam.This trade was partly borne by Siamese junks and partly
19by overland in the northern parts of the Malay Peninsula. The 
port of Singapore played a crucial role in diverting the junk- 
borne trade away from Penang.
The important trading partners of Siam were China and the
British Southeast Asian ports of Singapore and Penang.A number
of studies have been made on the China trade,notably by
20Sarasin Virapol and J.Cushman. What this section endeavours
19 Wong Lin Ken:"Trade with Siam and Indo-China" pg 135.
20 Sarasin Virapol: Tribute and Prof it: Sino-Siamese Trade 1652- 
1853.Harvard U . 1977.
J.W.Cushman:"Siamese State Trading..."
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to discuss is the trading network existing between Siam and 
the British South-east Asian ports.The establishment of 
Singapore and Penang marked a significant influence upon the 
trade of Siam.Siam was far off the British trading route to 
China.Yet the British occupation of Singapore in 1819 
precipitated the revival of British trade in the Archipelago 
region followed by mainland Southeast Asia.Wong Lin Ken 
suggests that in the 1820s,the private traders and textile 
interests hoped that the success achieved by the sale of 
British manufactures in the Malay Archipelago might be 
repeated in Siam and Cochin-China,where British raw and 
wrought iron and Bengal opium might also find an extensive 
market.^
When Singapore was first established,only 4 junks 
annually from Siam visited the place .However by 1824 the 
number of vessels had risen to 35 carrying sugar,rice,salt in 
exchange for British cotton piece goods,opium and cloth.The 
following two tables indicate the trend in the value of trade 
conducted between 1826-1855.
21 Wong Lin Ken pg 134.
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Table IV
Siamese Trade With Singapore 1826-40 (thousand Mex. 
dollars)
Year Import to Siam Export from Siam
1826-30 207 250
1831-35 192 206
1836-40 303 316
Source:Burnev Papers IV.2 pg 91,162.
Table V
Siamese Trade With Singapore And Penang 1840-1855 
(thousand rupees)
Export of Siam
1840-41 
Singapore Penang 
no vessels 32 5
tonnage 6421 873
value 732 312
1845-46 
Singapore Penang 
30 136
8262 14,283
458 706
1854-55 
Singapore Penang 
109 144
18,000 5999
988 1.355
Import Of Siam
no vessels 42 2 25
tonnage lo,153 367 8171
value 877 259 567
82
1783
523
95
17,818
1.03
111
5484
939
Source:East India Statement of Trade with Singapore and 
Penang
Before discussing the factors influencing the trading 
links,it is worth pointing out that the traded products did 
not change substantially between 1828-1847.
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Table VI
Comparison Traded Products 1828 and 1847
1828/29 1846/47
With Singapore With Penang With Singapore With Penang 
Export Import Export Import Export Import Exp Imp
Sugar P.Goods Tobacco I.Piece Sugar Cotton Sugar
Rice Opium Tin Opium H.Ware Opium Rice
S.Wood Sundeies B.Nest Gamboge Gamboge
Salt Rattans Sugar Sundries
Tobacco Glass Rice Rice
Source:Burnev Papers III.l pg 187.
East India Trade with Singapore 1846-48. 
(Abbreviations:S.Wood = Sapan Wood. I.Piece = Indian 
Piece B.Nest = Birds nest. H.Ware = Hardware )
The table shows that Siam was a net exporter of bulky primary 
products and an importer of manufactured goods.Sugar remained 
the leading staple export to Singapore and Penang,whilst 
cotton piece goods and opium remained the major imports.The 
Chinese prohibition of opium imports in 1823 was an important 
factor in diverting British opium interests to Siam.These 
bulky products were transhipped from the Asiatic ports to 
Europe thereby establishing indirect trade between Siam and 
the West.
The factors influencing the trade link between Siam and 
the British Southeast Asian ports can be attributed to the 
Anglo-Siamese Treaty of 1826 and the trading environment 
resulting from the commercial terms.Tables IV and V show two
29
different phases: firstly the period 1826-40;and secondly
1840-55.The development of Siam's trade with Singapore and
Penang was a response to the 1826 Treaty.The Agreement
consisted of 6 articles designed to permit greater freedom of
trade and to define more clearly the levy of duties on
goods.The most advantageous concession granted to the British
was the provision for free trade between merchants and
inhabitants without any official interference;
"Merchants subject to the Siamese or English, 
going to trade in Bengal or in any country 
subject to the Siamese,must pay the duties 
upon commerce according to the customs of the 
place or country,on either side;and such 
merchants and inhabitants of the country shall 
be allowed to buy and sell without the 22
intervention of other persons in such countries.
However there were certain limitations on the conduct of
free trade.The import of opium was banned in Siam whilst rice
was a prohibited article of export.Trade was confined to the
port of Bangkok and to the Malay Provinces.The Siamese
intended to reserve the power to prevent British ships from
participating in the coastal trade.Burney attributed the
Siamese intention to promote Bangkok as an entrepot for the
23entire commerce of the country. Perhaps another reason for 
restricting trade to Bangkok was to control British trading
22 Burney Treaty 1826.Article VI.
23 Burnev Papers II Pt.4 pg 171.The Burnev Papers (5 Vols) 
are a collection of British official papers relating to the 
Burney mission to Siam in 1825-1826 and other aspects of 
Anglo-Siamese relations from 1822-1849.
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activity;for in the provincial ports the Siamese 
administrative control was much less effective.lt will later 
be pointed out that one of the underlying considerations of 
the Siamese was the fear of conflict arising from British 
activity in the outlying provinces,which in the Siamese view 
was a prerequisite for direct intervention on the part of the 
British government.
The second phase shows an unfavourable balance of trade
between Siam and Singapore.Such a sudden change was linked to
the reimposition of the royal monopoly.In a petition from the
British merchants to their home government in 1843,it was
asserted that "the King observed the terms of the Treaty from
1826 till 1840 and then effected his purpose by degrees,and
it was only after he found his conduct met with no
remonstrance from the British government that he completed the 
24monopoly." The petition pointed out that the transformation
of the trade surplus of 1830-38 into a deficit was caused by
25the monopoly system. In order to assess the accusation made 
in the memorial,the activity of a certain British merchant in 
Bangkok is worth discussing.
24 Petition of the British Merchants Aug 29,1849.Quoted in 
Journal Siam Society (JSSKVIII 1959 pg 222.
25 Ibid.
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Robert Hunter was a prominent British merchant residing
in Bangkok during the pre-Bowring era.This Scotsman arrived
in Bangkok in 1824.He first lived in India and then moved on
to Singapore where he established business interests.From
Singapore he traded with the Rajahs of Pattani,Trengganu,and
Kelantan.His trading venture was known as Morgan,Hunter,and
Co. In 1824 Hunter approached King Rama III presenting 1000
muskets,and in gratitude the King permitted Hunter to
establish a factory in Bangkok.His Factory "Hung Huntra" was
engaged in the profitable business of importing products for
the Court,most notably glassware from Singapore.In 1835 two
young merchants from Singapore,James Hayes and Christopher
Harvey,came to join Hunter.Hunter became a royal favourite
2 6being granted a noble title Phra Tate Wanet in 1831. The
American missionary,Dr.Bradley,described Hunter's position as
having "a large establishment and doing an immense amount of
27business"in 1835. However in the early 1840s,Hunter's close 
connection with the King became strained due to certain mal­
practices on the part of Hunter in his conduct of trade in 
Siam.
2 6 Based on Adey Moore:"An Early British Merchant in Bangkok" 
in JSS 1959.Various studies have been made on the Hunter 
episode.For more details see Neon Snidvongse:"The Development 
of Siamese Relations with Britain and France in the Reign of 
Mongkut".Phd, London U.,1961.
27 Abstract of the Journal of Rev.Dan Beach Bradley.Medical 
Missionary in Siam 1835-1873.Edited by Rev.George Harris 
Feltus,pg 8 .
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The Indian Government to whom Hunter petitioned for
support, noted that Hunter lodged his complaints in 1845
whereas the practise of royal monopolies had become effective
in 1843,and thus Hunter had traded under that system for 2
years.The Indian Government believed that it was personal
conflict with the King that induced Hunter to expose the
Siamese re-imposition of the monopoly system;
"with respect to the personal injuries complained 
(of) by Hunter,they appear to have been jg some 
measure provoked by his own imprudence."
It may be asserted that the Siamese authorities had no
29intention of removing the royal monopoly. Therefore when the 
British merchants came to participate in the Siamese trade 
after 1840,they were unexpectedly confronted with the 
traditional system of royal monopolies which was thought to 
have been removed by the Treaty of 1826.The revenue of the 
Siamese government had continuously been derived from trade 
and marketing operations.The provisions of the 1826 Treaty and 
the 1833 American Treaty prohibited government paticipation 
in trade which inevitably meant a serious loss in state 
revenue.As Vella pointed out,the tax farming system expanded 
so greatly during the 1840s that it soon became as restrictive
2 8 Court of Directors EIC from London to Governor and Council 
of Bengal Jan 2,1846.In Adey Moore "An Early British.." pg 53.
29 The Siamese Government did not express in the Treaty that 
they intended not to re-establish the monopoly system.See 
Adey Moore pg 53.
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30of trade as direct government control had been.
The Opening Up Of Siam To The World Economy
Western traders in Singapore conducting trade with Siam
were connected with commercial firms in Europe.This placed
them in the position to express their needs to their
government through the various Chambers of Commerce.The
Singapore Chamber of Commerce had support from the commercial
bodies in England,in particular the East India and China
Association of Liverpool.This body was the guardian of
Liverpool interests in the East and one of the leading
opponents of the East India Company's monopoly of the China
trade. Singapore was held as an example of the prosperity that
free trade could bring and her success quoted as an argument
31for the removal of commercial restrictions.
The commercial community in Singapore expressed their
request for trade with Siam "upon a legitimate footing" to the
Indian Government;
"..all that remains to be done is to prevail 
upon the Siamese Government,to make those 
modifications and amendments in those parts 
of the Treaty,as regards the residence of 
foreigners and the tariff duties,which
30 W.Vella:Siam Under Rama III.Locust Valley,1957.pg 139.
31 C.M.Turnbull:"The European Mercantile Community in 
Singapore 1819-1867".In Journal Southeast Asian History 
(JSEAin Vol.10.no.1.March 1969,pg 32.
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experience has shown to be opposed to a full 
and free development of the commerce of the 
country.The Siamese King,like most semi- 
barbarous persons,is slow to perceive the 
advantages."
The merchants of Singapore took up the complaints concerning
the spread of monopolies on iron,steel,pepper etc;the heavy
tonnage duties; the ban on rice and teak exports; and the
33requirement that Europeans use Siamese vessels. In 1849 a
movement began to spread amongst the merchants and
manufacturers of Britain to urge the Government to try to open
"the markets of Japan,Korea,Cochin-China,and Siam to the sale
34of British Manufactures". The various Chambers of
Commerce;Hali fax,Hudders field,Manchester,Birmingham, and
Singapore pressed for government intervention as pointed out
by Crawfurd in 1849:
"The difficulty of dealing with a government so 
rude,vain,rapacious,and unacquainted with its own 
relative position,as that of Siam,is very great.. 
...I am,therefore,of (the) opinion that the Foreign
Office ought to take the dij^ct management of the
affair into its own hands."
Several points can be made about the series of memorials
32 East India 1847-48 No.174.From Governor Prince of Wales 
Island,Singapore,and Malacca,to A.R. Young Esq (Under-Secretary 
to Govt of Bengal) Fort William,Singapore,Dec 28,1847.
33 PRO FO 17/162 Memorial of Singapore Chamber of Commerce,Oct 
1848.
34 PRO FO 17/161 Memorial to Secretary of State,Palmerston. 
April 13,1849.
35 PRO FO 17/161 J.Crawfurd "Notes on Commerce of Siam and 
Cochin-China".March 5,1849.
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3 6presented. Firstly the Chambers of Commerce in Singapore 
maintained close links with their counterparts in the large 
industrial cities of Britain,notably Liverpool,Glasgow,and 
Manchester.This was strengthened by the presence of former 
official-merchants who had retired to England from the Straits 
eg Crawfurd.Secondly the Singapore mercantile community was 
now looking to London rather than Calcutta as its economic 
centre.The direct approach to the Foreign Office was to gain 
positive support,for earlier the Indian Government had shown 
an unsympathetic attitude towards the Hunter affair and 
reluctance over the idea of another commercial mission to 
Siam.
The Indian Government's perception of the Siamese King 
being "semi-barbarous" and failing to see the advantages of 
trade was a rather imperialist attitude and concept.lt was the 
conditions put forward by the British for trade that aroused 
suspicion amongst the Siamese.This was indicated throughout 
the Treaty negotiations conducted by the British envoy,James 
Brooke,who was sent from London to negotiate with the Siamese 
in 1851.Basically the Siamese refused the proposals presented 
by Brooke because they were not prepared to grant British 
merchants "special privileges", namely the right of 
residence,the reduction of the measurement duties,and the
3 6 Memorials by the various Chambers of Commerce are published 
in ML Manich JumsaitKinq Monqkut and Sir John Bowrina. 
Chalermit,1970 pp 14-22.
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general exportation of rice.Such terms were in the Siamese
view changing "the fixed rules and customs of a great
37country..and bring them all into confusion and ruin."
The failure of the Brooke mission determined certain 
factions in the Singapore mercantile community to embark upon 
force.A.Logan, Secretary of the Singapore Chamber of 
Commerce,suggested to Brooke the need for an aggressive 
policy;
"Events of subsequent occurrence fully confirm 
the opinions then expressed to the systematic 
endeavours of the Siamese to subvert the 
existing Treaty by pertinacious obstructions 
to British trade... force would offer the best 
security against any hostile collisions., 
the position of the British sij^jects and 
property is now so critical."
Abraham Logan was one of the leading public figures in
Singapore.He was the owner of the newspaper Singapore Free
Press and its editor,in addition to being Secretary of the
39Singapore Chamber of Commerce. Yet there existed another 
group in the Chamber who preferred to await a change of 
Siamese Government and policy rather than resort to a gun-boat 
policy.Ironically several members of the Singapore Free Press 
expressed support for the latter by declaring that warlike
37 PRO FO 69/1 High Officers to Sir James Brooke,Sept 
24,1850.For more details see Nicholas Tarling "Siam and Sir 
James Brooke" in JSS XIVIII,Pt 2,Nov 1960,pp 43-72.
3 8
PRO FO 69/1 Logan to Brooke.June 14,1850.
39 C.M.Turnbulls"The European Mercantile.." pg 18.
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demonstration "does not appear to us to be that best suited
for upholding the respect due to the British nation,or for
assuring the ultimate advantage to British trade with 
40Siam." The fact was that "British life and property" was in
no immediate danger as Logan made believe.A British merchant
in Bangkok,John Jarvice,reported to his employer in Singapore
41that the business environment was stable. Thus ended any 
hostile proceedings on the part of the British Foreign Office 
towards Siam.
The conciliatory response of the pacifist faction was
adopted.The change in the King and Siamese policy occurred at
the accession of Mongkut in 1851.Mongkut's perception of the
West was derived from Rama 111, namely that of caution and
suspicion.However the difference was in response.Vella
described Mongkut as conducting a " policy of self-
42preservation by conciliation and concession." Mongkut was 
aware of Western military strength and saw the need to 
accommodate Siam to Western terms.For instance in 1843 Mongkut 
undertook English lessons with Rev.Carwell,an American
40 Singapore Free Press Jan 24,1851.Quoted in N.Tarling 
"British Policy Towards Siam,Cambodia,and Vietnam,1842-58" 
in Asian Studies Aug 1966 pg 250.
41
PRO FO 69/2 Brooke to Austen Oct 4,1850.
42 W.Vella:Siam Under Rama Ill.pq 124.
38
43Missionary resident m  Bangkok. Moreover Mongkut's
impressions of the West were reinforced by British activity
in Burma.In Mongkut's letter to his half-brother,Prince
Wongs a, Mongkut attributed the Anglo-Burmese War in 1853 to the
error of the Burmese King in encouraging hostility towards
foreign merchants;
"The British entered into this war not because 
they want the Kingdom of Ava,but in order to 
get monetary compensations,and perhaps some ^  
site near the sea for the purpose of trade."
Mongkut realized that the British movement in Asia was for her
trading purposes rather than political ambition as reflected
in their actions towards the Burmese and the Anglo-Chinese War
1839-41 followed by the Treaty of Nanking.Therefore on his
accession, Mongkut embarked upon reforms relating to foreign
trade:a heavy "measurement duty" was reduced from 1700 to 1000
Baht;and the prohibition to export rice and import opium was
removed,though the opium trade was restricted to the Chinese.
The British Government despatched another mission to Siam 
for a commercial treaty in 1855.The task was assigned to Sir 
John Bowring,Governor of Hongkong and British Plenipotentiary 
in China.The Bowring Treaty was negotiated in less than three
43 Neon Snidvongse "The Development of Siamese Relations with 
Britain and France in the Reign of Mongkut" Ph.D.diss, 
University of London 1961.
44 King Mongkut to Prince Wongsa 1852.In Mongkut's letters 
First Collection.Bangkok 1919.Translated in N.Snidvongse Phd 
pg 211.
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weeks.The Treaty rectified the many disadvantages under which 
the Western merchants traded.The underlying element of the 
Treaty was that it succeeded in granting "free trade" to 
British subjects thereby ending the royal monopoly:"they are 
permitted to trade freely in all seaports of Siam,(Article 
IV),and British merchants were permitted to buy and sell 
directly without any interference. The measurement duties and 
tonnage dues were abolished and replaced by a 3% import tax 
for all articles "calculated upon the market value of the 
goods",with the exception of bullion and opium which was duty 
free.The export of rice was to be permitted unless there were 
shortages in the country.All articles of export were subject 
to the payment of only one impost, from production to 
shipment,and the duty to be paid on each Siamese product was 
specified in the schedule of tariff to the Treaty.
The success of the Treaty was due to the increasing
awareness by the Siamese authorities of the need to conciliate
the British. According to the Siamese Chronicles,the 5
Commissioners appointed by Mongkut to negotiate the Treaty
were reluctant to accede to British terms,namely the
45establishment of a British Consulate and to the reduction 
46of the duty. Indeed Bowring noticed a sense of hesitancy on 
the Siamese part to conclude the new Treaty.The Kalahome (War
45 Ponasawadan No.62 pg 194.
^  Ibid pg 135.
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Minister) and the Praklang on different occasions made the
same remarks to Parkes on the limitation of Siam's natural
resources and the incapability of sustaining a large foreign 
47trade. However,though the Siamese were aware of the economic
revolution implied in the provisions for free trade,yet,as
Vella points out,it was preferable to being "thwarted" by the 
48British.
The opening up of Siam in April 1856 after 130 years of 
virtual isolation from Western trade raises three important 
points.Firstly the introduction of free trade changed the 
Siamese economic system.It put an end to state trading and the 
monopoly system,and meant that the King and his nobles could 
no longer depend upon trade as a major direct source of 
revenue.Secondly the Bowring Treaty set a pattern for other 
Western powers to negotiate commercial treaties with Siam upon 
the same basis.To this effect,Siam had her doors opened to the 
world economy,and had to prepare herself for the influx of 
western trade, enterprise,and capital.The problem was the 
"most favoured nation"clause whereby Siam was to grant equal 
concessions to all the Treaty Powers.The third point was that 
the key provisions of the Treaty represented a substantial 
surrender of sovereignty by Siam,namely the establishment of 
extra-territoriality;free trade;and the low import and export
47 Snidvongse Phd pg 2 75.
48 W.Vella pg 140.
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duties.It was the issue of both political and economic 
sovereignty which was to have a significant influence upon the 
Siamese response to British economic activity in Siam.
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Chapter 2 
Trade and Shipping,
The Port Of Bangkok And The Intra-Asian Trade
The opening of Siam marked the influx of Western vessels 
into the port of Bangkok though not necassarily direct from 
Europe.Siam continued its position as part of the British 
network of the intra-Asian trade,and remained a primary 
producer and an importer of manufactured goods.The impact of 
the growth of foreign trade was three fold.Firstly the 
qualitative changes it brought to the Port of Bangkok. 
Secondly,the necessity to adapt to the events of the 
international economy.Thirdly,the competition created by 
German shipping interests.These three issues serve to show 
Siam's response to the influence of international trade,a 
study which has been overlooked by historians,and significant 
to the understanding of Siam's economic development.
/ The port of Bangkok was never a port for ocean-going 
vessels. This was due to the limitation of "the Bar" which 
prevented vessels of a greater draft than 13 feet from 
entering.Vessels drawing 14.5 ft have at times passed the bar 
at high water.Vessels which exceeded this draft tended to be 
those carrying bulky cargo as teak,and had to proceed to Koh 
Sichang or Anghan Head where the cargo was unloaded on to
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"lighters" (vessels which plied between Koh Sichang and 
Bangkok) .Koh Sichang is situated west of Bangkok,and was where 
most of the unloading on to lighters took place.During the 
North East monsoon ships had to proceed to Anghkan Head (about 
20 miles from the bar) to complete loading.'1'/'''
The influx of Western vessels into Bangkok as a result
of the Bowring Treaty marked the need for more defined port
regulation. In 1859 the British Consul,Schomburgk,expressed his
concern for the safety of vessels at anchor.The Consul
reported to the Siamese Superintendent of Trade,Prince
Wongsa,that the disorderly system of anchoring where the
Master considered it most convenient,tended to result in
2
collisions and accidents. Schomburgk urged on Wongsa the need 
for stringent rules and regulations for the port,and an 
authoritative person to enforce them.Wongsa preferred a 
Siamese for the post of Harbourmaster,but upon the strong 
recommendation of the British Consulate,a Briton named John 
Bush was selected.The fact that port transactions concerning 
Western vessels would be facilitated if carried out in English 
was in Schomburgk's view an important factor in considering
For more details about the "bar" see Arnold Wright and 
Oliver Breakspeare.20th Century Impression of Siam:Its 
History.People.Commerce.Industries and Resources.
London,Lloyd's,1908.pg 139.
2
PRO FO 628/2/21 Schomburgk to Krom Luang Wongsa March 
21,1859.
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3
the appointee for the post of Harbour master.
^Captain John Bush was a British merchant who had brought
4
a cargo for the Second King in 1857. As Harbourmaster he drew 
up a set of regulations,one ruled that/Western ships entering 
Bangkok needed to report to the Harbourmaster,and receive
5
permits from the Customs officials. Constance Wilson makes a 
distinction between the procedure for Treaty and non-Treaty 
vessels.At first the Treaty vessels (British,Americans, 
French,Danish,Italian) reported to the Customs House and after 
1859 to the Harbourmaster, paying the fees and duties 
established by the Treaty.The non-Treaty vessels paid custom 
duties to the Superintendent of Customs,Prince Wongsa,and 
vessels belonging to the Siamese officials were likely to have 
been granted special privileges.^
Statistics on the trade and shipping of Siam during the 
pre-1914 era tend to vary. It was not till 1890 that the 
Siamese Customs Department published figures for the trade and
3 Ibid.
4
Bristowe:Louis and the Kina of Siam pg 134.
5
Photjana Luang-Aroon:"Commercial Shipping and the Thai 
Economy 1855-1925".MA diss,(Thai Text),Silapakorn U.1980,pg 
59.The thesis accounts for the growth of the Port of Bangkok.
 ^ C.Wilson:"Siam at the Eve of Modernisation.." Phd pg 614.
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7
navigation of Bangkok. For the period after 1890,the figures 
given by the British Consular reports and the Siamese Customs 
Department continued to differ but fluctuated in the same 
direction.The difference in figures can be explained by the 
period of collection.The general point to make about the 
trading trend in Siam is that the variation in the numbers of 
British and foreign vessels was dependent on the size of the 
rice crop,as seen in the following table.
Table I
Correlation Between Rice Exports And Shipping
Year Average Rice Average Total Average GB Average %of 
Export (1000 vessels vessels GB vessels
tons) cleared cleared cleared
1857-60 56 205 78 38%
1861-70 109 327 104 31%
1871-80 166 486 148 30%
1881-90 287 413 244 59%
1891-1900 415 464 316 68%
1901-10 - 749 107 14%
SourcesVarious British Consular Reports;W.J.Ingram 
Economic Change in Thailand 1850-1970.
Rice was primarily carried by British vessels,and the sharp 
fall in the their number was on account of German 
competition.Details of the rice trade and the predominance of 
German shipping will be discussed later.This section 
endeavours to discuss the trade pattern up till 1900 and in
7
1856-90 statistics for the trade and shipping passing 
through Bangkok are based on the British Consular Reports,and 
at times the United States Consular Reports.
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doing so will divide it into two phasess 1856-70 and 1870-1900.
Throughout the period 1856-70,the number and tonnage of 
British vessels entering Bangkok increased,as indicated in the 
following table.
Table II
Number Of British Vessels Entered And The British Share
Year No.GB Ton Total no %
vessels (1000) vessels GB Share.
1856 58 17 141 41%
1863 82 30 304 26%
1866 69 26 281 24%
1867 101 40 327 30%
1868 103 47 346 29%
1869 164 73 460 35%
1870 162 73 404 40%
Source:Various British Consular Reports.
By looking at the British percentage share of total vessels, 
the British accounted for approximately one-third of total 
shipping entering the port of Bangkok.The year 1856 when the 
Bowring Treaty came into effect marked a substantial
percentage of British share of vessels,and this was primarily 
British vessels from Singapore.
It is worth pointing out that in 1856 the British share
of the carrying trade was 40%,and it was not until 14 years
later in 1870 that Britain was able to regain that
47
position.The fall in percentage during the 1860s can be 
explained by the rising competition from the European Treaty 
vessels.The international environment of the Franco-Prussian 
War contributed to the re-establishment of British position 
in 1870.The American Consul, Partridge,reported that "the 
commerce of the Port (Bangkok) was much reduced by the French
o
and German War". Already,the figures for 1869 show that the 
number of British vessels had surpassed those of all Britain's 
Western competitors combined;
Table III
Nationality No.Vessels Nationality No.Vessels
Entered Entered
British 164 Dutch 19
French 31 German 65
Danish 5 Swedish & Norway 4
Russian 2 USA 10
Portuguese 4 Spanish 1
Total: Siamese 155 
Western 141 
British 164
Source:British Pari.Papers LXV 1870.
British vessels entering Bangkok in 1870/71 were 
predominantly sailing vessels arriving from the British 
Colonial ports in particular Singapore and HongKong.The 
British steamers that entered Bangkok came from Singapore.
o
USCR no.1523.Commercial Relations of USA with Foreign 
Countries Year 1871 pg 991.
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Table IV
Entered Cleared
Flag From/To Steamers Sailing Steamers Sailing
British Australia 3 3
China 5 - 6
Europe 6 6
H-K - 38 43
Japan 1 2
Manila 1 1
Saigon 1 1  1
Singapore 17 21 18 21
Sources US Consular No 1523 Year ending 1871.
There were few British vessels that came direct from 
Europe.The vessels were primarily from the British Asian ports 
and the East Indian Colonies.These centres had information on 
market conditions in Siam.The completion of the 
telegraph line from Saigon and Singapore to HongKong 
facilitated the acquisition of information.In addition there 
was a bi-monthly line of Siamese mail steamers from Bangkok 
to Singapore,and an American steamer running monthly to Hong 
Kong,which also assisted the merchants in Singapore in 
evaluating trading prospects.
Several points can be made about the characteristics of 
British trade with Bangkok during this first phase.Firstly 
the British had established predominance in the Siamese 
carrying trade.Secondly,as the British Consul,Knox,had earlier 
foreseen in his 1860 trade report,Siamese trade continued to 
be linked with Singapore rather than directly with Britain;
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"Yet little doubt can exist,as to the 
establishment of a regular and profitable 
trade with Britain which will avoid the 
cost of transhipment at Singapore.This 
trade will most probably be entirely in 
the hands of British merchants."
As in the pre-Bowring era,Siam continued to be increasingly
integrated into the British network of the intra-Asian trade.
The second phase 1870-1900 marked a widespread expansion 
of world trade which in turn affected the intra-Asian 
trade.Siam's foreign trade progressed under the favourable 
international environment:the opening of the Suez Canal,the 
increased use of steamers,telegraphic communications,and 
railroads.As already pointed out,there was a direct 
correlation between rice exports and trade,and this period 
marked a substantial rise in the world demand for rice which 
inevitably meant a growth of British participation in Siamese 
trade and shipping.The Siamese administration adjusted itself 
to the rapid increase in trade,by establishing exchange 
banks telecommunications and mail services,and reorganizing 
the Customs regulations.
In the following table,the figures clearly indicate an 
increase in the number of British vessels,tonnage,and 
percentage share engaged in the Siamese trade.
 ^PRO FO 69/21 Knox to Russell,Jan 21,1860,Trade of Siam 1859.
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Table V
Average Number of British Vessels Entered and the British 
Share.
Year No.GB Ton Total No. % GB
Vessels (1000) Vessels Share
1886-90 210 217 413 51%
1891-95 319 255 441 72%
1896-99 355 319 495 71%
1900 169 142 454 37%
Source:Various British Consular Reports.
Between 1886-1899,2/3 of the carrying trade was conducted by 
British vessels.Again Britain's interest in Siamese trade was 
oriented towards the British Colonial ports:Singapore, 
Hongkong,and India;rather than direct trade with Britain.
Table VI.
Siamese Trade With British Colonial Ports
Year Average Total Value 
of Trade with India, 
Singapore,Hongkong. 
(million tcs)
Average Total Value Asian trade 
of Siamese Trade. as % of Siam 
(million tcs) trade.
Export Import Export Import Export Import
1895-99 41.4 29.6 49.7 39.1 83 93
1900-04 68.8 40 78.1 60.1 88 66
1905-09 83 42.5 103.3 73.7 80 57
1910-14 74.8 30.5 98.5 77.4 75 38
Unit $3 Mexican = 5 tcs
Source:Various British Consular Reports. 
NA Kh 0301.1 38E.
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Table VII.
Siamese Trade With British Colonial Ports and 
Britain.
Year With Singapore With Hongkong With India With Britain
Exp Imp Exp Imp Exp Imp Exp Imp
1895--99 18.6 16.7 22 10.4 .8 2.5 - -
1900--04 31.2 22.8 34.5 15.0 3.1 2.2 1.0 8.4
1905--09 40.8 20.9 35.4 17.6 6.8 4 3.1 11.9
1910--14 41.7 11.9 30.7 10.9 2.4 7.7 6.7 16.6
Source:NA Kh 0301.,1 38E.
The greatest proportion of trade was carried out with 
Singapore.The share of British imports to Siam from Singapore 
was calculated by the British Consul in 1901 with the 
following results;
Table VIII.
Country of Origin Value in Million Mex Doll. %
United Kingdom 605 50
India 254 21
Dutch East Indies 123 10
Germany 88 7
Others 131 11
Total 1,201
Source:Various British Consular Reports.
Exports from Siam.
Having presented statistics on the value of trade to 
indicate Siam's link with the intra-Asian trade,further
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discussion is needed on the content of the trade with Asian 
ports.The leading Siamese exports were rice and teak,followed 
by cardomons,cotton,pepper, sugar,and sundries.These exports 
found their destinations at Hongkong and Singapore,whereby 
they were transhipped to Europe and China. It is worth 
observing that rice and not sugar came to be the leading 
staple export.Bowring's prediction of sugar becoming the 
leading export was short-lived,and by 1881 sugar exports had 
"dwindled to a mere nothing".^The leading exports,rice and 
teak,had several similar characteristics.Firstly the bulky 
products were carried by British vessels to Asian ports. 
Secondly both faced severe competition from British Burma.
It is interesting to note that the rice exports were
destined not for Britain but rather for her Empire. An
explanation for the lack of demand from Britain was put
forward by Knox;
"Siam rice is too small in the grain and too 
much broken in the cleaning t ^ b e  much of 
value in the English market."
Rice exports had been destined for China.However the Chinese 
influence upon rice exports came to an end when the price 
offered in 1867 was much lower than in the previous years.Also 
in 1867 the Chinese issued a decree to promote the intra-Asian
^  W.A.Graham:Siam Vol II pg 107.
^  PRO FO 69/21 Knox to Russell,Trade Report for 1859.
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12rice trade. In response,Siamese rice traders in 1868 sought
new markets in Europe and America.These new markets expanded
in 1868,and the British Consul reported that 69 vessels had
left Bangkok with full cargoes of rice for Europe,
13Mauritius,California, and Australia. The British Consul saw
the advantage created by the change in market, and the
prospects it provided to the European firms;
"In consequence of this change of markets,the 
rice business of Bangkok came exclusively in 
the hands of European merchants residing in 
Bangkok,and these firms owned most of the ^  
steam mills,the change proved satisfactory."
The main markets for Siamese rice were the British Colonial
ports of Hongkong and Singapore.
Table IX.
Destination of Rice Exports 1884 (in piculs)
Hongkong 1.6m Java 44,787
Singapore 2.3m Manila 3,412
Europe 780,000 Coast 2,912
China 504
Source:PRO FO 69/100 Trade Report 1884.
16 Piculs = 1 ton.
Rice exports from Bangkok competed with two other Asiatic 
ports,namely Rangoon and Saigon.
12 PRO FO 69/40 Knox to Russell,Trade Report for 1866.
1 3
PRO FO 69/43 Knox to Russell,Trade Report for 1868. 
^  PRO FO 69/48 Knox to Clarendon March 1869.
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Table X.
Three Leading Rice Exporting Ports (1000 tons)
Place of Export 1887 1888 1889 1890
Rangoon 543 493 418 -
Bangkok 402 450 303 480
Saigon 481 505 282 507
Sources British Consular Report No. 938 Trade of 1890.
After 1890 rice exports increased when the Chinese pioneered
the process of producing clean,white rice as opposed to the
15less appealing cargo rice. Therefore,in addition to cargo 
rice,there were another two types being exported.The first was 
the "best" Siamese white rice sent to Singapore from whence 
it was distributed through the Malay Archipelago and to 
adjacent countries.Secondly there was the "ordinary" Siamese 
white rice which was sent via Singapore and Hongkong to the 
major powers in Asia,namely China and Japan.
As the rice trade developed,new issues emerged in the mid 
1890s which were related to the Unequal Treaty.The foreign 
rice exporters of Bangkok came into conflict with the Siamese 
Customs Department upon the question of the duty imposed on 
broken rice after February 1893.British rice exporters 
complained to their government,but the latter was unable to
15 Skinner:Chinese Society in Thailand.Cornell U.Press,1957 . 
pg 103.
t k  *Ibid.
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support their claim for a refund of the duties paid on certain
shipments since 1893,nor could they object to the action of
the Siamese Government in raising the export duties without
17previous notice. The Treaties sanctioned an export duty of
4 ticals per koyan on rice,and 2 -ticals per koyan on paddy,but
made no mention of broken rice (the residue left after the
paddy had gone through the process of milling).Until February
1893,broken rice was invariably made to pay upon export a half
duty of 2 ticals per koyan.After then a full duty of 4 ticals
per koyan was levied upon certain grades of broken rice,as if
18it could be classified as a finished article.
The German firm Messrs Markwald & Co was the first to 
protest to the Siamese authorities against the change.However 
the Customs authorities showed no response and thus the firm 
placed the matter in the hands of their Ministers.The other 
foreign representatives likewise took the question up,and on 
July 10,1894 a joint note of protest was addressed to the 
Foreign Minister, Prince Devawongse. The foreign representatives 
were not satisfied with Devawongse's statement on the 
propriety of the enhanced duty.In their second note of protest 
October 16,1894,they demanded refunding by the Siamese 
Government of the entire difference between the duties 
actually levied on broken rice since the higher export duty
^  PRO FO 69/160 de Bunsen to FO Aug 5,1895 pg 28.
18
PRO FO 69/160 de Bunsen to Kimberly Feb 8,1895 pg 83.
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was introduced and those which the same exports would have
19paid under the old system.
Devawongse wrote to the German Minister reiterating the
full rights of the Siamese Government under the Treaty to levy
duty on any form of rice,including broken rice not exceeding
the Treaty limit of 4 ticals per koyan.Devawongse admitted
that the lower qualities of broken rice should still be at the
half duty,and that in drawing the line between rice liable to
the higher and that liable to the lower duty,the Customs
Department should be guided by some fixed standard of
quality .Devawongse enclosed a copy of his note to all the
representatives and requested them to furnish him all
statistics showing the exact losses which the raised duty had
inflicted upon their merchants and defining the precise
qualities of broken rice in which they dealt.In compliance
with the request,the Borneo Co,the Arracan Co,and a British
Chinese firm showed figures indicating they had been affected
respectively to the extent of 11,696 ticals,594 ticals,3000
20ticals.However the Siamese merely shelved the statistics.
The British Minister,De Bunsen,suggested a settlement to 
clarify that broken "white" rice should be recognised as 
chargeable with the full export duty only,and that broken
19 T. • .Ibid.
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"cargo" rice should be liable to the half duty only.De Bunsen 
proposed that the Siamese Government should refund all excess 
of duty paid on broken rice, both "white" and "cargo" over 
and above the former half duty,during the period between 
February 1893 (when the half duty was first raised) and the 
end of that year.For the ensuing period (from January 1894 to 
the present) only the excess paid on broken cargo should be 
refunded.For the future,broken white rice would pay at the
rate of 4 ticals,and broken cargo rice at the rate of 2 ticals
, 21 per koyan.
This suggestion was approved by the Borneo Co and the 
Arracan Co but was opposed by the German Minister who 
recommended to his Government that Siam should be made to 
repay every tical of duty levied over the old rates on broken 
rice of all categories .Messrs Markwald & Co "took the law into 
their own hands" with the Custom House in January 1894.They 
deducted about 7000 ticals,an amount representing the refund 
and they declined to pay this sum to the Custom House.The 
Siamese made no distinction in the export duties between rice 
and broken rice,whereas the German Minister did not regard 
broken rice as rice.However De Bunsen was inclined towards 
the Siamese interpretation of the Treaty being the correct
2 1  TV-* * *4Ibid.
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22one. Devawongse accepted De Bunsen's suggestion of adopting
a fixed rule of demarcation between the higher and lower duty
but Devawongse rejected any compensation for the past export
23duty levied since February 1893 and the losses incurred. The 
German Minister accepted De Bunsen's proposal but considered 
that:
"The Siamese in introducing the full duty 
suddenly and without giving notice of such 
intention to the merchants,and the 
arbitrariness displayed till now by the 24 
Custom House,must be denounced as unjust."
He also insisted on the full or partial repayment of all
duties on broken rice levied since the enforcement of the new
duty.Under these circumstances,de Bunsen proposed to await the
result of the German Minister's action and if the latter
proved successful,De Bunsen would endeavour to claim the
repayment to the British merchants on the same principle.
The episode on the duty on broken rice serves to show the 
increasing concern of the British Legation in protecting their 
economic interests.From the Siamese perspective,this proved 
a dangerous precedent as it meant that any conflict with 
British economic activity could precipitate direct 
intervention from the Government.This meant that the Siamese 
needed to take conciliatory procedures so as to diffuse any
23 PRO FO 69/160 de Bunsen to Devawongse June 1895 pg 149.
24
PRO FO 69/160 de Bunsen to Salisbury OCT 9,1895,pg 233.
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political tension.The difficulty was how to concede British 
terms without arousing hostility from a Third Power,namely 
Germany.Such concern remained apparent in the Siamese 
response.
The teak trade was the second leading bulky product which 
was carried by British vessels and destined for the British 
Asiatic countries.There are no statistics to show the amount 
of teak carried by British vessels.What is certain is that 
teak was an important commodity for the British Empire.Teak 
output from Northern Siam may be classified into two 
groups.Firstly,that from Chiengmai territory bordering the 
Salween,which was floated down that river to Kado,the duty 
station and thence to Moulmein in Burma (See Map I).These logs 
were classified as Burmese exports.Secondly, there were those 
floated down the Me Ping,Me Wang,Me Youm,and Me Nan rivers,all 
tributaries of the Menam,to Paknampho,the duty station and 
thence to Bangkok.
The figures for teak exports are based on those exported
from Bangkok.Constance Wilson gives the figures from 1883
25only, but based on the British Consular Trade Reports for 
the years 1870-77,and the Siam Mercantile Gazette,figures for 
teak exports can be traced back as early as 1870.
25 C.Wilson:Thailand:A Handbook of Historical Statistics.G.K.
Hall & Co.,1983.
60
Table XI.
Value of Teak Exports From Bangkok 1870-1882 (1000 tcs).
Year Value Year Value Year Value
1870 136 1875 113 1880 321
1871 174 1876 177 1881 466
1872 177 1877 324 1882 630
1873 448 1878 495
1874 242 1879 350
Sources British Consular Reports;Siam Mercantile Gazette 
March 16,1889.
The value was originally quoted in Mexican dollars ,but this 
data has converted the value to ticals based on the rate 3 
dollars = 5 ticals.
British Consular Trade Reports and Foreign Office
correspondents made references to teak as an export
commodity,and to the involvement of Western trading houses in
teak shipments.In the Trade Report for 1859,Knox reported that
royal steamers had transhipped teak to Bombay,and another
2 6vessel was loaded with teak destined for France. In
1861,Trade Reports referred to the German trading house Messrs
Markwald conducting teak shipments to Singapore,and the French
house Messrs Remi Schmidt Co delivering 300 tons of teakwood
27destined for Saigon.
2  ^ PRO FO 69/21 Knox to Russell,Trade for Siam 1859. 
27 PRO FO 628/3/33 Year 1861.
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The principal markets for Siamese teak were Europe, 
India,and the Straits Settlements with occasional shipments 
to America, Africa,and Australia.
Table XII.
Destination of Teak Exports (1000 tons)
Year Europe Eastern and non-European Total
1898 8.8 17.6 26.5
1899 11.6 22 33.6
1900 11.2 27.1 38.3
SourcesDickson "Teak Industry.." in 20th Century 
Impressions...Wright and Breakspeare.
It was India rather than Europe which was the important
destination for Siamese teak,and this can be accounted for by
the increase in Indian railway construction.
Table XIII.
Destination Of Teak Exports (1000 tons)
Year Europe India Mileage Indian Railway Far East
1891 5.4 3.7 17,300 -
1895 24.7 - 19,500 -
1900 11.0 14.6 24,700 -
1906 19.6 67.8 29,000 9.8
1909 12.5 44.8 31,500 14.1
Source;British Consular Reports,Iyer K.V.Indian 
Railways pg 119-120.
There were three ports in the world from which teak was 
exported:Rangoon,Moulmein,and Bangkok.Of these,Rangoon was the 
most important teak exporting port to Britain,followed by 
Moulmein and Bangkok. Consular figures show that by 1890
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Bangkok had surpassed Moulmein in teak shipments to Britain 
but continued to remain second to Rangoon.
Table XIV.
Arrivals of Teak to Britain in 1890 from: Tons
20,000
30.000
25.000
Moulmein
Rangoon
Bangkok
Source:BCR NO.A938 pg 22 "Trade of Chiengmai 1892".
As pointed out,teak exports from Moulmein were in fact Siamese 
teak,and thus the fall in teak exports from Moulmein can be 
attributed to the decrease of logs sent from North Siam to 
Moulmein.In 1909,a London distributing company Foy,Morgan & 
Co presented a table which illustrates the absence of teak 
logs from Moulmein and important increases from Bangkok and 
Rangoon.
Table XV.
Quantities of Burmah and Siam Teak Delivered at 
London Docks 1909. (logs)
Moulmein Rangoon Bangkok
Landings
Logs
Planks 285
1990
1383
1086
705
Source:Fov,Morgan & Co Dec 31 1909.
Imports in Siam.
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British goods imported into Siam during the period 
included the following:cotton piece goods;machinery;and metal 
goods,namely railway material.Cotton piece goods came 
primarily from Singapore and Hongkong,whilst the machinery and 
metals goods came direct from Europe.The following table gives 
an indication of the growth of capital goods imported to Siam.
Table XVI.
Value of Machinery and Metal Goods to Siam (million tcs)
1896-1900 1901-05 1906-10 1910-14
Machinery .829 1.466 1.350 1.450
Metal Manu - 4.600 5.0 5.0
Source:Kh 0301.1 38E Statistics Import & Export pg 44.
Machinery included that for milling,whilst metal manufactures
consisted of railway material,steel bars,and iron.Most of the
machinery for the mills was imported directly from Britain.The
British Consul reported in 1898 that "all Bangkok rice mills
28are installed with British machinery". The following table 
shows the share taken in the import of iron,steel,and 
machinery by the various countries.
2 8
BCR No.2353 Report for the Year 1898 on the Trade of
Bangkok.
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Table XVII.
Percentage Share of Imported Capital Goods.
Country 1900 1901 1902 1903
UK 46 33 33 43
Singapore 31 20 19 32
Germany 9 37 34 12
USA 5 2 4 3
Others 7 6 8 8
Source:BCR No.2898 Report for the Year 1901 on the Trade 
of Bangkok.
BCR No.2353 Report for the Year 1898 on the Trade 
of Bangkok.
Britain and Germany were the main competitors in providing
Siam with machinery goods.The large increase in imports from
Germany consisted of railway material ordered by the Royal
Railway Department which in the British Consul's view was
29"strongly inclined to favour German productions". This issue 
will be discussed in Chapter 7.
Political Issues Arising from Trade.
As Siam became increasingly integrated into the Asian 
economy,issues emerged which necessitated the Siamese 
administration adjusting itself to the events of the world 
economy.An important issue was the fluctuating price of world 
silver to which Siam responded in 1902 by adopting the gold
29 BCR No.2898.Report for the Year 1901 on the Trade of
Bangkok.
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30standard. However,the experience of the international 
currency influenced the Siamese Treasury to adopt a policy of 
revaluation in 1906.Its importance was the attention it drew 
from the British Legation in Bangkok and the British Financial 
Adviser. The growing British concern was the impact of such 
a policy upon British trade with Siam.Ian Brown in his thesis 
has given a detailed account of the episode,but various points 
need to be put in perspective.
In 1906 the continuing rise in the value of silver
determined the Finance Minister,Phya Suriya,to revalue the
baht in October 1906 from 15 bahts£1 to 13.3 bahts£1.Though
the British Financial Adviser,Williamson,did not support the
31policy,both Suriya and Devawongse embarked upon it. Such a 
policy stirred strong reaction from the British Charge 
d'Affairs,Beckett,and from Williamson who pointed out to 
Devawongse that the revaluation would prove detrimental to
30 Details of the adoption of the Gold-Standard see I.G.Brown 
"Siam and the Gold Standard 1902-08" in JSEAS.Vol.10.no.2 
(Sept 1979) pp 381-99.
^  NA 5 Kh 26/15 Suriya to King Oct 31,1906.
Suriya was Finance Minister 1906-08.J.F.Williamson was 
Financial Adviser 1903-24.
The baht/ticat was a silver 
coin,which meant that the rise in the price of silver could 
cause the baht to exceed its exchange value,and thus lead 
to an eventual drain of the baht from Siam.Revaluation was 
a means of preventing the "drain".
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32trade. Beckett reported to his Foreign Office that the three
foreign exchange banks had refused to purchase ticals at the
advanced rate of Is 4d.Such resistance was to have an effect
33upon rice exports due to hoarding by the grain sellers. Yet 
the Siamese administration did not reconsider their decision.
The merchant community in Bangkok was convinced that in
raising the baht to 13.3 = £l,the Treasury had seriously
overvalued the currency,and that within a short time the baht
would have to be devalued,thereby inducing traders to delay
their purchasing of the baht from the banks in anticipation
of that fall.The fall in the price of silver in mid-1907 made
rumours of devaluation even more realistic because such a fall
meant that the Treasury was no longer in a position to revalue
34the baht to protect the currency.
The King,having returned from Europe,asked the American 
General Adviser,Stroebel,to conduct an enquiry into the 
effects upon trade of the recent revaluation,and to decide the 
case for devaluation.In January 1908 Stroebel presented a 
memorandum on the exchange issue,pointing out that "the 
Government should not even consider the possibilities of
32 PRO FO 371/133 Pt.l,Beckett to Grey Nov 7,1906.
33 Ibid.The three foreign banks were:The Hongkong & 
Shanghai;Chartered Mercantile;and Banque de L'Indo-Chine.
34 Based on I.G.Brown "Siam and the Gold Standard.."pg 391.
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35reducing the value of the tical". Stroebel added that 
because of the abnormal trade conditions of the previous 18 
months,it was extremely difficult to determine the extent to 
which the export trade had been affected by the revaluation 
of late 1906,or whether it had been affected at all. There was 
no doubt that the rice trade had suffered as a result of the 
poor monsoons of 1906 and 1907,and the confusion of the 
Hongkong exchange.
Suriya claimed that the difficulties in the rice trade
resulted from the monsoon rather than the revaluation.I.G
Brown substantiates Suriya's belief by drawing up a table
showing the correlation between the value rate of ticals and
the value of rice exports.From the table,Brown concludes that
there was little correlation between the size of rice exports
3 6in a particular year and advance in the Treasury rate. 
Furthermore there are indicators to show that the 1907 policy 
stimulated business confidence.Firstly between 1906-11 the 
number of vessels entered and cleared in Bangkok increased.
35 NA 26/15 Stroebel Memorandum on Exchange Jan 9,1908. 
Edward Henry Stroebel was an American General Adviser 1904- 
OS.
3 6 I.G.Brown:"The Ministry of Finance and..." Phd thesis pg 
250.
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Table XVII
Total Number of Ships Entering and Cleared from Bangkok
Year Entered Cleared British Share %
1906-07 766 767 13
1907-08 768 754 14
1908-09 785 791 12
1909-10 830 832 10
1910-11 927 928 10
Source:NA Kh 0301.1 38E
Secondly the total value of trade did fall but the balance of 
trade was favourable.In 1906 there was a trade surplus of 
28.8m baht,and in 1909 the surplus increased to 32.7m baht.
Table XVIII.
Total Value of Trade (million Tcs)
Year Import Export Total Value
British
Import
Share
Export
1905 68.8 106.9 175.7 17.4 % 1.6%
1906 77 105.8 182.8 15.6 % 1.3%
1907 78.6 99.7 178.3 14 % 3.6%
1908 76.8 100.7 177.5 17 % 3.5%
Source:NA Kh 0301.1/38
The conclusive indicator was that British exports to Siam 
increased substantially.In Suriya's report to the King,he 
pointed out that the high value of the baht increased the 
purchasing power of the baht thereby stimulating imports.This 
meant that the banks' fear of a baht shortage hindering 
business transaction did not arise.The high value of the baht 
precipitated importers to exchange the baht at the banks for
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gold coins to purchase imports,thereby enabling the banks to
37sell baht to the government.
Shipping.
Towards the end of the 1880s,two British companies
entered the Siamese carrying trade:the Holt and the Scottish
Oriental Co.Holt controlled the steamers running between
Singapore- Bangkok.Holt's interest in Bangkok began with the
transport of emigrants from Swatow to Singapore and Bangkok
of which by 1885 about a third were carried in Holt's 
3 8ships. The Holt Co did not own the Singapore-Bangkok line.The
line was a Bogaardt-Holt participation in which Holt had the
controlling interest .Theodore Cornelis Bogaardt was a Dutchman
who came to Penang in 1878 and opened an office in the name
of Mansfield,Bogaardt & Co. In 1882 he went to Singapore to
assume control of W.Mansfields,where he became Holt's 
39agent. In conjunction with Bogaardt,Holt built a 1000 ton 
steamer,the Hecuba,to participate in the Bangkok rice carrying 
trade.This was followed by the Hecate and Medusa in 1885,and 
a fourth ship in 1889,the Hydra,built by Patter & Sons of
37 NA 5 Kh 26/15 Suriya to King May 19,1908.
38 F.Hvde:Far Eastern Trade 1860-1914.Adam & Charles Black, 
1973.pg 52.
39 K .G .Trenaonnina:Home Port:Sinaaoore.OUP.1967.pg 34.
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40Liverpool. In 1892 rice vessels came under Holt's branch 
company,The East India Ocean Steam Ship Co,running vessels 
between Singapore-Bangkok;Singapore-Borneo.
The Scottish Oriental entered the Siamese trade in 1890 
opening up a regular and direct trade between Bangkok- 
Hongkong,and the South China Ports.The Company possessed 8 
vessels for the Bangkok-Hongkong route and 4 for the Bangkok- 
Singapore.In addition the Scottish Oriental owned 2 steam 
lighters which carried rice cargoes between Bangkok and the 
outer anchorage,and distributed imported goods to the various 
coastal ports,namely Chumporn and Koh Sichang.The following 
table indicates the number of lighters.
Table XIX.
Number of Lighters in 1890 Operating Bangkok-Coastal Ports.
Owners Numbers Tonnage
British 21 5200
Siamese/Chinese 24 4875
German 11 2155
French 7 1670
Total 63 13,900
Source:BCR No 938 Report for the Year 1890 
on the Trade of Bangkok.
Though the British had fewer lighters than the Siamese,yet the 
British lighters carried more tonnage in 1890.This was an 
indication of Western interest in developing the coastal trade
^  F.Hyde pg 51-52.
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which grew in the first decade of the 20th century.
British dominance of shipping in Siam was surpassed by
the Germans through 1900-1914,when both the Holt and the
Scottish Oriental sold their line of steamers to the
Germans. In mid 1898,Messrs Alfred Holt & Co sold the East
Indian Ocean Steamship line to a German Syndicate composed of
the Norddeutscher Lloyd Steamship Co (NDL),Messrs Behn Meyer
of Singapore,and Messrs Windsor & Co of Bangkok.Six months
later the Scottish Oriental sold their fleet to the
Germans.The British Consul estimated that the sale of Holt's
steamers represented a reduction of 33% in British shipping 
41in Bangkok. The Bangkok Times commented the "sale of the
42Scottish Oriental line will represent another 33%".
The timing of German interest in the Siamese trade was 
connected to the rice trade.In 1894 there were 3 German rice 
mills,and by 1897 approximately 8% of the annual steam tonnage 
of Bangkok was German.The Norddeutscher Lloyd Shipping Co was 
at the time in search of localities to establish branch lines 
for steamers to feed their growing Far Eastern service.Bangkok 
and its expanding trade offered the advantages desired for 
such a branch.
41 BCR No.2353 Report for the Year 1898 on the Trade of
Bangkok.
42 Bangkok Times Dec 27,1899.Quoted in USCR LXIII 236 
"Industrial Development in Siam".
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Hyde in his biography of the Holt Co attributes the sale
to the costs of running the East India Ocean Steamship Co,in
that it had "become increasingly difficult to control the
management of ships which traded entirely so far from
home".Hyde further points out that;
"The decision to sell was not only a wise
one in itself but was in line with the
general policy of cutting out wasteful 
expenditure and of increasing the efficiency 
of each individual^nit of the Company's 
earning capacity."
Hyde's point can be substantiated by looking at the terms of
the sale contract.The 10 Year Agreement stipulated that the
NDL Co carry Holt & Co's Singapore transhipments for Siam at
a reduced rate,in return for the Holt Co refraining from
44competition on the Singapore and Hongkong route. The NDL 
agreement with the Scottish Oriental was also concluded on the 
same principles.Butterfield & Swire (agents of the Scottish 
Oriental in Hongkong) was obliged not to start a competing 
line but retained its agency.This meant that the German line 
was entirely represented by a British firm.
The Agreement involved the transfer of 11 Holt lines and 
14 Scottish Oriental lines to the NDL Co,and gave the Germans 
a monopoly of the carrying trade as indicated in the following
4 ^ F .Hyde pg 95/96.
44
PRO FO 371/522 Paget to Grey March 16,1908.Enclosing the 
Sale Contract.
table;
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Table XX.
Share of German Ships Entering Bangkok
Year No Vessels GB Ships German German % GB %
1898 518 396 31 6 76
1899 462 301 78 16 65
1900 454 169 195 42 37
1901 591 151 272 46 25
1902 727 104 322 44 14
1903 620 91 306 49 14
1904 738 140 351 47 18
1905 754 106 364 48 14
1906-07 766 99 343 44 12
1907-08 768 107 313 40 13
1908-09 785 98 342 43 12
1909-10 830 88 345 41 10
1910-11 927 94 404 43 10
Source:Various British Consular Reports.
The German share was approximately a quarter of the 
total carrying trade which did not give them a monopolistic 
position as had been held by the British in the 
1890s.Nevertheless the greatest portion of Western vessels 
entering the port of Bangkok were German.By 1905 the NDL Co 
possessed 19 steamers on the Hongkong-Bangkok route;and 9 on 
the Singapore-Bangkok.
The influx of German steamers into the port of Bangkok 
raised physical difficulties.These steamers of 2000 tons 
proved too large to enter Bangkok on account of the sandy bars 
which (as mentioned earlier) prevented vessels of a greater 
draft than 13 ft from entering.Instead these steamers
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proceeded to the island of Koh Si Chang in the South where the
cargo was unloaded on to lighters destined for Bangkok.In 1900
the NDL Co suggested the dredging of the "bar" to enable such
steamers to enter Bangkok;
"Several of our ships of the formerly East 
Indian Steamship Navigation Co and the 
Scottish Oriental Steamship Co,have stranded 
at the Menam bar.The bar has become increasingly 
shallow,..therefore the Government need to 
undertake dredging work."
However Prince Henry of Prussia did not support the NDL's
scheme,due to the expenses and maintenance involved,on the
grounds that "it would be of little use to cut a better
channel over the bar than the present one formed by nature."
To have such opinion held by Prince Henry was useful to the
Siamese,and Devawongse informed the Harbourmaster;
"This is welcome information for me.
Prince Henry is right."
Devawongse studied the reports of the Harbourmaster and
asserted that the alleged stranding of German vessels was not
due to the shallowness of the bar but as a result of the
47German vessels crossing the bar at low tide. In response,the 
NDL attributed the increased stranding to the inadequate 
lighting.The issue was taken up with the Superintendent of the 
Naval Department,Admiral Richelieu (Chao Phya Chonlayut
45 NA 5 N 9.1/1 NDL to Consul-General for Siam in Berlin, 
Baron Paul Merling Aug 15,1900.
46 NA 5 N 9.1/1 Devawongse to Mom Baijant-Thep Oct 14,1900.
47 NA 5 N 9.1/1 Devawongse to Baron Paul Merling,Consul for 
Siam in Berlin Oct 24,1900.
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48Yothin) . He reported that the German complaint "was fair
enough",but this was not on account of the water depth.
Richelieu pointed out that as the steamers were larger and
carrying more cargo than before,it was only natural for the
steamer to drag the mud.The only solution was to ensure the
steamer avoided cruising by the edge of the bar where it was
shallow,and also to avoid collisions by placing lightships at 
49mud points. Such proposals were welcomed by the Siamese.The
underlying reason for the Siamese sceptism over dredging the
bar was the military threat it created;as it would facilitate
the entry of warships into Bangkok which had occurred in 1893
50in the "Paknam Incident".
Towards the end of 1905,the NDL endeavoured to secure
more adequate coaling facilities for its merchant steamers
51running to Bangkok. The Germans already possessed a coaling 
depot at Koh Kram but this was not sufficient.The Germans 
needed proper facilities to load larger cargoes at Hongkong 
and Singapore,and to load coal on their outward journey to 
increase the cargo carrying capacity. The German proposal was 
handed over to the American Assistant General Adviser,
dfi
NA 5 N 9.1/9 Chonlayut Yothin to King,Aug 4,1901.
4Q
NA 5 N 9.1/9 Chonlayut Yothin to King Aug 4,1901.
50 NA 5 N 9.1/1 Devawongse to Sommot,Principal Private 
Secretary to the King.
51 NA 5 B 12/8 Westengard (Assistant General Adviser) to Luang 
Anuphan (Harbour Dept) Jan 10,1906.
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Westengard.The latter discussed the issue with the Minister
of Local Government,Prince Naret,and both agreed that the NDL
52be granted a right for 5 years,so as to benefit trade.
However,the contract was not a perpetual agreement,as
it was likely to raise questions concerning the permanent
rights given to the Germans.Restrictions were also placed
against the use of hulks for any purposes other than supplying
the mercantile ships of the Company itself;and the supervision
53of Koh Si Chang was placed under the Harbour Department. In
this way,the agreement sufficiently protected Siamese
interests.The agreement was also handed over to the British
Minister for his approval so as not to raise any British
54suspicion that the Siamese were biased towards the Germans.
Shipping and politics were interwined in the need to re­
establish the British position to break the German monopoly 
as seen in an attempted scheme for an Anglo-Siamese Shipping 
Co in 1902.After the British shipping interests were 
transferred to the NDL in 1899,the British gradually felt the 
effect and therefore attempted to re-establish their 
position.In 1902 Sir Alfred Jones of Elder,Dempster & Co
52 NA 5 B 12/8 Westengard to Naret (Minister of Local 
Government) Jan 5,1906.
53 Ibid.
54 NA 5 B 12/8 Westengard to Luang Anuphan (Harbour Dept) Jan 
10,1906.The British Minister was Ralph Paget.
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proposed to establish a subsidized line of mail steamers to
run under the Siamese flag between Singapore-Bangkok,and
55Hongkong-Bangkok. Jones and the Consul for Siam in
Liverpool,Donald A.Stewart,intended to invest £25,000,and the
Siamese to subsidize with another £10,000 to carry on a weekly
service of 4 steamers,costing £100,000.^ I n  return for the
57subsidy,Jones proposed the followings
A)Register the steamers as belonging to Siam.
B)Place them under the Siamese flag.
C)Carry at least 6 Siamese apprentices.
Stewart pointed out to the Siamese Minister in 
London,Prassidhi, that such a scheme would not only benefit 
Siamese trade but would also provide the opportunity to train 
young Siamese to becoming shipping experts.
The issue was passed on to the Financial Adviser,Rivett-
Carnac.In terms of the cost factor,Rivett-Carnac did not agree
with the advantage for the Siamese Government of embarking
upon a large subsidy for a regular mail communication with 
58Singapore. However,in political terms such a scheme was
^  NA KT 46.6/1 Donald A.Stewart (Consul for Siam in 
Liverpool) to Phya Prasiddhi (Siamese Minister in London)
Jan 8,1902.
^  NA KT 46.6/1 Devawongse to Sommot March 24,1902.
^  NA KT 46.6/1 Stewart to Prasiddhi Jan 8,1902.
NA KT 46.6/1 Rivett-Carnac to King April 4,1902.
James C.Rivett-Carnac was the Financial Adviser between 
1899-1903.
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advantageous to counter-balance the German hegemony.German
steamers held an increasing share in the trade between
Bangkok-Singapore.Rivett-Carnac explained the following views
to the King:that the German predominance was proving
detrimental to the Bangkok trade because it allowed the German
companies to impose whatever rate of freight they desired.The
Germans controlled the rice trade,milling,and transport,and
were thus in the position to withhold rice shipments. In
addition the German firms had allied themselves with a
combination of rice millers formed for the purpose of
suppressing the price of paddy and were believed to have bound
itself not to ship rice milled by firms which had not joined 
59the cartel.
The Borneo Co and Messrs Wallace Bros (two of the largest 
Eastern firms in London) both approved of the scheme and 
agreed that Jones to be responsible for the 
implementation.^Rivett-Carnac reiterated to the King's 
Principal Private Secretary, Sommot,that the Siamese subsidy 
was not to exceed £6000 for the 4 steamers (£1500 each) per 
annum.®^Stewart accepted the Siamese proposal but there was 
a dilemma caused by the political issue in connection with the
59 Ibid.
^  NA 5 B 12/2 F.Verney (Counsellor to the Siamese Legation 
London) to Prasiddhi Jan 2,1902.
NA 5 B 12/2 Rivett-Carnac to Sommot Sept 13,1902.
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decision.The impending political consideration was the
6 2ratification of the Treaty with France. The Treaty had not 
been ratified by France,and the Siamese held the impression 
that the French were in the habit of demanding terms whenever 
advantages had been granted to other powers.The Siamese 
believed that the French would use the opportunity to demand 
a shipping route,thereby placing two Great Powers in 
competition.
Indeed in 1905 the French "Messageries Fluviales de
Cochin-Chine" was seeking to undertake a postal service
between Bangkok-Singapore thereby guaranteeing the connection
with English and French mails.The Siamese were reluctant to
grant the French any more concessions.The Telegraph Department
had already agreed to the French route Saigon-Bangkok
subsidising £500 per steamer.Such a subsidy was also granted
to the Danish East Asiatic Co.Devawongse preferred to wait for
the Treaty with France to be ratified first, and then for the
Finance Ministry to decide again whether to subsidize the
6 3British company. As a result,the issue did not arise 
again.Perhaps the reason why the scheme was dropped can be 
attributed to Siam's increasing doubt that the regular mail 
steamers would prove profitable.Earlier in 1898,the Minister 
of Public Works had signed an agreement with the Coastal
^  NA 5 B 12/2 Devawongse to King Feb 14,1902.
63 Ibid.
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Navigation Co to run a mail steamer between Bangkok-Trak,and
64Prachin Khiriket with a subsidy of 800 bahts. However by 
1902,there were no regular mail steamers.
British Penetration Of The Coastal Trade
Western enterprise in the coastal trade had the effect
of opening up the South,and from Damrong's correspondence with
the King's Private Secretary,Sommot,the former was clearly in
favour of promoting British enterprise,but with caution.In
1906 the British India Steam Navigation Co conducted steam
mail between Penang-Phuket-Mergui-Rangoon.^The Minister for
Public Works,Narit, did not see the importance of such a
concession,but Damrong saw such a service as facilitating
administrative development.^ Damrong cited the example of the
East Asiatic "mail" steamer running between Chumporn-Nakorn
Srithamarat,whose impact had been a rise in revenue and the
6 7facilitation of transport.
Coastal navigation served three underlying purposes smail;
64 NA 5 B 12/4 Prince Damrong (Minister of Interior) to Sommot 
Oct 14,1902.
^  NA 5 B 12/1 Damrong to Narit (Minister of Public Works) 
Dec 5,1901.Prince Narit was twice Minister of Public Works: 
1892-93;1900-06.Between 1893-94,he was Finance Minister.
66 Ibid.
67 Ibid.
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convenience to inhabitants and administrative purposes;and 
68trade. Throughout the first decade of the 20th century,the
South-Eastern coastal route was dominated by the Danish East
Asiatic Co vessels,and the NDL;whilst the French Messageries
Fluviales de Cochin-Chine monopolised the North-Eastern
coastal routes (see Map II).The Siamese attention to the
participation in the coastal trade became evident in 1903 when
the Commissioner of Nakorn Srithamarat,Phya Sukum,commented
that coastal shipping of mail facilitated agricultural
marketing in the Southern region with the effect that in 1903
there were applications for the installation of 3-4 steam rice
6 9mills at Nakorn Srithamarat. Later in 1908,the Minister of
Public Works,Prince Naret,commented to the King;
"Government subsidy serves a beneficial 
purpose.By subsidising coastal shipping, 
this increases trade and brings prosperity 
to both the inhabitants and Government."
The Danish East Asiatic Co (EAC) was the first western 
enterprise to operate the coastal trade.In 1905 the Company 
entered a 2 year contract to run a mail steamer Bangkok-Krat 
known as the "Chakrabongse",which visited the South-Eastern 
Coasts :Koh Si Chang,Sri Maharaja,Koh Pra,Payong,Chantaboon,and 
Trat.For each round trip,the Siamese paid a subsidy of 625
6 8 P.Luang-Aroon;"Commercial Shipping and.." MA diss.,pg 93.
^  NA 5 B 12/3 Damrong to King Oct 15,1903.
7% A  5 B 12/7 Naret to King March 4,1908.
Naret was Minister of Public Works 1908-13.
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71ticals. The Siamese had an interest in this line and granted
subsidies.In 1905 the Siamese subsidized 1000 ticals for an
extra steamer running along the East Coast of the Malay
72Peninsula to maintain the loading of 50 tons of cargo. In
1908 the East Asiatic Co requested the Siamese Co to subsidize
the steamer on the East Coast at a level of 2000 baht per
73month;Damrong supported the subsidy at the Cabinet meeting.
Such Siamese subsidies eventually culminated in the Danes
74ceding their line to the Siamese in 1909. Anderson of the
Danish East Asiatic Co proposed to offer the steam liner to
the Siamese public by turning it into a Siamese company called
the Siamese Steam Navigation Co Ltd with a capital of 2
75million ticals. The Siamese were required to take over 
approximately 200,000 ticals worth of shares and then to 
spread the shares among the public.The Danish East Asiatic 
possessed 7 steamers running between Bangkok-Chantaboon-Krat 
under the Siamese flag but purely Danish property.
The cession marked the first Siamese national line of
71 NA 5 B 12/4 Agreement for a Mail Service Betwen Bangkok
and the Ports on the Southeast Coast of Siam.Nov 1907.
72 NA 5 B 12/4 East Asiatic Co to Suriya,Minister of Public 
Works Oct 6,1905.
^  NA 5 B 12/7 Cabinet Meeting June 5,1908.
^  NA 5 B 12/7 EAC to Devawongse Jan 9,1909.
75 NA 5 B 12/7 EAC to King June 1908.
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steamers.Anderson also intended to carry out the same policy
7 6with their Bangkok-Europe line. In 1907 the Danish enterprise
had 2 steamers built for the direct trade Bangkok-Europe,each
77carrying 4000 tons of cargo. Based on the British Foreign
Office despatches,references were made to the shipping
business in Siam,and it is from such observations that some
deductions can be made to explain the Danish transfer.By
1909,the NDL service was experiencing severe competition both
78from the Chino-Siamese and the Japanese. It was probable that 
the Danes also faced this competition and thus decided to cede 
their shares to the Siamese.
The presence of the Danish East Asiatic Co and the NDL 
Co provides a clear indication that the Siamese were not 
totally averse to western enterprise.Yet the Siamese did not 
possess the same attitude towards the British,notably the 
Straits Steamship Co.The explanation for this is found in the 
Company's connection with the Straits Trading Co,which proved 
a challenge to the Khaw family business of tin smelting (issue 
to be discussed in Chapter 8).Moreover the Siamese Government 
had a shared interest with the Khaw group in that they
76 T V . .Ibid,
^  NA 5 B 12/7 EAC to Devawongse,Jan 9,1909.
7 fi PRO FO 371/739 British Legation in Berlin to Grey Oct
15,1909.
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7 9provided subsidies amounting to 5000 baht per month. In 1906 
the officials in the Southern region attempted to exclude the 
Straits Trading Co and other British enterprises by refusing 
them the right to purchase land.Damrong endeavoured to make 
use of the Straits Trading Co by insisting that the Company's 
steamers (which were operated by the Straits Steamship Co) 
running between Phuket-Saiburi deliver mail without any 
Siamese subsidy.
In 1907 both the Straits Steamship Co and the British 
India Steam Navigation tried to operate their services without 
any form of concession from the Siamese Government.The first 
Company had a steamer which called at Phuket port every 6 
days;the other plied between Victoria Point and Ranong on a 
fortnightly basis.By 1909 attempts were being made to counter­
balance the NDL monopoly of the Southeast coastal route. It was 
generally believed that the NDL was considering the 
possibility of entering into competition with the Danish- 
Siamese Steam Navigation Co which held a practical monopoly 
of the shipping trade on the East Coast of the Peninsula.The 
Straits Steamship Co (with its regular service of 4 steamers) 
was approached by the Siam Steam Navigation Co with a proposal 
to restrict the former's service to British ports as far as
^  NA 5 B 12/6 and B 12/1 Narit to King Feb 7,1904.
on
NA 5 B 12/1 Sri Sahadhep (Vice Minister of Interior) to
King June 23,1906.
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81Kelantan. The proposal was declined by the Straits Steamship 
Co thereby placing the British in direct competition with the 
Dano-Siamese vessels along the Singapore-Bangkok coastal 
ports.
The Straits Steamship Co negotiated with the East Asiatic 
Co to adjust the competition of the carrying trade along the 
East Coast of the Malay Peninsula.The Straits Steamship Co 
recognized the growing importance of the East Coast trade,and 
the possibilities of extension when the railway connection 
between Singapore and Bangkok had been effected.They had 
demonstrated their wish to participate in this trade by 
placing two of their vessels on the Bangkok-Singapore run by 
way of the East Coastal ports.The negotiations took place in 
Denmark with the result that the Straits Steamship Co acquired 
7/10 of the shares in the Siam Steam Navigation Co; were 
constituted agents of the company in Singapore and became the 
central controlling body in place of the East Asiatic Co in 
Bangkok.The Siamese flag continued to be flown in exchange 
for Siamese Government subsidy,and the East Asiatic Co and 
the Siam Steam Navigation Co engaged not to enter into 
competition with the Straits Steamship Co's runs in the 
Straits of Malacca and on the West coast of the Peninsula.The 
Agreement was carried out with Siam's knowledge because fear 
might arouse Siamese suspicion of a possible transfer of the
81 PRO FO 371/1220 Beckett to Grey Oct 28,1904.
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Siam Steam Navigation's vessels from the Siamese flag to the 
82British flag.
The competition faced by the NDL (mentioned earlier) 
became apparent in 1909.The German vessels of the NDL found 
increasing difficulty in obtaining outward cargoes owing to 
Chinese shippers' increasing dislike of German methods,namely 
the heavy freights charged and the uncertainties and delays 
attending the delivery of cargoes.The Chinese endeavoured to 
detach themselves from employing the vessels of the NDL,and 
to start an independent line of steamers of their own.Several 
influential Chinese-Siamese had planned to form a company with 
a capital of 3 million ticals with a view of running a line 
of 4-5 steamers between Bangkok-Hongkong.The NDL Co sent their 
Singapore Director on several occasions to Bangkok with 
proposals to fix freights on a lower scale.The movement 
resulted in a Charter granted by the King to the new Chino- 
Siamese Mail Steamship Co Ltd on January 10,1909.The objective 
of the new Company was defined as being to establish a service 
of trading vessels between Siam and foreign countries, 
especially Singapore,Hongkong,and China;to build or charter 
vessels with these objects;to lease shipping wharves or coal 
depots;to act as shipowners and brokers and to transact fire
^  PRO FO 371/1474 Beckett to Grey Nov 11,1912.
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83and marine insurance business. The British Minister,Paget,
gave the following description of the Company;
"The establishment of this native enterprise, 
should,if worked successfully prove a severe 
blow to the NDL...who.. already approaching 
the Directors with ag^iew to avoiding cut­
throat competition."
The organization of the Company was due to the efforts 
of Luang Sophon,son of a Chinese merchant in Bangkok.His 
father Akorn was involved in the teak trade,milling of 
rice,and the farming of liquor and opium,yet lacked shipping 
expertise.In 1907 Sophon did participate in the shipment of 
rice to Messrs Windsor & Co.Sophon was aware that European 
management was essential.He approached the British Charge 
d'Affairs,Beckett,to recommend for the post of manager some 
suitable member of the British mercantile community in Bangkok 
who was conversant with the Siamese language and with the 
Chinese shippers.Beckett communicated Sophon's request to 
Messrs Bradley & Co,and on stating their inability to accept 
the agency (owing to their non-expiration of their agreement 
with the NDL),to Messrs Jardine Matheson & Co,who accepted the 
agency at Swatow for one year,subject to renewal.As regards 
a British manager at Bangkok,this was overruled by the
O  "3
PRO FO 371/738 Paget to Grey March 10,1909 Annual Report 
on Siam 1908.
84 Ibid.
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85Commit tee, which preferred to dispense with European control.
The difficulty confronting the Siamese in conducting
trade with China was the lack of Treaty relations between Siam
and China.Yet even if Treaty relations were established,Sophon
was averse to flying the Siamese flag and preferred to fly the
British flag,as the latter provided security and freedom from
molestation. Sophon assured Beckett that he would welcome any
co-operation on the part of British owners.The combination of
shippers meant that the trade was large enough to admit
participation by a fleet of British vessels,and the Chinese
were prepared to enter an agreement with any British
shipowner.Sophon wanted an arrangement whereby Holt & Co and
the Chino-Siam Steam Navigation Co would form a joint 
8 6venture. A British company would be able to support capital 
when funds were low and provide competent management which 
would then ensure the success of both companies as Sophon had 
limited experience in shipping.For the British,it was the 
opportunity to regain the position in the Siamese carrying 
trade which was lost in 1899 by the transfer of Messrs Holt 
& Co's vessels to NDL Co.The self-denying ordinance which 
Messrs Holt & Co made with the NDL in 1899 was to expire in 
1909.Therefore there appeared to be no obstacle to Holt & Co
^  PRO FO 371/738 Beckett to Grey April 8,1909. Paragraph based 
on Beckett Report.
86 ibid.
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concluding some arrangement with the Chino-Siam Steam
87Navigation Co along the lines indicated by Sophon.
However Holt & Co pointed out to the Board of Trade that
any co-operation with the Chino-Siam Steam Navigation Co was
complicated by the monopolistic trade routes of the NDL Co.The
goods sent by Messrs Holt & Co's steamers to Singapore through
the Bill of Lading were carried from Singapore by the NDL not
only to Bangkok but also to Borneo and that any interruption
of existing business relations with the NDL would have a
88prejudicial effect on this trade. Further difficulties were 
anticipated from the fact that the firm of Messrs Butterfield 
& Swire,who were agents of Messrs Holt & Co,were also agents 
of the NDL Co in the Chinese ports.The agreement between 
Messrs Holt & Co and the NDL could be terminated at 18 months 
notice.Alfred Holt personally saw the most feasible course as 
being to enter into some arrangement with the NDL Co for a 
joint service,carried on by vessels owned by Holt & Co under 
their management,and boats owned by the NDL under German 
management, such vessels to run not only between Siam and 
China,but also between Siam and Singapore,and possibly to 
Borneo.
87 Ibid.
PRO FO 371/739 Board of Trade to Whitehall June 
12,1909.Entire paragraph.
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The Borneo Co expressed its willingness to assist in 
regaining for the British flag a share of the trade to 
Bangkok.In its letter to the Board of Trade,the Borneo Co 
stated;
"We,of course,are not ourselves in the 
position of shipowners,but should British 
management of the business become necessary, 
we would be prepared to offer our service 
to undertake the general management of the 
combined British and Chino-Siamese Companies 
and assist in any way we could in regaining 
for the Britj^h flag a share of the trade 
of Bangkok."
The Borneo Co proposed to invest capital in the Chino-Siamese
Navigation Co in hope of securing the agency for the Company 
90in Bangkok. The British Foreign Office supported the
Company's proposal as a step in the direction of reinstating
91the British flag in the Siamese trade.
It happens that Butterfield & Swire endeavoured to 
arrange a transfer agency from the German firm to a British 
house.They approached the Borneo Co which provisionally 
accepted the offer,but hesitated because it was already 
representing the Japanese Nippon Yusen Kaisha (NYK).Therefore 
the Borneo Co needed to ascertain whether its acceptance of
oq
PRO FO 371/739 Borneo Co to Board of Trade Aug 4,1909.
^  PRO FO 371/739 Beckett to Grey Sept 20,1909.
^  PRO FO 371/739 Whitehall to Board of Trade Sept 23,1909.
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Butterfield & Swire's offer was compatible with the terms of 
its contract with the Japanese company.The NYK had at one time 
endeavoured to eliminate competition with the NDL Hongkong 
line,whose service it wished to replace.The Nippon Yusen 
Kaisha was a powerful Japanese line which in 1906 had faced 
competition from the NDL on the Bangkok-Hongkong route. In 1908 
the NDL concluded an agreement with the Nippon Yusen Kaisha 
whereby the Japanese Co withdrew from the Indian shipping
trade whilst the NDL agreed not to compete in the Japan-China
. 92route.
When the First World War broke out in 1914,German 
shipping in Bangkok was suspended.Windsor & Co were agents for 
the NDL at Bangkok whilst Butterfield & Swire were agents for 
the NDL in Hongkong.By an arrangement between Windsor & Co and 
the China Navigation Co,NDL's interests were maintained by 
employing British vessels.This was in opposition to British 
interests,as the British wanted permanently to oust German 
shipping interests.The business of the German firm Windsor & 
Co became paralysed;but by securing the services of British 
vessels,they were able to maintain their business connections 
with the local market and to retain a shipping practice which 
would be restored to the Germans once the war was 
terminated.Thus the interests of Windsor & Co and the NDL Co
Q9
PRO FO 371/522 Paget to Grey March 16,1908.
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93were identical. This not only deprived local British firms 
of the opportunity to acquire business,but preserved German 
commercial practice,which in turn served to restore German 
trade in Bangkok.
91
PRO FO 422/69 Lyle to Grey Sept 1,1914.
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Chapter 3 
British Enterprise in Bangkok
The Role And Importance Of British Trading Houses in Bangkok.
In order to understand the development of the Siamese 
economy,it is important to discuss the role of Western trading 
houses in Bangkok among which the British were predominant in 
both numbers and importance.Falkus has described the features 
of British investment in Siam as part of the British economic 
network in Southeast Asia.H/hat this chapter seeks to 
elaborate is the factors influencing the direction and degree 
of British enterprise in Bangkok,and the relationship between 
the British government and its overseas investments.This 
involves a discussion of the trading houses and the banks.
The characteristic unit of private British trade with the 
East was the Agency House.The agency or trading house acted 
as banker, bill broker,shipowner,freighter,insurance agent.It 
was the medium through which "backward” areas were brought 
into economic relations with Britain.The main type of business 
carried out by the agency house was selling and buying for 
others on commission.The growth of agency houses originated 
from the loss of the East India Company's monopoly of the
M.E.Falkus:"Early British Business in Thailand" in British 
Business in Asia Since 1860.edited by R.P.T.Davenport-Hines 
and G.Jones.CUP 1989.
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China trade in 1834.British merchant houses established 
themselves throughout Southeast Asia in Singapore,Penang, 
Java,and Manila.Once the Bowring Treaty came into effect in 
1856,Siam became part of the British network of establishing 
agency houses from Singapore.
The opening up of Siam marked an influx of Western
import-export houses into Bangkok.The first post-treaty firm
was the American firm J.S.Parker and Co,a branch of Heard &
Co in Hongkong,which opened in April 1856.A month later the
Borneo Co Ltd opened its branch,followed by D.K.Mason,both of
them Singapore-based British companies.By 1858 several more
British companies had been set up,including S.P.Goodale &
Co,and Hamilton Grey,while the renowned American firm of
Russell & Co also opened an office.A French concern,Remi
Schmidt,opened in 1857.The 1858 Treaty with the Hanse Cities
was followed by the opening of two important German houses:A
2
Markwald,and Pickenpack Thies & Co. Nearly all these firms 
were branches of Companies already established in Asia,the 
British being based mainly in Singapore,the others in 
Hongkong.
Before the 1883 Treaty (by which British firms were 
permitted to be established outside Bangkok),the main
2
M.E.Falkus "Early British Business in Thailand"in British 
Business in Asia Since 1860.pq 129-130.
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activities of the British and other western firms in Siam was 
the traditional importing,exporting,and general agency 
business,the latter mainly for insurance and banking companies 
connected with the finance of trade.For instance the Borneo 
Co represented three insurance companies:the Netherlands 
Indies Sea,the Bengal,and the North China.The Borneo also
acted as agents for the Chartered Mercantile Bank of India;the
3
Oriental Banking Co;and the Northern Bank of Scotland. The
German firm of Pickenpack Thies acted as agents for the
4
British Hongkong and Shanghai;and the Bank of Rotterdam.
It can be pointed out that the nationality of the trading 
house did not necessarily correspond to that of the agencies 
it handled.British firms were represented in Bangkok by the 
Americans,Germans,Danish,Dutch,and other houses;in turn 
British firms represented Western companies of various 
nationalities. Another interesting point was that several 
representatives of the agency houses were appointed as 
consular representatives.In 1867 Paul Pickenpack was the 
Consul for Hanseatic Republic,Swedish and Norwegian
5
Consulate,and the Netherlands Consulate.
Between 1883-1914 the nature of Western enterprise and
3
Bangkok Calender 1863.
 ^ Ibid.
 ^ Bangkok Calender 1867.
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its degree of involvement in the Siamese economy changed 
markedly. Initially the Western trading houses were located 
exclusively in Bangkok,and dealt with the interior through the 
agencies of Chinese middlemen.However, the 1883 Treaty enabled 
these firms to diversify their operations into the Siamese 
provinces through the establishment of branches.Therefore the 
numbers of Western trading houses increased as the Siamese 
economy itself developed and rice exports rose.Such 
qualitative changes were accompanied by the extension of a 
more specialised agency business such as banking houses and 
shipping companies.
The transactions conducted by Western trading houses were 
dependent upon the compradores.The compradore system 
originated in China,and as in China,Western merchants in 
Bangkok found themselves at a loss as to how to gauge the 
local market and deal directly with retail merchants. 
Westerners were unfamiliar with the language and had limited 
sources of trading information.^To overcome these 
problems,Western firms established in Bangkok employed Chinese 
compradores who provided the link between the Western firm and 
the native economy ie:between the market and production.The 
Chinese compradores tended to originate from a respectable 
background; possessed wide business contacts,were respected 
by the merchant community,and most important,were fluent in
 ^ Skinner Chinese Society in Thailand pg 102.
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the English language.Most of these compradores had received
education in Penang,Singapore,or Hongkong.This meant that they
were naturally fluent in English and several Chinese
dialects.The prominent dialect used in the business community
7
was the Tai Chiew.
From the Chinese point of view,the compradore was the 
principal trader.According to the contract with the western 
firm,the compradore was entitled to employ his own choice of 
assistants;dealt with Chinese merchants from the interior; 
secured market information;conducted exchange transactions; 
assumed responsibility for all Chinese personnel and for 
warehoused merchandise;and even dealt with the Customs House
g
on behalf of the firm. The compradores were employed by three 
major Western dominated sectors:trade;shipping;and banking.
The general practise of the compradores engaged in 
trading activities was that of the firm's contact man.They 
tended to make an agreement with the Western firm to deliver 
a certain amount of goods at a particular time.In return,the 
compradores worked on a commission basis in addition to having 
a regular source of income.However,if the compradore failed
 ^ Ibid.
0
Chee Peng Lee;The History and Development of the Hongkong 
& Shanghai Banking Corporation in Peninsula Malaysia" in Frank 
H .H .King (ed.),Eastern Banking:Essays in the History of the 
Honakona & Shanghai Banking Corporation.London.1983.pg 358.
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to fulfill the terms,he was obliged to compensate for the
loss.Therefore the nature of the profession required
consistency and capability.In order to meet the two
qualities,the compradore tended to be recognised and respected
by the business community.In the purchase of rice,the
compradore had one assistant directly subservient to him.The
assistant was also required to master the English language,and
g
his major task was to settle the price with the producer. The 
shipping compradores were more specialised in their 
profession.They were attached to every Western vessel,and 
their duty was to check the Bill of Lading.Their role was 
significant due to the competition existing amongst the 
Western firms.For instance the Danish East Asiatic Co employed 
compradores to deliver goods throughout its coastal routes: 
Bangkok-Chantaburi;Bandon-Songkla;carried by its vessel the 
"Maha Vidjaravudh".
/
^ T h e  banking compradore was the backbone to foreign 
banking activities in Bangkok.The Western banks were compelled 
to employ their services to deal with local businessmen.The 
compradorehandled two important documents:the Bill of Exchange 
and the Commercial Documents.The latter consisted of Bill of
9
Skinner:Chinese Society in Thailand.pq 102.
^  Sirilak Sakkriangkrai:"Origins of the Capitalist Class in 
Thailand 1855-1910".MA.diss.(Thai Text), pg 93.
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Lading,Bill of Invoice, and Bill of Insurance. ^ Apart from 
serving as interpreters,the compradore also became guarantor 
or underwriter for the foreign banks in their dealings with 
local businessmen.For instance Cheah Chee Seng,the compradore 
to the Chartered Bank,was responsible for the entire Chinese 
banking community.In short the compradore served as a link 
between the foreign bank and the local business community.
Compradores tended to specialise in their field (trade,
shipping,banking) and remained with that particular
activity,though not necessarily with the same firm.The high
standard inherent amongst the compradores may be attributed
to their early training in Western based firms in Penang,
Hongkong,or Singapore.Wang Hang Chow,compradore of the
Hongkong & Shanghai Bank for 15 years, received his business
12training in Hongkong. Sam Hing Si,compradore to the Bangue
de L'Indo-Chine,was trained with the Mercantile Bank of India 
13at Hongkong. These compradores complemented the operation of 
Western activity rather than competed with them,because it was 
through their expertise that the Western mercantile houses 
could function effectively.Through this system,the Chinese 
were able to obtain experience and expertise in trade and
^  Wright and Breaksoeare:20th Century Impressions of Siam., 
pg 287.
12 T. . ,Ibid.
Ibid.
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finance,so that by the end of the first decade of the 20th 
century they were already in a position to establish their own /
enterprises in both banking and shipping.
The British Trading Houses.
The most prominent of the Western houses in Bangkok was
the British Borneo Co.Out of the five Western firms which came
to be established immediately after the Bowring Treaty,only
the Borneo Co survived up to 1914.The underlying reason for
the latter's success was that the Borneo Co responded to the
development of the Siamese economy.The Company diversified its
activities from the traditional areas of import,export,
shipping,and insurance into areas of productive capital
investment,notably teak and tin.The establishment of the
Borneo Co in Bangkok depicts the movement of a British
mercantile house from its base in Singapore.A number of
studies have been conducted on the origins of the Borneo
Co,notably by Longhurst and more recently by Stephanie 
14Jones. The interesting element about the inception of the 
Borneo Co was its relations with the Siamese Court,a patronage 
which was a prerequisite to the Company's success.
14 H .Longhurst:The Borneo Storv:The History of the First 100 
Years of Trading in the Far East bv the Borneo Co.Newman 
Neame,1956.
Stephanie Jones:Two Centuries of Overseas Trading:the Origin 
and Growth of the Inchcape Group.Macmillan.1986.
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The Borneo Co began as a trading concern set up by the
Scots W.R.Paterson and William Morgan in Manila and Singapore
in 1842.In 1847 branches were established in Singapore,
Batavia,and Manila,under the General Manager,Robert
MacEwan,the headquarters situated in Singapore.In 1849
Paterson retired and MacEwan assumed control under the name
of MacEwan & Co,and its Singapore manager was John Harvey.In
1856 MacEwan became in need of capital,and in response,
combined with another Scotsman,Robert Henderson,to float the 
15Borneo Co. The headquarters was based in Singapore with 
operations in Calcutta,Hongkong,Batavia,Siam,and Sarawak. 
Contact between the Company (at the time still known as 
MacEwan & Co) and the Royal House of Siam began immediately 
after the signing of the Bowring Treaty.The earliest recorded 
correspondence was dated September 2,1856,addressed by King 
Mongkut to MacEwan & Co,acknowledging the receipt of "useful 
articles for our own good copying and employment of 
philosophical instruments", and allowing the Company to export 
rice.^^Correspondence between the Court and the Company 
continued throughout Mongkut's reign.As early as March 
1858,the King himself expressed his satisfaction at the 
opening of the Borneo Co branch, and the Company assured the
15 Brief origins of the Borneo Co taken from "The Borneo 
Co",Chapter 11,in A History of the Inchcaoe Group by 
Griffiths.
Letter published in Longhurst.The Borneo Story.. pg 41.
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17King of its willingness to further commercial development. 
Some of the correspondence between Mongkut and the Company 
which has been published consists of twelve letters mostly
concerned with the ordering of merchandise for the Palace,
18 19namely candlesticks,glassware, a small brass cannon, and
20books concerning the eclipse. One renowned letter concerned
the Company's recommendation of Anna Leonowens as Governess
21to the Siamese Court.
However there are two unpublished letters in the Inchcape
Archives between Mongkut and the Company Managing Director in
London,John Harvey,written shortly before the King's death in
1868.One concerned the eclipse of the sun.The second letter
dated June 3,1868,and classified as Royal Private
communication,contained two interesting points which give a
strong indication of the political instability at the
time.Firstly,Mongkut discussed his uncertainty of the Law of
22Succession now that he was "an old man". Secondly,Mongkut
17 Stephanie Jones pg 20.
18 Letters of Mongkut's correspondence with the Borneo 
Co.published in the cremation book of Luang Prakob Nitisar,Feb 
4,1971.
19 Mongkut to Adamson Feb 27,1862.Published in ibid.
20 Mongkut to Adamson Oct 12,1862.Published in ibid.
21 Letter published in Longhurst.The Borneo Storv.pg.41
22 Mongkut to John Harvey,Managing Director of Borneo Co in 
London,June 3,1868.From private collection.
103
expressed his grave concern about his descendants,and sought
23advice from Harvey,"his worthy Friend", on investing royal
funds in England;
"I will consider as I place confidence that 
you might be able to ascertainedly knew the 
required safe way of placing my fund in such 
the (a) profitable operation as it may be safe 
and favourable to my own family in future."
The significant point to be deduced from the letter is the
cordial relation between Mongkut and a British merchant,and
the confidence placed with Harvey.The irony of the King's
attitude was his perception of business prospects in Siam,for
while Western houses were in the process of establishing their
activities in Bangkok, being confident of the business
environment,the King was seeking ways of diverting his funds
abroad.With hindsight Mongkut's intentions may be interpreted
as short sighted.However,the political environment was not
favourable to Privy Purse investment on account of the
uncertainty over the Crown (the ambition of the Second
King).Taking this factor into consideration,it was only
natural for the King to have adopted such precautions.
The operation of the Borneo Co was begun in Siam by 
Samuel Gilfillian,who was appointed its first manager in 
Bangkok.He arrived as the accredited agent of Lloyds of 
London,and within two years Lloyds appointed the Company as
23 Ibid.
24 T. . .Ibid.
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agents.Insurance became the first of the Company's major
activities.This was due to the nature of trading difficulties
25encountered in Bangkok; the absence of both a developed
commercial infrastructure and accommodation for visiting
merchants,the lack of a pilot service to guide vessels up the
Bangkok river,and the refusal of marine insurance companies
2 6to provide cover for vessels sailing in Siamese waters.
According to the Company minute books,the firm traded in
rice,sugar,salt,and tin,and imported from Britain and Europe
27calico,metals,marine stores,opium,and Spanish dollars. In
addition the Company became engaged in steam rice milling
using paddy husk as fuel,represented banking houses,owned a
saw-mill,and acted as managing agent for the Siam Steam
Touring and Navigation Co Ltd from 1881,carrying passengers
to the Chantaboon Sapphire mines and shipping pepper and other
2 8coastwise goods. To facilitate the trading activities,the 
Company had its own wharf,offices,three long godowns,bachelor 
mess,and a managers house.The Company assisted in the 
establishment of the Danish East Asiatic Co by lending 40,000 
Mexican dollars to its founder John Anderson.In 1882,the 
Company began what was to become the Company's prominent 
undertaking in Siam,namely teak extraction in Northern Siam.
2 5 Longhurst pg 41-42.
2 6 Stephanie Jones pg 205.
27z/ Ibid.
^  Ibid pg 216.
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The chart (Appendix V) shows the Company's extensive 
network and operation in Siam right up to 1914.The long term 
success was due to the Company's initiative in diversifying 
its operations into both trading and extractive activities. 
Such success was complemented by Court patronage,which 
facilitated its adjustment to the developing Siamese 
economy.The obstacle to Western enterprise operating in Siam 
was not the need to combat a land of savages and jungles,as 
in Borneo,but to cultivate acquaintance with a people who 
mistrusted European intentions.Bearing in mind this 
consideration,the Borneo Co earned the confidence of the 
Siamese elite both before and after its establishment in Siam 
and maintained it right up to 1914.
The nature of Western enterprise and its degree of 
involvement in the Siamese economy changed as the economy 
progressed.Imports became more diversified to accommodate the 
demand for capital goods;retail and manufacturing services 
became more widespread in line with the growing Western 
mercantile community;the growth in trade was accompanied by 
the establishment of Western exchange banks.It is worth 
noticing the increase in the number of Western trading 
houses,in particular the British,and their changing role from 
traditional trading activities to manufacturing,retailing,and 
services.
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General trading,in particular rice shipments,was the
most prominent activity engaged in by the agency houses.The
terms of the Bowring Treaty as such did not precipitate
Western trading houses to establish themselves in the export
of rice.In the years following the conclusion of the
Treaty,the management of rice exports continued to be handled
by Chinese merchants in Bangkok.The destination of rice
exports had an important influence in sustaining the Chinese
monopoly in its shipments.Siamese rice to Singapore was
managed by Low Poh Jim & Co in Bangkok,whose partner Chop Joo
Tye was in Singapore .Low Poh Jim was the first consignee of
the steamer Chao Phya which was built at Hartpool in 1858 for
29the King.This steamer plied between Singapore-Bangkok.
Another Chinese rice agent was Yap Sian Tee & Co in Singapore
whose managing partner resided in Bangkok under the name of 
30Yap E.Gin. It is clear that the Chinese bondage between 
Bangkok and Singapore kept the rice trade under Chinese 
management.
The profits generated form the rice trade were a strong 
inducement to the Chinese to continue their participation in 
rice shipments .This is indicated by the nature of trade
29 Song Ong Siancr.One Hundred Years History of the Chinese 
in Singapore.OUP 1984 pg 100.
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transactions conducted by the Chinese merchants in
Singapore.The Straits Chinese in Singapore bought on credit
in Singapore which enabled them to make large shipments to
Bangkok to be sold in Bangkok for cash.Such a procedure
facilitated trade and was dependent upon the availability
31of credit in Singapore. However in 1864 a commercial crisis
occurred in Singapore which had the effect of changing the
Chinese credit system of trade.The causes of the trade
depression involved a culmination of several factors,but the
crucial element was the nature of the credit system, which the
Free Press picked out as the primary cause;
"The system on which business is conducted 
here,sale of goods on 3 months'credit,has 
been frequently blamed as the cause of 
these disasters.The real evil is the 
indiscriminate credit given to evej^one 
who chooses to start as a trader."
In addition,the accidents experienced by Chinese steamers
imposed a severe financial restraint,as the Chinese were
customarily reluctant to place their steamers and cargo under
insurance.That such risks were involved in the trade between
Singapore and Bangkok was reflected in the anxiety inherent
amongst Chinese merchants;
"The steamer Ban Yong Seng belonged to Low Sam 
and traded regularly to Bangkok...he was always
^  PRO FO 69/21 Knox to Russell Jan 21,1860 .Trade of Siam
1859.
32 Song Ong Sian;One Hundred.. pg 127.
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33glad to hear of the safe arrival."
The significance of the crisis upon the conduct of Chinese 
trade between Singapore and Bangkok was that the credit system 
was gradually phased out deterring the participant of 
speculative traders.This did not create a vacuum in trading 
merchants but rather confined trade to those merchants with 
adequate capital to conduct trade in cash,namely the 
established Chinese trading houses and the Western houses from 
Singapore participating in the Siamese trade.
The prominent Western firms engaged in the rice trade 
were the Borneo Co,Markwald & Co,and Pickenpack Co.Their 
operations were confined to the milling and shipment of 
rice.The buying and selling remained in the hands of the 
Chinese middlemen.The rice exported was known as "cargo" rice 
which was roughly husked rice not properly milled,and had a 
ready market in Germany.The German firm Markwald & Co erected 
their first rice mill in Bangkok in 1866.The Company had been 
established in Bangkok since 1858 as rice millers,importers, 
and exporters. The Head Office was in Bremen under the name of 
Rickmers which dealt with rice milling and shipping, 
possessing its own vessels.3^
33 Ibid pg 140.
34 A.E.Stiven "Rice" in Wright and Breakspeare,20th 
Century..pg 144.
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The increasing number of Western mills erected in Bangkok
reflects the opportunity pursued by European firms,but this
only occurred on a short-term basis.As the rice exports were
destined for Singapore and Hongkong,the Chinese agents in
these countries preferred to conduct their transactions with
the Chinese middlemen in Bangkok.Nevertheless the Western
firms were the first to establish rice mills and maintained
their dominance till 1870,when the number of Western mills
had been surpassed by the number of Chinese ones.The first
steam rice mill in Siam was built by an American Company in
1858.By 1864 there were three steam mills in European hands
(2 British,1 German),and by 1867 the numbers had risen to 5
35western owned steam mills.
The establishment of rice mills can be regarded as the
first clear indication of western enterprise in Bangkok.
However in 1877,the British Consul reported the ominous news
that Chinese shippers had ordered several steam mills from
England for their own purpose;
"Up till very recently foreigners were the sole 
owners of rice-cleaning mills,which also until 
very lately have been highly remunerative.Now 
however,the indefatigable Chinese are setting 
up mills,and as they are not only the principal 
owners of rice milled at the European mills,but 
likewise enter into arrangements in regard to 
freight,insurance and other matters with their 
owners,any change in such transactions must be
^  Skinner pg 103.
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3 6a loss to the Europeans."
By 1879 there were as many Chinese as western mills, and 
thereafter the number of Chinese mills in Bangkok increased;
Year Chinese Western
1889 17 8 ( 3  GB,3 French,3 Germans)
1895 28
Source; Skinner Chinese Society in Siam.pa 203
The procedure by which western traders obtained their
cargo of rice serves to illustrate the difficulties involved
in undertaking trade,namely an unregulated duty system,and the
impending influence of the Siamese officials supervising
trade.Western merchants obtained their rice cargo through a
series of agreements with the Chinese middlemen to deliver a
certain amount of rice,and the merchant would then pay the
duty at the Customs House.The Praklang and the Customs
officers supervised the loading of rice to ensure that the
37amount loaded corresponded to the duty collected. The Siamese 
interest was to gain as much revenue as possible through the 
duty collected.The problem faced by Western merchants stemmed 
from the uncertainty over the Chinese middlemen. In 1858 a 
British merchant named Cateau complained to the British 
Consul,Schomburgk,that his middleman,a Pequan of Paklat,
3 6 Quoted in Skinner pg 103.
PRO FO 628/2/16 Proclamation by Chao Phya Praklang 1858.
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38failed to deliver 100 koyans of rice as agreed. Therefore to 
ensure a consistent delivery,western merchants endeavoured to 
pay the middlemen on a commission basis as an incentive.Such 
a practise was in existence throughout the period.
The corollary of western activity in rice shipment was
the competition created amongst them.One incident occurred in
1890 which was brought to the attention of the British Foreign
Office. British merchants complained that the German firms were
in a privileged position in conducting their trade.The rice
mills owned by Messrs Markwald & Co and Messrs Pickenpack &
Co had since 1866-1889 paid duty on the picul weight at 21
piculs to the Koyan, whilst the Borneo Co paid at the rate of
3922 piculs to the Koyan. The complaint was reported in
1889,and the Borneo Co blamed the Siamese administration for 
the arrangement,and regarded it as an infringement of the 
Treaty.However nothing came out of this issue,perhaps because 
the Borneo complaint was found null and void on account of the 
Treaty terms between Siam and Germany which fixed the duty at 
that rate.
The change in the nature and characteristics of the 
British trading houses in Bangkok became evident after 1880.By 
the 1880s, of those trading houses established after the
io
PRO FO 628/1/15 Schomburgk to Praklang Jan 28,1858.
39 PRO 30/33/1/17 Satow Papers March 1889.
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Bowring Treaty,those that remained were the Borneo Co Ltd,the 
Germans,and a Swiss firm. However the numbers of new ones did 
increase as seen in the following table.
Table II
Western Trading Houses in Bangkok 1880
British German Swiss
Borneo Co Markwald & Co Jucker,Sigg&Co
Bangkok Dry Dock Pickenpack & Thies
D.Maclean & Co B.Grimm
A.M.Odman German-Siam Trading
Bangkok Rice Mill Windsor & Reillich
Bonneville & Co
Bangkok Saw Mill
SourcesBangkok Times;various British Consular Reports;
Map of Bangkok,published in .Portrait of Bangkok by 
L .Sternstein,pg 29.
The most prominent activity of the agency houses was general 
trading.However several changes were apparent,most notably the 
participation in rice and saw milling.The Bangkok Rice Mill 
was established through a joint venture between the Borneo Co 
and A.M.Odman. D. Mac lean and the Bangkok Dry Dock were both 
engaged in servicing ships which reflects the growth of the 
number of foreign vessels entering Bangkok.Yet the western 
houses were restricted to operating in Bangkok only.
The 1883 Treaty had an effective influence upon the 
growth of Western trading houses.It allowed operations to be 
carried on outside Bangkok,which in turn stimulated the 
establishment of saw mills to accommodate the timber extracted
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by the British teak companies in Northern Siam.The favourable 
trading environment led to the advent of 2 British shipping 
companies participating in the carrying trade.The growth in 
trade induced the establishment of foreign banks to manage 
currency exchange.Such rapid diversification was a response 
to the qualitative economic changes in Siam. It may even be 
suggested that the Siamese economy was entering a transitional 
stage by the mid 1880s.This can be indicated by a table 
showing the numbers of British houses present in Siam and a 
cross-section of their activities.
Table III 
British Enterprise in Bangkok 1898
Steamship Saw Mills Rice Mills Banks
Holt & Co Borneo Co Borneo Co Hongkong Shanghai
Scottish Oriental Bombay-Burmah Arracan Charter Mercantile
Denny Mott Howard Erskine
Siam Forest Bangkok Rice Mill
Import/Export Retail Retail
Denny Mott 
Borneo Co
Stephens,Paul & Co 
Dispensary 
F.Clarke & Co
John Sampson & Co 
Bangkok Dock Co 
British Dispensary
Bangkok Dispensary 
Bangkok Brick & Tile 
Works
John Dunlop 
Harry A.Badman 
W e s t e r n
Ravensway & Co 
Messrs Douglas & 
Grant
Newspapers
Bangkok Times
Siam Weekly Advertizer
Siam Observer.
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T a b l e  IV
Other Western Enterprise 1898
Germans French Swiss
Markwald & Co Banque L 'Indo-Chine A.Berli
B .Grimm
Schmidt & Fertsch Co 
Windsor & Co
Messageries Maritimes
Danish American
J.J.Riechman & Co
German-Siam Trading CO Siam Electricity Co American Import
East Asiatic Co
Source:Bkk Times;Various BCR;Map of 
Bangkok,published in Portrait of Bangkok.
Among the Western trading houses established in Bangkok, 
the British were predominantly engaged in steam ship 
lines,teak,rice milling,banks,newspapers, wholesale general 
merchants,and retailing.The latter involved engineering, 
dispensary,tailoring,and a wide range of services to 
the mercantile community.This structure persisted throughout 
the period.The major change in British economic activity came 
at the end of the 19th century,when the two British shipping 
lines were transferred to the German NDL Co.The opening decade 
of the 20th century also marked the establishment of two 
German firms from Singapore;Behn Meyer Co and Katz Bros.
Behn Meyer & Co was a prominent German trading house in 
Singapore.In 1906 the firm established a branch in Bangkok 
through the purchase of another German firm Messrs Schmidt,
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40Fertsch & Co. Messrs Katz & Bros opened business in Bangkok
41in 1908 assuming control of the German-Siam Trading. The
interesting point to make about these two firms was that they
were registered as British companies in Singapore so as to
secure privileges in the British Colony.Both Companies applied
to the British Legation for registration as British companies
on the grounds that they were recognised as such in
Singapore .However the British Charge d'Af fairs, Beckett, refused
to extend the privileges enjoyed by British nationals in
Bangkok to the Germans. Beckett pointed out that Siam was an
extraterritorial country,which meant that the representatives
of the Treaty Powers were established for the purpose of
promoting and fostering the interests of their own nationals
42and not those of other countries.
As for the British,certain changes also contributed to 
their trading influence in Bangkok.In 1905 the Louis 
T.Leonowens Co was established;in 1908 the Siam Forest Co was 
liquidated and the Borneo expanded its activities into the 
field of oil godowns.The kerosene godown was used by the Shell 
Transport & Trading Company's SS Murex which delivered 
shipments of "Crown" kerosene from Sumatra to the Royal Dutch 
Petroleum Co.The mutual interest culminated into the formation
4fi
PRO FO 371/739 Beckett to Grey Sept 23,1909.
41 Ibid.
42 Ibid.
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of the Asiatic Petroleum Co in 1903/and the Borneo Co became
43its agent in Bangkok. The extent of British economic activity 
seemed to have revolved around the teak firms;F.Clarke & 
Co,Louis T .Leonowens,and the Borneo Co.The nature of the teak 
trade (the inconsistency of the rate of return) was an 
influential factor in inducing such enterprises to diversify 
their activities into general trading.This issue will be 
discussed in chapter 5 on teak enterprise.
The British firm F. S. Clarke & Co was begun by
F .S.Clarke,who entered the service of the Borneo Co in London
in 1867 and had spent 10 years in Siam with the Company 1872-
1882 before leaving to establish his own firm F.S.Clarke &
Co.The Bangkok agency firm was engaged in the saw mill and
timber business,which earned him a profit in 1899 of around
44£4000 annually and "increasing all the time". Among its 
agencies were the Siam Forest Co,a French mining company,a 
sugar refining company,the National Bank of China,and the 
Commercial Union Insurance Co. Clarke Co bought consignments 
of goods from Europe,chartered steamers for the Chinese rice 
millers, bought Japanese coal from Mitsui & Co,and purchased 
opium on behalf of the Siamese Government.The Company sold
43 The Borneo Co.Past.Present.and Future 1856-1988 and 
Beyond.Published by The Nation,Dec 1988.
44 M.E.Falkus "Early British Business in Thailand" pg 141.
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45Siamese rice,pepper, hides,and other commodities in Europe.
Yet concurrent with the spread of British activity there
was a Siamese movement to participate in the management of
certain British companies.In 1912 the Finance Ministry became
a share holder in the Bangkok Dock Co.The sources of this
particular company are kept at the Commerce Ministry.From the
documents,there is no mention of the details involved in the
transfer of shares,but what is evident is that the list of
shareholders indicates the dominating hold of the British in
the Company remained.Amongst the 73 major shareholders,there
46were 5 prominent ones,holding over 500 shares;
The remainder of this section will discuss the business 
environment of the early 189Os,and account for the 
establishment of the prominent Western houses in Bangkok. 
Already in 1891,the Bangkok Times described the increase in
Shareholder No.Of Shares.
1)Ministry of Finance
2 )L.Davidson
3)James S,Smythe
4)Charles Henry Bush
5)J .S .Sanderson
750
1400
636
2000
6895
Source:Registration Dept.Ministry of Commerce. 
File 198 Bangkok Dock Co.
Ibid
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the number of trading houses as"springing up like
47mushrooms". The number of firms established in Bangkok in 
1891 can be traced through the Bangkok Times,and British and 
American Consular Reports.From such sources,there were six 
British houses which came to be established in 1891 from
Singapore:
1)Harry A.Badman & CO
2)McAlister & Co :sailmaking,requirements for steamships.
3)M.Fusco & Co :General Store.
4)Messrs Douglas & Grant:Scottish Rice Mill Engineer.
5)Bangkok Brick & Tile Works (J.Clunis).
6)Ravensway & Co:marble merchants,baths,tiles.
Towards the end of 1891,Beckett reported an unfavourable
business environment attributed to "the unsoundness of the
Bangkok credit system".Beckett also added that "a climax was
reached when a large European firm lately went into
48liquidation" (the Swiss firm Jucker,Sigg & Co). Indeed the
early 1890s witnessed the collapse of several companies,
n 49 namely;
1)The Siam River Steamboat Co:begun in 1888.
2)The Siam Electric Co;established 1889.
3)MaClean & Co.
4)Jucker,Sigg & Co.
5)Transfer of the Bangkok Tramway Co concession to the 
Danes.
Beckett attributed the "unsoundness of the Bangkok credit 
system" to the large advances made by the Siamese and European
47 BKK Times Oct 17,1891.
48 BCR Trade of Siam 1890 in BKK Times Oct 3,1891.
49 BKK Times Jan 30,1892.
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merchants to the "unsound" Chinese retail traders thereby
50precipitating an environment of business instability. Beckett 
gave no specific example nor explanation,but on the basis of 
the commercial reports from the Bangkok Times,the unfavourable 
business environment can be linked to the liquidation of two 
firms in early 1891:those of the Maclean Co,and Jucker,Sigg 
& Co.
Maclean Co was a British trading house engaged in rice
milling.In 1890 the Company bought the Bangkok Rice Mill from
a British merchant, Mr .Cairn, for 36,666 tcs. However Maclean did
not possess the capital due to Mr.Cairn nor was he able to pay
off the mortgage on the piece of property,belonging to
Naradhip (a former Cabinet Minister),on which the mill was 
51located. As a result, Maclean Co declared themselves bankrupt
52in 1891 with a gross liability of £70,000.
The liquidation of the Swiss firm Jucker,Sigg & Co was 
precipitated by the withdrawal of capital by its client Prince 
Sai Sanidwongse.The Company had acted as a depository 
institution with assets amounting to $979,000 (1,631,666
50 Ibid.
BKK Times Arbitration Case.March 19,1892.
^  BCR No.1087 Report fot the Year 1891 on the Trade of
Bangkok.
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53tcs). The company had also granted loans as seen in the 
table:
Table V
Loan to Amount Purpose
Maclean Co......5312 Chang Teak business
B.E.Smith 4000
Cowan 2208 " H
Gard 362 " Engineering
Western Agent 1208 "
Samsen Rice Mill 2000 " _
Total 20,395 "
Source:Rattanakamol:"Development and Role of Commercial 
Banks in Thailand 1888-1914".MA,diss.Chulalongkorn U 
1981,pg 38.
In 1892 its financial committments placed Jucker,Sigg, & Co 
in a precarious position when Sai Sanidwongse closed his 
deposit account of 95,000 tcs and was entitled to another
27.862 tcs the 5% interest accrued since 1895,thus a total of
54122.862 tcs. In addition Mr.Sigg had died earlier in February
551891 placing the Company in turmoil. The Company transferred 
its Bangkok Tramway concession to the Danes in the same 
year,and finally went into liquidation,its assets passing to 
A.Berli.
53 Ratanawadee Rattanakamol:Development and Roles of 
Commercial Banks in Thailand 1888-1945.MA.diss.(Thai Text) 
Chulalongkorn University 1981.pg 38.
The thesis concentrates on the establishment of Chinese banks 
in post 1914 era.
54 NA 5 Kh 9/2 Naradhip to Berli,liquidator of Jucker,Sigg,and 
Co.Jan 2,1892.
55 BKK Times Feb 28,1891.
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The common link between the collapse of the two mentioned
companies was the repercussionary effects of the loss of
profits in opium farms. In the Arbitration Case of 1892 between
Mr.Cairn and the Bangkok Rice Mill,the former claimed that his
financial difficulties stemmed from the loss incurred in the
56collapse of opium farm. Simultaneously,Sai also faced 
financial difficulties caused by problems with opium 
farms,which induced him to withdraw his deposit from 
Jucker,Sigg,& Co.There are no other sources to indicate 
whether other Western firms had investments in opium farms,but 
what can be deduced was that opium farms were regarded as a 
profitable area for investment,inducing the British merchant 
Cairn and Prince Sai to divert their funds.Therefore it may 
be possible that the "unsound credit system"described by 
Beckett could be referring to the collapse of the opium farms 
which resulted in the liquidation of several firms towards the 
end of 1892.
For the purpose of understanding the character of the 
western trading houses in Bangkok in 1898,it is worth giving 
a short account of the origins of the prominent firms.The 
Borneo Co has already been discussed,therefore it serves a 
useful purpose to make a comparison with two other prominent 
Western firms during this period:Berli Jucker and the Danish
56 BKK Times ibid.
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East Asiatic Co.Albert Jucker was a Swiss merchant who had
arrived in Bangkok after 1866 sent by the French trading House
Malharbe & Julian to open a branch.In 1872,A.Jucker was joined
by his cousin Henry Sigg and together they formed a trading
house in 1872 known as Jucker,Sigg & Co.The trading house
acted as general merchants and ship chandlers.Their business
expanded when the French House Malharbe & Julian decided to
transfer their shares to Jucker in 1882.Jucker,Sigg & Co
represented European marine insurance principals,and owned the
Samsen Steam and Rice Mill.Jucker died in 1885 and H.Sigg in
1891,and as a result,together with the financial crisis,the
company was eventually liquidated to another Swiss
57entrepreneur Albert Berli.
The new company was then established under the new name
of A.Berli & Co.A.Berli was appointed Secretary of the Bangkok
Tramway Co in 1896,and in 1901 Edward Jucker (Albert's son)
became a partner in the firm and in 1910 married Berli's
daughter Mary. Edward Jucker began introducing leading
European brands of tinned milk,cocoa,and paper tissues into
the Siamese market.The growth in demand for such merchandise
led to the opening of branches in South Siam,in Chiengmai,and
58Nakorn Sawan in 1899,and in Lampang in 1914.
57 Based on "The Berli Jucker Album" and "100 Years of Berli 
Jucker",compiled by Walter Meyer in 1982.
58 Ibid.
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The Danish East Asiatic Co was one of the prominent
trading firm in Bangkok.The Company had its origins in Messrs
Anderson & Co in 1897.The importance of the Company's origins
was that it was established in Siam for the sole purpose of
conducting import-export business.The Company had extensive
interests in the teak trade (holding concessions in the
northern teak forests and operating a saw mill in Bangkok).The
Company was engaged in the import of building materials
especially cement,which no fewer than 30-40,000 casks were
imported annually;while exports (besides teak) comprised of
sticklac,rubber,gum benjamin, hides,horns.The Company was the
first to tranship teak directly to Europe by steamer,and by
1908 had established a new line of vessels (5 in number,and
4-5000 tons each) built exclusively for the teak trade.A
regular monthly service was maintained from Copenhagen,
Middlesborough,and Antwerp to Bangkok,and from Bangkok to
London and Copenhagen.In addition the Company operated
steamers along the east and west coasts of the Gulf of
Siam.This Company also owned the Oriental Store (General
Merchants).The Company's extensive operation can be regarded
as being of a similar structure to the Borneo Co,on account
59of the diversity in activities.
59 Based on "Imports,Exports,Shipping"by Norman Maxwell in 
Wright and Breakspeare.20th Century...
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The British Banks in Bangkok.
The establishment of British exchange banks in Southeast 
Asia was a corollary of the growth of British trade in 
Singapore, Hongkong,and Penang.Exchange banks were needed to 
finance trade through their co-ordination of the medium of 
exchange.The prominent British banks in the region were the 
Hongkong & Shanghai;the Chartered Mercantile;and the Chartered 
Bank.In 1859 the Chartered Mercantile Bank established a 
branch in Penang followed by the Chartered Bank in 1875;whilst 
the Hongkong & Shanghai Bank controlled an extensive network 
throughout the region,establishing branches in the Philippines 
1872,in Singapore 1877,in Penang and Java 1884.^^
The three Western banks operating in Siam during the 
period were the Hongkong & Shanghai Bank 1888;the Chartered 
Mercantile Bank 1894,and the Banque de L'Indo-Chine 1897.As 
Bangkok became increasingly integrated in the Asian 
trade,business prospects were conducive to the operation of 
exchange activities.The first western bank to establish a 
branch in Bangkok was the Hongkong & Shanghai in March 
1888.Its interests in Siam had existed since 1865,when the 
Bank appointed the German firm Messrs Pickenpack,Thies & Co 
as its representative in Bangkok.
r q
For more details see H.H.King.Eastern Banking:Essavs in 
the History of the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation.
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Historians writing on the Hongkong & Shanghai Bank tend 
to attribute its establishment in Bangkok to the political 
atmosphere.^1 The fact that the French had established their 
authority in Cochin-China after 1863,aroused Siamese 
suspicions of French designs upon Siam.It was believed that 
a French company was intending to represent the Banque de 
L'Indo-Chine which had the effect of provoking the British 
legation in Bangkok to urge the Hongkong & Shanghai Bank to 
open a branch.However political considerations were perhaps 
only one explanation.The economic environment must also be 
taken into account.In 1884 rice exports were increasing at an 
annual average of 200,000 tons,which meant that the amount of 
silver dollars needed for exchange was inevitably beyond the 
management of the Bank's agent Pickenpack,Thies & Co.Such 
economic needs for the supply of silver dollars was perhaps 
another element of inducement.
The Western banks in Siam had three financial activities. 
Firstly the pure banking business of receiving money for 
current or deposit accounts and discounting bills.Second was 
foreign exchange operation which in Siam proved to be the
^1 Historians writing on the history of the Hongkong & 
Shanghai Bank:Thiravet Pramuanratkarn,"The Hongkong Bank in 
Thailand:A Case Study of a Pioneering Bank",in Frank H.H.King 
Eastern Banking...
Maurice W.Collins:The Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corp.
Faber & Faber,1965.
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prevailing activity.The third activity was short-lived,namely 
that of note issue.The underlying point to mention is that 
these banks confined their operations to Bangkok.Moreover the 
role of the banks became undermined by a series of movements 
undertaken by the Siamese Treasury,namely the issue of 
notes;the adoption of the gold standard in 1902,whereby the 
Treasury became responsible for the provision of silver 
dollars;and the establishment of the Siam Commercial Bank 
which acted as the government deposit bank. It was this Siamese 
response in challenging the operation of the Western banks 
which culminated in a political issue involving both the 
Siamese and British governments.
Both the Hongkong & Shanghai and the Mercantile Chartered 
Bank acted as depository banks for government funds in Bangkok 
and abroad.Siamese government records reveal that the Treasury 
had funds deposited in these banks abroad;namely the tax 
revenues of the Southern Provinces of Ranong,Takaupa, 
Pangna,Trang were deposited in the Penang branches of the 
Hongkong & Shanghai and the Chartered Bank.Although the 
records are incomplete,there is evidence that $110,000 was
deposited in 1884,with $24,000 in the Hongkong & Shanghai
62Bank. In addition there were deposits with the Chartered Bank 
in Singapore.This was on account of the trade conducted
6 2 Thiravet Pramuanratkarn,"The Hongkong Bank in Thailand.." 
pg 424.
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between the Siamese Southern States and the Straits
Settlements through which the Chartered Bank gained the
predominant position amongst the British banks.The Consul-
General in Singapore deposited cheques received from the
6 3Phuket Treasury with the Chartered Bank in Singapore. In 1907
the Chartered Bank established an office in Phuket and had
already contemplated a branch in Chiengmai as early as 1904
64to exchange rupees into ticals. The following table shows the 
amount of funds deposited with the Western banks in Singapore 
in 1907.
Table VI
Siamese Funds in Singapore 1907
Bank Amount (tcs)
Hongkong & Shanghai 27,930
Chartered 314,906
Banque de L'Indo-Chine 49,180
Total 392,017
SourcesNA Kh 0301.1 30/8 Present Financial Position in 
Siam 1907.
Although the Chartered Bank appears to have held the 
bulk of the Penang deposits,the King's private funds were 
exclusively with the Hongkong & Shanghai Bank in Singapore 
under the account name of "Ngern nguad Praklang" ie "Treasury 
monthly deposit,current account" after 1877.Other Siamese
63 Ibid.
NA Kh 0301.1 37/116 Chartered Bank (BKK) to Williamson, 
Financial Adviser.Dec 14,1904.
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funds were also kept in the Singapore branches of the
Chartered Mercantile,the Chartered Bank, and the New Oriental
Bank.By 1890 the Hongkong & Shanghai Bank in Bangkok had some
350 current and deposit accounts,including those of such firms
as the British Bombay-Burmah Corp;the Borneo Co; Jucker,Sigg
& Co;the American legation;and the Siamese aristocracy.lt can
be assumed that the accounts under the name of Naradhip,the
Finance Minister (1892-93),were in fact the King's private 
65accounts.
Paper Currency.
The Hongkong & Shanghai Bank note issue was the first 
major issue of the fifth reign.In 1889,the Government 
permitted the Bank to issue notes in eight denominations; 
1,5,10,40,50,80,100,and 400 ticals.Apart from the Hongkong 
Bank,the Chartered Bank also began note issue in 1897,followed 
by the Banque de L'Indo-Chine in 1899,both on a more limited 
scale.The Hongkong & Shanghai Bank manager,Smith, cultivated 
cordial relations with the Customs Department.This institution 
had been instructed to receive the Bank's notes in payment of 
duties. ®^However the Bank's notes did not gain a wide 
circulation,nor did Smith attempt to develop the Bank's
^  T .Pramuanratkarn pg 424.
^  I.G.Brown,"Paper Currency:The Government Note Issue in the 
Reign of King Chulalongkorn". JSS Vol. 60 ,Pt. 2 , (July 1972) pp23- 
44.
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general business to the outlying provinces beyond Bangkok.
The limitations of the note issue circulation can be
ascribed to the response from the indigenous population.The
rice cultivators placed no confidence on the value of a paper
currency and instead continued to accept silver,which was
imported in large quantities. An indication of such attitude
is reflected in the substantial amounts of notes returned to
the Paper Currency Department and exchanged for baht coins
during October-December of each year.It was during these
months that the rice crop was harvested and rice millers found
that the provincial rice farmers preferred to be paid in coins
6 7rather than in notes. Another factor worth considering was
the lack of banking agents in the provinces to supervise the
circulation of paper currency.lt may just be that the Siamese
Treasury was not in favour of the issue being undertaken by
foreign banks on a wide scale.In 1890 the Siamese Government
was already considering issuing its own paper currency.
Various steps were taken in proceeding with the State note
issuesNaradhip,the Finance Minister,placed an order with the
German printer Giesecke & Devrient of Leipzig for almost 4
6 8million notes,which scheme proved futile.
It was in 1899 with the issue of the Paper Currency Act
67 Ibid pg 37.
68 Ibid pg 24.
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that the Western banks'role in note issue was removed.As in
Singapore,where the government came to an agreement with the
banks to withdraw the notes within a certain period,the
Siamese Treasury's task was facilitated by the banks'
voluntary agreement to withdraw their notes.In addition,the
Siamese had the strong support of the British Financial
Adviser,Williamson,who pointed out to the banks that the
69government notes would in turn benefit the banks. The
Government paper currency proved highly satisfactory, in that
its circulation rose from 3.4m tcs on March 31,1903 to 7.3m
tcs on March 31,1904,a marked increase of 110% within a 
70year. The note issue exceeded that of the Hongkong Bank as 
early as December 1902,and in the following month,the 
Government issue exceeded the total amount of all three banks 
combined.^
The British Response To The Gold Standard 1902.
The next movement undertaken by the Treasury which 
resulted in the diminishing role of the British banks was the 
adoption of the gold standard in 1902.Ian Brown has given a
69 Ibid pg 37.
7 n
NA Kh 0301.1 38.B/4 Williamson Budget Report.
^  NA Kh 0301.1 38/4 Williamson Report.April 2,1910 quoted in 
Brown article "Paper Currency..." pg 32.
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72detailed account of the gold standard episode. What this 
section seeks to present is the role of the British banks and 
their response to the gold standard.By closing the mint for 
the free coinage of ticals,the government made itself 
responsible for the due supply of currency to the banks. 
Previous to the closing of the Royal Mint for the free coinage 
of silver,the Treasury was not required to maintain a large 
reserve stock of coined ticals for the purpose of financing 
the trade of the country.When the Banks required ticals,they 
brought dollars to the Royal Mint to be coined into ticals.The 
responsibility for ensuring a sufficient stock of coin for 
trade purposes had rested mainly with the banks.
The Banks reacted to the Government measure by demanding
compensation.Each bank held a substantial part of its funds
in dollars in Hongkong and Singapore.Consequently,with the
revaluation of the baht,the banks asserted that they were
faced with losses.The Banks had in their course of business
remitted ticals out of Siam,and thus when reimporting those
funds at an enhanced value of 17 tcs to the pound sterling,
73they incurred severe losses. The Managers of the Banks 
approached the Financial Adviser,Rivett-Carnac,on November 
27,asking whether the Government intended to compensate them
7  ^ I.G.Brown "Siam and the Gold Standard 1902-08",JSEAS,
Vol.10,No.2,(Sept 1979),pp 381-99.
7  ^NA Kh 0301.1 23/1 Rivett-Carnac Memorandum Dec 13,1902.
132
74for the loss. The Hongkong Bank estimated its loss at
£150,000;the Chartered Bank at £60,000;and the Banque de
75L'Indo-Chine at £44,000; all accused the Government of not 
informing them of the policy before hand.
However,the Financial Adviser refused to consider their
claims and reiterated the Government policy,that it was the
prerogative of the Government to close the mint,and the
measure effected was to be regarded as a normal fluctuation
7 6in the exchange rate. He continued that as the Treasury had
discussed the proposal with the Banks when it had first been
considered in 1899,the Government had given every indication
77of its intentions. The Finance Permanent Secretary,MC Piya
Phakdi,informed the 3 Banks that it was not feasible for the
Government to give notice of the change as it would have
7 8resulted in speculation. The Treasury proceeded to justify 
its action by claiming that it was taking similar action to 
that of the Indian Government in 1895,and was not committed
NA Kh 0301.1 23/1 Rivett-Carnac Memorandum Nov
28,1902."Interview between Managers of local Banks and 
Financial Adviser regarding the closing of the Mint".
7 5 NA Kh 0301.1 23/1 Letters from the 3 Banks' complaint to 
Mahit Nov 1902.
^  NA Kh 0301.1 23/1 Rivett-Carnac Memorandum Nov 28,1902.Also 
in Brown article "Siam and the Gold Standard" pg 384.
77"  Ibid.
^  NA Kh 0301.1 23/1 MC Piya Phakdi to the 3 banks.Dec 8,1902.
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79to meet the claims for compensation.
As Brown has described,the Banks' response was "immediate 
80and emphatic". The Managers of the 2 British Banks threatened
to refuse to purchase baht at the new rate fixed by the
Government, an action which impeded the financing of the export
rice crop.At one point,the Banks actually carried out that
81threat and refused all exchange business. A meeting was held
between the Banks and the principal rice millers at which the
managers sought to have the export of the rice crop held 
82back. In addition,both the Hongkong and the Chartered Bank
despatched their more senior Singapore managers to Bangkok to
8 3press their dissatisfaction. The Chartered Bank refused to
84honour Government cheques. However as the action was unco­
ordinated by Browne (Manager of the Hongkong Bank),who acted 
as the spokesman for the Banks,the Government was able to 
counter the movement by ordering the withdrawal of all its
7 9 NA Kh 0301.1 23/1 Memo of the Minister of Finance,Prince 
Mahit Dec 10,1902.
80 Brown article "Siam and the Gold Standard.."pg 384.
o i
NA Kh 0301.1 23/1 Rivett-Carnac to Verney in London Jan 
12,1903.
NA 5 Kh 20.1/22 Mahit to King Nov 29,1902.Also in Brown 
"Siam and the Gold Standard" pg 384.
NA Kh 0301.1 23/1 Manager HSB (BKK) to Rivett-Carnac Dec
2,1902.
NA Kh 0301.1 23/1 Memo of Finance Minister Dec 10,1902.Also 
in Brown article.
revenue accounts.
134
The Western business community appeared to support the
Siamese measures as indicated in an anonymous letter received
by Rivett-Carnac;
"If the Siamese Government made up its mind 
to a gold-standard,the sooner the Siamese 
Government shows a firm hand in the matter, 
the sooner everything must develop...Siam 
appears to always be in the position of 
being bullied by a big boy,and generally 
knuckles under,but in this there are many 
boys being bullied who on being satisfied 
that Siam has put her back to the wall and 
really sayss"we are going to do this whatever 
may happen,the boys will doubtlegg give to a huge 
grumble and possibly sink away."
Indeed the Government,on the recommendation of Rivett-Carnac,
refused to recognise the claim by the Banks for
compensation.As a compromise,the Government endeavoured to
minimize the loss incurred by undertaking the following steps
on December 19,1902.The Government decided to fix the selling
rate at 20 bahts£1 instead of the 17 baht;£l as originally
announced on November 25.The Treasury also allowed the Banks
to repay in dollars at the old rate 3 dollars :5 ticals.The
Government also gave its consent to accept at a similar rate
all the dollars in the vaults of the Banks at the date of
closing the Mint,and also all dollars en route to Bangkok on
85 T.Pramuanratkarn;"The Hongkong Bank .." pg 425.
O  fT
NA Kh 0301.1 23/1 Anonymous letter by a well wisher to 
Rivett-Carnac Dec 6,1902.
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87the same date. By this concession,the Government estimated
88it would relieve the Banks of 3/4 of the loss. In addition, 
the Government agreed to deliver the following amount of 
ticals to the Banks between December 1902-January 1903.
Table VII
H-K & Shanghai Tcs 9875
Chartered Bank " 2672
Banque de L'Indo-chine " 975
Total ” 13,527,000
SourcesNA Kh 0301.1 23/3 Jan 15,1903.
The episode showed that the Siamese response to the 
British Banks was firm,and such a stand was primarily 
undertaken on the advice from the Financial Adviser.The 
adoption of the gold standard,and the Government's refusal to 
meet the Banks' claims, were policies derived from Rivett- 
Carnac . Therefore it placed the Siamese Treasury in a solid 
position in that the policies were carried out 
following adequate consideration and exposed the Banks as 
interested in securing their own personal interests, rather 
than considering the trading prospects of Siam.
The various threats and demands by the Banks could 
clearly have crippled trade.Yet it may be asserted that the 
Banks' threat of inactivity could not have been prolonged as
ft 7
NA Kh 0301.1 23/1 Rivett-Carnac Memorandum Dec 17,1902. 
88 Ibid.
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the Siamese intended to approach other banks abroad to assume
responsibility,namely Baring Bros of London,a prominent
British merchant bank.After the crisis,Rivett-Carnac commented
in his letter on the near chance which Baring Bros had had of
establishing themselves in Siam;
"Baring Bros have missed a splendid opportunity 
of getting a grand concession,for the Government 
would doubtless have eventually given them the 
concession for a National Bank of Siam,with all 
the Government business at its command,...I had 
to ask you to keep the matter secret from the 
Hongkong & Shanghai Bank and the Chartered Banks 
as obviously they would have used their utmost 
influence in London to prevent the Government 
from starting a bankj^g business in opposition 
to them in Bangkok."
The Idea Of A National Bank and The Effects on the British 
Banks.
The significance of the Siamese proposal to establish a 
National Bank appeared to be connected with a series of 
policies conducted by the Siamese to limit the role of the 
British Banks.For instance,the establishment of an autonomous 
currency in 1902,and the transfer of funds from the Hongkong 
& Shanghai Bank,are perhaps the key indicators of a well- 
conceived policy.The proposal to establish a National Bank was 
a sensitive issue,as it raised several political questions, 
most notably the British fear of a Third Power.Brown in his
pq
NA Kh 0301.1 23/3 Rivett-Carnac to Frederick Verney, 
Counsellor at the Siamese Legation in London.Jan 12,1903.
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thesis explicitly made the connection between the proposed
National Bank and the move for monetary sovereignty;
"It would appear that Prince Mahit's principal 
objective in establishing the "Book Club" was 
to attempt to break the European monopoly of 
banking institutions in Siam.It is perhaps 
significant that the plans for the bank began 
to take shape in mid 1903,only some 6 months 
after the Ministry and the European Banks had 
been in dispute over the way in which the qn
Government had abandoned the silver standard."
Indeed,as mentioned earlier,the 1903 idea of a national Bank
was behind the approach made by Rivett-Carnac towards Baring
Bros. However,the idea of a National Bank had been apparent
since 1898 when a British financier Clarke offered to
undertake such a task.The movement became a reality with the
establishment of an indigenous bank,the "Book Club",in April
1906,and in January 1907 it received a Royal Charter and
became known as the Siam Commercial Bank.
The point to make about Brown's observation is that there 
does not appear to be any connection between the adoption of 
the gold standard and the establishment of a National 
Bank.Indeed,the Siamese intended to establish not an 
indigenous National Bank,but rather a National Bank to be 
managed by the British.The approach to Baring Bros reflects 
the Siamese intentions and the Financial Adviser's intention 
to sustain British influence.However there is evidence to show 
that the Finance Minister,Prince Mahit,was enhancing the role
90 Brown Phd pg 160.
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of the "Book Club",which simultaneously involved the curbing
of the European Banks' monopoly over financial transactions.
The British Minister,Paget,wrote two letters consecutively to
Grey reporting on events which can be seen as detrimental to
the Western Banks.Mahit had withdrawn a considerable portion
of Government deposits from the Banks and transferred it to
the "Book Club".According to Paget,Mahit was inducing
important private customers,such as opium farmers and wealthy
Chinese rice millers to divert their funds from the British
91banks to the Siamese. Such action was described by Paget "as
92a breach of morality".
The impending threat was the influence of a Third Power
in the establishment of a National Bank.A number of shares
held by the Bank were taken up in Germany and Denmark,and thus
appeared as a German-Danish Bank.The "Book Club" had a German
Manager and secured the Deutsch-Asiatische Bank as its
93correspondent in Hongkong. The German domination was a 
controversial issue concerning the direction in which the 
Siamese intended the Bank to take.The Bangkok Times and the 
Siam Free Press announced the formation of the Company as a
^  PRO FO 371/132 Paget to Grey May 14 and 15 1906 pg 183. 
Q9
PRO FO 371/132 Paget to Grey May 14,1906.
93 Ibid.
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94sign of establishing a National Bank.
Paget believed that "the fact that it was a German
95institution in disguise did not bother the British". Yet his
opinion changed as Rivett-Carnac and the British banks in
Bangkok gave more attention to the role of the Bank.Both the
Hongkong & Shanghai and the Chartered Bank complained to Paget
of the Book Club's change in role from a purely local one to
9 6an exchange bank. There are no documents to confirm the
influence of the British Banks upon Paget's view,but rather
the context of the complaint that the new bank had been
97started "with unfair advantages”. Nevertheless several
factors can be attributed to the change in Paget's
attitude.Paget anticipated German domination given the nature
of the Bank's vulnerability.Paget adopted the view that the
Siamese shareholders would inevitably sell their shares to the
e.
Deutsch- AsiatischBank thereby paving the way for German 
9 8control. By March 1907,Paget became confident of the Bank's 
position as a Siamese institution.There are two important 
indicators which brought about such confidence;the management
94
PRO FO 371/132 BKK Times Feb 11,1906,and Siam Free Press 
Feb 13,1906.
95 PRO FO 371/132 Paget to Grey May 14,1906 pg 179.
96 PRO FO 371/132 Paget to Grey May 15,1906.
97 Ibid.
98 Ibid.
140
and the terms of the Charter.
The bank's administration was separated into two:the
Director in charge of Foreign Affairs was to be a Westerner
(but not of British or French nationality);and the Director
for internal management was to be a Siamese.The first Foreign
Affairs Director was F.Kilian (German agent of the Deutsch-
Asiatische Bank),and Pra Sanpakarn was in charge of Internal 
99Affairs. The crucial factor m  maintaining Siamese
sovereignty over the Bank was the provisions of the 
Charter.Article 7 stipulated that "not more than 1/3 of the 
capital stock or shares of the Bank,may be owned,directly or 
indirectly,by subjects of a Power enjoying rights of
extraterritoriality in Siam.."^^In Paget's view,it was
perhaps this article with which the Siamese endeavoured to 
escape the "wolf in sheep's clothing",namely the control of 
the Deutsch-Asiatische Bank.^^
In addition,Rivett-Carnac asserted that the Siamese
102intended the Bank to be purely a Siamese institution.
However Mahit held a different view,warning the King that a
9 9 In Siam Commercial Bank 60 Years Commemorative Book pg 
23.
100 PRO FO 422/61 Paget to Grey March 8,1907.
101 Ibid.
1 D9
PRO FO 371/132 Rivett-Carnac to Paget Feb 19,1906.pg 169.
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British Financial Adviser would naturally secure his nation's 
interest;
"It seems that the Adviser is not willing^ 
to get rid of his country's interests."
Mahit's source of evidence was likely to have been based on
Rivett-Carnac's approach to Baring Bros in 1903.Moreover just
7 months after Mahit's warning to the King,the City of London
was showing interest in participating in the proposed National
Bank.In August 1906,Laing & Cruikshank,the broker for Siam in
London,offered their services in connection with this
establishment.They suggested that the Bank employ a British
104manager to supervise the State Bank. Nevertheless the 
Charter and the administrative structure provided security 
against Western domination.
By comparing the Bank's shareholders in 1907 and 1910,it 
is apparent not only that Article 7 was enforced,but that the 
proportion of foreign shareholders had fallen.When the Bank 
was first established,it comprised 3000 shares of which the 
Deutsche Asiatic Bank held 350 shares,and the Danish Landmark 
Bank 250 shares,amounting to 600 shares in foreign hands.By 
1910,544 shares were foreign owned which accounted for 18%,but 
in relative terms the Germans had increased their influence.
i O'?
NA 5 KS 12.2/12 Mahit to King Jan 19,1906.
1 fl4
NA Kh 0301.1 37/120 Laing and Cruikshank to Williamson 
Aug 24,1906.
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P.Schwarze,the General Manager,owned 250 of these shares.
Schwarze had close connections with the Deutsch-Asiatische
Bank and this number of shares gave him considerable voting 
105power. It was the controlling position of the Germans which 
eventually aroused suspicion amongst the British Banks in 
1913.
The German threat to Britain's financial position in 
Bangkok in 1913 became a contentious issue when A.H.Barlow, 
Manager of the Hongkong & Shanghai Bank,heard the prospect of 
the Siam Commercial Bank being converted into a State Bank.The 
event of such a transaction taking place involved the transfer 
of Siamese Government funds from the British banks in Bangkok 
(2m tcs) to the German managed Bank.British fear of such 
proceedings became more apparent when the British 
Minister,Peel,received the news that the newly appointed 
German Minister,Von Buri,was seeking negotiations with the 
Siamese to surrender their extraterritoriality rights.^®In 
return for such a surrender,the Germans were likely to press 
for the conversion of the Siam Commercial Bank into a State 
Bank, thereby damaging British financial interests on a 
substantial scale.
It was clear to the British Consulate and the Treasury
PRO FO 422/65 and 371/984 Peel to Grey April 2,1910.
PRO FO 422/68 Peel to Grey June 27,1913 pg 56.
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Chambers in London that from a commercial perspective,such an 
establishment would be advantageous to the Siamese Government, 
giving it the assistance of a powerful State Bank in remitting 
funds abroad,in raising loans,and in carrying out its currency 
policy.Yet the British considered their interests in Siam,in 
particular those of the British Banks.The British Government 
were desirous that the authority of the proposed State Bank 
should not prejudice the position of the British Banks.Even 
if the State Bank was to be placed under British management, it 
would be desirable that its powers concerning foreign exchange 
be restricted, so as not to interfere with the exchange 
business of the other Banks. Under these circumstances,the 
conversion of the Siam Commercial Bank into a State 
Bank,accompanied by continuing German management and without 
restrictions on its exchange business,would severely undermine 
British interests.
Another alternative was for the Indian State Bank to 
establish a branch in Bangkok and to persuade the Siamese to 
transact their financial business through that branch and its 
connected establishments in Asia.The Hongkong & Shanghai was 
currently holding the bulk of Government funds abroad. 
Therefore even if the Siamese Government were willing to deal 
exclusively with the Indian State Bank,strong objections would 
be raised by the three foreign banks established in Bangkok. 
The British Minister,Peel,suggested that the "only permanent
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way" to avert the danger of the German Siam Commercial Bank
being converted into a State Bank was to bring about the
establishment of a Central Bank of Siam under British
management,and having its principal office abroad situated in
London.This procedure would serve to augment British financial
influence and place an end to any possibility of a German
107managed State Bank. The difficulty encountered was of
selecting the bank which would undertake such task,due to the
competition which it would create with the existing banks.Peel
recommended that the Board of Trade needed to consult an
independent financier who had no particular interest in any
108of the British Banks in Bangkok.
However the Board of Trade did not share Peel's proposal. 
Complications would arise in approaching the two British Banks 
with any suggestion for individual or concerted action in the 
matter, particularly as the British Government was in no 
position to offer them substantial terms.Moreover they 
gathered that the French Government might demand that the 
Banque de L'Indo-Chine be permitted to participate in any 
Siamese State Bank.The Board of Trade saw it as impractical 
to proceed with any definite action and suggested Peel observe
10*7 Ibid.
108 PRO FO 371/1751 Minute on proposed establishment of 
National Bank in Siam.Sept 20,1913,by Peel.
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. 109any developments.
It was in December 1913 that constructive action became
necessary.A serious banking crisis in which the Siam
Commercial Bank became involved brought direct intervention
from the Treasury.The crisis was linked to the failure of an
indigeneous banking institution,the Chino-Siam Bank,which had
close business relations with the Siam Commercial handling its
deposits.The Financial Adviser informed Peel that the outcome
could result in the conversion of the Siam Commercial to
German management.^^Peel asked Grey to despatch a British
Financial agent who was "unconnected with any bank here" to
make representations over to the need for the State Bank to
have a British connection.^^^The Board of Trade supported such
a movement but anticipated difficulty in selecting an
appropriate agent.Instead the Board of Trade suggested that
the Hongkong & Shanghai Bank and the Chartered Bank be
persuaded to form a consortium to assume the management of
112the Siam Commercial.
It was not till mid 1914 that the engagement of a British
109 PRO FO 371/1751 Board of Trade to Whitehall Oct 30,1913.
110 PRO FO 371/1751 Peel to Grey Dec 23,1913.
111 Ibid.
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financial agent was effected by Rivett-Carnac.Rivett-Carnac
proposed a financier named Touche,lately an Inspector of the
National Bank of India,but Touche was not experienced enough
113to deal with the situation. Therefore two more names were
submitted;Tegetmeier of the Bank of New Zealand;and Hunter
114from the Bank of Madras. W.B.Hunter was chosen as he had
already been engaged in reconstructing the Siam Commercial
Bank.His task was to advise the Siamese Government on the most
appropriate method for converting the Siam Commercial into a 
115National Bank.
This episode of the establishment of a National Bank has 
been primarily presented in the context of the British 
view.Evidence of the underlying factors which the Siamese took 
into consideration is limited.However there are two reports 
submitted by the foreign advisers,Rivett-Carnac and 
Westengard,from which some deduction of the Siamese 
consideration can be made.As early as 1899,Rivett-Carnac 
presented a memorandum to the Finance Minister concerning the 
Siamese considerations on a National Bank.11^He specified the 
point that the financial infrastructure was not ready for the
ill
PRO FO 371/2100 Lyle to Sir Walter Langley May 8,1913.
114
PRO FO 371/2100 Rivett-Carnac to Langley June 26,1914.
115 PRO FO 371/2100 Lyle to Grey July 30,1914.
NA KT 101/2 Rolin-Jacquemyns Papers.Rivett-Carnac 
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117bank to "be a purely Siamese institution". In
1906,Westengard warned Devawongse of the political
complications arising from securing German participation;
"I do not say that it is a bad thing for 
Siam that a third power should increase 
its interests here.But I do say that the 
Siamese Government should be cautious not 
to put itself in a position where it can 
be accused of having directly favoured 
and encouraged such an increase of 
influence in a third pOY^g/at the expense 
of England and France."
Public Works.
British economic activity was primarily geared towards 
foreign trade,not only through import-export houses,but also 
in banking, shipping,insurance etc.British involvement in the 
service sector: dispensary,engineering,and tailoring has also 
been noted.Yet the role of British activity in the municipal 
development of Bangkok was limited.The Siamese intended to 
undertake municipal investment themselves,but the weakness of 
economic management resulted in continuing dependence on 
Western influence.One interesting factor was that public work 
investment was undertaken by the Danes.Such public works and 
services included the electrification of the city and 
tramways.The remainder of this chapter will account for the 
growth of Danish influence and its position compares with that
117 .Ibid.
lift NA 5 KS 12.2/12 Westengard to Devawongse May 22,1906.
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of the British in Bangkok.There were certain similarities and 
differences between the Danish and British operations.Both 
conducted business under the patronage system.The difference 
was the Danish showed respect for Siamese intentions to secure 
various concessions for their own investors.lt has already 
been discussed how the British endeavoured to secure all 
concessions.
An indication of Siamese preference for Danish influence
is indicated in the first tramway concession in 1887
undertaken by two prominent Danes (Admiral de Richelieu and
J.Loftus) known as the Bangkok Tramway Concession.Admiral de
Richelieu was the first Danish naval officer to enter the
service of the Siamese navy in 1876.He assumed the title of
Phya Cholyuthathien,became Commander-in-Chief of the Navy,and
resigned in 1902 after 27 years service. His brother,Louis
de Richelieu (Phra Polsintanevat), was also employed in the
Siamese navy,and entered into partnership with another
Dane,Aage Westenholtz,to establish the Samsen Tramway Co in 
119July 1901. Both concessions eventually amalgamated with 
another Danish enterprise,the Siam Electricity Co Ltd.
The Siam Electricity Co was formed in Denmark in 1898 for 
the purpose of supplying electric light and power in Bangkok
119 Thai-Danish Relations 30 Cycles of Friendship.Ministry of 
Education,Denmark,1980.pp 54-59.
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for 40 years.The Company began its operation through the
purchase of an electric light concession which the Siamese had
granted to a British entrepreneur L.E.Bennet in 1897.The
Danish Company bought the concession for 200,000 tcs and had
a registered capital of 600,000 tcs.The Company Chairman was
J.Gluckstadt,resident in Copenhagen,whilst the management was
120undertaken by Westenholtz,a resident civil engineer.
Siam Electricity Co Ltd
Bangkok Electric Bangkok Tramway Samsen Tramway 
Light Concession Concession Concession
1899. 1900. 1907.
The crucial element about this Danish Company which 
distinguished it from the British was the mutual trust 
established between Westenholtz and the Siamese 
Government.Such a relationship did not exist with British 
entrepreneurs with the exception of Louis Leonowens.It was the 
way in which the Siamese endeavoured to secure tramway 
concession that reveals the attitude and response from 
Westenholtz.In 1904 the King endeavoured to promote an 
indigenous tramway company,as it had been twelve years since 
two Siamese companies had collapsed (Siam River Steamboat 
Co,and Siam Electric Light Co).In reaction to such a 
concession,Westenholtz expressed his support;
1 ?fi
NA 5 N 21/11 Brief History of Bangkok Electric Light 
Concession,submitted to the King Sept 20,1901.
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"We understand that the concession be granted 
to Naradhip,rather than us (Siam Electricity Co) 
because he will form a Siamese Co and it is 
considered proper to give it prefejgnce over 
a company of foreign nationality."
The key issue was that Westenholtz accepted the fact that
the King intended the concession to be a Siamese one.To this
effect, Westenholtz feared the consequences if the Siamese
company was to collapse which would open the opportunity for
a Western enterprise to assume control;
"We do not see why preference should be given 
to a company which,though nominally Siamese, 
would for all practical purposes be owned 
and controlled by a great foreign nation,whose
representative would look after the pecuniary 
interests of his nationals in the usual way; 
rather than confide the wojl^to the subjects 
of a small nation (Siam)."
Westenholtz was of the opinion that it should be stipulated
that the concession be granted to Naradhip and that the
majority of shares be Siamese so as to prevent foreign
intervention.
The Minister for Local Government,Prince Naret,considered
Westenholtz' s advice and suggested to the King that the
capital ought to be raised before the concession be 
123granted. The amount of capital required was approximately
NA 5 N 21/40 Westenholtz to Naret, Minister of Local 
Government.Nov 23,1903.
122 _.. .Ibid.
NA 5 N 21/40 Naret to King March 4,1904.
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124900,000 tc. Westenholtz offered to work the concession if
Naradhip failed to raise the necessary capital.He proposed to
construct the tramway under a new Company,rather than the
Siamese Electricity Co,subservient to Siamese law,in which the
Siamese would assume half the total shares whilst the
125remainder would be offered for public subscription.
In October 1,1905 Naradhip formed a joint stock company,
Siamese Tramway Co Ltd,to work the concession modelled on the
lines of a British limited company.The Siam Electricity Co had
shown success in tramway construction which undoubtedly
induced the Siamese to embark upon such a project in the
expectation of profit.However,faced with financial constraint
on account of the costs of material involved,investors were
granted only small returns.In 1907 the majority of the shares
were brought by the Siam Electricity Co,which operated three
126lines intersecting the City of Bangkok.
British involvement in municipal enterprise came in the 
supply of machinery goods.Railway material was an important 
merchandise supplied from Britain,and will be discussed in 
Chapter 7.An important event which occurred during this period 
was the arbitration case between a British engineering firm
194
NA 5 N 21/40 Westenholtz to Naret March 3,1904.
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NA 5 N 21/40 Westenholtz to Naret Feb 8,1904.
126 Lamont Groundwater,"Engineering" in 20th Century..pq 192.
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in London,the Brusch Electric Co,and the Siamese Electric 
Light Company.The contention drew the attention of the British 
Foreign Office despite its non-interventionist policy.
The Siam Electric Light Co (SEL) was a Siamese syndicate
formed in June 1899 with a subscription of 480,000 tcs for the
monopoly of public electric lighting in Bangkok.The King held
half the shares privately.At the end of June,a contract was
concluded between the Syndicate and the Brusch Co for the
supply of all machinery (plant and apparatus for an electric
light station).The total price amounted to £44,828 of which
the Syndicate paid £30,486 leaving a balance of £14,342 
127unpaid. Being short of capital, funds were raised by the 
further issue of shares but it was discovered that the dynamos 
were inadequate.The Brusch Co claimed £14,800 balance due on 
the contract,with interest on the deferred payments.The Siam 
Electric Light Co admitted only £11,000 due within 36 months 
after the commencement of lighting,but denied that lighting 
had yet begun.
The chief differences of opinion involved the amount of 
interest due to each party,and to the question of whether the 
final instalment on the total sum contracted to be paid within 
the specified period.The arbitration was conducted throughout
197
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May 1892.The decision was carried out on May 13th after an
arbitration hearing of 9 days,by which the Brusch Co was
awarded £13,000 in return for a replacement of the dynamos.The
problem was that the Siam Electric Light Co did not have the
129funds to meet the £13,000 payment. To overcome the financial
committment,the King decided to grant the concession for 50
years to a new purchaser,and to maintain his shares in the
Company.In September 1892,Mr.Fritschi took up the King's lease
and informed Devawongse that;
"As the King possessed half the shares of 
the Company,it appeared to be ample guarantee 
to protect me against losses."
The root of the conflict was the failure of management,as
suggested by the Bangkok Times;the SEL Co "bit off more than
131it could chew in purchasing the amount of plant it did".
The dependency on foreign technology,capital,and 
management,was a prerequisite for Western involvement in 
business management in Siam.Nevertheless certain projects were 
kept as State undertakings, namely the water works.In 1899 a 
French company (Compagnie Generale de Travaux d'Utilite 
Publique de France) forwarded a memorandum on sanitary 
measures for Bangkok.The proposal involved the supply of
1 oq
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purified water,sewerage system,and improved housing
conditions .The estimated cost of the scheme was £400,000 (6 .8m
132tcs) with an annual expenditure of 312,800 tcs. The
Siamese authorities were in no position to undertake such a
133programme due "to financial and economical reforms". Siamese
policy towards the water supply was made explicit when
A.J.Corbett (Straits Engineering Syndicate Ltd) applied for
a concession to lay pipe lines,for which Westengard informed
Naret,it was;
"Not advisable to grant permission...set 
precedent for others to ask permission 
for other roads and thus there would be 
created a concession for a water supply 
of Bangkok.I do not think the Government 
wishes to grant such a concession."
The presence of British enterprise in Bangkok served as 
"agents" of modernisation.The trading houses induced the 
growth of trade and brought qualitative changes to the 
business environment in Bangkok.The banks provided a model for 
the establishment of an indigeneous one and the experience for 
the Chinese compradores.The crucial element was that British 
and Chinese capital complemented,as opposed to challenging one 
another.As regards public works,the involvement of the Danes 
demonstrates an element of counter-balance to British
1 32
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Chapter 4
The Development of British Economic Interests in Northern Siam 
and the Opening of the Teak Forests,1856-1883.
The Northern Economy and its Link with British Burma.
An expected immediate result of the Bowring Treaty would 
have been trade between Bangkok and Northern Siam,yet the 
latter region continued to be economically linked to Burma.The 
corollary of the growth of the overland trade was the demand 
by British subjects, especially those engaged in the teak 
trade,for greater protection.There were two underlying 
complaints:firstly the problem of dacoit;and secondly the 
essence of jurisdiction for British merchants. These two issues 
necessitated the Siamese Government's intervening in the 
autonomous Northern tributary states which led to the Treaty
of 1874,and a revised one in 1883 known as the Chiengmai
Treaty,giving Britain greater authority in that region.
The British Consul in Bangkok,the trading community,and 
the missionaries,all had vested interests in Northern Siam.The 
basis of British interests was the caravan trade,and the 
prospects of securing the trade with Yunnan in South
China.From the perspective of British subjects in Burma,it was
the rich teak forests of the region which were the luring 
factor.The region Monthon Payab consisted of 5 tributary
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states:Chiengmai,Lamphun,Lampang , Nan,and Phrae.Bangkok's
ability to exercise control over these states was 
limited,thereby allowing the hereditary rulers (known as the 
Chaos) of these states an element of autonomy.The Siamese King 
was limited to the role of ratifying the States' officials 
after they had been chosen for office from among the ruling 
families.The union between the Chaos and the Bangkok 
authorities was based on mutual self-intereststhe states 
sought protection and autonomy,whilst Bangkok sought "prestige 
and the defence of its heartland."'*'
The economic system of these states was characterised by
state trading; "every cultivator,without exception,at the close
of the harvest...payed into the Government granary a quantity
2
of grain equal to what he may have sown. " While the local
inhabitants kept the Chaos supplied with rice,the hill-tribes
were responsible for the more exotic gifts ;weaving and
3
embroidery were the principal handicrafts. The principal 
export from the Northern provinces was teak,which was 
extracted from the Siamese forests in the Salween side and 
were floated down the Salween river to Moulmein in Burma. 
The overland imports to Northern Siam consisted mainly of
 ^N.J.Brailey;"The Siamese Forward Movement in N.Laos States 
1850-92", Ph.D.University of London 1969 pg 79.
2
J.A.Ramsay: "Development of Modern Bureaucratic Polity",Ph.D, 
diss,Cornell U,1971.pg 45.
PRO FO 69/55 Captain Lowndes Journal,June 30,1871.
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European goods brought from Burma.The trade was conducted by
4
regular British subject of the Shan States, to the extent that 
the Indian rupee was the prevailing currency used in Northern 
Siam.
The fact that the rupee and "no Bangkok money was to be 
5
seen in the bazaar" is an indication of the northern trade 
being oriented towards Burma rather than Bangkok.The only 
trade with Bangkok was that in salt and gun-powder from 
Bangkok in return for tobacco,grain,and stick-lac.The fact 
that the economic system provided a small tax-base together 
with the autocratic rule of the Chaos gave the northern states 
an economic structure inimical to diversification.
The Caravan Trade.
The overland trade of Northern Siam was carried on with 
three Burmese districts:Amherst,Salween,and Tavoy.The trade 
between the district of Amherst and the Siamese autonomous 
states was registered at 3 stations of Hline-bwai,
Kawkariet,and Meetan.These 3 stations were situated almost due 
north,east,and south respectively of Moulmein.The Kawkariet 
route was the principal one as the road was easier to
4
PRO FO 69/55 There had been no trade with China for the past 
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5 Ibid.
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travel.The Hline-Bwai route was the most direct route to the 
Shan States of Chiengmai,and secured a fair portion of the 
traffic,whilst that by Meetan,due to its geographical 
position,only had access to trade of the most southern part 
of those states.The overland trade to the Amherst district 
from Siam consisted of cattle, ponies, livestock,silk,in 
exchange for European twist and yarn,metal ware,and salt.**
The overland route to and from the Salween district was
conducted via the Dagwin route.From Kyouk-Hnyat on a bend of
the Salween river,direct north from Pahpoon,traders journeyed
by water up the Salween,and rejoined the land route from
Pahpoon via Kollido,at a point close to the river's edge where
the route breaks off into the two branch roads leading into
Eastern and Western Karenee. Exports along these Salween routes
consisted of piece-goods,betel nut,rice,metal ware,salt,sugar,
tobacco,woollen goods and sundries.Imports from Northern Siam
consisted of cattle,lacquer ware,grain,vegetables,stick-
7
lac,silk,piece-goods,pickled tea and tobacco.
Trade between North Siam and the Tavoy district was 
carried on by Shans and Burmese from Rangoon and Moulmein 
using the Myitta route.Traders starting from Mergui proceeded 
by the town of Tenasserim and up the Tenasserim River to a
 ^ Report on the Inland Trade of British Burma 1877-78 pg 14. 
7 Ibid pg 14.
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place called Poungyiek in the Tavoy district and then on to 
a road leading to Siam.When returning,the route via Mergui was 
more convenient,involving a raft journey down the Tenasserim 
River.The Siamese State traded treasure,gold bullion,rubies 
and coral in exchange for precious stones,notably
g
sapphires,silk and metal wares.
The overland trade between Northern Siam and British 
Burma showed that British trade with the former was part of 
a horizontal movement from India into Burma,and hence into 
Northern Siam.The importance of the overland trade is 
reflected in the growth of two trading centres;Raheng and 
Chiengmai.According to Consul Edwards in his journey to 
Chiengmai in 1874,he noted that the "trade of Raheng is
9
considerable". Raheng was the emporium for the trade between 
Bangkok and the Northern provinces,Chiengmai,Lamphoon,and 
Lakhon.The traders were mostly Burmese Tongsoos and other 
British subjects who travelled from Moulmein passing through 
Raheng.These traders brought "piece goods miscellaneous 
articles of barter,and money to exchange for cattle, 
elephants,ivory..in the eastern Laos states and Lakhon." 
Edwardes also gave a clear description of the extent of the
® Ibid Year 1878-79 pg 11.
9
D.J.Edwardes,"Report Describing Chiengmai and Other Teak 
Districts of Siam" in BCR 1874 pp.10-23.Reprinted in 
Political Economy of Siam 1851-1910.edit by Charthip Nartsupha 
and Suthy Prasartset pg 159.
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cattle trade;
"...many thousand head of buffaloes and Kine 
were thus annually exported to Moulmein,besides 
a number of elephants,and 200 or 300 parties 
of British subjects,averaging at least ten or 
fifteen men in^gach party,annually passed through 
the province."
The exports from Chiengmai were teak,stick-lac,betelnut, 
ivory, hides,and various kinds of jungle produce.Teak was the 
predominant export.Edwardes observed in 1874 that 35,000 logs 
were annually worked out of the Salween,whilst those exported 
to Bangkok did not exceed 1000-2000 logs per annum. ^ ^"Besides 
teak,other exports to Bangkok were primarily local products 
such as lacquer,ivory,hides, used for decorations.
The chief import to Chiengmai was salt which included 
salt fish and kapee.Next in importance were British 
manufactured goods which were transacted by Chinese 
merchants, to whom alone the traders were to sell their 
goods.There were a small number of Chinese caravans from the 
borders of Yunnan which exchanged opium and local goods for 
cotton cloth.The limited economic relations between Northern 
Siam and Bangkok eventually determined the British authorities 
in Burma to press the Bangkok administration for intervention.
^  Ibid pg 161. 
11 Ibid pg 179.
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British Interest In Teak
For many centuries,the teak forests had been exploited
on a small scale to satisfy domestic demand.The local people
extracted teak for the construction of houses,temples,
bridges,boats.In the Siamese records of Rama III,there are
various correspondences concerning the demand for teak from 
12Bangkok. British involvement in the teak extraction of the
Siamese Northern forests dates back to as early as 1835,when
13it was carried out by Messrs.Hunter and Hayes.
In order to understand the importance of teak to British 
interests and the factors which enabled the British to play 
a predominant role in its extraction,some general points about 
the nature of the product needs to be considered.Teak is 
classed as a medium hardwood.lt contains silica,which renders 
it insect-proof and fire resistant. Its main use has always 
been in shipbuilding; in Europe ships and decks were made of 
teak from the early nineteenth century,as a substitute for the 
diminishing stocks of European oak.In addition teak was also 
used for railway carriage construction,and for panels.
The area of the earth's surface in which valuable teak 
forests were found was not extensive,being restricted to the 
monsoon countries:Southern India,Burma,Siam,and Cochin-
12 NL R.3 JS 1197,Year 1835.
^  Burney Papers IV Pt.2 pg 82.
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China.Some teak was found in Java but was not of adequate 
quality,and the forests of Cochin-China and a part of Siam 
remained inaccessible before 1914.There were three ports in 
the world from which teak was exported:Rangoon,Moulmein,and 
Bangkok,of which Rangoon was the most important.
The teak bearing forests lie in the north of Siam,and the 
most productive region,around Chiengmai and Phrae,encompassed 
all the headwaters of the Me Ping,Me Wang and Me Yom.The right 
bank of the Me Ping from the Me Layan,down to Klong Kong below 
Kam peng was also a very productive region.Both sides of the 
range of hills were scattered over with the teak forests;the 
timber on the west side being floated down the streams to the 
Thoungyengh and thence into the Salween to Moulmein in 
Burma,and that on the east side into the Me Ping,and finally 
to Bangkok (see Map I).
Teak extraction was arduous,time consuming,and involved 
a significant outlay of capital.This arose from the nature of 
the teak forests and of the timber.Teak grows in the forest 
alongside a wide variety of other trees,so that each 
individual tree that had to be felled needed to be 
selected,marked,cut,and then dragged by elephants through the 
thick forests to the river systems. Elephants were also used 
to push logs into the water,and for freeing floating logs from
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14obstructing their journeys to rafting stations or mills.
The Chaos were content to be forest owners,and in order 
to develop the forests without disrupting the traditional 
Siamese beliefs in ghosts,foreign labour was employed,notably 
the Burmese and Shans,to work them for a consideration. 
Therefore,the actual work in the forests,the girdling, 
felling,and dragging were performed by the Burmese and 
Shans;the lumbermen were not permanent migrants and only 
remained for 2/3 years,returning to Luang Prabang.
On the eve of the Bowring Treaty,the working of teak by
British subjects had already advanced to a significant
stage.The teak extracted from the Shan forests was sent to the
Moulmein market,where there was a rising demand,partly as a
result of British possession of the Tenasserim Division.There
was no regulatory control between the two Governments over the
flow of teak to Moulmein,except for a duty levied by the Chaos
15on each tree that was cut. However,the teak trade had grown 
to the extent that the Commissioner of the Tenasserim 
Provinces brought the subject to the attention of the Indian 
Office in 1847;
"...but now that a great number of our subjects
14 Methods of teak extraction are explained by Falkus article 
"Early British Business in Thailand",and Hamilton King "Teak 
Industry in Siam" in Political Economy of Siam 1851-1910.
15 Burnev Papers IV Pt.l pg 238.
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are engaged in working these forests,and large 
sums of money are embarked in such operations, 
it becomes incumbent on us to form some 
permanent arrangement to encourage them as much 
as possible and Jg protect our subjects who may 
embark on them."
The Commissioner in Burma feared that conflict might arise
between the Shan States and the Northern States over the
revenues derived from teak extraction.In order to secure the
Shan forests to British interests,the Commissioner advised
that "arrangements are absolutely necessary to be made by the
2 States.
Disputes Over The Teak Trade.
The development of the teak trade in the Northern states
was accompanied by intense disputes over dacoit and dual
leasing by the Chaos.Unlike Burma,where the Crown had direct
control over the teak forests,the Siamese monarch had limited
authority over the Northern autonomous states.The disputes
regarding timber cutting in the Siamese territories became
ever more frequent after the British assumed possession of the
18Tenasserim Provinces in 1824. British demand for teak from 
Moulmein provided the "vent" for teak traders to engage 
themselves in the forests of Northern Siam.Such an influx of
17 ,Ibid.
18 PRO FO 69/42 Col A.Fytche,Commissioner Tennasserim 
Division,to Sec to Govt India.April 16,1866.
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teak profiteers gave rise to hostile conflict between the 
Eastern Karenees and the Zimmay Shans.
The disputes involved claims by both parties to certain
19forest tracts on their mutual frontier. The Karenees claimed
the forests at the upper part of the Yuam stream,whilst the
Shans claimed those between the river Mee Pai and River Mee 
20Hang. These claims frequently led to dacoity.As the forests 
were worked by Moulmein timber traders who purchased teak for 
export to British territory,this involved British interest in 
the prevailing situation.The teak which floated into Burma 
paid a duty at Kado,and thus any disruption to the flow of 
teak meant a loss of revenue to the British Burmese 
authorities.^  ^
The British Commissioner of Moulmein,Capt Hopkinson,made 
the following comment on the the importance of the teak trade 
in 1860;
"Moulmein has now become part of considerable 
commercial importance,and this position it 
owes chiefly to its export trade in teak timber... 
In 1858/59 teak timber to the value of nearly
400,000 pounds was exported from Moulmein,of 
this timber not more than 5 % was of home grown, 
the remaining 95% was all foreign timber,and of 
this foreign timber,a great portion came from
19 PRO FO 69/55 J.Talbeys Wheeler,Secretary to Chief 
Commissioner,to Sec to Govt India.Sept 16,1871.
20 Edwardes Journey .
^  PRO FO 69/55 Wheeler to Sec to Govt of India,Sept 16,1871.
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the territory understooc^t0 within the 
Chiengmai jurisdiction."
The prosperity of Moulmein was dependent upon Siamese teak and
the Commissioner in Burma had already approached the Indian
Office to provide means of sustaining the trade;
"We have in fact,no responsible authority to 
deal with throughout the whole of the country 
bordering on the eastern frontier,and it is 
this utter absence of anything in the shape 
of a government which ensures the dacoits 
and murderers,who infes}^ these forests the 
most entire impunity."
As the Indian authorities showed no response to the
Commissioner in Burma,Hopkinson approached the British
Consul,Schomburgk,for immediate response.
The visit of the British Consul,Schomburgk,to Chiengmai
in 1860 focused attention upon the situation.The purpose of
his visit,as suggested by British officials in Burma,was to
examine the teak trade carried on between Lower Burma and
24Northern Siam through the Port of Moulmein. A number of legal 
cases were brought before him by British subjects,of which the 
most important was that of Chew It.Chew It (a British subject) 
had suffered the seizure of his property,flogging and 
imprisonment in iron for several months at Chiengmai on a
22 PRO FO 69/21 Capt.Hopkinson,Commissioner at Moulmein,to 
Schomburgk,March 30,1860.
23 Tickell to Hopkinson Nov 24,1860 in Indian Foreign 
Proceedings Vol 60.Quoted in Brailey Phd pg 123.
24 PRO FO 69/21 Capt H.Hopkinson,Commr at Moulmein,to 
Schomburgk March 30,1860.
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charge of coining money.Schomburgk attempted to invoke the
Bowring Treaty but the Chao refused;
"Chew It had been dealt with contrary to the 
Treaty concluded with Britain...Chao pretended 
that the Treaty referred only to Siam proper. . 
(Bangkok),and could not be applied to Chiengmai 
or any of the Lao States,and that Britain 
would have to enter into separate treaties with 
them."
Schomburgk's policy was hindered by the fact that he gained
inadequate co-operation from the Siamese Government who
claimed that in the Chew It case,they could not intervene in
a state which governed with its own laws different from 
2 6Siam. It became apparent that a separate treaty was to be
\
considered.Prince Wongsa confirmed to Schomburgk that the King
and his Royal Council considered that;"as Chiengmai is
tributary to Siam,the treaty made between Britain and that
27country,includes all its territories."
In order to protect the trade of Moulmein,Schomburgk 
suggested the appointment of a British Vice-Consul at 
Chiengmai.The idea was supported by Commissioner Hopkinson who 
declared;
"It is the timber transactions that the value 
of the Vice-Consul's service would be found 
inestimable.He would be able to secure honest
^  PRO FO 69/21 Schomburgk to Russell May 7,1860.
2 6
PRO FO 69/30 Praklang to Schomburgk July 6,1861.
27 PRO FO 69/30 Prince Wongsa (Acting Supreme Governor of the 
Northern Districts and Tributaries of Siam) to Schomburgk.May
7,1863.Translated by Knox.
169
dealing among the chiefs and the traders,and 
what is of more consequence, among the traders
themselves;all timber bargains would be 
registered in his office,and extracts from 
the registers certifying the ownership of 
the timber and to the m^rks on it would be 
forwarded to Moulmein.”
Schomburgk's plan to regulate the teak trade by the
establishment of a Consulate was submitted to the Royal
Council.The Council,attended by 8 officials,decided that it
was the Chao of Chiengmai's privilege to consent to such an 
29establishment. The result was that "an understanding was come
to that the Chief would in future protect such British
subjects as visited his province and in case of grave dispute
30refer the matter" to the Consulate in Bangkok. The most 
controversial case was the Mong Shwe Gan case which 
subsequently led to the 1875 Treaty.
The Mong Shwe Gan case reflects the problems confronting
teak traders conducting business in a territory without any
31adequate system of regulation. As British subjects from Burma 
came into the north to compete for forest leases,the Chaos 
took the opportunity to exploit the situation by demanding
2 8
Hopkinson to India Govt Nov 9,1860.IFP Vol 60.April 1862.In 
Brailey Phd pg 126.
29 NL R.4 JS 1223 Vol 34,Year 1860.
30 PRO FO 69/42 Knox to Clarendon Feb 19,1866.Referring to 
1862 Cabinet Meeting.
31 PRO FO 69/42 Burn's case.Narrative taken primarily from a 
petition from Johnstone to Col.A.P.Phayre.See Brailey Phd pg 
131-140.
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bribes thereby leading to dual leasing. In 1858 Shwe Gan (a
forester and a British subject of Moulmein) obtained a lease
from the Chao Rachaboot to work the forests upon the Yuam
creek in return for the payment of duty,and the Chao agreed
32not to enter any other agreement concerning the lease.
Shwe Gan had his property devastated by the Karens,and
faced with the inability to meet the duty payment,decided to
take refuge in Moulmein.In 1861 Shwe Gan returned and found
that the lease had been transfered to Lenaine,an Indo-British
residing in Moulmein,and agent for Messrs Snadden.The Chao had
transferred the lease to Lenaine on the justification that
33Shwe Gan had failed to pay the duty. The Siamese
Commissioner,Putararpi,regarded the Chao's procedure as an
infringement of the Agreement,as the latter had no authority
to conclude another agreement without the consent from the
34Bangkok administration.
In April 1863 Snadden,dissatisfied with Lenaine's 
progress,bought the concession from Lenaine for 180,000 
rupees,and transferred the work to Johnstone (a British 
subject and timber forester from Moulmein) for 170,000
32 NL JS R.4 1226/66 Chao Phya Putararpi,Superintendent of 
North,to Chao Chiengmai,Year 1864.
33 PRO FO 69/42 Enclosure pg 23 Snadden to Schomburgk March
15,1863.
^  NL JS R.4 1226/66 Putararpi to Chao Chiengmai,Year 1864/65.
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35rupees. Johnstone began operations in the Myne Loongye 
Forests on a large scale and was recognised by the Chief of 
Chiengmai as the legitmate holder of the forests of Myne 
Loongyee.However Captain R.C.Burns (agent for Shwe Gan) put 
forward a case against the Chief of Chiengmai claiming 
compensation for Shwe Gan.Captain Burn was formerly an officer 
of the Madras Staff Corps,and a partner of Shwe Gan,whilst 
Johnstone,as owner of the forest,acted as agent for the Chief 
of Chiengmai.
The disputed issue was the extent of the concession.The
Chao's agreement with Johnstone had given the latter rights
over a greater area than the original one with Mong Shwe
Gan,including some teak forests to which Burmese and Karens
had prior claims. Capt Burn and Mong Shwe Gan attempted to
take over these also,and the Chao Kawilorot objected.Burn
reported his non co-operation to Knox,who then obtained a
promise from Mongkut that,"unless the Chief acts up to his
3 6contract,His Majesty will compel him by force if necessary."
The Siamese authorities decided the case in favour of the 
Chief and the decrees confirmed by the King.In response,the 
British Consul wrote to Mongkut before the latter had 
confirmed the decree insisting upon the detention of the
35 T. . ,Ibid.
^  PRO FO 69/42 Knox to Russell,June 27,1865.
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Chiengmai Chief and that the Loongyee Forests be handed over
to Captain Burn "which he is undoubtedly (entitled) to.." and
that there were other charges from British subjects against
the Chief of Chiengmai which the Consul had not yet' submitted
for trial.The Consul threatened that if these cases were not
decided in favour of Shwe Gan,he would refer the entire
proceedings to the Viceroy and the Governor-General of
India.Nevertheless,the King was not intimidated by the threats
and confirmed the decree,whilst the Chief of Chiengmai was
37detained in Bangkok for questioning.
To resolve the situation,the Siamese Government decided
that Capt Burn be appointed Siamese Consul for Moulmein and
gave notice that the Chief of Chiengmai might no longer be
detained.The arrangement implied that the British Consul would
withdraw all cases against the Chiengmai Chief if the latter
handed over the forests to Shwe Gan.The Chief of Chiengmai
abided by the demands of the British Consul.This meant that
38Johnstone could no longer work in the forests.
Finally,with the case reviewed several times,Shwe Gan's
39case was concluded as invalid. Shwe Gan in 1860 had sold his 
timber to Lenaine at a "fair marketable rate" and also
37 Based on PRO FO 69/42 Burn's case.
38 T. . .Ibid.
39
PRO FO 69/42 pg 24 Snadden to Schomburgk.June 12,1863.
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transferred a grant he held of a portion of Myne Loongyee 
Forests for an old debt.The reluctance of the British 
Government to interfere in the case was clearly seen in the 
new Consul General's memorandum to the Secretary of State 
Russell;
"Many of the Statements in Mr.Johnstone's 
petitions are essentially false...if Col.
Phayre had looked into the matter closer.. 
he would have found that the petition was 
not so wel^grounded as he seems to have 
imagined."
The Shwe Gan case serves to illustrate several points
about the nature of conducting trade in the Northern
states.Firstly there was no proper system of allocating leases
nor any form of registration. For instance Shwe Gan had
abandoned the forest for 3 years but yet still laid claim to
it.The overwhelming authority of the Chaos encouraged such
practise.Kawilorot dissatisfied with Lenaine's progress
transferred the work to Johnstone.In reaction to this system
practised by the Chaos,Mongkut endeavoured to adopt concrete
measures against the Chaos, and this can be seen as the
beginning of a centralizing policy.The fact that the British
Government showed reluctance to interfere in Northern affairs
posed a severe constraint upon any movement for British
protection.As a last resort,the British Consul appealed
directly to Mongkut to obtain justice for British subjects;
"I fear that unless some change is made in 
this regard,serious complications between
40
PRO FO 69/42 Knox to Russell,June 27,1865.
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the government of British India and that of 
Siam may arise,which may result in grave 
contingencies^which I should be the first 
to deplore."
The British Indian Government took the initiative by 
despatching an exploratory mission to Northern Siam which 
Gen.Fytche had proposed in 1862 and 1863 whilst Commissioner 
of Tenasserim.lt took Brown and Fytche 3 months to seek an 
appropriate officer,notably Captain F.Lowndes of the Burma 
police.Capt Lowndes reached Chiengmai on April 18,1871.He 
concluded that there was no hope of an agreement between the 
Zimmay Shan and the Karenees because both intended to obtain 
money from the foresters.He pointed out that the Karenees had 
the upper hand in threatening the Zimmay Shans.Due to their 
"savage" nature,the Karenees continuously encroached upon the 
Zimmay forests,sending dacoits and thereby frightening off the 
foresters.^
As Chiengmai was a distance from Bangkok,the former had
43no means of protection. The normal journey time down river 
from Chiengmai to Bangkok (a distance of about 500 miles) 
would take about 3 weeks,while the journey in the other 
direction could take 3-4 months. It was common for the 
Chiengmai authorities to mistaken the Burmese Shan workers for
^  PRO FO 69/42 Schomburgk to Mongkut.March 9,1864.
42 PRO FO 69/55 Capt.Lowndes to Col D.Brown,Commissioner 
Tenasserim Division,June 30,1871.
43 t K .,Ibid.
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dacoits.For instance in May 1870,the Chiengmai authorities
massacred 80-100 Burmese Shans working teak near Hmyne-Longyee
for a timber merchant Moung Tha Quay.Though the case was put
forward to the Siamese Government to compensate for
44damages,the case was merely shelved.
The British Commissioner,Wheeler,pointed out to the
British Indian Government that in order to ensure the
flourishing teak trade to Moulmein,an understanding between
the Karenees and the Zimmay Chiefs would have to be agreed
upon defining their rights over the forests and their
boundaries.Secondly,there was the need to check the entry of
marauding gangs.It seemed clear to the authorities that the
most effective way of conciliating the two policies was
through the establishment of an administration at the 
45frontier. According to the British authorities in Burma,the 
Siamese Government agreed to the British proposal because it 
was in Siam's interest that some form of stability be 
maintained in the Northern Provinces.As Chiengmai was 
degenerating into disorganization thereby leading to a 
decrease in revenue,Chiengmai would eventually become a 
valueless tributary of Siam.Therefore the Siamese were in 
favour of establishing a British Burma station at Zimmay to
PRO FO 69/55 "Alleged Murder of British subjects in
Zimmay".
^  PRO FO 69/55 Wheeler to Sec to Govt of India.Sept 16,1871.
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46facilitate trade between Bangkok and Zimmay.
The Regulation Of The Teak Trade.
In response to the Burmese authorities' request,the
Indian Government induced Knox to assert his influence with
the Siamese Court to restore order on the Siamese bank of the 
47river. The first step was for the Siamese Government to adopt
efficient measures for the protection of their own rights in
48the forests against the encroachments of the Karenees. Once
the territory was clearly defined separating Siamese territory
and the Kareenees, the timber merchants would become more aware
49of whom they were dealing with. Therefore what the Indian 
Government was pointing out to Knox was for the Siamese 
Government to implement two measures; firstly,to increase the 
police force on the left bank of the Salween; secondly, to
establish posts to correspond with those on the British
. . 50side.
These measures would partially control the activities of
Ibid.
47 PRO FO 69/60 C.U.Atichison (Secretary to Govt of India) to 
Knox 17,1873.pg 10.
48 i iIbid pg 11.
49 Ibid.
^  Ibid pg 12.
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the dacoits.Perhaps a more effective remedy would be for the
Siamese Government to permit the Indian Government to exercise
authority on the Siamese bank of the Salween to co-ordinate
51authority with the Consul over British subjects. According 
to Article II of the 1855 Treaty,the British Consul alone 
could determine cases involving British subjects,rather than 
the Siamese authorities.Therefore civil cases concerning 
British subjects in Chiengmai were referred to Singapore as 
the Consular Court in Bangkok was six weeks journey.These 
cases were settled with delay and crimes committed by British
subjects in the Siamese districts on the Salween were often
52left unresolved. This contiguity of the frontier rendered it 
necessary that a convention be established to deal with 
offences committed by British Burmese in Chiengmai,and by the
natives of Chiengmai in British Burma,so as to prevent all
53future disputes.
In 1873 a Court of Arbitration was established in Bangkok 
to investigate the claims brought by the British subjects.This 
procedure was agreed by both the Siamese Government and Knox.A 
decree was granted in favour of British subjects,whereby the 
Chao of Chiengmai was to pay 490,246 rupees,which he applied
51 Hamilton King "Teak Industry in Siam."
52 .Ibid.
53 BPP 1874 XLIX 533 pg 14.Foreign Minister,Bhanuwongse,to 
Chief Commr,British Burma.
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to pay within a period of six months;the Siamese Government
54was to be responsible for this payment. There was a strong
desire by the Siamese Government to assist in the adjustment
of the long standing claims asserted by British Burma against
55the Chao arising from the timber transactions. Knox demanded
the balance be paid with interest,to which the Siamese
Government refused to agree on account of financial
restraint,as pointed out by a British official from the
Consulate,Alabaster,to the British Foreign Office;
"(It was) Well known that the Siamese Treasury 
was in a temporarily disordered state,and that 
there was difficulty in meeting claims much 
smaller than the Chiengmai claims."
However Knox refused to accept such an excuse,which led the
Regent to begin to complain about Knox's conduct;
"I believe it is not possible that the present 
British Consul-General should any longer be 
allowed to negotiate with us on Indian Affairs.
His insolence is beyg^d the endurance of the 
Siamese Government."
The Siamese Government refused to negotiate with Knox
regarding the Chiengmai affair,and instead,the King sent a
mission to the Indian Government in Calcutta.The purpose of
54 More details about payment see BPP 1874 XLIX 533 or FO
69/60.
55 BPP 1874 XLIX pg 10.Lt Col H.T.Duncan (officiating Sec to 
Chief Commr British Burma) to Sec to Govt India.June 19,1873.
^  PRO FO 69/60 H.Alabaster (British Consulate) to Lordship 
May 28,1862.
PRO FO 69/60 Minute by Regent of Siam.July 30,1873 pg 339. 
The Regent (Chuang Bunnag) held such position at the accession of 
King Chulalongkorn in 1868.
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the mission was explained to Lord Ashley Eden,Governor of 
Bengal;
"Knox expressed the opinion that it was improper 
for the Siamese to have approached the Indian 
Government, and that it was of no advantage.lt was 
necessary for us to negotiate such a Treaty so as 
to overcome any other problems which may arise 
with other Powers.We decided to approach the 
Indian Government because we are familiar with 
your senior officigjs and believe they have a 
sense of justice."
From Ashley Eden's reply to the King,it seems evident that the
Indian Office supported the Siamese actions;
"You should bring the northern states under 
your control,but I understand j:j^e difficulties 
due to the various obstacles."
The Siamese embassy to Calcutta concluded a Treaty which 
contained two major propositions.Firstly the establishment of 
a strong police force on the Chiengmai frontier.Secondly,the 
formation of a regular Court co-ordinated by Siamese judges 
at Chiengmai.The Treaty was signed at Calcutta on January 
14,1874, for the purpose of promoting commercial intercourse 
between British Burma and the adjoining territories of 
Chiengmai,Lakon,and Lampoonchai,and of preventing dacoity.For 
the repression of crime and the prevention of dacoities, 
Article I stipulated that the King was to bind the Chao of 
Chiengmai to establish and maintain guard stations on the 
right bank of the Salween river,and to maintain a sufficient
C O
NL 5 JS 1239 no 2169 King to Ashley Eden,Year 1877/78.
59 Ibid Eden to King.
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force there.British subjects were to be provided with 
passports to facilitate the distinction between genuine 
British subjects and those claiming to be so to seek Consular 
protection.
Definite rules and regulations were stipulated concerning 
timber transactions in the Siamese territories,purchase, 
cutting,and girdling.To overcome the problem of "double 
dealing",a new system of leasing forest was created whereby 
the lessee was required to obtain a written lease signed by 
the Chao Muang of Chiengmai and the Siamese judge.Such a 
procedure was an attempt to prevent forest owners from leasing 
forests to more than one party. The terms of the Treaty were 
expected to be modified and revised after seven years.Yet the 
weakness of the Treaty was the absence of a British Consular 
resident in Chiengmai.The Treaty represented the first attempt 
embarked upon by the Siamese Government to control British 
activity in the Northern provinces.
The delay in the Siamese Government's intervention in the
affairs of Chiengmai can be attributed to the resistance of
the Regent.The Regent was conservative to any reforms on
provincial administration;
"..Keep the tributary states as free from 
the interference of the King as possible, 
and,therefore,to allow the chiefs to rule
181
their own provinces much as they choose.
There are several reasons behind the Regent's policy of non­
intervention in the Northern tributary states.Firstly the 
Regent himself admitted that he feared the consequences of 
government intervention as it would subsequently lead to 
rebellion in the Northern states,which would prove of "great 
expense to the Government, .a most unprofitable business. "^The 
Regent was indeed aware of the Chao of Chiengmai's misconduct 
but foresaw a more optimistic future with the new Chao of 
Chiengmai,who promised to co-operate with the British Burmese 
authorities in effecting police regulations and settling 
British cases.
Another explanation may be that the Regent foresaw the
border disputes as beyond the means of the Siamese Government
to handle. The Regent attributed the problems of dual leasing
to the British subjects themselves;
"The forest contains much timber which has a 
great price at Moulmein and these Burmese 
British subjects go and struggle for it among 
themselves and incite the Chiefs to side with 
one or another of them,and make him small 
presents and then at last all go against him 
and each one claims the forest and demands 
compensation for wood he pretends to have cut, 
but which if he even cut it,was not taken by 
the Chief himself but was transferred from one
^  BPP 1874 XLIX 533 pg 8 .Consul General for Siam to Sec Govt 
India.May 29,1873.
^  PRO FO 69/60 Minute by Regent July 30,1873 pg 335.
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6 2British subject to another."
Perhaps the underlying reason for the Regent's 
conservatism,and one which was put forward by the British 
Consul,Satow,was self-interest.The Regent was head of the 
Bunnag family whose interests were largely restricted to the 
maritime provinces of Siam where all appointments had long 
been their prerogative.Thus it had been the Regent's foreign 
policy to extend in the direction of the Malay
C ”3
Peninsula,rather than in the Northern states.
The Treaty Of Chiengmai 1883
When the 1874 Treaty was signed,the British and Siamese 
representatives had agreed that it would be subject to 
revision seven years after it came into effect.By 1881 the 
British were anxious to have it revised for two 
reasons:firstly the terms of the Treaty had never been fully 
implemented. Secondly large British timber companies were eager 
to begin timber operation in the teak-rich states,but were 
reluctant to move into them without more effective safeguards 
than provided by the Treaty of 1874.The British therefore 
began to push for a Treaty which would give their merchants 
greater protection.At the same time,King Chulalongkorn was 
beginning to accumulate political authority.The death in
62 Ibid pg 337.
PRO 30/33/15/10 Satow Diaries Nov 29,1885 pg 5.
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January 19, 1883 of the Regent "Grand Old Man" (who had opposed 
the new Treaty) enabled the King to conclude a new one,which 
while meeting British demands,would also serve to increase 
significantly Bangkok's control over the Chaos and to further 
the cause of centralization.
Scarcely two years after the Treaty of 1874 was
concluded, the Chief Commissioner of British Burma called the
attention of the Indian Government to the subject of
dacoities,implicating the Siamese Government by their
inability to enforce the provisions of the Treaty.For instance
in October 1874,a cattle trader of Moulmein,Moung Phya
Hito,was attacked by Siamese dacoits,losing property to the
value of 5032 rupees together with three men.Yet no proper
inquiry was made into the case.Not only were the Siamese
guards unable to protect British subject traders from
robbery,but in many cases they refused assistance in following
up the dacoits or recovering the plundered property.Col Brown,
the Commissioner in the Tenasserim Division,wrote to the
Commissioner of British Burma;
"..If attacks of this sort are to be made on 
traders with impunity,all intercourse will g^
soon cease between our people and the Siamese."
The Indian Govrhment,aware of the existing conflict 
between Knox and the Siamese Government,despatched Hildebrand
64 PRO FO 69/65A Col D.Brown to Major Street,Officiating Sec 
to Chief Commr British Burma.Oct 6,1875.
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on a mission to Chiengmai and Raheng to gain information as 
to the state of trade and affairs generally in those 
provinces,with a view to the possible establishment of a 
Consulate in the latter place.^ Hildebrand reported that 
Panarin (the Siamese Commissioner) was "ignorant of the most 
ordinary duties connected with his office" despite his 
"enlightened views" and familiarity with the West.Yet 
"probably no better official will be found in Siam for the 
work which has to be done."^Another Indian Government 
official condemned the 1874 Treaty on the grounds that the 
protection,which was guaranteed to British traders by Article 
III,"is enitrely visionary".He quoted the dacoity upon Moung 
Bike,a British subject trader,which occured in June 1875 on 
the frontier between Chiengmai and the Salween district,as 
suggestive of the character and reality of the protection from 
criminals . ^
Several factors may be put forward concerning the
ineffectiveness of the 1874 Treaty,which was summarised in
6 8Hildebrand's report. Firstly,there was the incapacity of the 
Siamese judge.The latter tended to remain inactive regarding
^  PRO FO 69/65A Duncan to Sec Govt India July 22,1875.
66 Ibid.
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the case, and refused to decide upon any compensation .A British 
subject had the choice of the case being decided at the 
International Court in Chiengmai or at the British Consulate 
in Bangkok.As British subjects claimed that they were met with 
injustice from the Chaos,cases were instead sent to 
Bangkok.The task of the International Court was to investigate 
and report,and had only one Siamese Commissioner permanently 
attached,which was not adequate to guarantee a just report.
Secondly there was the problem of communications between
Chiengmai and Bangkok,which became an impediment to the
enforcement of order,thereby serving "practically to
6 9invalidate the treaty, which remains a dead letter." Thirdly
the continuation of "double dealing" can be attributed to the
wives of the Chaos. According to the British Burma
authorities,it was the wife who exercised great influence in
the governing of the states and tended "to make the best use
70of her position to accumulate wealth as fast as she can." An
Indian Government official summed up the prevailing situation
in the North;
"The present system has been weighed in the 
balance and found wanting;it affords protection 
to neither life nor property and gives active 
encouragement to the perpetration of crime in 
a district close to our frontier by criminals 
who want but little inducement to extend their
69 T. . .Ibid.
70 PRO FO 69/65A Commr of Tenasserim Division to Sec Chief 
Commr.
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operations in our country.
The Chief Commissioner of British Burma saw the need to
appoint a resident Consular agent at Chiengmai to represent
British interests and to provide for the protection of British
subjects conducting trade with the Siamese Northern frontier 
72provinces.
The Consul-General continuously asserted that the Siamese
Government and its officials had treated British subjects with
injustice,and an enquiry was conducted concerning such
claims.The result of the inquiry was assessed in an interview
73with the prominent timber traders in Moulmein. The latter
were unanimously of the opinion that cases of oppression
inflicted by the Siamese authorities were almost unknown,and
their statements showed satisfaction with the 1874 Treaty.This
view was evaluated from the amount of treasure carried into
Chiengmai between the years 1880-81 which amounted to
1,232,950 rupees as compared with 721,765 rupees in 1879-
80.Yet the number of cases confronting the Consul-General was
74still considerable-43 cases in 1880.
^  PRO FO 69/65A Simkinson to Sec Govt India.Aug 9,1876.
72 PRO FO 69/65A Commr of Tenasserim Division to Sec Chief 
Commr,a report of Assistant Commr's visit to Zimmay.
73 PRO FO 69/107 Commr of Tenasserim Division to Chief 
Commr.March 28,1881.
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Even in a case between a British subject and the Chief
of Chiengmai,the Siamese authorities continued to disengage
themselves from any proceedings .This was indicated in the case
in January 1875 of Mong Guna,a British subject from Moulmein
who had his workers and property confiscated by the Chief of
Chiengmai who claimed to have mistaken the workers for
dacoits.Mong Guna presented a complaint to Phya Kalahome
Rachasena,the Royal Commissioner.He stated that three of his
men and sixteen elephants were arrested by the Deputy
Commissioner and the Court of Phre.The Royal Commissioner told
Mong Guna to await the return of Pra Pom (Deputy
Commissioner).Instead Mong Guna appealed to the Court of
75Chiengmai despite the absence of the Commissioner. The case
was presided over by Luang Boriban from Lampang,who awarded
7 6Mong Guna compensation. At the return of the Commissioner,
Phya Thep Prachoom,Luang Boriban was imprisoned and the award
77to Mong Guna was declared null and void.
The case was sent to Bangkok to be decided by the British 
Consulate.A re-investigation was conducted,but the Siamese
Ibid.
7 6 NA 5 PS 8 JS 1242-1244 Bhanuwongse to Palgrave,the British 
Consul,(In Siamese) Dec 27,1882 pg 320.
77 Ibid.Luang Boriban awarded Mong Guna compensation without 
any investigation.An explanation for such procedure was 
because Boriban wanted to exert his authority above the Chaos 
of Monthon Payab,as he later confessed "in order to frightened 
the Chao of Lampang".
188
Foreign Office refused any arbitration on the grounds that the 
evidence was inadequate.Throughout the case the King remained 
aloof,but was anxious for the case to be decided upon.The King 
wrote to the Kalahome (War Minister) Chao Phya Surawongse 
Wayawadh;
"I am waiting for your opinion...and would 
like the case-to be decided upon as soon 
as possible."
Mong Guna was finally awarded compensation as it was perhaps
the only viable solution to conclude the case.The case was
regarded as a turning point in the future of British interests
in Siam.Since 1873,no British claimant in Chiengmai had
obtained justice,and if the Siamese Government succeeded in
79evading the case,"no justice can...be looked for in future."
In 1883, the Treaty was due for revision, and this 
coincided with the death of the Regent.The Treaty of Chiengmai 
1883 reflected a positive outlook regarding new regulations 
in leases.It prohibited British subjects,the Shans and 
Burmans,from working teak forests without obtaining duly 
registered permits,and the local Chao was prohibited from 
issuing permits to more than one lessor for the same 
forest.The significant protection given to British subjects 
which the 1874 Treaty had failed to give was the appointment
7 8 Letter King to Surawongse Wayawadh 1240 Year 1878 .Published 
in Sutisonakram.Biography of Ch.Borommahasisurivawonq. Vol I 
pg 350-351.
^  PRO FO 69/107 Palgrave to Granville July 30,1880.
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of a resident British Consul in Chiengmai in addition to a 
Siamese Commissioner.
As the local chiefs had always been the great offenders 
in the leasing of forests,and had been the cause of endless 
litigation in the past,which had been sent to Bangkok for 
trial,the Treaty made a definite attempt to bring the local 
chiefs to heel,and to provide the means of assuring the 
British companies and individuals of a measure of security.The 
first Consular appointment was Mr.E.B.Gould as Vice-Consul at 
Chiengmai;while the King's half-brother,Prince Bidyalabh,was 
appointed Assistant High Commissioner.A Court was established 
in Chiengmai known as the International Court to deal with 
cases.In 1883,relations between the Northern states and 
Britain entered an entirely new phase.The mutual understanding 
between the Siamese officials in the North and the British 
Consular officers was a positive movement towards the 
induction of British Companies working the teak forests.
190
Chapter 5
British Enterprise in the Siamese Teak Industry.
The period 1883-1914 marked a fundamental period of
British interests in the Siamese teak forests.From the
Siamese perspective, the entry of the British teak companies
in Northern Siam offered the chance for the Bangkok
administration to exert its authority over the autonomous
Northern States as suggested by N.J.Brailey;
"The Siamese were prejudiced against the 
small-time British Burmese foresters,but 
were prepared to welcome large Western 
Companies due to the latter's orderliness 
and the chance their entry provided of 
dispossessing the local Siamese Governors 
of their traditional control over the 
teak industry."
Furthermore the continuing extraction of teak by Western 
enterprise secured the Siamese a regular source of income 
based on the duty collected.Therefore,rather than challenging 
the operation of the British teak companies,the Siamese 
embarked upon a programme to regulate and control their 
presence.Previous studies have overlooked the problems 
inherent in the equal distribution of leases.The fact that the 
British were predominant in teak extraction placed them at an
 ^N.J.Brailey Phd "The Origins of the Siamese Forward Movement 
in West Laos 1850-1892" pg 269.
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advantageous position compared to that of the French and the 
Danes.This chapter serves to show the prevailing issues which 
the Siamese administration considered in formulating its 
response.
The reorganisation of the forestry control involved the
extension of leases which induced Western enterprise to
entrench itself in the Siamese forests.Brown suggests that the
forestry measures "should be seen as simply encouraging the
emergence of a Western oligopoly in the Siamese teak
2
industry,but certainly not its cause." The crucial point is 
that the extension of leases and the conservationist policies 
induced the already established British firms to prolong their 
activities.Another important factor which facilitated British 
operation was the conflict between the Forestry Department, 
headed by a British Director,and the Interior Minister, 
Damrong,which gave the companies a chance to manoeuvre in 
acquiring leases.
The Growth Of British Firms In The Teak Industry.
The opening up of the Siamese teak forests resulted in 
the growth and domination of British teak companies.By 
1905,six European companies had been established to work the
2
I.G .Brown:The Elite and the Economy in Siam 1890-1920.OUP 
1988.pg 118.
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forests:4 British,1 Danish,and 1 French.The Borneo Company 
followed by the Bombay-Burmah Trading Corporation and the Siam 
Forest Company were the first three British firms which 
ventured into the teak business from the 1880s.In the 1890s 
the Borneo Co and the Bombay-Burmah Trading Corp became the 
two largest teak companies operating in Siam.Both were 
involved in the teak business in other parts of Asia:the 
Bombay-Burmah Corp in Burma;the Borneo Co in Borneo.
The nature of teak extraction placed Western enterprise 
in an unchallenged position.Efficient large-scale working of 
teak extraction involved an investment of fixed and working 
capital on a scale that only the major Western companies could 
provide.From selecting and marking a teak tree to its eventual 
arrival in Bangkok took an average of 5-6 years.The logs were 
floated individually down the various tributaries of the Chao 
Phya River (if destined for Bangkok) ,where they would be 
assembled into rafts of some 120-150 logs at a convenient
3
rafting station such as Raheng (Tak). Elephants were used to 
haul the logs from the forests to the river.An elephant could 
cost several hundred pounds (a good "tusker" perhaps £500- 
600) and as many as 50 or 60 could be required in a single 
forest,as well as for transport and for work in the rivers.The 
need for large sums of capital to finance the forest works
3
M.E.Falkus "Early British Business in Thailand" pg 135.In 
British Business in Asia Since 1860.CUP 1989.
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clearly favoured the British companies,who were also in a
position to import the Indian rupees necessary to pay the
Burmese foresters up till the early years of the 20th 
4
century. As the teak forests adjacent to the streams became 
exhausted and logging had to move deeper into the 
forests ,working in such remote areas required heavy investment
5
in elephants,labour,and forestry equipment.
The Borneo Co was the first Western enterprise to embark
on the Siamese teak forests.The Company commenced its
operations as early as the 1860s but without much success.The
British Consul commented in his trade report that;
"Some of the leading firms here (Borneo Co) 
were very unlucky in their first attempts 
to develop the teak trade,and are notglikely 
to engage in it again for some time."
It was the British system of working the forests which proved
inadequate in a tropical country suspicious of Western
activities.The Borneo Co's procedure in working the forests
was to send agents to superintend the cutting of timber and
its transit to Bangkok.The problem was that these agents were
pioneering in a remote region dealing with people unfamiliar
with Western customs and suspicious of Western designs.
Furthermore there was the continual occurence of dacoits and
 ^ Ibid.
5
I .G .Brown:The Elite...pg 118.
6 PRO FO 69/46 Trade of the Year 1867.
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fever,and lack of Consular protection.However the Borneo Co 
managed to renew its teak operations in 1884,after the 1883 
Treaty had been concluded.In 1886 the Borneo Co slightly 
adjusted its procedure by continuing to operate via the system 
of agents but having agents permanently stationed in 
Chiengmai.Such a system facilitated the acquisition of forest 
leases from the local Chaos with the effect that by the early
7
189Os,the Borneo Co was the largest teak firm in Siam.
The system of agents itself was not as important as 
choosing the agents themselves.The Company's strength 
originated in the appointment of agents who had already 
integrated themselves into Siamese society and more 
important,had direct access to the Court and the Siamese 
elite,including the Chaos.The two prominent agents of the 
Borneo Co were the American Presbyterian Dr.M.A.Cheek, 
followed by Louis T.Leonowens,son of the famous Court 
Governess Anna Leonowens.
N.J.Brailey in his thesis has given a detailed account
of Cheek's activities in the Borneo Company's early
0
operations. Several of Brailey's points need re-mentioning 
to understand the strength of the Company's early
success .Cheek came to Siam as a missionary doctor,married the
 ^ PRO 628/224 Archer to White December 6,1894.
g
Brailey Phd.
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daughter of an esteemed missionary in the Northern states,and
abandoned missionary work to enter the lucrative teak industry
as the Chiengmai agent of the Borneo Co. When he joined the
Company,he was already on intimate terms with the Chaos,an
9
advantage which he pursued in negotiating for leases. As early 
as 1886 the American Consul described Cheek's extensive teak 
business;
"..Known to have large leases of timber 
forests on his own account,which he is 
working in Chiengmai and other provinces.
This requires the oversight of a very 
large number of elephants and men engaged 
in working this timber.He has a saw steam 
mill and a larger one coming on the 
strength of which he is negotiating for 
the contract for building the British 
Consulate and other buildings."
Cheek owed his position largely to loans totalling Rs 90,000
from the Chao of Chiengmai,Intanon,in 1885,partly interest-
free but requiring him to build Chiengmai its first solid
bridge across the Me Ping River.^In March 1885 Cheek gained
12the Me Yom forest in the environs of Chiengmai.
By mid 1888 there were rumours that Cheek intended to 
disconnect himself from the Borneo Co to conduct an entirely
 ^ Ibid pg 270.
^  Mcgilvary to Mitchell March 12,1886.No.71 in PMSL Vol 
5.Quoted in Brailey Phd pg 333.
^  US Minister H.King to Sec State May Dec 29,1899.DUSMB Vol 
7.Quoted in Brailey pg 334.
12 Falkus "Early British Business.." pg 138.
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independent teak business.C.S.Leckie of the Borneo Co offered
Cheek a renewal of the contract by increasing his salary on
condition that Cheek repaid the Company loans.Cheek claimed
that any forced sale of his assets would ruin his business
prospects. Leckie stood firm and as a result Cheek disengaged
himself, becoming a formidable competitor to the Borneo 
13Co. Cheek was replaced by Louis T.Leonowens,who proved even
more successful than Cheek, establishing an intimate relation
with the Chaos.Leonowens'profound understanding of the
northern culture facilitated his integration with the
Chaos.He gave the Chaos constant attention,giving them
14presents and participating in their activities. The Company
had employed him in 1886 when he opened a branch in Raheng.In
1892 Louis was joined by another assistant D.F.Macfie who was
15sent from the London office.
The Bombay-Burmah Trading Corporation adopted a different 
system in its acquisition of leases.In contrast to the 
Borneo's relationship with the Chaos via agents,the Bombay- 
Burmah Corp was aggressive in its pursuit of leases through 
outlays of capital,to the extent that by 1900 the Company was 
the largest teak enterprise in Siam,having overtaken the 
Borneo Co.The Bombay-Burmah Corp had undertaken extensive teak
1 ^
W.S.Bristowe:Louis and the Kina of Siam.6.976^ pg 76.
^  Ibid pg 77.
15 Ibid pg 85.
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operations in Upper Burma.However,due to constant 
confrontation with the Court of Ava,eventually culminating in 
the Third Burma War in 1885,the Company had difficulties in 
securing forest leases.Simultaneously,the forests of Burma had 
experienced intensive exploitation,resulting in rising costs 
of operation.Such conditions influenced the Company to divert 
its labour and capital into the teak districts of Siam.^
It was in April 1884 that the Bombay-Burmah Corp sent its
representative Bryce to Bangkok,seeking an audience with the
King.On arrival,the King offered the Me Tuen concession which
17had been a subject of border squabble. However the Company
refrained from risking capital in the Siamese teak trade and
the forest consequently reverted to the Borneo Co at the end
of the year.The Company had experienced diminishing returns
from its operation in Burma due to the rigid conservatory
measures imposed by the British Colonial administration
following the British annexation of Upper Burma in 1886.In
1888,the Company opened a branch in Bangkok,and in 1889 built
18a saw-mill,and sent a representative to Chiengmai in 1891.
The strength of the Bombay-Burmah Corp rested in its
^  M.E.Falkus "Early British Business..".pg 142.
I.G .Brown:The Elite and the Economy...pg 111.
^  PRO 30/33/2/17 Bryce to Satow April 23,1884.
18
M.E.Falkus "Early British.."pg 142.
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substantial capital outlays.This was indicated in their system
of acquiring leases from those who had already defaulted.The
years 1888-92 marked a period of inadequate rainfall for the
timber logs to float down the rivers.This proved disastrous
for local foresters in debt.The Company took the opportunity
to pay off the debts of the foresters in the Me Tah forests
in return for their leases.An example of such a case was the
Company's acquisition of the Me Song Forest.The original
Burmese lessee of this particular forest,Moung Kalah,owed Rs
30,000 to a Siamese lady in Raheng (presumably the Chao's
wife).The Company cleared the debt,and in return acquired
Moung Kalah's 5000 logs in the river,his future output of
19logs,and mortgages on his 18 elephants. By 1893 the Company
had shown significant interests in the Siamese teak forests
as reflected in the number of staff involved.sH.Nisbet and
W.W.Wood in Chiengmai; J.Grey and F.C.H.Wetherall in
20Lampang;and H.C.Shekel1 in Raheng.
The underlying factor which consolidated the Bombay- 
Burmah Corp's position in the Northern teak forests was the 
resignation of Leonowens from the Borneo Co in 1897.The 
Bombay-Burmah Corp paid Leonowens to disengage himself from 
the timber trade in the Salween and Menam watershed for a
19 R .H .Macaulay:History of the Bombav-Burmah Trading Corp Ltd 
1864-1910.(1934 ^ pg 51-54.
20 Bristow pg 86.
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21period of six years commencing in January 1898. In 1901 
Leonowens revived his interest in the teak trade on a free­
lance basis.Leonowens used the bidding system to bring the 
Bombay-Burmah Corp and the Danish East Asiatic into 
competition.He proceeded to dispose of the logs rejected by 
the Bombay-Burmah Corp to its striving competitor,the 
Danes.This precipitated the Bombay-Burmah Corp Manager, 
Macfarlane,to accept more of Leonowens' undersized logs "in 
order to undermine their (Danish East Asiatic) connection with
Leonowens" by leaving "nothing but almost valueless timber for
22the East Asiatic Company".
The disadvantage of the Bombay-Burmah's early operations 
in Siam compared to those of the Borneo Co was that the 
Bombay-Burmah Corp lacked reputable agents who were acquainted 
with the Chaos. This explains the continual suspicion on the 
part of the Siamese in granting leases directly to the 
Company.Such a disadvantage was outweighed by the Company's 
access to ready capital.As explained earlier,the Company began 
its operations by obtaining leases through the purchasing of 
defaulted logs.In addition,the Bombay-Burmah Corp continued 
the system of advancing payments to the Chaos for forest 
leases,a system which the Borneo Co had discontinued from 
October 1896.For instance in 1900,the Siamese withdrew the
2  ^ Ibid pg 95.
22 Ibid pg 102-103.
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renewal of a valuable lease from the Borneo Co,namely the Me
Ta in Lampoon.The reason behind this was because the Bombay-
Burmah Corp had secured the lease on behalf of the Chao of 
23Lampoon.
Another system adopted by the Bombay-Burmah Corp was to
work the forests through financing the locals engaged in teak
production.The Company advanced the necessary credit to
finance their work on the security of their elephants,so that
the Company had to continue paying working expenses even if
the foresters were unable to deliver their timber for a
considerable time.The Bombay-Burmah Corp financed Phya Pitak
Tuayhan (an official from the Forestry Department) to work two
forest leases in Uthai Thani.Once Pitak defaulted,the Company
24secured the concession. By November 1902,it was recorded;
Table I
Elephants Logs marked Buffaloes
Mortgaged & undelivered.
526 22,409 60
Source:R .H .Macaulay:History of the Bombav-Burmah Trading 
Corporation 1864-1910.(1934) pg 79
The available sources of teak supplies in North Siam did not 
justify the Bombay-Burmah's becoming owners of a herd of
^  NA 5 M 16.2/31 C.S.Leckie,Borneo Co,to King Aug 30,1900. 
24 NA 5 M 16.2/58 Raja Nukul to King Dec 16,1896.
Total Debts
Rupees 884,715
Tcs 277,164
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elephants large enough to work out an entire forest lease for 
three years,as adopted in Burma. Instead the Company despatched 
their officers to supervise the work as opposed to contracting 
with small foresters or with agents,like Cheek or Leonowens. 
The only involvement in working the teak was the systematic 
girdling of trees rather than felling them.This system was
consequently adopted by the Borneo Co and the Siam Forest
n 25 Co.
The formation of the Siam Forest Co is an example of a
Company formed for the sole purpose of working the Siamese
forests.Falkus has traced the origins of the Company of which
some mention is needed in order to understand the problems
encountered by the Western companies in working the Siamese
teak forests. The Siam Forest Co had its roots in Ewart,
Latham & Co (formerly Gillanders, Ewart,& Co) a Liverpool firm
2 7trading in Bombay. This firm in 1883 acquired the agency of
the Bombay Saw Mills of which the Bombay-Burmah Corp was the
2 8chief supplier in Upper Burma. As the Bombay Saw Mills came
25 M.E.Falkus,"Early British Business.." pg 143.
Girdling involves the cutting of a deep ring round the tree near 
the base,the preliminary operation in the business of teak 
extraction.lt is performed 2 years before the trees are felled, 
during which time they die and become seasoned.
26 Ibid pg 139-143.
27 "The Anglo-Thai Corp Ltd" in History of the Inchcape Group, 
pg 189.
2 8 Falkus article pg 139.
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into conflict with the Bombay-Burmah,the firm needed to seek
an alternatave teak supplier .Ewart, Latham, & Co sent C.H.
Dennis on an exploratory mission to Burma in the hope of
obtaining teak at lower prices than that supplied by the
29Bombay-Burmah Corp, but the latter was in itself facing
difficulties with the Court of Ava.However in the course of
the mission,Dennis had learnt that there were extensive
unexploited teak forests in North Siam. Dennis proceeded to
30the local Governor of Lakhon and acquired a forest lease. In
1884 the Siam Forest Co was formed to take up the lease
acquired by Dennis with a paid up capital of Rs 100,000.The
terms of the lease came into effect on January 1,1886 for a
period of 10 years.The Company obtained rights of working the
Me Ngow forests covering around 2000 sq miles in return for
a payment to the Chief of Lakon of Rs 8000,and royalty
payments on teak logs varying from Rs 4 to Rs 1 according to
31the size of the logs.
The fluctuations in the floating season were a damaging 
factor to business prospects.The inadequate floating season 
of 1888-92 (which period the Bombay-Burmah Corp exploited to 
their advantage) proved disastrous to the Siam Forest Co and 
the Borneo Co.The Siam Forest Co tried unsuccessfully in 1892
29 "The Anglo-Thai Corp..." pg 190.
^  Ibid pg 191.
31 Paragraph based on Falkus article pg 140.
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to refloat the Company in London with an increase in working
capital.lt was not till 1897 this proved possible,when
conditions in the teak market were much more favourable.The
new Company was then floated in London with an authorised
capital of £50,000 (£30,000 paid up) to take over the assets
of the Bombay concern.At this stage the total investment in
the Bangkok saw mill and other property was estimated at
£12,ooo while the estimated value of logs actually felled or
in transit was nearly £37,000.Such an event proved to be a
turning point in the affairs of the Company.Renewed interest
was taken in the working of the Me Ngow concession and the
Company bought timber from Leonowens and other lessees.In 1902
a new manager,W.A.Elder,was appointed in Lakon,as Dennis and
Phare proved incompetent,and had been dismissed in 1889 by the
32Company Chairman.
The significance of the early experience of the Siam 
Forest Co shows the importance of capital associated with the 
teak trade.The fluctuating nature of the floating season 
required a substantial amount of credit to balance the delay 
inherent in the rate of return.The lack of ready capital was 
compensated for by the Company's employment of Tan Chan Piah 
as their chief Clerk.It was the latter who helped to secure 
the lease from the Chao Lakhon. Elder later pointed out in his 
memoirs that without Tan Chan Piah's advice,"I might never
^  Ibid pg 141.
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have secured the lease at all,in face of the keen competition
33of the Bombay-Burmah Corp and the Borneo Co."
Amount of Capital Investment in Teak
The teak industry was brought almost entirely under the
control of Western firms;this applied to extraction;milling;
and shipment.Figures on the amount of capital invested in teak
tend to be based upon contemporary estimates by British
Consular officials whose concept of "capital" appeared to have
been the actual value of teak logs cut in the forests and in
34transit to Bangkok at a particular time. Consular Reports put
total British investment in teak alone at £900,000 in 1895,and
35£2 million by 1899. In 1902 Beckett calculated that total
British capital invested in teak was no less than £2
million,and that the annual cash disbursements made by British
teak firms could not fall short of £300,000.Yet in 1900,the
Consular Report stated that it was not possible to obtain
accurate statistics on foreign investment in the teak industry
3 6but that British interest was predominant. What this section 
endeavours to point out is not the amount of British capital
^  W.Elder.MS.Memoirs written in 1958 pg 107.JA,ATC 8/1.Quoted 
in Stephanie Jones:Two Centuries of Overseas Trading.pg 211.
34 Falkus "Early British Business in Thailand" pg 123.
35 Ingram "Economic Change in Thailand 1850-1970", and M.E. 
Falkus "Early British Business in Thailand",pg 123.
^  BCR No.2717,Trade of Chiengmai 1900 pg 6.
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involved in teak but rather the extent of British predominance 
by looking at the proportion of logs produced and the 
geographical extent of the forest leases.
Table II
British Output as a Percentage
Nationality Quantity 1898 % Quantity 1899 %
British 30,000 logs 59 83,000 logs 69
Danish 800 " 2 5,500 " 5
Chino/Siamese 20,000 " 39 31,500 26
Total 50,800 120,000
Source:BCR No.2717 Trade of Chiengmai 1900 pg 6
Table III
Annual Teak Output Sent to Bangkok 1902
Producers No.Of Logs Per Annum
Bombay-Burmah 35,000
Borneo Co 10-12,000
Siam Forest Co 6-7,000
L .T .Leonowens 8,000
Danish East Asiatic 3-4,000
Chinese Producers 10-12,000
Native Producers 20-25,000.
Source:M.E.Falkus"Early British Business.." pg 
143.
From the table,the total annual output was in the region of
100,000 logs in 1902,of which some 2/3 were produced by 
European firms, nearly all of which were British.The Borneo 
Co and the Bombay-Burmah Corp alone accounted for over 2/3 of 
European output.
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Table IV
Renewal of Leases for Period of 6 Years in 1899-1902
Year 1899
Total Owner Chiengmai Lampang Lampoon Phrae Tak Nan Others.
7 BBC - 3 - 2 - - 2
14 Borneo 6 6 - - - - 2
1 Siam Forest — — — — - - 1
Year 1900
7 BBC — 4 1 2 — — _
15 Borneo 7 6 1 - 1 - -
1 Siam Forest - 1 - - - - -
6 Siamese 2 1 — 3 — - -
Year 1902
21 BBC 7 4 5 1 — 1 3
17 Borneo 7 7 1 - 2 - -
1 Siam Forest - 1 - - - - -
22 GB Subject 3 14 - 1 2 1 1
2 Dane EAC - 1 - - 1 1 -
1 Dutch - - - - 1 - -
6 Kim Seng Lee - 3 - - 1 2 -
15 Siamese 3 4 — 3 — — 5
Source:Year 1899 NA 5 M 16. 1/19;Year 1900 NA 5
16.1/19 Damrong to King Feb 11,1900. Year 1902
5 M 16. 2/77 Damrong to Sommot January 21 1902.
From the table,the years 1899 and 1900 shows the number of 
leases applying for renewal,and the year 1902 illustrates the 
actual number of leases being worked.In the years 1899 and 
1900 the Borneo Co had more leases renewed than the Bombay- 
Burmah Corp due to the expiry of leases which the Borneo Co 
had acquired between the years 1896-97.The table for the year 
1902 raises several interesting points.Firstly it shows the 
geographical predominance of the British in Siamese teak
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extraction.Burmese British subjects continued to work the 
forests but it was the British Companies which had extensive 
leases,the Bombay-Burmah Corp being the most 
prominent.Secondly Lampang appeared to be the region of 
intensive exploitation.The Chao of Lampang continued the 
practise of leasing his forests to small-holders which 
accounts for the substantial leases held by the Burmese 
British subjects.Lampang was considered the stronghold of 
Borneo's teak enterprise,the valuable forest being the Me 
Jaffa.For the Bombay-Burmah Corp,Chiengmai was the Company's 
sphere of influence.
The Siamese did embark upon means to challenge the 
British enterprise in the teak trade.As early as 1889,the 
Siamese Court concluded an agreement with Cheek to work the 
forests for 10 years.Cheek described the partnership as an 
attempt by the Siamese "to keep out British interest from the 
interior";
"At this time it was considered desirable to 
prevent the extension of British trade in the 
provinces;both the Bombay-Burmah Trading Corp 
and the Borneo Co were desirous of exploiting 
the forest resources of the Lao provinces..It 
was supposed that I would be able ,backed by 
the Siamese Government^^o checkmate these two 
formidable companies."
The Siamese were skeptical of the British,as the Bombay-Burmah 
Corp was regarded as having been responsible for the
^  Case of Dr.Cheek 1893 DUSMB Vol 3.In Brailey Ph.d pg 334.
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annexation of Upper Burma.In 1894,Damrong informed the Company
agent,H.Nisbet,that when the Bombay-Burmah Corp crossed over
to North Siam,the King "did not sleep for a week as he was
38afraid trouble would come to the country." Despite this 
element of suspicion on the part of the Siamese towards the 
British,the Siamese were in no position to exclude the British 
due to both the political implications and the nature of the 
teak industry itself.Therefore instead of challenging the 
British enterprise,the Siamese embarked upon a programme to 
control the presence of the British.Such policy happened to 
coincide with Siamese intentions to exert greater authority 
over the Northern autonomous states.
Siamese Control of the British Teak Enterprise
After 1883,the Siamese administration in Bangkok carried
out several measures to exert control over the Northern
states.The death of the orthodox Regent influenced this
timing.In 1884 Prince Pichit Prichakorn was sent to Chiengmai
to reorganize the government service.He declared that forest
concessions required ratification by the Central
39administration. In 1892,the system was developed by 
appointing a resident Governor-General for Monthon Payab.Phya
38 Bristowe pg 84.
39 NA 5 M 16/10 Prince Penphat,Assistant Minister of
Agriculture,Report 1903.
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Song Suradet was the first to assume the position,and the
affairs of forestry came under his supervision,including the
authority to ratify leases.He advocated that every
concessionaire had to plant 4 trees for every tree cut,and
40raised the lease to 6 years. This procedure lasted till 1896 
when the Royal Forestry Department was established whereby all 
forestry affairs came under the Department.This curtailed the 
authority of the Chaos.
The influx of Western enterprise raised several new 
issues which necessitated the need for forestry 
regulation.Firstly,the struggle for teak leases no longer took 
place amongst individual British subjects but rather amongst 
British companies.In such cases the Chao Muang began to demand 
bribes to lease forests and to encourage competition amongst 
potential lessees.The second problem was the continual 
occurrence of teak theft.In the 1890s the companies were 
imposing pressure upon the Siamese government for regulatory 
measures.At the same time,regulation of the timber industry 
was crucial from Bangkok's perspective as it was a focal point 
of Western dissatisfaction and likely to precipitate British 
intervention as experienced in Burma.
The struggle for forestry concessions was precipitated 
by the Chaos themselves.The Chaos' "game" of creating
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competition amongst the British Companies provided a source
of income.The Chaos no longer possessed the financial means
to work the forests, nor any access to markets, nor the
authority to force the Burmese and Khamus to work the
forests.Instead the Chao exploited their position as forest
owners.One particular case was the struggle between the
Bombay-Burmah Corp and the Borneo Co over the Me Ngad and Me
Jaffa forests in 1896.There were three contenders for the Me
Ngad forest:Pimba, financed by the Borneo Co;a Siamese
representative of the Treasury;and the Chao Burirat of
Chiengmai.The latter had originally been the hereditary owner
of the forest but due to the reorganisation,the forest had now
reverted to Crown property.Pimba had already concluded with
Leonowens of the Borneo Co to work the forest which agreement
was supported by the Chao Burirat.However, C.S.Leckie of the
Borneo Co held the impression that Pimba intended to work the
forest for the Bombay-Burmah Corp.The Governor-General,Song
Suradet,decided that if the Chao Burirat granted the lease to
the Borneo Co,the Bombay-Burmah Corp would exert claims upon
the lease as Pimba had secretly agreed with Nisbet of the
41Bombay-Burmah Corp to sell the logs to them.
Simultaneously there occurred the conflict over the Me 
Jaffa forest in Lampang,which was leased by the Chao to Mong 
Song Kin.At the death of the latter,the Chao transferred the
^  Episode based on NA 5 M 16.2/58 Damrong to King Nov 1896.
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lease to the deceased's,wife Mong Ruen,for which the British 
Consul,Stringer, sought confirmation from the Commissioner, 
Phya Krai Kosa. The ratification was denied on the grounds 
that Mong Ruen had already commenced teak extraction before 
the terms of the ratification were negotiated.Mong Ruen needed 
capital to meet her husband's debts,and decided to transfer 
the lease to the Borneo Co without the consent of the 
Siamese.^
Both cases became a political issue when the matter was
handled by the British Consul,Mr. French. The latter recommended
that the Borneo Co work the Me Jaffa,and the Bombay-Burmah
Corp the Me Ngad as the latter had already had capital engaged
in that forest, and that Pimba opt to work for the Bombay
Burmah Corp.The leases were ratified for a term of 6 years.Yet
the Chao of Chiengmai refused to sign the contract for the Me
Ngad forest to the Bombay-Burmah Corp.The Siamese used the
British forestry officer from India,Herbert Slade,who at the
time was observing the forestry system in Siam,to explain the
advantages of such an agreement;
"Slade asserted that if the Chao Chiengmai 
signed the contract as the lessor,then the 
latter would in return gain part of the duty 
collected by the Government on teak.If the
Chao refuses to lease his forests,then not
only would he not earn any more income but
furthermore the Government intend to
42 Ti • . Ibid.
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43confiscate the land and lease."
Damrong supported Slade's warning and reiterated that he 
intended Song Suradet to sign the contract on behalf of the 
Government as owner of the forest if the Chao continued to 
resist.The point to make is that both the Siamese and Slade 
wanted to regulate the teak trade so as to prevent Western 
dissatisfaction.The Siamese were still disturbed by the 
thought of the Bombay-Burmah Corp's causing the annexation of 
Upper Burma.
The second impending issue was that of teak theft.The
Siamese Proclamation of 1887 had made an attempt to check the
constant theft of teak logs and the sawing of stolen timber
through the payment of fines.However the payment of a fine
double the value of the stolen logs did not prove effective
as it virtually exempted the thief from all further
punishment.lt was only with the presence and advice of the
British Vice-Consul that theft frequently led to both fining
44and imprisonment. The issue was brought to the attention of 
the Siamese authorities by both the Borneo Co and the Bombay- 
Burmah Corp.Leckie and Johnson of the respective companies 
discussed the problem with Damrong,who agreed to "put a stop
43 Ibid.
44 PRO FO 69/190 Vice-Consul Beckett to de Bunsen Dec 6,1895.
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45to a growing evil of such dimension". Damrong drew up
regulations for the compulsory registration of hammer-marks,a 
law imposing adequate penalties on persons found in possession 
of defaced logs,and appointed an official to superintend the 
entire teak business.The common practise was stealing timber 
which was unstamped with the Companies' mark.Many of the cases 
in which the Borneo Co and the Bombay-Burmah Corp were 
prosecutors were in regard of teak marked with the hammer-mark 
of foresters,which they claimed they had instructions to 
collect. They had no legal proof of this offer to the Governor 
except their own assertion.^
The case of the Borneo Co versus Chin Cheng serves to 
illustrate the advantage given to British firms owing to the 
presence of their Vice-Consul.The Borneo Co charged Chin Cheng 
of possessing a teak log clearly marked with the Company's 
hammer mark.The accused did not deny that the log was the 
property of the Company but declared that he had purchased it 
at Raheng from Siamese subjects.At the same time,he eagerly 
proposed to pay in cash the usual fine of doubling the value 
which would have exempted him from imprisonment.The Governor 
would have given his consent had not the agent of the Company 
protested.The British Vice-Consul,Beckett,insisted upon the
^  PRO FO 422/42 de Bunsen to Kimberly Jan 31,1895.pg 7.
46 PRO FO 422/42 Report by Acting Vice-Consul Black Dec 
1894,pg 40.
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need to detain the accused until he could produce the sellers
of the stolen log.The Governor gave his consent to Beckett's
proposal in the hope that such a precedent would have a
47deterrent effect on timber theft.
The complaints by the British companies concerning the
obstructive manner of the Chaos in creating competition and
the problem of teak theft were brought to Siamese
attention. Damrong saw the need to meet the demands, and
explained to the King;
"In my opinion,this is an important issue, 
and we need to come to terms because it was 
the complaints of the British Company whi^h 
precipitated the Third Anglo-Burmese War"
Damrong applied to the Indian Government for the loan of an
experienced officer from their forestry department.In
1896,Herbert Slade was employed to establish a Forestry
Department.In his lengthy report submitted to the Siamese
Government on 10th August 1896,Slade pointed out Siam's
problems concerning revenue collection and the indiscriminate
49cutting of trees. Slade drew up a table showing the 
difference between the amount of logs which had already paid 
a royalty and the amount of logs arriving at Chainat, the duty
47 Paragraph based on PRO FO 69/190 Vice-Consul Beckett to de 
Bunsen Dec 6,1895.
48
NA 5 M 16.1/10 Damrong to King Jan 6,1894.
49
NA 5 M 16/9 Slade Report Aug 10,1896.
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station.In theory all logs extracted from the forests were
charged a royalty which was paid at the forest,and it took one
year for these logs to reach the duty station at Chainat.The
report also noted that the Bombay-Burmah Corp and the Borneo
Co were sending an average of 25,000 logs a year to
Bangkok,yet in 1894/95 royalty was paid on only 4776 logs and
50in 1895/96 on only 14,633 logs. Therefore the Government 
was not receiving the expected income collected.
In order to continue the teak revenues as a regular
source of income,Slade proposed that forests needed
conservation.Years of indiscriminate working of the forests
without any control had decreased the number of teak trees and
was in effect a loss to Government revenue.The British Consul
observed that the total number of logs which passed the duty
station at Chainat in 1893/94 was 109,957,and of these,72,730
were full sized logs,which left the number of undersized logs 
51at 37,027. A pessimistic estimate in 1890 suggested that at
the present rate of usage,the teak forests would be exhausted
by 1910 at the latest. Warington-Smyth of the Mining
Department commented in 1896;
"all the western forests in the neighbourhood 
of the streams available for floating timber
50
NA 5 M 16/9 Slade Report pg 36.
51 BCR No.938 Trade of Chiengmai 1890.
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52have become practically exhausted."
Slade's emphasis on forest conservation was used by the
Siamese as an excuse to transfer the forest administration
from the Chaos to the central administration of the state.The
King pointed out to the Chaos that;
"If the forest operations are not organised, 
conflict may arise with the foreigners,namely 
Britain.Once the forests are exhausted,this 
would give the British the excuse to accuse 
us of failing to control our forests as 
occured in Burma.Such (an) example is worth 
considering.lt is necessary to conserv^the 
forests before they become exhausted."
In response to the need for new regulations on leases, revenue
and the cutting of timber,a Forestry Department was created
within the Ministry of the Interior in 1896 under the British
Director Slade. The latter drew up the organisation of the
Department,and the legislation of the forests can be
54summarised as follows;
1)A reduction of the areas leased by one-half,the other 
half being considered as a reserve area.
2)Felling cycle was 12 years and no teak tree below 6
ft.4 inches could be felled.
3)The prohibition of girdling owing to the accumulated 
girdled stocks.
4)The imposition of a royalty of 10 rupees on all logs 
measuring over the pikat rate standard of 3 ticals, or
52 Warinqton-SmvthrFive Years in Siam.Vo1 I pg 104.
^  NA 5 M 16.3/5 King to Chao of Chiengmai April 9,1897.
^  BCR 1901 No.2717 Report for the Year 1900 On the Trade of
Chiengmai.
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about 30 cu.ft and of 6 rupees on all below that size.
5)The Siamese Government assumed administrative and 
technical control over the teak forests and the native 
chiefs became sharers in the profits only.
6)A timber Revenue Station was to be started at 
Paknampo,the southern most junction of the Siamese 
rivers,about 155 miles north of Bangkok.
The crucial clause was the 6 year lease plan without 
guarantees of renewal.Such a condition was not compatible with 
the Bombay-Burmah Corp system of working the forests.The 
latter tended to purchase from Burmese foresters the renewal 
of rights on their 3 year leases.
Competition Between the French and the British.
It is worth considering the presence of the French in 
understanding the political complications involved in the 
direction of Siamese policy.The Franco-Siamese Treaty of 1893 
established a 35 km demilitarised zone on the Siamese side of 
the Mekong frontier.This placed the province of Nan adjacent 
to the territory of French influence.The forests of Nan were 
scattered unlike in Monthon Payabh.The Nan forests were 
divided into three parts:Me Ing ;Me Youm;Me Nan Forests.The 
Siamese were concerned with the French interest in teak 
concessions especially in the valley draining north into the 
Mekong.From the Siamese perspective,the French influence in 
the Mekong region needed to be controlled especially as the 
Khamu labours in the area were being registered as French
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55subjects. In response,the Siamese endeavoured to induce a 
British Company in Nan to counter the spread of French 
influence.^
In 1895 Damrong offered the Me Ing Valley to the Bombay-
Burmah Corp,but the latter refused.Not only was the region
remote but, more important,it was an outlet into the Mekong
River and thus vulnerable to French tariffs.The Company was
not prepared to embark upon an enterprise which would place
57them at the mercy of the French. However Nan embraced two
other principal rivers which flowed through the teak districts
Me Yom and Me Nan,both connected with the Menam.The Bombay-
Burmah Corp was anxious to obtain the Me Yom to which Damrong
58replied that it was not available. Instead Damrong 
proposed to offer the Me Nan to the Bombay-Burmah Corp.Not 
only would the presence of the British serve to counter­
balance French influence,but it would also provide the
opportunity to break the monopoly of the Chao of Nan,who was
59"already tottering in his allegiance". In addition a trader 
Bun Yim was regarded in Nan as working secretly under French 
influence.Therefore the Siamese needed the Bombay-Burmah Corp
PRO FO 422/45 de Bunsen to Salisbury Dec 27,1895.
NA 5 M 16/5 Phya Raja Nukul to Sommot May 20,1896.
^  PRO FO 422/45 de Bunsen to Salisbury Dec 27,1895.
eg
PRO FO 422/45 de Bunsen to Devawongse Dec 27,1895 pg 22.
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to counter-balance French pressure.^
The Chao of Nan was not hostile to the introduction of
British enterprise in the form of teak concessions.
Nevertheless he had a traditional fear that the Bombay-Burmah
Corp was responsible for the annexation of Upper Burma.The
Siamese Commissioner,Song Suradet,used every means to
dissipate this suspicion by convincing the Chao that it was
the desire of the Siamese Government to reserve the Nan
forests as a Government monopoly, to be worked by state
capital.lt was believed that the Nan forests were in the
process of being monopolised by Chin Bun Yin,who was on
intimate terms with the Chaos of Nan and Phre.In response,the
Chao of Nan handed over his forests to the King and declared
he had no objection if the King was to lease a portion of the
forests to the Bombay-Burmah Corp;
"He (Chao of Nan) has now bowed to the 
inevitable,and from fear of the French 
on one side,and the British on the other, 
has resigned himself intg^the hands of 
the Siamese Government."
French interests in the Siamese teak forests became 
evident in 1901 when M.C.Waternau (a journalist) and his 
patron M.Raoul d'Hermilly de Chevilly applied to Suriya,the 
Minister in Paris, for a teak concession in Me Kok and Me
^  PRO FO 422/47 Acting Consul Beckett to Charge d'Affairs, 
Archer,March 9,1897.pg 94.
Ibid.
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6 2Ing, the finest forests in the Mekong region.They proposed
that a Siamese participate as owner of the concession,and the
Company be a Franco-Siamese joint venture. They insisted upon
the concession and were supported by the French Foreign
Office.Devawongse considered that there was a difficulty in
denying them the concession because of the rumour in France
that the Siamese were excluding the French from the Siamese 
6 3forests. The French pointed out that the teak logs from the
two forests would flow to the Mekong and thus be of natural
advantage to them.The proposed working capital was 3.6 million 
64Francs. In response Suriya advised Devawongse not to transfer
the forest to the French,as they had refused to accept the
terms of the Treaty with Britain for the prevention of 
65crime.
Again in 1904 the attempt by the French to work the teak 
forests brought the attention of the British.The Chino/Siamese 
company,Kim Seng Lee,endeavoured to transfer their forests to 
a Belgian Company on the condition of consent from the Siamese 
authorities.The Caisse d'Escompte et de Credit of Brussels 
offered 4 million tcs (2 million in cash and 2 million in 
shares) for the lease,and to be placed under Siamese
6 2
NA 5 M 16.2/7 Devawongse to Sommot March 9,1901.
63 .Ibid.
64
NA 5 M 16.2/17 Suriya to Devawongse July 21,1903.
65 _.. .Ibid.
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jurisdiction.^The Company represented French capital and the
scheme was believed to have been instigated from Saigon to
counteract British influence in Northern Siam.The British
Foreign Office insisted on Paget's using his influence with
the Siamese Government to prevent any measures from being
6 7introduced which might jeopardise British interests. In
response, the Bombay-Burmah Corp made an important contract
with Messrs Kim Seng Lee,by which for a payment of 25 million
tcs it obtained the rights and titles as lessees to 5 timber
forests:3 in the district of Lakhon Lampang;1 in Nan;l in
Muang Park.By 1907 the Bombay-Burmah Corp became holders of
27 leases and 2 sole permits of half areas within the Me Nam
6 8Valley, for a period of 6 years. The affiliation of Kim Seng
Lee with western capital was carried out with hesitancy but
was yet unavoidable,as expressed in the King's own words;
"It is a great pity that Kim Seng Lee,being 
the only Siamese Company will now have to 
be dominated by Western capital there^ 
removing the Company's independence."
Relations Between the Ministry of Interior and the Forestry 
Department.
It was asserted by Prince Penphat,the Assistant Minister
^  NA 5 M 16.2/23 Giard to Damrong Nov 4,1903.
^  PRO FO 422/58 Lansdowne to Paget April 28,1904 pg 79.
^  Macaulay pg 75.
^  NA 5 M 16.2/18 Events concerning Monsieur Giard intention 
to purchase Kim Seng Lee Concession.April 13-21 Feb 1903.
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of Agriculture,that Slade was naturally biased towards his
countrymen which had the effect of sustaining the British
70monopoly,in particular the Bombay-Burmah Trading Corp. Thai
historians such as Sunthornsawat tend to adopt this
71view. However there is some correspondence indicating that 
it was the lack of co-operation between the Interior 
Minister,Damrong,and the Forestry Director, Slade,which 
facilitated the British Companies' obtaining leases.The 
considerations undertaken by Damrong and Slade in granting 
leases differed:Damrong was influenced by the political 
factors,whilst Slade was concerned with the conservation of 
the forests.Such conflict placed the role of the Forestry 
Department at stake and allowed the British Companies to 
manoeuvre.
The structural weakness of the Department enabled Damrong 
to exert his authority over the institution.The duty of the 
Department was to conserve the forests,and to this effect it
had established agents in 8 leading forestry provinces by
721900. However,there were several difficulties in carrying out 
the supervision.Firstly there was the language problem and the 
limited number of interpreters for those Forestry officers
70
NA 5 16/10 Prince Penphat Report 1903.
71 Chaichome Sunthornsawat:"A Historical Study of Forestry in 
Northern Thailand 1896-1932. "MA diss. (Thai Text) .Chulalongkorn 
U, 1978.
72
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posted in remote areas as Nan and Phre. Second was the
shortage of staff.In 1900 the Department had 14 Europeans and
2 Siamese which proved inadequate to ensure the collection of 
73revenue. Such a shortage also meant that not every timber was
necessarily marked.Therefore British firms simply informed the
Department that the trees had been marked,and paid the royalty
at the duty station Paknampo.The Department trusted the
credibility of the British Companies,and diverted its
74attention towards supervision of the small-holders.
At the initial stages of the work conducted by 
Slade,there often arose differences in principle and policy 
between the Department and the Interior Minister .Such friction 
allowed the British Companies to resist the demands of the 
Department.The Bombay-Burmah Corp had a practical monopoly of 
the Salween timber trade by 1900.In that same year,a general 
scheme was settled for the Me Nam Forests whereby the royalty 
of Rs 4/- per log was to be raised to 10/- for large logs and 
6/- for smaller ones,and that girdling was prohibited.Such 
legislation was Slade's policy of increasing the revenue and 
conserving the forests.Both the Borneo Co and the Bombay- 
Burmah Corp accepted the terms only for the Me Nam Forests but
74 T. • .Ibid.
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75not for the Salween ones.
In response,Slade used "the threat of prosecution for
breach of former leases in the Salween" as his bargaining 
7 6power. Yet such lever was removed from Slade when Damrong and
the Bombay-Burmah Corp concluded a secret agreement that under
77no circumstances should they be sued in Court. From Damrong's 
point of view the agreement was to prevent the Company's head 
office from intervening in the affairs of Siam.It seemed 
evident that the thought of the Bombay-Burmah Corp being 
responsible for the annexation of Upper Burma was still 
inherent amongst the Siamese administration.As a result, Slade 
had to reduce his terms and settled on a basis of differential 
rates of royalty for each forest without girdling rights.
Another case was the British practise of indiscriminate 
7 8girdling. Hitherto there had been no incentive for the 
lessees to girdle more trees than they could extract.But after 
1896,the Bombay-Burmah Corp and the Siam Forest Co were aware 
that girdling trees would enable them to have their leases 
renewed.If the girdled trees were left uncut,their dryness 
would result in forest fire.The danger of indiscriminate
Ibid.
77 Ibid.
7 8 NA 5 M 16/3 Report of the Forestry Department Year 1900.
225
girdling could be overcome if Damrong issued a general order
prohibiting all further girdling in every forest.Such a course
was strongly recommended by Slade.Slade came to an agreement
with the European firms that all girdling be ceased,to which
the Western companies agreed. Yet it was in the Siamese
interest for the Companies to carry out girdling,as pointed
out by the King to Damrong;
"The fact that extra time is granted to 
Companies for completing the girdling of 
trees is a means of conducting indiscriminate 
girdling.As the Department is short of staff 
to supervise the girdling,we have to continu^g 
allowing the Companies to girdle the trees."
The reason for this lack of co-operation between Damrong
and Slade was of a personal nature.This is expressed in
Damrong's letter to the King explaining his refusal to extend
Slade's term of office;
"The reason why I decided to extend Slade's term 
for 7 months and not for another 3 years was 
because Slade wants the Forestry Department 
to become independent,and with the role of the 
Interior Minister merely to recommend.Slade 
wants the Director to possess authority as 
that of the Railway Director.I suggest the 
Forestry Director should p l a^a role like the 
Customs or Police Director."
Slade's recommendation for the headquarters in Chiengmai was
to facilitate the work of the Department. Slade pointed out to
Damrong that the bulk of the correspondence on forestry
^  NA 5 M 16.2/6 King to Damrong Sept 25,1903. 
80
NA 5 B 9/16 Damrong to King Oct 12,1900.
matters^came from Raheng and Chiengmai,which could be handled 
there,and only a few issues required the final approval of the 
Interior Ministry;
"Until the Forestry Department is sufficiently 
large and important to have a senior officer in 
Bangkok who would be a sort of secretary on 
forestry matterg^the head quarters needs to be 
near the work."
Slade was in effect implementing the British system in Burma 
by which the Conservator held extensive authority as pointed 
out by Damrong;
"Slade wants the Forestry Director to be 
resident in Chiengmai,whilst I prefer him 
to be in Bangkok.Slade is following the 
Burmese in that the Department has full 
authority."
Slade pointed out that there was no danger of the Conservator
exceeding his authority,but rather the other way round,that
83he may waste time referring issues to Bangkok.
Such terms were unacceptable to Damrong.The establishment 
of the headquarters in Chiengmai and the Conservator to 
possess authority as in Burma was seen as a threat to 
Damrong's newly formed provincial administration.The teak 
business involved Chaos and British companies,which was a 
serious concern of the Interior Minister.Slade regarded his
O 1
NA 5 M 16/7 Slade to Damrong Nov 4,1896.
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role as to advise the Government whilst Damrong treated the
84Conservator as a junior clerk. However in cases where Slade
and Damrong co-operated,Siamese policy in controlling leases
proved effective. For instance in 1896 when the Chao of
Chiengmai refused to sign the contract of the Me Ngad forest
to the Bombay-Burmah Corp,Damrong supported Slade's warning
85of confiscation which succeeded in persuading the Chao. Yet 
such unity occurred before the establishment of the 
Department.
The Renewal of Leases.
The fact that the British companies,especially the 
Bombay-Burmah Corp,were in a position to resist the demands 
of the Conservator can also be attributed to the support of 
the British Government.The distribution and renewal of 
forestry leases serve to illustrate the extent of such support 
and the effects upon sustaining the British monopoly,in 
particular the position of the Bombay-Burmah Corp.As the 
political environment became more favourable to Siam's 
independence,the Siamese became more rigid towards the renewal 
of leases.As a result,complications emerged at the opening of 
the 20th century as the leases of 1897 were due for 
renewal.The problem was that it was in the interest of the
84
NA 5 M 16/3 Report of Forestry Department 1900.
O c
NA 5 M 16.2/58 Damrong to King Nov 12,1896.
228
Siamese not to renew some of the leases.
The 1896 Royal Proclamation had stipulated that forest
leases had to be ratified by the Siamese authorities.The
leases previously worked continued to be recognised whilst
those applied for after February 1897 were required to proceed
in accordance with the new regulations.This was to prevent
indiscriminate cutting and to allow the Government to close
8 6those forests which needed conservation. The Borneo Co was 
the first to approach Damrong in requesting the renewal of 
certain leases.Damrong handed over the applicants to the 
Forestry Department.Both the Bombay-Burmah Corp and the Siam 
Forest Co followed suit as they became increasingly aware that
any undecided leases would exclude them from working the
* +. 87forests.
The forestry conditions specified that the forests
applied for had first to be inspected before being considered 
88for renewal. The problem was that there were certain leases 
which the British companies had acquired privately from the 
Chaos for a fixed term of years thereby bypassing the proper 
channels of ratification by the Government.The Siamese
o c
NA 5 M 16.1/19 Sri Sahadhep,Vice Minister of Interior,to 
Damrong Feb 3,1900.
87 T, . .Ibid.
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authorities were obliged to ratify such leases granted by the
Chaos on account of approaches made by the companies to both
89the Colonial and Foreign Office. Damrong did not approve of
the companies' procedure in using the British Minister to
assert their demands as it turned the forestry issue into a 
90political one.
91The entire discussion revolved round 3 points:
1)Whether the Siamese were to consider the renewal of 
existing leases which had been acquired from the Chaos 
before 1897.
2)Whether the Siamese were to recognise leases concluded 
after February 1897.
3)Whether the Siamese were to be held responsible for 
debts contracted by the Chaos of Phre and other local 
officials.
Damrong pointed out to the British Minister,Greville,that the 
Siamese had no desire to disrupt work on account of renewing 
leases. Though such leases were to revert to Crown 
property,Damrong showed his concern that in the distribution 
of such leases, consideration would be taken of previous 
leases.
The renewal of leases was a complex issue and was handled 
by Damrong as Slade was in Europe.The Bombay-Burmah Corp 
(represented by Grey and Mcdonald),supported by Greville,
89 Ibid.
90 Ibid.
9  ^NA 5 M 16.1/17 Damrong to Greville June 6,1899.
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complained to Damrong about their leases in Monthon Payab.Now 
that the 6 years lease had expired,the Bombay-Burmah Corp 
applied for renewal.The Forestry Department refused to 
recognise the leases on the grounds that they had not been 
officially ratified.The Siamese regarded the ratification of 
these leases as being a dangerous precedent because other 
companies might demand such privileges.
In response to the Bombay-Burmah Corp requests,Damrong
urged the Company to be more flexible.As a compromise,the
Company demanded that the Chao of Nan and Phre be permitted
to continue working the forests as the Company had concluded
a contract in purchasing the teak logs.Damrong resisted such
demands with the justification that the contract was not known
to the Government and thus was not legitimate;
"We are not in a position to extend unratified 
leases to the Bombay-Burmah because others would 
claim such privileges.We intend to close those 
forests whose leases have expired and when 
appropriate to reopen them...Yet there is a small 
chance for an open tender system as we intendgjo 
lease the concession to the original lessee."
Damrong also informed Sommot of the explanation for his
decision;
"The Bombay-Burmah is not the only teak firm.
If the Company was to be allowed to work the 
forests contrary to the (Forest Legislation), 
this would hinder Slade's control of the 
forests,and thus would lead to the removal of
92
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93the Forestry Department."
However the Bombay-Burmah Corp head office in London was
94not satisfied with Damrong's exclusionist policy. The Company
wanted more assurance,as Sri Sahadhep (Vice Minister of the
Interior) commented on the issue;
"The Bombay-Burmah demand for the renewal of 
leases is a very disturbing issue because its 
Director in London has finang^al influence and 
may create problems for us."
As Slade was on a European tour,Damrong urged him and the
Siamese Minister in London,Prasiddhi,to explain to the
Company's head office the Siamese motives for refusing to deny
9 6the Company forest leases.
Slade and Damrong finally drew up an agreement with the
97Bombay-Burmah's head office;
1)The Government permitted the Company to purchase the 
confiscated timber of the Phre forest at 10 rs per 
log.As for Phya Santow,who was in debt to the Company 
and had failed to deliver the agreed amount of logs,the 
Government decided that the Company should cease the 
contract and renounce any claims to the debt.
2)As for the renewal of leases,the Forest Department 
needed to inspect the forest before ratification by the
9 3
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94
NA 5 M 16.1/17 Sahadhep to Devawongse Aug 30,1899.
95
NA 5 M 16.2/58 Sahadhep to Sommot Aug 30,1899.
^  NA 5 M 16.1/19 Devawongse to Prasiddhi Sept 3,1899.
NA 5 M 16.1/19 Sahadhep to Damrong Feb 3,1900.
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King.
It was in the Government interest to sell the logs as the
Company might assert claims and it was likely that the Company
would have purchased the confiscated logs.The extension of
leases merely allowed the Company to sell those logs
9 8girdled,and not to cut any more trees. The significance of 
the extension of leases was that more capital was required for 
its working and thus sustaining the British monopoly. 
Secondly,the problem of indiscriminate cutting prevailed.
Assessment of the British Companies' Position in Siam.
By the turn of the century the 4 British Companies in
Monthon Payab had branches in Chiengmai,Lampang,Me Hong
Sorn,Phre,Nan,Swankaloke,and Tak.In 1913 there were 25 British
agents representing the 4 British companies in Northern
Siam.The Bombay-Burmah Corp had 10 agents;Louis T.Leonowens
99had 6;Borneo Co had 5;and the Siam Forest Co had 4. As the 
political environment changed in that Siam's independence 
became more secure,the Siamese attitude towards British teak 
business also changed,as indicated by the renewal of 
leases.Renewal of leases depended upon the condition of the 
forests and the amount of trees available for extraction.In
9 8
NA 5 M 16.2/25 Damrong to King Aug 25,1902.
99 Based on photograph in Phornphun Chongwattana Thai 
MA.diss.,"The Disputes of British Subjects..." pg 89.
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1903 the Bombay-Burmah Corp was given a 6 year lease at a duty
of 6 rupees,whilst the Siam Forest Co was granted a 10 year
lease with a rate of 10 rupees.^^Some leases to the Bombay-
Burmah were extended by 10-15 years.For instance the lease on
the Forest Me Larn in Me Hong Sorn was extended for another
15 years.^^Another case to show the privileged position of
the Company was when its leasing in Lampoon had expired after
6 years,it was extended for another 2-3 months to enable the
102Company to complete dragging the logs. Other British 
Companies also had their leases renewed for instance the 
Borneo Co.
Table V
1)Forest Me Tan - Lampang extended 7 months
2) " Me Turn - " 2
3) " Me Ta Lampoon " 6 "
4) " Me Tang Chiengmai " 6 "
Source:NA 5 M 16.2/77
It was difficult for the Interior Ministry to follow the 
policy of equal distribution of the Forestry Department on 
account of the quality of each forest concerned.Such practise 
often placed the Siamese being accused of favouritism towards 
the Bombay-Burmah Corp.Another difficulty was the policy of 
conservation. It .may be interpreted that such a policy was not
NA 5 M 16.1/25 Damrong to Devawongse Aug 15,1903. 
NA 5 M 16.2/5 Damrong to King July 29,1908.
102
NA 5 M 16.2/5 Damrong to King Jan 20,1907.
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to exclude the British but rather to sustain their presence. 
The reservation of certain forests for future extraction would 
ensure the Siamese a regular source of revenue.
The key explanation to the Bombay-Burmah's success was
due to its capital holdings. Damrong continuously insisted that
the Forestry Department (after Slade) provide an equal
103distribution of leases to the Western companies, but in
practise,the Siamese policy had a contradictory effect in
giving the Bombay-Burmah Corp the upper hand.When the Interior
Ministry wanted a certain forest to be worked,it adopted the
open tender system.The problem of such a system was that the
lease was ceded to the highest bidder,which was inevitably one
of the British companies.The Borneo Co had complained that
such an open tender system was ineffective because it opened
the path to the Bombay-Burmah Corp monopoly;
"The problem about the open tender system is 
that the lease goes to the highest bidder 
which tends to be a British Company due to 
their large capital holdings.Such pattern 
tend to remove the small-holders^gjjd 
increases the British monopoly."
The open tender system may have appeared to be part of 
the Department's favouritism towards the British companies. 
However this policy was not consistent.On the contrary,Paget 
complained that the Siamese had taken discriminatory action
103
Ibid.
NA 5 M 16.1/25 Damrong to Devawongse Aug 15,1903.
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against the British;
"Paget has complained that the Siamese have 
permitted certain companies (Danes) to girdle 
but not British Companies.Damrong informed 
me that he sees no reason for Paget's complaint 
and pointed out the policy of the Forestry 
Department is not to place a certain company at 
an advantage but rather to carry out the means 
which best serves the working of forests in 
Siam. "
Paget had heard rumours that the Siamese Government was
contemplating the renewal of leases to certain parties thereby
giving advantages to those having girdled the timber.Paget
urged Devawongse not to endeavour such a step. ^ ^Damrong
reiterated the point that the "Forestry Department policy was
not to place any particular Company at an advantage,but rather
the interest of forestry as a whole." Indeed the Danish East
Asiatic was at the time girdling trees at Phre without
107Departmental permission. But according to Sri Sahadhep,the
Danish East Asiatic had already made a report of their need
to continue working the Phre forests,as the girdled trees were
108not enough to earn a profit. The crucial element was that 
the Danes not only carried out illegal girdling, but moreover 
their lease was in the Phre forests which the Siamese had 
determined to have closed to Western capital.In a private 
letter from Sri Sahadhep to Sommot,there is evidence that the
105 NA 5 M 16.1/25 Devawongse to King Aug 7, 1903.
106 NA 5 M 16.1/25 Paget to Devawongse Aug 7,1903.
107 NA 5 M 16.1/25 Devawongse to King AUg 7, 1903.
108 NA 5 M 16.1/25 Sahadhep to Sommot Aug 15 ,1903.
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Ministry of the Interior favoured the Danes;
"We intended to give the Danish East Asiatic Co 
more privileges than any other British Company, 
but as the Forestry Department did not approve 
and the British Minister had accused us of being 
bias,we considered it^inappropriate to extend the 
lease to the Danes."
The interesting question is the reason behind the 
favourable Siamese attitude towards the Danes,and their 
failure to insist upon the lease.The Interior Ministry may 
have wanted to use the Danes as a counter-balance against 
British hegemony.The Danish Company was already faced with 
financial difficulties,and if the Phre forests were not 
renewed,the Company would not have been able to sustain their 
operation.^^Nevertheless the Interior Ministry was unable to 
appease the Danes.Firstly there was the burden of the British 
Minister accusing the Siamese of favouritism.As the Bombay- 
Burmah Corp was a reputable company in Britain,there was the 
possibility that the Company would approach the British 
Government for support.Second,and perhaps more conclusive,was 
that not only did the Phre forests need to be closed for 
conservation purposes, but if the Danes were to continue 
operation and then default,the Bombay-Burmah Corp would 
inevitably purchase the lease (as they had endeavoured to gain 
a footing in this forest),and would then place the Siamese in
109 . .Ibid.
Ibid. In 1903 the Danish EAC sold their leases to the 
British.(NA 5 M Devawongse to King Aug 7,1903.)
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a difficult position.
The Siamese attitude towards the presence of the British
can be described in two ways.On the one hand the Siamese
endeavoured to prolong the presence of the British as pointed
out by a Siamese official;
"Siamese encourage British capital in 
teak rather than Siamese capital because 
both the Government and the Chaos earn 
income from the duty collected,whereas 
Siamese concessionaires tend to default."
Yet the Siamese administration possessed an element of
prejudice against the presence of the British.Indeed the
Siamese attempted to participate in teak extraction,but due
to the lack of capital and business expertise,British
companies remained unchallenged as pointed out by the King;
"British Companies have now ousted Siamese 
small-holders from working the forests,and 
have now monopolised the industry..Siamese (are) 
not experienced in teak investments whereas 
the British companies and the Forestry 
Department are like a kite having^l^own 
from Burma with much experience."
The Forestry legislation was reorganised in 1909 as most of
the teak leases were expiring,and it was found necessary to
improve the entire system of leases.The underlying term was
that the felling cycle was lengthened to 30 years being
divided into two halves of 15 years.The Forestry
NA 5 M 16.2/21 Prince Pravitr to Queen (Regent) April 
21,1897.
117 NA 5 M 16.2/18 King to Suriya Aug 24,1903.
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Director,Lloyd,described the new system of leases to the
Financial Adviser;
"Under this system the whole of the teak 
bearing forests of Siam have been leased^^ 
and brought under systematised control."
113
NA Kh 0301.1/10 Lloyd to Williamson March 8,1910.
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Chapter 6
The Development of British Interest in Railways,1885-1905.
Railway construction was a main area of British 
investment during this period,not only in her Colonies;India 
and Burma,but also in the industrialising world,notably 
America.Siam was an obvious area for the British to dominate 
railway construction.Siam lacked both the capital and the 
expertise to undertake railway construction .Yet Siam succeeded 
in protecting herself from being dominated by Western railway 
companies.A contributory factor to the Siamese preservation 
of sovereignty was the environment of intense rivalry amongst 
the British,German,and the French.The British were the first 
to commence railway surveys in Northern Siam in the early 
1880s;and it was the British who constructed and financed the 
first major railway line connecting Bangkok with the North 
East in the 1890s.However British intentions to dominate 
railway construction in Siam was obstructed by the 
establishment of a Railway Department headed by a German 
Director.
Several studies have been undertaken on railway 
construction in Siam.Somjai Phirotthirarach in her thesis 
presents a descriptive account of Western interests in the 
Siamese railways and the political complications arising from
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the rivalry between Germany and Britain.^D.Holms discussed the
role of railways in the context of Siam's political
2
survival,and the social and economic effects. The key issue 
which needs further explanation is the question of economic 
sovereignty,how the Siamese managed to prevent the domination 
of foreign railway companies and succeeded in constructing 
railways through state enterprise.In discussing the role of 
the British and the Siamese response to their involvement in 
the railways,certain issues need to be discussed:the rise and 
decline of British influence in the Siamese railways;the 
dictatorial nature of the German-dominated Railway 
Department;three railway arbitrations;and British portfolio 
investment in the construction of the Northern line.
British attention to the construction of a railway line 
in Siam was first considered at the London Chamber of Commerce 
in 1885.Holt S.Hallett addressed the meeting on the topic 
"Railway Extension to South-West China and Siam".The 
underlying issue was the prospect of trade to be gained by 
constructing a railway line from Moulmein across to the 
Siamese Shan states and northwards penetrating South-West
Somjai Phirotthirarach "The Roles of the Western Powers in 
Thai Railways Construction During the Reigns of King Rama V 
and VI".MA.diss.(Thai Text),Chulalongkorn U.1974.
2
David Holm "The Role of the State Railways in Thai 
History,1892-1932",Phd.diss.,Yale U.1975.
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3
China. Hallett referred to A.R.Colquohoun's exploration
mission to the area of the Siamese Shan States in 1871;
"(Colquhoun) was much struck with the fertility 
of the country and the numerous caravans which 
were traversing it in every direction.He returned 
to England in 1881 consulting with me upon the 
most feasible direction for the construction of 
a railway."
A.R.Colquhoun was an Engineering Officer of the British
Burma administration despatched to explore an alternative
route connecting British Burma and Western China.The route via
the Irrawady River,Bhana and Talifoo involved political and
physical difficulties.The British Burma Public Works
Department supported Colquhoun's proposal of a new route
through the Shan States as it would involve fewer 
5obstacles. The line also served a political value as it would 
counter any French attempt to secure the sea route to China 
via Yunnan;
"With a large market established at Kiang Hsen, 
and a railway connecting it with Bangkok and 
Moulmein^our trade could.never be ousted by the 
French."
The French economic threat originated from the French 
Governor-General in Indo-China,de Lanessan,who suggested to
3
PRO FO 69/103 Supplement to the Chamber of Commerce May
5,1885.
 ^ Ibid.
 ^ PRO FO 69/104 Col A.M.Lang,Officiating Sec of the Chief 
Commr British Burma,Public Works Dept.
 ^ PRO FO 69/103 Supplement to the Chamber of Commerce May
5,1885.
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his government that a rapprochment with the Burmese monarch 
in controlling the Upper part of the Irrawady would secure the 
Yunnan route.^
In 1884 the two British engineers,Hallett and Colquhoun,
applied to the Siamese Legation in London for a railway
concession connecting Moulmein with Raheng in the Siamese Shan
States.However they were not met with success.Colquhoun
attributed the Siamese decision to their mistrust of the
Indian Government,rather than to the actual presence of
British capital.Colquhoun had the impression from
Devawongse,the King's Private Secretary, that the King was
aware of the French intentions and realized the importance of
the railway line as a safeguard;
"The only means of safety they (Devawongse and 
the King) see is the opening of the country to 
trade,the introduction of railways and thus 
foreign capital and the connection of our 
commercial interests ig Siam and British Burma 
by means of railways."
However Devawongse was rather apprehensive about the support
from the British India Government.There was already the
telegraph connection between Bangkok-Chiengmai-Burma 
9
frontier. Any further concession could arouse the French to 
demands.By contrast Satow,the British Consul in Bangkok,
7
S .Phirotthirirach MA.diss.
o
PRO FO 69/104 Colquhoun to Satow July 14,1884.
9
* Ibid.
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attributed Hallett's failure to the Siamese fear of losing 
their sovereignty;
"I think the Siamese would fear the great 
extension of extra-territorial jurisdiction 
which the grant of a concession to a foreign 
company would involve."
Indeed Satow's view can be substantiated by the content of the
correspondence between Devawongse,who at the time was the
King's Principal Private Secretary,^and the Siamese Minister
in London, Prisdang.
This private correspondence serves to show the connection
between railway construction and the question of economic
sovereignty.The Siamese were fully aware of the benefits of
railways,but as Prisdang pointed out to Devawongse;
"Railways are a means of developing and bringing 
prosperity to a nation,but we need to consider 
the question of sovereignty... that it could 
jeopardise our independence (decision-making).
This railway may help to develop the nation at 
the expense of our independence.We need to 
possess a strong administrations0 that 
Westerners cannot exploit us."
Prisdang suggested that the Siamese would need to borrow
capital and to administer the railway construction so as to
direct the route in accordance to Siamese interest.He
concluded that;
^  PRO FO 69/104 Satow to C .Bernard-Singapore.Aug 30,1884.
^  Prince Devawongse was the King's Principal Private 
Secretary 1880-1885;replaced Bhanuwongse as Foreign Minister 
in 1885 which office he held till 1924.
12 NA KT 5.2/1 Prisdang to Devawongse Sept 1884.
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"The Company whose tender gives us the most 
power in the railways is the appropriate one, 
not the Company which givej^us the best 
interest rate or subsidy."
In order to understand the grave Siamese concern over the
question of sovereignty,a few points about the nature of
railway investment are worth considering.Railway investment
involves a large outlay of capital,administration,and
supervision,which the Siamese were not prepared for.Prince
Naret,Prisdang's successor,was aware of such committments and
14emphasised these crucial considerations to Devawongse. Naret 
perceived the long term consequences of British involvement 
in railways.The profits gained from railways would induce 
western investors to extend their control over the 
administration.On account of the "Most Favoured Nation 
Clause",the other Great powers would inevitably object to such 
British predominance,thus creating political complications.
Indeed the Siamese could respond by concluding an 
agreement to protect its interests,but yet the administration 
was not strong enough to enforce such terms.Naret recommended 
the Siamese authorities to administer the construction in 
order to maintain Siamese control despite the lack of
13 T, . .Ibid.
^  NA KT 5.2/1 Naret to Devawongse Nov 31,1884.
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15personnel and expertise to undertake such a task. Therefore 
the question of whether the Siamese Government or a foreign 
company would undertake the construction remained 
inconclusive.
What remained clear was the Siamese perception of the
Moulmein-Yunnan route as an infringement of their
sovereignty.In order to avoid their position from being
undermined,Naret decided to approach Sir Thomas Tancred to
survey the railway route to Khorat in the North East thereby
diverting British interests from the North.The route covered
a distance of 150 miles and was an area adjacent to the French
frontier.In 1885 Tancred sent two engineers to survey the
railway route,and his report was presented to the Siamese
Government in 1886.^However the Siamese were in no position
to provide any security for the construction which dissuaded
the Western companies from applying for the contract.The lack
of confidence in the rate of return finally shelved the
preliminary surveys.On the part of the British Indian
authorities, the hope for a Moulmein-Shan-Yunnan route
gradually faded,as pointed out by the Secretary of State for
India,Lord Randolph Churchill;
"Until the main line is well advanced to 
completion and the branch is in progress, 
it would be a waste of money for the
16 T. . .Ibid.
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Indian Government to commence any works 
on the British side of the border.The 
main line would be a large enterprise 
which the Siamese Government could not 
undertake and upon which no European 
Company would embark without the guarantee 
from some European (jjyvernment possessing 
control over Siam."
Nevertheless,the British Government was still interested
in the Siamese railways,and Joseph Chamberlain,President of
the Local Government Board,endeavoured to convince the Siamese
Minister in London,Naret,that the timing was appropriate for
18railway construction due to the falling price of iron.
Chamberlain pointed out that the unfavourable conditions of
international trade affected Europe and Britain,and that
Britain was seeking new markets;
"Presently trade throughout Europe is slack 
causing falling prices in coal and labour. 
Therefore it is in the interest of Britain 
to sell and the interest of Siam to buy.
Britain needs to find markets for her 
stocks which are at a low price.Therefore 
this is a good opportunity for railway 
building."
Chamberlain also touched upon the issue of sovereignty by
giving reassurances of Siam's independence;
"Siam is an independent state and therefore 
must not allow France to interfere.... It
17 PRO FO 69/104 Govt of India Foreign Dept to Randolph 
Churchill,Secretary of State of India.Oct 5,1885.
18 NA KT 5.2/1 Conversation between Joseph Chamberlain and 
Naret at the House of Commons.March 8,1886.Reported by 
F.Verney March 9,1886.
19 T. . .Ibid.
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isup to the Siamese Government from whom 
she wants to secure railway material,perhaps 
equally amongs^French and British 
manufactures."
Several points can be made about Chamberlain's meeting
with the Siamese Minister.Firstly it indicates that Anglo-
Siamese economic relations were not restricted to the Foreign
Office nor to the Indian Office,but also concerned the Local
Government Board.Chamberlain explained to Naret that "issues
involving people's welfare is a concern for any Cabinet 
21Minister." Secondly his recognition of Siam's independence
was the first time that a senior member of the British
Government had mentioned it directly to the Siamese.Thirdly
it shows that the nature of Britain's interest in Siam was for
trading purposes as opposed to political ambitions.Finally
Chamberlain's opinion was,in Verney's view,"valuable" because
of his "constant contact with leading commercial men in 
22Britain." Indeed the Siamese considered the construction of 
the Bangkok-Yunnan railway line,but were still doubtful of 
Chamberlain's recognition of Siam's independence.This is 
reflected by Siam's manoeuvre to involve another Great 
Power,Germany.
20 Ibid.
21 Ibid.
22 Ibid.
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In 1887 Devawongse,as Foreign Minister,embarked on a
European tour in which one of his tasks was,in the American
Consul's view,"to form a company and secure proper parties and
23capital to build the railway". Devawongse visited the leading
firm in Germany,Krupp,and British capitalists in London where
he induced the Duke of Sutherland and Sir Andrew Clarke to
visit Siam to secure the concession.However Sutherland would
24offer no scheme without a Siamese guarantee. In 1888 Sir
Andrew Clarke,agent for the British engineering firm of
Punchard, Mctaggart,Lowther & Co,visited Siam for the purpose
of the concession.The scheme involved a system of main railway
lines extending to South West China opening up large tracts
of land,and thus opening up trade between Bangkok and Northern 
25Siam. The King did not accept the proposal and instead
granted a complete survey through Uttradit to the North and
2 6a branch line to Khorat, thereby discouraging any connection 
between North Siam and Moulmein,and at the same time enhancing 
Siam's control over the Northern States.(See Map III).
According to the report of the British Consul,Gould,the 
King endeavoured to grant the concession to a British
23 USCR XXII-XXIII 1887 April-Sept pg 106 "Railroads in Siam" 
by Jacob T.Childs.
24
PRO FO 69/122 Gould to Salisbury March 17,1888.
25 NA KT 5/17 Messrs Pune hard, Me taggart, Lowther & CO to 
Devawongse,Oct 21,1892.(Memo of events that occured in 1888).
7 6
NA KT 5/17 Messrs Punchard to King Aug 3,1888.
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Company,but was placed in a dilemma.Firstly the concession
involved the extension of extra-territorial jurisdiction,and
secondly there was the fear of French demands;the King,he
said,merely granted the preliminary surveys to Clarke on the
27basis of personal friendship. Gould's report tended to
contradict his earlier conversation with the former Foreign
Minister,Bhanuwongse.The latter had expressed to Gould that
the Siamese Government did not feel threatened by the French
2 8due to their committments at home. Perhaps Bhanuwongse only 
referred to Devawongse,who did not feel that the French were 
an impending threat.There is no evidence to show the King's 
fear of the French,but perhaps the King's scheme for the 
Khorat route is an indication of a desire to anticipate any 
French military movements.
Tender For The Nakorn Rachasima Line.
Clarke's preliminary survey of the North Eastern line to 
Khorat was carried out at a time when the Germans were showing 
increasing interest in Siam.In November 1888,the German firm 
Krupp had despatched Bethge,their agent in China,to meet 
Devawongse in the belief that the latter intended to employ
^  PRO FO 69/122 Gould to Salisbury March 17,1888.
2 8 PRO FO 69/122 Memo of Conversation between Gould and Ex- 
Foreign Minister Bhanuwongse Jan 31,1888.
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29a German railway engineer. Bethge pointed out to Devawongse
that his employment would protect Siamese railway interests
from British dominance;
"The engagement of a German just plainly 
warrants to the Siamese Government a 
sure guarantee of a really energetic and 
strictly impartial protection of its 
(Siam) interests vis-a-vis the English 
concern entrusted ^jth surveying and such 
preliminary work."
In response,Devawongse transferred his responsibilities on
railways to the Ministry of Public Works and established the
Railway Department,appointing Bethge as the first Director.
Such a movement can be interpreted as preventing the British
scheme for the Moulmein-Yunnan route.Furthermore Devawongse
agreed with the German Minister in Bangkok,Kemperman,to allow
Germans to compete with the British on the tender for railway
concession;
"Kemperman is suspicious of the British 
and told me during a private conversation 
that the British intended to take advantage 
of Siam's railway interests.Kempermann has 
continuously warned me that Sir Andrew 
Clarke is very likely to call for an exclusive 
use of British material.Therefore Kempermann 
urged me to permit the Germans to participate 
in the tender.I replied that such a procedure 
will be useful t^Siamese interest and will 
be carried out."
29 NA KT 5.2/5 K.Bethge to Devawongse Dec 11,1888.Karl Bethge 
was an engineer of the Royal Prussian Railway 1882-86,had 
worked in Serbia,then obtained the dual post of Krupp and 
German Government's engineering representative in China.
30
NA 5 YO 5.2/5 Bethge to Devawongse Dec 9,1888.
31
NA 5 YO 5.6/1 Devawongse to King.Feb 12,1889.
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The Germans used diplomatic means through their Minister to 
gain a foothold in Siam.This marked the beginning of the 
Anglo-German economic rivalry in Siam.The Germans were aware 
of the Siamese need to draw on another Great Power to counter­
balance the British. Records from the German Foreign Office 
indicate such an awareness;
"There was the conviction in Thai Government 
circles that Siam's future could only be 
secured through a close contact with Germany, 
and that English and French influence,in 
particular where the rajjways were concerned, 
had to be kept at bay."
Clarke was led to believe that the undertaking of the
preliminary surveys would secure him the concession.Instead
the Siamese decided for an open tender system.In 1891 the
concession for the 160 miles standard gauge railway line was
advertised throughout the Siamese Legations in Europe (London
and Berlin).The concession included both the construction and
the supply of railway material,thereby limiting the tenders
to companies with large financial holdings.From the Siamese
point of view,they intended not to distinguish between the two
because it was the supply of railway material which provided
33a strong inducement for companies to tender. By September 
1891,the Siamese Legation in London had been approached by 15
32 Klaus Wenk "The Relations Between Germany and Thailand" in 
Southeast Asia and the Germans.Horst Erdman Verlag.Tubingen- 
Basle,1977.pg 153.
33 S .Phirotthirarach MA.diss,pg 32.
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Companies.However the Legation did not possess substantial
34details on the concession to attract companies. Several 
would-be tenderers in both Europe and America complained that 
the Railway Department had provided inadequate information on 
local conditions to permit accurate estimations of the costs 
involved.
By October 1891,there were two principal bidders:a German
Syndicate and a British Company.The German Syndicate "The
Joint Stock Co for the Construction of Railways in Siam"
comprised 5 German firms and was represented in Bangkok by 
35F.Lenz. The German's rival was a Scotsman,George Murray-
Campbell,who represented Murray-Campbell & Co in Singapore,and
was financed by Matheson & Co.Murray-Campbell had experience
of railway construction in Ceylon,Jamaica,and in the Malay
Peninsula,where he had acquired local knowledge of labour and 
3 6resources. Murray- Campbell's bid was 220,000 baht lower than
the German,but yet Bethge recommended the German tender,
asserting that the Scotsman had not fulfilled the required
specifications;
"Regarding the tenderers,I feel compelled to 
declare that only the German tender fulfilled 
the formalities prescribed by the specification,
34 NA KT 5.2/15 Phra Srithabakdi (Siamese Legation in London) 
to Devawongse Sept 19,1891.
35 NA KT 5.2/20 Suriya to German Foreign Minister,Baron 
Marshall von Bieberstein,Oct 19,1891.
o c
NA KT 5.2/26 Sir Charles Gregory to Verney Dec 1,1891.
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Messrs Campbell had not filled the declaration, 
and only sent a simple letter accompanied by a 
note from Jardine Matheson declaring the bank 
would support Campbell.As the letter is not 
binding,therefore of no value to the
Siamese Government."
Bethge's decision was reported to the British Minister who
counter-argued that Campbell had not received the tender
form,and as his estimates were lower than the German
38rival,Murray-Campbell was the rightful choice. Bethge
informed the Minister of Public Works, Narit,that despite the
lower estimates by the Scotsman,there was a question of
quality.Campbell had not carried out any surveys nor studied
the plans laid out by the Railway Department,and this might
39create long-term problems.
On the one hand,it does appear that Bethge was naturally
biased towards the German Syndicate.Hickey,agent of Murray-
Campbell , reported to Devawongse that Bethge had approached his
Company to raise their bid so as to justify the choice of the
40German Syndicate. On the other hand,Bethge's suspicions of 
Campbell were on account of the technical benefit to railway 
construction in Siam.Verney (Counsellor at the Siamese 
Legation In London),who was prejudiced against the Germans,had
37
NA KT 5.2/32 Bethge to Narit,Public Works Minister Oct 
19,1891.Oct 18,1891.
38
NA 5 YO 5.6/7 Devawongse to King Oct 18,1891.
39
NA KT 5.2/32 Bethge to Narit Oct 19,1891.
40
NA KT 5.2/18 Hickey to Devawongse Oct 18,1890.
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41earlier praised Bethge as a "man of intention and loyalty".
However, from the correspondence amongst the Siamese Ministers,
it seems clear that they were suspicious of Bethge.Firstly,
Narit's letter to the King stated;
"Bethge's report is biased towards the Germans, 
and the price list is not reliable as the costs 
that ought not to be reduced are reduced,and 
those that have been increased ought not have 
been raised.Therefore th^2cost factor is not 
the determining factor."
The issue was sensitive and it was left for the King to decide
with the warning from Devawongse that;
"If this case is mismanaged,it would become a 
severe issue.Therefore it is for Your Majesty 
to consider wij^ great caution before making 
the decision."
In October,the King informed Narit of his choice;
"We notice that the English party is cheaper 
than the German one,and is likely to perform 
the work more in accord with the regulations 
than is the German party.The contract should 
therefore be given to the English because it 
will be m^je useful to the interests of the 
country."
The last reason given was perhaps the most important in 
selecting the British bidder.Holms pointed out that the choice 
marked the culmination of Devawongse's effort,begun in 1887,on 
his world tour,to involve non-French and preferably British
41 PRO FO 69/145 Verney Conversation with Sanderson,Permanent 
Secretary at the Foreign Office,Feb 14,1891.
4.9
NA KT 5.2/18 and 5 Yo 5.6/7 Narit to King Oct 21,1891.
^  NA 5 YO 5.6/7 Devawongse to King Oct 8,1891.
44 NA 5 YO 5.6/7 King to Narit Oct 21,1891.No longer 
available,quoted in Holm Phd pg 60.
255
45capital. But in this case,it was the threatening position of
German hegemony which determined the Siamese anxiety for
British capital as seen in Devawongse' letter to Suriya;
"Bethge's action during the tender was very 
biased,so that if I had not been aware of 
this,wemay have ended up with the Germans 
constructing the railway^jn their interest 
at the expense of Siam."
The issue of the tender for the Khorat railway concession 
was noted by the newspaper,the Bangkok Times.From the various 
articles, there is a clear indication of the inevitable 
support for British interest in Siam from the Western 
community.The newspaper attacked the Siamese,in particular 
Bethge,for adopting the standard gauge as used in Burma and 
Malaya;
"By adopting the normal gauge in Siam,a 
cheaper traffic may be established from 
the Chinese-Siamese frontier to Bangkok, 
and no meter gauge competition need to ^
be feared to direct the trade to Moulmein."
The principal reason which the article gave against the
standard gauge in Siam was the cost of transloading fron one
train to another in connection with the Burmese railway.Bethge
explained to Devawongse that the Bangkok Times editor was
protecting interests which were contrary to those of the
Siamese,namely in preventing Bangkok from being linked to the
^  Holm Phd.
46 Devawongse to Suriya Dec 8,1891.Quoted in Somjai thesis.
47 NA KT 5.2/6 Enclosure of BKK Times in Bethge to
Devawongse.Feb 7,1891.
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48South China trade. In response, Bethge accused the editor of
being ignorant of railways.Yet in November 1891,after the
concession had been granted to Campbell,the Bangkok Times
changed its attitude and began praising Bethge's conduct of
the affair;
"The whole Bangkok community is disgusted 
with the absurd fuss made about very 
ordinary occurences..What does the whole 
theme after all amount to.Tremendous
efforts are being made to prove that the
Director-General has used irregular 
means to secure the railway contract for 
his coujj^rymen,as if that was a henious 
crime!"
The Quarrel Between British Engineers and Bethge
As pointed out earlier,the appointment and establishment
of the Railway Department was the Siamese response to British
intentions of dominating the railways.An assessment of the
role of Bethge is one way of determining the effectiveness of
Siamese restrictions on the British.The responsibility of the
Railway Department was to organise and oversee the
construction of State railways,and to regulate and inspect any
50private railway which might be built in the Kingdom. The 
Department was placed under the direction of the Ministry of
49
NA KT 5.2/15 BKK Times "Storm in Teacup" Nov 23,1891.
50 NA 5 First Report in Holm pg 48.
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Public Works,and was thus subservient to the Minister.In
practise,the Department,directed by Bethge,acted as an
autonomous body,which placed the British engineers within the
Department in a vulnerable position.Murray-Campbell accused
the Minister of Public Works,Narit,of being Bethge's puppet,as
the former lacked any knowledge of railways and thus became
51dependent upon Bethge's advice.
Complaints about Bethge prevailed throughout the
construction of the North-Eastern line.The Murray-Campbell
contract involved both the construction and the supply of
railway material and had to accede to the requirements of the
Department.Implementation of the contract was supervised by
the Consulting Engineer and the Inspector General resident in
London,which position was occupied by a British engineer,
Spence Moss.The latter had spent 15 years under the British
Government in Ceylon and the Straits,and was employed by the
52Siamese in 1892. Though reports on the railway material were 
submitted to Moss,yet he was directly subservient to Bethge.
For instance when Messrs Matheson and Co approached 
Spence Moss concerning the telegraph material for the Nakorn- 
Rachasima line,Spence Moss had to refer the matter back to
PRO FO 69/158 Campbell to Sec of State Aug 24,1893 pg 13. 
^  NA KT 5.2/39 Spence Moss to Devawongse Feb 11,1892.
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53Bethge in Bangkok. Another British engineer,F.D.Mitchell,
pointed out to Devawongse that the Chief Engineer should be
empowered to settle all matters of detail directly with the
Contractor.Mitchell described the system of waiting for the
sanction of the Public Works Minister (who in turn followed
the advice of others) as "pernicious", because it could lead
to claims by the Contractor against the Department on account
54of unnecessary delays.
Another example of Bethge dominating the decision making
was the issue of iron bridges.Blundell (British engineer of
the Department) believed that English bridges were practical
and safe, whilst Bethge preferred American bridges.Blundell
informed Bethge of his strong views;
"It must be clearly understood that in doing 
so (signing the contract),I merely act on 
your behalf to save the delay of sending the 
drawings to Siam and back again,and that I do 
not sign them as Consulting Engineer or by 
signing accept any responsibility for the 
strength or suitability of the design of the 
bridges.In saying this I do not wish to appear 
to criticize or express my opinion on the 
designs you have prepared,for which you are 
solely responsible and upon^hich I have not 
been officially consulted."
In addition Blundell complained to Maha Yotha (Siamese
53 NA KT 5.2/40 Spence Moss to Secretary Siamese Legation May 
18,1892.
54 NA KT 5.2/41 Statement by F.D.Mitchell to Devawongse July 
11,1892.
55 NA KT 5.2/50 Blundell to Bethge.
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Minister in London) that Bethge accused him of abusing his
authority as Consulting Engineer to the Department,quoting
Bethge's words;
"Moss Blundell does not recognise the authority
of the Railway Department as superior to himself
and proceeded to infer that the interests of the 
Siamese Goverja^nent are likely to suffer in 
consequence."
In order to understand the British complaints,it is worth
considering that the British method of conducting railway
investment was different in Siam from that in her Colonies. In
India the supply of railway material was tendered,and the
inspection of the work during manufacturing was arranged by
the Consulting Engineer.In the English Crown Colonies
(Jamaica,Ceylon,Straits Settlements),contracts for
construction did not include the supply of material,because
it would place the Contractor in a monopolistic position by
tendering at a high rate and purchasing inadequate material
57at the lowest price. It seemed that Bethge's exertion of 
authority was intended to undermine the Contractor's 
authority.
The problem in Siam about purchasing through a Contractor 
was that the railway material was ordered ahead of demand. 
Spence Moss sent a statement to compare the prices to be paid
56 NA KT 5.2/58 Blundell to Maha Yotha July 3,1893.
^  NA KT 5.2/59 Blundell Statement June 2,1893.
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to the Contractor and the current market price for the same 
58items. Moss calculated the loss incurred in not purchasing
in the open market at £40,000 (480,000 tcs) and pointed out
59the profits earned by the contractors. In addition the excess 
supply of railway material was paid for in cash rather than 
by instalments.^
Blundell questioned Maha Yotha on the large shipments of
material and enclosed 16 letters to the Siamese Legation in
London advising the Minister to reconsider home orders for the
Khorat Line,and that the export of railway material be
regulated by the amount of work completed in Siam.^In
response,Bethge sent a telegram to the Siamese Minister in
London "to stop all inspection and shipment of material for
6 2the purchase of this railway." In reaction,Murray-Campbell
sent a telegram to Bethge;
"You (Bethge) have exceeded the rights to 
possess (in the ordering of railway material) 
by my contract with the Government in thus 
interfering with the forwarding of material, 
and I hold the Government responsible to me 
in all damages and loss that I incur and
58 NA KT 5.2/45 Spence Moss to E.H Loftus,Danish engineer in 
the Railway Department,Aug 29,1892.
59 . ,Ibid.
^  NA KT 5.2/51 Narit to Devawongse Jan 3,1892.
^  NA KT 5.2/51 RRD to Minister of Public Works Dec 13,1892. 
^  PRO FO 69/158 Campbell to Bethge Jan 30,1893 pg 30.
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6 3also on account of this breach of my contract."
It is evident that the lack of technological expertise 
amongst the Siamese placed the Railway Department in the hands 
of the foreign engineers.However the conflict between the 
German Director and the British engineers gave the Department 
an element of balance in the sense that no particular Western 
power possessed a dominating hold over the nature of railway 
construction.
Conflict Between Campbell and the Siamese Government.
From the Siamese perspective,the construction of a 
railway line by a British contractor served to counter-balance 
the German orientated Railway Department.What the Siamese 
failed to foresee was the dispute created between the German 
Director and Murray-Campbell,which brought the intervention 
of the British Government.Such conflict was derived from 
Bethge's series of complaints against Murray-Campbell,namely 
the slowness of his work.Campbell offered to set out the 
entire line without any co-operation from the Department. 
Bethge refused and decided to place the planning in his own 
hands to which Campbell agreed.After a year and 3 months, 
Campbell only received the plan and section of the line up to
63 T. . . Ibid.
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64133 km, thereby preventing Campbell from continuing any 
preliminary arrangements.This delay caused a financial 
constraint upon Campbell.To overcome the problem,Campbe11 
proposed to extend the contract from 5-7 years and claimed 
500,000 tcs damages for neglect by the Department.
Campbell had three main complaints .Firstly the delay over
the preparation plans;secondly the deduction of payments by
the Hongkong and Shanghai bank;and thirdly the prohibition of
the supply of railway materials.On account of these
complaints,Campbell appealed to the British Foreign Office to
intervene.Campbell asserted that the dispute affected "the
economical working of the contract and its progressive and
65satisfactory execution." Concurrently,Jardine Matheson & Co 
threatened to cease all financial facilities to Campbell 
unless the Siamese Government made an immediate payment of all 
sums improperly detained. ^ Campbell pointed out that his 
financial weakness was impeding the construction and thus 
would jeopardise British commercial influence in Siam.In 
response to Campbell's complaint,the British Foreign Office 
pressed Devawongse for arbitration.Devawongse preferred to 
settle the dispute without acceding to arbitration,but
64
PRO FO 69/158 Murray-Campbell to Sec of State Aug 24,1893- 
Complaints pp 15-25.
^  PRO FO 69/158 Campbell to Sec of State Aug 24,1893.
^  PRO FO 69/158 Campbell to Rosebery Oct 24,1893 pg 299.
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6 7Campbell refused to compromise.
The Siamese Government yielded to arbitration upon the
pressure from the British Government and also agreed to hold
the proceedings in London.Campbell nominated Sir Guildford
Molesworth as his representative,whilst Bethge nominated Herr
Lange (Chief Counsellor to the Imperial German Government's
Minister of Public Works) to represent the Department.The
award of March 19,1894 granted Campbell less damages than he
had claimed,only 172,000 baht plus a one year extension of the
contract to compensate for the Department's delay in handing
6 8over mechanical drawings and in going to arbitration.
However changes in the political environment raised
issues concerning the Campbell contract.Due to the French
occupation of Chantaboon,the Siamese decided not to extend the
line eastwards to the Nongkai at Mekong.The Siamese Government
negotiated with Campbell to give up the last portion of the
contract so that the line would terminate at Genkoi-70 miles 
6 9from Bangkok. The termination was advised by the two British 
engineers in the Department (Newman and Blundell),on the 
grounds that it would be to Siam's advantage to undertake the 
construction in the French sphere of influence,carried out by
^  Ibid pg 39.
fi Q
PRO FO 69/158 Sanderson to Verney Oct 27,1893.Holm pg 69. 
^  PRO FO 69/180 de Bunsen to Salisbury Oct 20,1895 pg 55.
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a joint stock company incorporated as a Siamese company;
"It might avoid possible trouble with the 
French if the Khorat terminus were in the 
hands of a commercial company instead of 
under the control a Siamese state 
railway official."
Campbell agreed to terminate his contract only upon the
condition that his previous claims be met and he could secure
the contract for the proposed Northern line Ayuthaya-
Chiengmai.The Siamese refused these terms and decided to
terminate Campbell's contract.The British Minister,de
Bunsen,expressed another view, namely that Campbell was
71reluctant to extend the line further. The geographical 
difficulties in the eastern part of the region and the 
scarcity of labour beyond Genkoi involved financial 
constraints which Campbell was not prepared to meet.
The Siamese termination of Campbell's contract resulted 
in another Court case.A Dutchman,Van Bosse,declared the 
Department to be justified in cancelling the contract and 
advocated Campbell be paid 578,222 baht retention fund and 
damages of 50,133 baht,still no where close to the 9 million
70
NA 5 YO 5.2 Newman and Blundell to Bidyalabh Sept 26,1896. 
Prince Bidyalabh was Acting-Minister for Public Works 1894- 
97;Minister 1897-99.
PRO FO 69/180 Memo of de Bunsen by Black Sept 20,1895 pg 
63.
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72baht claimed by Campbell. Jardine Matheson who financed
Campbell,approached the British Minister, Greville,to support
73Campbell's contentions. On July 30,1898, Greville,with 
Foreign Office approval,presented Devawongse with documents 
which indicated that Lange and Van Bosse had acted contrary 
to the procedure in the matter of arbitration.
The General Adviser,Rolin-Jacquemyns,raised the issue
with the British Foreign Office,and both agreed that a third
Court of Arbitration take place,the matter to be decided by
a professional jurist.Rolin-Jacquemyns proposed to appoint a
Russian Privy Counsellor,but Salisbury objected that the case
needed to be conducted under British law declaring that,
"nobody but an English jurist would be competent to decide 
74it." A.Clarke was appointed and pronounced the following 
judgement;
1)The Railway Department was unjust in cancelling 
the contract.
2)The Railway Department should pay Campbell in 
addition to £37,000 another £161,000 by May 1901.
This meant that Murray-Campbell and Jardine,Matheson & Co had
managed to turn Van Bosse's annulled award into a net
profit,to be equally divided between the contractor and his
NA 5 YO 5.3/10 Umpire's Award,Nov 15,1897.Holm pg 73.
7 3 NA 5 YO 5.3/14 Memorandum of Railway Arbitration June 1900.
7 4  t K  * riIbid.
PRO FO 69/180 Campbell to Salisbury June 29,1897.
266
financier.
The dispute between Campbell and the Siamese Government
left an unfavourable mark on the Siamese attitude towards the
private construction of railways.Sir Alexander
Randle,Consulting Engineer to the Indian Government for
railways,had warned Devawongse in 1891 of the dangers involved
with contractors;
"Troubles with contractors,even in India, 
have been so serious,that the rule there 
now is...that the Government and Companies 
do their own work by their own engineers,^ 
without the intervention of contractors."
The Siamese mistake was that they believed the agreement was
only between the Railway Department and the Contractor,but in
reality the Siamese had to deal with the British Government,
77which led to difficulties and financial loss.
The Northern Line and the Siamese Loan.
The scheme for the Northern line Bangkok-Chiengmai (Map 
III) had been contemplated since 1895, and by the end of 
1896,the Siamese had turned down 4 British applicants: 
J.Macarthy;Murray-Campbell; Liversey and Henderson;Newman
7 6
NA 5 YO 5.1/25 Enclosure of Verney's letter of August
5,1899.
^  NA 5 YO 5.1/25 Sommot to Verney Sept 1,1899.
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7 8representing the Borneo Co. The British Foreign Office did
not exert its influence to ensure a British contract for the
concession.On the contrary,the British Foreign Secretary
declared to the London Chamber of Commerce his recognition of
Siam's decision to manage the railways;
"Siam is absolutely an independent State, 
and any railway which is made through it 
will depend entirely upon the control and 
judgement which th^^Siamese Government will 
exercise over it."
The British Foreign Office was aware that the timing was not
appropriate due to the Murray-Campbell railway arbitration,and
furthermore,the Siamese experience with the arbitration case
was dissuading the Siamese from granting contracts to
Westerners;
"Doubt that the Siamese give the concession 
to Campbell-sick of quarrels with contractors qq 
and more likely to try own hands at railways."
Indeed the Murray-Campbell incident had deterred the Siamese
from granting the contract to a Western enterprise,and made
them instead inclined to undertake the construction
themselves.Yet the Siamese administration was faced with the
decision of whether to grant the contract to a Siamese company
or have it constructed by the Railway Department.
7 8 NA KT 5.10/17 Rolin-Jacquemyns to de Bunsen April 13, 
1896;de Bunsen to Rolin-Jacquemyns April 12,1896;Newman to 
Bidyalabh Oct 30,1896.
79
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The General Adviser,Rolin-Jacquemyns,recommended a
private company to operate the construction and to be
81incorporated under Siamese law. Rolin-Jacquemyns ' opinion was
based on his argument that departmental construction involved
more expenditure. In addition Rolin-Jacquemyns favoured private
construction because he did not trust the Department.This is
evident in his model concession which formed the terms to
which any future concession would be granted to foreigners .The
82two main points were :
1)Companies should be Siamese Companies-those 
concerned to be placed under Siamese Law.
2)Profits to be equally divided between the 
government and the Company.Concession to be limited
to 25 years.
On the other hand,the Siamese administration found it more
appropriate to build railways departmentally than through
contract.The Cabinet feared the dominance of private
entrepreneurs.Damrong abhorred the large railway companies in
France and America. Experience with Campbell had shown the
problems involved with private entrepreneurs,and this
influenced the Siamese preference for state enterprise.The
Government laid down 3 principles in June 1899 favouring
8 3departmental construction:
1)A11 main railways to be built by the 
Railway Department:the Nakhon Rachasima
81 NA 5 YO 1-9 Rolin-Jacquemyns to Bidyalabh Jan 6,1897.
82
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Railway;the line north of Chiengmai;and Southern 
line to the Malay Peninsula.
2)Some regions were not to have railways.This 
was a precaution against foreign enemies (from) 
using them for attacking Bangkok.
3)Other lines could be built by private 
entrepreneurs.
These principles were a means of maintaining Siam's 
sovereignty. This became evident when the Government bought 
the Bangkok-Petchburi line from Aage Westenholtz and 
transferred it to Naradhip.
The British Government were convinced of the Siamese
Government committment to undertake construction,but there was
the question of finance and administration being dominated by
other Western powers. Departmental construction would allow the
German Director to exert his influence,whilst construction by
a Siamese Company would involve a foreign loan.Greville warned
Salisbury that;
•'The control of the railway system of Siam by 
foreign officials,or the construction of lines 
by foreign capital,wgjjld be a distinct blow to 
British ascendancy."
The only means left for the British to maintain some influence
in the Siamese railways was by participating in the loan.
Salisbury insisted Greville to persuade the Siamese Government
85to apply to the London market for the loan.
84
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The issue of a loan had been considered since 1896,when
J.J.Richmenn offered to Devawongse to negotiate with the
German financial houses whenever Siam was in need of 
8 6capital. In December 1897,the British Financial Adviser
87proposed to raise a European loan, and in 1898 Mahit,the
Finance Minister,was instructed to make inquiries as to the
88terms and conditions upon which a loan could be raised. In
1899,there were practical considerations which meant that the
time was not ripe for a loan.Not only did the Cabinet fear the
political implications of a foreign loan,but moreover the
political environment of Siam's uncertain position was
detrimental to a loan on favourable terms as pointed out by
Suriya, the Siamese Minister in Paris;
"So long as the independence of country is 
assured and ability to pay up interest and 
capital is in conformitggto agreement,Siam 
can borrow any amount."
In 1902 the issue of the loan re-emerged in connection 
with the construction of the Northern line,linking Bangkok 
with Uttradit.The scheme involved the doubling of funds to the 
Railway Department,an amount which the Government's current
o c
NA 5 T 1 Devawongse to Phya Nonth-Siamese Minister in 
Berlin May 19,1896.
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revenue was unable to meet.The Public Works Ministers,
Narit,pointed out to the King that the raising of a loan would
90give Siam two advantages. Firstly,it would provide
capital,and secondly the opportunity to negotiate with foreign
powers.Narit also made the point that as the loan would place
Siam in debt, such a disadvantage outweighed all other
advantages.The Finance Minister,Mahit,who saw the necessity
of a loan, had the support of the Financial Adviser, Rivett-
Carnac.The latter was in favour of Archer's scheme of
procuring a loan of 1 million sterling to be equally shared
91between France and Britain. Mahit enquired at the Hongkong
& Shanghai Bank in London on the terms for raising the 
92loan. In December 1902,Mahit informed the King that Rivett-
Carnac was to enquire in Europe about the loan under the
93supervision of the Siamese Minister in Paris,Suriya.
There was the question of the loan being linked to the 
rate and speed of railway construction.There were 2 
factionstGehrts (German successor to Bethge as Director of the 
Railway Department) advocated a slow pace,whilst Mahit wanted 
a fast pace.Gehrts made the point that it was important not
90
NA 5 Kh 25/1 Narit to King Feb 2,1902.
91 PRO FO 422/56 Charge d'Affairs,Archer,to Lansdowne Aug 
27,1902 pg 309.
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to construct railways ahead of commercial requirements;
"In Siam the increase of population and 
cultivation will follow the railway lines, 
and under due consideration of this fact, 
it is my opinion that the railway of this 
country might not (to) be built too quickly.
The spending of an average of 3.5 million 
baht yearly as done in the years 117 (1898) 
to 120 (1901) is in general quite sufficient 
for the effective development of the country 
and will insure a better fi^^ncial result than 
the spending of large sum."
Gehrts did not expect the trunk lines in Siam to generate a
revenue higher than a 5 % rate of interest.Furthermore Suriya
believed that the Lopburi-Uttradit line would give a
depreciating return of 10%, and thus preferred to use the loan
for establishing a National Bank for agricultural 
95development. In contrast Mahit saw "no harm in quick 
construction" ,^as railways was the key to stability,and the 
profits from railways could be used for further construction.
The decision to raise the loan was passed on to the
General Adviser,Stroebel.The latter pointed out that;
"The real danger in making (taking out) a 
loan lies not in making a ^ a n  but in making 
a loan and not paying it."
In his view the loan was unavoidable, and he gave his
94 NA 5 Kh 25/3 Gehrts to Narit (Minister Public Works) Jan 
20,1903.
9** NA Kh 0301.1 25/1 Suriya to Devawongse March 13,1903.
96 NA 5 Kh 25/1 Mahit to King Feb 5,1902.
97 NA 5 Kh 25/1 Memorandum by Stroebel on question of loan 
Oct 25,1904.
273
consent.The negotiations for the 1905 loan were entrusted to
Suriya and Rivett-Carnac. Suriya pointed out to Devawongse that
9 8there were two types of financing houses: private financiers
such as Rothschilds;and Joint-Stock ones such as the Hongkong-
Shanghai Bank.Rothschilds had several branches throughout
Europe,and if the Siamese were to secure the loan from the
French House,it might give the impression that the Siamese
were merely using the French name but had in fact negotiated
99with the British house. As for the Joint Stock banks, the 
loan was determined by the public as it was the latter who 
subscribed to the shares. In 1903 there was no such bank in 
France which would accede to the Siamese terms.
Therefore Rivett-Carnac then approached the Hongkong &
Shanghai Bank,but the London Bank offered only 92 nett at 5%
with no security.^^^In January 1905,Suriya wrote to the Consul
102for Siam in Stockholm,Axel Johnson,for assistance, who then 
contacted Wallenberg and Suriya.Wallenberg and Johnson met in 
Paris and negotiated with the Hongkong & Shanghai Bank,and the 
Banque de L'Indo-Chine which offered 90 and a half nett at 4
98
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and a half % pa.The Danish Landtmann Bank of which Wallenberg
was the Director also underwrote a small part of the loan.The
loan contract was negotiated by Suriya and Rivett-Carnac in
103London which was signed in March 19,1905. The loan was for 
£1 million at an interest of 4 and a half issued at 95 and 
a half,to be repaid within 40 years, using the general credit 
of Siam as security.
Ian Brown pointed out that the main reason for the
European confidence in Siam's credit was the employment of
a British Financial Adviser and the publication of the
budget,as it reassured the investors of the safety of their 
104investment. Perhaps Brown's point covered the overall 
confidence but not the actual timing of the loan. It may be 
suggested that the confidence in 1905 was firstly due to 
Siam's adoption of the Gold standard of 1902 and,secondly,to 
the Entente Cordiale,as it placed an end to Franco-Siamese 
hostility,thereby Siam was successful in raising a loan via 
the Joint-Stock banks.The fact that the French Banque de 
L'Indo-Chine participated in the loan clearly illustrates the 
public confidence in Siam's credibility.By the end of the 19th 
century,the Siamese administration was committed to its policy 
of departmental construction of railways.The termination of 
the Murray-Campbell contract and the construction of the
103 .Ibid.
104 Brown Phd pg 145.
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Northern line indicates the firmness of Siamese policy.Another 
important issue which also illustrates Siam's committment to 
their policy was in 1903 when the Siamese refused the French 
the construction of two railway lines in Northeastern Siam.
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Chapter 7
British Involvement in the Siamese Railways.1905-1914:The 
Construction of the Southern Line.
The construction of the Southern railway was of an 
entirely different nature to that of the Eastern and the 
Northern lines.The Siamese experience with the Murray-Campbell 
arbitration case,and the British confrontation with the 
German-dominated Railway Department influenced the 
characteristics of Southern railway construction.Firstly the 
construction was primarily British in nature.The line was 
built in the British sphere of influence with British capital 
and by a British Railway Department.Secondly there was a 
difference in purpose.lt has already been discussed how the 
purpose of the Northern line,to penetrate Yunnan,remained 
unresolved,whilst the Northeastern line was to serve political 
interests.However the Southern line was more realistic in its 
purpose,namely to connect with the Malay Peninsula railway 
line for trading purposes.
The importance of the construction of the Southern line 
in the context of Anglo-Siamese economic relations was shown 
in controversies over several issues:the exclusion of German 
engineers from participation in construction;the establishment 
of a separate department for the control of the line;and the
277
origin of the funds for the financing of the line.These issues 
revolved round the Secret Agreement of 1897,whereby Siam was 
required not to grant "any special privilege or advantage 
whether as regards land or trade" in the Peninsula to the 
subjects of a Third Power "without the written consent of the 
British GovernmentThe Siamese perceived the railway line as 
an attempt by the British to extend their influence from the 
Federal Malay States.It was attempts to prevent these issues 
from developing into a political crisis which culminated in 
the 1909 Agreement.
The Idea of the Southern Line.
The scheme for the Southern line was associated with the
British Colonial Office's intention to open up Southern Siam.
British interest in the construction of a railway line in
Southern Siam began in 1890 when there were two applicants.
Firstly the Penang Syndicate "^proposed to construct a line
from the mouth of the Pry River in Province Wellesley to Kulim
2
in Kedah which was favourably viewed by the Raja of Kedah. The 
second applicant was a British investor,Dunlop,on behalf of 
Kulim and Singora Railway Syndicate,who applied for the route 
from the Port of Singora (Songkla) to Purlis Kedah or
 ^ NA KT 5.10/3 Dunlop to Devawongse Jan 26,1890.Penang 
Syndicate was the strongest banking mercantile and shipping 
interest of Penang.
2
NA KT 5.10/3 Gould to Devawongse Oct 21,1889.
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3
Penang, under the name of "Royal Siam Transpeninsula Railway".
From the Siamese perspective,such a railway route offered 
both political and economic advantages.As Singora (Songkla) 
was closed to navigation for 5 months of the year,a railway 
line would bring constant communication between Bangkok- 
Singora.In addition,the line would serve to open rich tracts 
of mineral and agricultural land, thereby increasing the 
revenue of the country;provide rapid transport of mail and 
merchandise between the 2 seas;and above all strengthen
4
Siamese control of the Malay States. The Siamese decided in 
favour of the project and Dunlop proceeded to Europe in 1892
5
to make the necessary arrangements for construction. From the 
British point of view,the proposed railway line would allow 
the development of the Purlis coalfields,and create Penang as 
a coaling station. The scheme was undertaken by the Malay 
Railways and Works Construction Co Ltd,consisting mainly of 
railway contractors and capitalists of a high reputation in
7
England. However the Franco-Siamese Paknam incident,whereby
 ^NA KT 5.10/3 Dunlop to Devawongse March 26,1889.
4 NA KT 5.10/3 Dunlop to King July 29,1892.
 ^ Ibid.
 ^ PRO FO 69/240 Straits Independent (Penang) March 21,1891. 
Enclosed in Perks to Grey Dec 1,1893.
7
Further discussion see Chandran "Private Enterprise and 
British Policy in the Malay Peninsula:the case of the Malay 
Railway and Works Construction CO 1893-95"JMBRAS Vol 37 
Pt.2,1964 pg 25-46.
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French gun-boats entered Bangkok,resulted in the postponement
g
of the scheme, and the Siamese decided to cancel the
concession,as explained by Bidyalabh,the Deputy Minister of
Public Works;
"In my opinion,it was not necessary to delay 
because this railway route serves no particular
importance to us.If Dunlop fail to construct in g
time according to the concession,we can cancel it. "
Perhaps the Siamese cancellation of the concession can be 
regarded as a retaliation against the British for their non­
interventionist attitude during the Paknam incident.
The line proposed by the Penang Syndicate of the route 
Phrai to Kulim was modified,thereby giving a direct connection 
between Kota Star and Kulim,Kota Star to Phrai and from Phrai 
to Kulim and Selama.From a commercial point of view,much of 
the trade would be diverted to Penang.^Such a consideration 
dissuaded the Siamese from adopting such a proposal.The
difference between the two route concessions was that one was 
to be built from Siam into the Peninsula;the other from the 
Peninsula into Southern Siam.The former had found favour 
amongst the Siamese as it implied the extension of
o
NA KT 5.10/3 Dunlop to Sanprasit (Minister of Public Works) 
Sept 13,1893.Prince Sanprasit held the office 1893-94.
g
NA KT 5.10/3 Bidyalabh (Deputy Minister for Public Works) 
to Devawongse.Dec 29,1893.
^  NA KT 5.10/3 Bethge to Minister for Public Works Dec
18,1893.
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administrative control from Bangkok.
British interest in Southern railway construction was 
revived in 1896 when two retired British civil servants,Sir 
Luther Vaughan and Sir Edward Thorton,applied for a railway 
concession Bangkok-Chumporn,and the Kra Trans-Peninsula 
Railway.Sir Luther Vaughan was a retired army officer who had 
served in India.He had experienced railway management on the 
North Western Railway,whilst Sir Edward Thorton was a retired 
diplomat who had served as British ambassador to St.Petersburg 
and Constantinople.These two applicants had no experience of 
conducting business in a tropical country,and this reflects 
the nature of concession hunters who were merely profit- 
seeking speculators whose only experience was that of dealing 
with foreign subjects.The Siamese decided to deny the 
concession giving the excuse that their policy was to 
construct their own line.*'*’
Indeed Thorton and Vaughan may have held the impression 
that such an excuse was fallible,but when considering the 
actual nature of the Kra-Transpeninsula line,and the political 
environment in 1898,the Siamese refusal was based upon their 
mistrust and suspicions of Western enterprise.The purpose of 
the Kra-Transpeninsula line and the Bangkok-Chumporn was to
NA 5 YO 5.2/14 Thorton and Vaughan to Bidyalabh July
23,1898.
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12accommodate the foreign trade of Siam. The construction of 
a harbour at Chulai was to serve the large ocean 
steamers,whilst the harbour at Kra would shorten the distance 
between Bangkok and Europe by more than 1000 miles.The
railways would serve the inland transport of goods between
Bangkok and the South.The estimated cost for the grand scheme
13amounted to 2 .8 million baht. The grand scheme would open up 
the South at such an advanced pace that the sovereignty of
Siam might be placed at stake.Such a perception was seriously
14considered by Bidyalabh. The capital involved,the
construction of bridges,and the withdrawal of Siamese shipping
services on rivers in the area was seen as a surrender of
sovereignty;
"On the whole I should call it an ultimatum
for a concession for a railway purpose,or if
it is a concession,it is not for a railway ^  
purpose but to concede the kingdom to them."
In this sense,the crucial element was that the Siamese were
suspicious of foreign investment as a threat to their
sovereignty,and thus preferred to construct their own
railway. It is also worth considering that the year 1898
^  NA 5 YO 5.2/11 Thorton and Vaughan to Bidyalabh Sept 
23,1896.
Ibid.
14 NA 5 YO 5.2/11 Bidyalabh to Bethge Oct 25,1896.
15 T. . .Ibid.
^  NA 5 YO 5.2/14 Thorton and Vaughan to Bidyalabh July
13,1898.
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coincided with the Campbell arbitration,an experience which 
determined the Siamese to undertake railway construction 
directly rather than through granting contracts to 
Westerners.It may also be added that the idea of the proposed 
port accommodating ocean steamers raised the issue of gun­
boats entering Siam.
The Development of the Southern Railway Line.
The construction of a Southern railway line began with
the extension of a line southwards from Bangkok to
Petchburi.The concession was initially granted in 1894 to
Westenholtz,a Danish resident Civil Engineer who had been
involved in tramways in Bangkok.In 1895 the Cabinet decided
to undertake the project and Westenholtz agreed to transfer
his concession on condition that he became the sole 
17manager. Westenholtz also faced financial difficulties in
undertaking such a concession,and thus it was in his interest
to transfer the concession,as was made explicit in his letter
to the Royal Secretary;
"It has from the beginning been my desire 
to see this railway as a Siamese Co,with 
as much Siamese capital as possible,but 
the difficulty of obtaining considerable 
subscriptions amongst the common people 
has amply been proven,even on such
^  NA 5 YO 5.5/5 Memorandum of Cabinet Meeting Oct 4,1895.
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18profitable undertakings as the tramway."
Westenholtz requested the concession be transferred to
Naradhip, asserting that he wanted to see the concession
19"carried out as speedily and efficiently as possible. " Though 
Naradhip was not a member of the Cabinet,he had served as 
Finance Minister,and perhaps regarded as experienced in 
business matters.
Naradhip obtained the King's sanction for the concession
and intended to conduct the enterprise with Siamese 
20capital. However the Siamese Finance Ministry offered to
assume control of Naradhip's concession and recompense him for
a certain number of shares,which offer Naradhip 
21refused. Naradhip's concession became unacceptable to the
King unless he accepted the Finance Ministry offer.The reason
behind the administration's suspicions of Naradhip's
concession was his intention of seeking German financial
support.Naradhip had drawn up a draft Agreement with a German
firm Rickmers whose conditions certainly affected Siamese
economic sovereignty.In clause 5 it was stipulated;
"Prince Naradhip shall,if required by Rickmers, 
register the said railway line and the concession 
therefore as a German concern in His Imperial
18
NA 5 YO 5.5/5 Westenholtz to Sommot Feb 9,1895.
^  NA 5 YO 5.5/5 Westenholtz to Bidyalabh Sept 23,1896.
20
NA KT 5.4/1 Extract from the "Siam Free Press" Oct 5,1896. 
Ibid.
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22German Majesty's Consulate General at Bangkok."
Clause 6 granted Rickmers "full power and authority".
In response,the Siamese decided to transfer the concession to
Armstrong,a British representative of the Chartered Bank.The
financial houses supporting Armstrong did not agree to the
Siamese specified route,and the concession was finally sold
to a Dane, P.B.C.Kinch,who in turn sold it back to the 
23Siamese.
The Southern Railways
In 1906 the idea of the Malay-Peninsula emerged on
account of the strong intentions on the part of the Straits
authorities to connect their railway line with Siam.The
American Consul noted that the Federal Malay States had
already completed 396 miles of railway;were in the process of
constructing a line through Johore which was expected to be
completed by 1908;and that there were other lines being
contemplated running north through Pahang,for which
preliminary surveys had already been undertaken,including a
24route through Kelantan to Kota Baru. The Singapore Free Press 
asserted in an article that there was no reason why the
^  NA 5 YO 5.4 Cabinet Meeting,April 17,1897.
^  NA 5 YO 5.4 Cabinet Meeting April 17,1897.
24 PRO FO 422/60 British Charge D'Affairs,Beckett,to Grey Sept
12,1906 pg 94.
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railway line through Johore could not be extended through
Kelantan with the object of meeting a continuation of the
Siamese railways, traversing the Eastern Siamese States
25southwards from Bangkok. Such direction would provide
convenience as the north-east monsoon often proved a hindrance 
for access into the east coastal ports.
The Federal Malay States'Officers wanted to extend the
railways northwards through the Siamese Malay States along the
eastern and western coasts of the Peninsula.The idea of the
line through Johore was to complete the connection between
Singapore and the northernmost limits of the Federal Malay
States. This scheme had, in Beckett's view, prevailed amongst the
more "enlightened and far seeing" Siamese authorities,notably
Damrong.These Ministers supported the scheme on condition that
2 6the northward extension would provide commercial advantages. 
Yet there was much doubt as to the commercial success on 
account of the geographical difficulties of the region lying 
between the Federal Malay States and the Siamese territory.
The railway scheme can be regarded as a reflection of 
British interest in extending their influence into Southern 
Siam as indicated in Westengard's report to the King;
25 PRO FO 422/60 Extract from "Singapore Free Press" Sept 
6,1906 pg 97.
^  PRO Fo 422/60 Beckett to Grey Sept 12,1906 pg 94.
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"The British Government,once having been 
informed that there is a chance of great 
industrial development in the territory- 
lying next to the British possessions, 
will not rest until that territory has 
been developed.The British Government 
will insist that the country shall be
opened up either by Siam,or,if she is 27
unwilling,then by Great Britain herself."
Simultaneously,Damrong saw the necessity of opening up the
south on account of the political pressure.Damrong regarded
the isolation of the South as an excuse for the British to use
2 8force in establishing their influence in the region. At the
same time,the opening up of the region would result in the
immediate influx of Western capital;
"If we turn to an open door policy by granting
every concession to the British investors, 
the region will be full of foreignej^ within 
a short period like Johannesburg.."
In order to accommodate the presence of Western activities,
Damrong endeavoured to provide the infrastructure and the
administration to control and regulate Western activities;
"..the Government has to develop the southern 
provinces in accordance with the British 
practice in its Colonies.Such a consequence 
will probably satisfy Britain,which is a 
business-oriented nation,rather than a 
territorial expansionist.Secondly,the 
Government must construct a railway into 
that region without delay so that it will
27 NA 5 M 14/50 Westengard,Assistant General Adviser,to King 
Dec 17,1906.
2 8
NA 5 YO 5.5/24 Cabinet Meeting Dec 17,1906.
29 Ibid.
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30communicate with the capital with ease."
The first step proceeded by the Siamese was to survey the
route for the railway line.In 1906 the Government employed a
British engineer,Henry Gittins,to study the feasibility of
such a line.Gittins submitted a report recommending the
immediate construction of a trunk line from the Port of Trang
on the West Coast by way of Patalung,Nakorn Srithamarat,
Bandon,and Bangtaphan,to be connected with Bangkok (see Map
IV).In comparison to the Northern line,Gittins asserted that;
"The line will be easier and cheaper to 
construct..and has the great advantage 
of close connection with the sea.It will 
go thrcugh a country capable of producing 
the best of tropical production...And 
which is most extensive plains for the 
cultivation of paddy,the wealth of the 
nation."
The estimated length of the line was 530 miles at the cost of 
£3m.The proposal was supported by Damrong and Phya Sukum 
(Acting Minister of Public Works) who had already made a tour 
of the Southern States and concluded that railways were a 
means of extending Siamese administrative control over the 
Southern States.
Several points may be made about Gittins' memorandum of 
1906.Firstly the timing of the construction was vital to the
30 T. • .Ibid.
31
NA KT 5.5/2 Gittins to Sukum,Acting Minister of Public
Works May 24,1906.
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opening up of the region.Any failure in the Siamese response
to open up the south to British interests might induce the
32Federal Malay States "to take action". Secondly the line 
would bring commercial benefits to the Siamese.The 
construction would accelerate the opening up of a port on the 
west coast,namely Trang,whereby Siam would be in the position 
to conduct direct trade with Burma and India instead of via 
Singapore.Thirdly the line was to commence from Trang 
northwards to Southern Siam,rather than from Petchburi,and was 
thus an indication of adhering to British influence.
The Establishment of a Separate Railway Department.
Gittins foresaw the political problems arising from the 
construction of the Southern railway.He anticipated that the 
German dominated Railway Department would bring an influx of 
German engineers into the Peninsula thereby expanding German 
political and commercial influence into the region.This would 
inevitably create friction with British interests in the 
Peninsula and Britain's privileged position which the Siamese 
had come to recognise under the 1897 Secret Convention.By this 
Convention,the Siamese had agreed that non-British capital was 
to be excluded in the British sphere of influence in the Malay 
Peninsula without British consent.
^  NA 5 YO 1-8 Gittins Memorandum Oct 20,1906.
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In order to maintain the predominance of British
interests,the British Charge d'Affairs,Beckett,proposed two
schemes . Firstly the survey,the construction,and the management
of the proposed trunk line would be handled by British
engineers. Secondly Siam would establish a separate Railway
Department to control the Peninsula line under a British
Director,whose status would be on a par with that of the
German Director.Such a scheme would ensure the route was in
accordance with British interests.A British Director was
necessary to the scheme because there were rumours that the
German Director was to be granted some influence in Cabinet
33decision-making concerning the railway route, 
r
Futhermore there were two other major rumours which 
aroused British anxiety.Firstly,the German Director was 
preparing large schemes for railways throughout Siam including 
a trunk line down the Malay Peninsula;an extension of the 
Khorat line to the Mekong at Nongkhai;and an extension of the
direct o o b  •
Chiengmai line with branch lines in variousASecondly,
there were rumours that the German Director was 
persuading the Siamese Government to commence the Malay 
Peninsula line from Petchburi southward,whereas if the Siamese 
had showed any inclination towards British interests,it would 
have begun at both ends or at Trang,where easy access from 
the sea would facilitate the shipment of British railway
^  PRO FO 422/60 Beckett to Grey Oct 1,1906.
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material;or in the region of Nakorn Srithamarat which offered
34a profitable commercial field.
Grey pointed out to the^ legation. Office the crucial
effects of the extension of German influence and insisted that
the "proposed railway must not be handed over to the German
engineers, but be left in the hands of the Siamese or British 
35officials". The Straits Settlements authorities feared that
departmental construction of the proposed line would destroy
any hope of annexing the Siamese Malay Tributary States under
3 6the Union Jack. Such a view was expressed by Beckett;
"The Siamese Government neither appreciated 
sufficiently Britain's special position in 
the Peninsula nor realized how unpleasant a 
situation might arise if the control of 37
railways were to fall into the German hands."
The Colonial Office endeavoured to establish a separate 
Railway Department.As the matter was to be discussed in 
London,the Governer-General informed Lord Elgin,the Colonial 
Secretary;
"I would urge that any proposal for 
departmental construction should be 
firmly refused.lt would mean that 
German influence and interests would 
exceed ours in the north of the
34 PRO FO 422/60 Memorandum of Conversation between Beckett 
to Westengard Oct 1,1906.
^  PRO FO 422/60 Grey to Beckett Aug 18,1906.
^  PRO FO 422/60 Beckett to Grey Oct 1,1906 pg 80-81.
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Peninsula."^
The Colonial Office held the view that the Siamese were 
intending to involve Germany as a supporter against the 
pressure from Britain and France.
The Siamese Ministers especially the Public Works
Minister were surprised at the British idea of establishing
a separate department which would exclude others.Beckett put
forward several reasons for the surprise.Firstly the Siamese
Government had endeavoured to avoid the nationalization of any
39particular department. Indeed the Siamese were intending to 
train and prepare Siamese officials to run the various 
Government agencies,for instance Luang Ramphai (German 
educated) for the Railway Department.Secondly by excluding 
other powers from the commercial privileges in the Malay 
Peninsula,this would inevitably lead to difficulties with the 
other Powers on account of the "most favoured nation 
clause".Westengard reiterated fears often expressed by 
Stroebel in connection with concessions,that the denial of 
commercial privileges to the Germans and the Americans would 
induce their respective Governments to assert diplomatic 
action to protect their nationals,and thus place the Siamese
3ft
PRO FO 422/60 CO to FO Feb 22,1907 pg 45.
^  PRO FO 422/60 Beckett to Grey Sept 12,1906 pg 91.
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40Government in a serious dilemma.
The crucial element was that the British Government
endeavoured to receive an assurance that the construction and
control of the new railraod would be entrusted to British
engineers and not left in the hands of the German dominated 
41Department. Stroebel did not understand the need for a
separate department if the construction were to be placed in
the hands of British engineers.The formation of a separate
department would incur greater expense for the Siamese
Government.Futhermore there was the political consideration
that any railway project built in the direction of the Mekong
Valley would allow the French the justification to claim a
42separate control for such an enterprise. The British
Minister,Paget,endeavoured to justify his demands by claiming
that where railways were state-owned,it was not unusual to
43have a separate department for a different railway. The 
underlying factor behind the British assertion was that as the 
Malay Peninsula railway was being constructed to join with the 
Federated Malay States railway,a German Director would be 
incompatible to its working;and that a British staff under 
German control was regarded as detrimental to British
40 t k -.Ibid.
4 1  TV\ * /-IIbid.
42
PRO FO 422/60 Duff to Beckett Dec 6,1906 pg 30.
43 Ibid.
293
interests.
In order to reconcile the British proposals,the Siamese 
were confronted with several problems.Firstly they found 
themselves in the difficult position of having to choose 
between giving offence to the British by pressing a desire to 
construct the Peninsula line departmentally under the 
Germans,or to Germany by withdrawing the Southern part of the 
railway system from the existing Department which was being 
administered by the Germans.Secondly,if the British seriously 
intended to press their claims,then the railways could not be 
built departmentally.Thirdly the Siamese Government was 
disinclined to encourage the extension of British enterprise 
in Siam,and more especially in the Malay Peninsula.In 
Beckett's view,the Siamese were interested in encouraging 
enterprises of other powers to maintain a balance among the 
commercial interests of all the Powers,thereby preventing the 
predominance of any single Power;
"..in the construction of the Malay Peninsula 
Railway,the Siamese Government will resort to 
its favourite trick of playing one Power off 
against another;ig^this instance,Britain 
against Germany."
Indeed in the construction of the Nakorn Rachasima 
line,the Siamese conducted the policy of balancing the Germans 
against the British.Whereas with the Southern line,the Siamese
44
PRO FO 422/60 Beckett to Grey March 15,1907 pg 106.
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intended to limit all Western enterprise in the construction,
in particular the British.The Siamese authorities themselves
were showing an increasing awareness of British preponderance
in the Malay Peninsula.Devawongse referred to Siamese
relations with Britain as "Shylock bonds" and Siam as the
45"slave" of Britain. Beckett repudiated the word "slave" m  
connection with the relations of Britain and Siam in the 
Peninsula and gave the following description of the British 
position in Siam;
"Britain was developing her garden and 
rendering it each year more fertile and 
productive.She did not want to see a stone 
wall erected on the boundary,nor to hear 
Siam say "I am not going to develop my 
garden,and I do not intend that you should 
do so." She wished rather to co-operate with 
Siam in mutual progress,to open up the 
Peninsula to her merchants as a new market 
at a time when new markets were becoming 
difficult to secure and y|aere world 
competition was severe."
The most favourable terms on which the Siamese Government
was disposed to allow the extension of the Federated Malay
States' system into Siamese territories were those laid down
47by Devawongse. The underlying terms were;
1) Capital to be provided by Siam.
2) The extension to be surveyed,constructed,and 
controlled by the Federated Malay States' railway
Department and leased to the Federal Malay States
45
Ibid.
PRO FO 422/60 CO to FO Feb 22,1907 pg 45.
46
47 PRO FO 422/61 Paget to Grey March 15,1907 pg 106.
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Government for a term of years.
3) The Siamese Government should have the option of 
assuming control after the expiration of that term.
The significance of these terms was that the Siamese saw the
need to compromise with the British,and indeed the proposal
marked a strong element of ceding authority to the British.On
the one hand,the establishment of a separate department was
undermining Siamese control of the construction.On the other
hand,the railway line would eventually be transferred to
them.The implication of this proposal was that the route would
inevitably be carried out to British advantage,and therefore
the long term effect could prove detrimental to the Siamese.
The British Foreign Office was anxious that the funds for
48the loan be secured by the British. Various financial houses
in London were interested in financing the railways,especially
the official brokers to the Siamese Government in London,
Messrs Laing and Cruikshank. In particular there were two other
49British financial groups who submitted to the Minister of 
Public Works proposals for the surveys construction,and 
financing of the Malay-Peninsula line.One was from the Duff 
Syndicate Co represented by Duff,and the other by 
Leonowens,agent for the Siam Trading Corp Ltd.Duff recommended 
the railway be constructed by a British Co with British
48
PRO FO 422/60 Beckett Dec 6,1906 pg 39.
49
NA 5 YO 5.5/26 Sukum to King Nov 22,1906.
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capital to safeguard British interests and provide an 
assurance that the ownership of the railway would never be 
transferred to the subjects of foreign Powers.Leonowens 
advocated the formation of a company with British and Siamese 
capital,to be administered by both British and Siamese 
employees.
The proposals of both representatives followed similar
lines in that the object was to provide some scheme which
would grant a large measure of control to the Siamese
Government,whilst at the same time being in harmony with
British interests.The Siamese would then be in a position to
avoid any cause of offence to Germany or loss of prestige to
50themselves,whilst complying with British interests. The
51following were the chief features of the proposals;
1) Interest at 5% p.a. to be guaranteed by the Siamese 
Government.
2) A fixed period for the completion of railways.
3) Option of purchase by the Siamese Government.
4) Administration and control to be vested in a Director 
of Siamese nationality.
Neither the Siamese Government nor the British were in the
position to give them official support until they had given
satisfactory evidence of their ability to carry out their
proposals.There were no details of the proposed Syndicate,but
it was presumed at the time that it was to be a Siamese one
50
PRO FO 422/60 Beckett to Grey Oct 31,1906 pg 100. 
Ibid.
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52controlled by Siamese Directors.
The Siamese arranged for the issue of the line to be
discussed between the General Adviser,Stroebel,and the British
53Foreign Office in London. The main core of Stroebel's task 
was to induce the British Foreign Office to withdraw its 
opposition to the departmental construction of the Southern 
line under German direction.To convince the British,the 
Siamese Government intended to assert that it had raised a 
loan on favourable terms and thus would be in a position to 
construct the line itself.The fact that the negotiation was 
to be undertaken by Stroebel was in Beckett's view a wise move 
on the part of the Siamese.lt meant that the Siamese 
Government was avoiding any clash of interest amongst the 
Great Powers,and was thus able to assert that it was merely 
following the decision of a General Adviser from a neutral 
country.
The Railway Agreement.
Throughout the negotiations between Stroebel and the 
British Foreign Office,Stroebel stated the strong objection 
of the Siamese Government to the publication of the Secret
52 I M .
5 PRO FO 422/61 Duff to Beckett Dec 6,1906 pg 30.
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54Agreement of 1897. The main point made by Stroebel against
the publication was that other Powers would at once question
the right of Siam to conclude such an Agreement,which they
would regard as a violation of the "most-favoured nation
clause"of their Treaties with Siam.The British Foreign Office
pointed out to the Siamese Minister in London,Visutr Kosa,that
they needed to publicize the privileged position of the
British to protect the Malay Peninsula from German 
55infiltration. Publication of the Secret Agreement was in 
Beckett's view linked with the subject of British engineers 
on the building of the Southern line. **^ Stroebel asserted that 
publication would not alleviate matters;that the Siamese 
Government would merely unload its difficulty on to the 
shoulders of the British Government,and would be able to 
inform foreign Powers that they (the Siamese) would be glad 
to grant the concession,but needed British consent with 
accordance to the Treaty.
The Siamese Government had no intention to establish a 
separate department.Stroebel suggested as a means of 
overcoming the difficulty that the Federal Malay States might
54 PRO FO 422/61 Paget to Grey March 30,1907.
NA 5 YO 5.5/27 Devawongse to Sommot 1906.
56 NA 5 YO 5.5/27 Westengard,Assistant General Adviser,to
Devawongse Oct 1,1906.
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57lend annually to Siam to finance the construction. The
interest rate was to be low and each section completed to be
58held as security.Stroebel privately proposed 4 points;
1) That an agreement on non-political and business lines 
should be made with the Federated Malay States.
2) To advance capital at an interest rate of 3 1/2 -4%.
3) The Federal Malay States to construct the line with 
their own materials and engineers,each section when 
completed being handed to the Siamese Government,who 
would have virtual control after construction.
4) Obviate any control by the German dominated Department 
and staff to be British.Personnel may be selected by 
the Federal Malay States.
The Siamese Government was willing to borrow but refused
to consult with the Federal Malay States over the railway
59route. Westengard stated that the Siamese intended that the 
lines should become a through traffic route between Bangkok 
and Singapore.The plan contemplated by the Siamese Government 
was for the line to run from Patalung to Trang on the West 
Coast.Anderson from the Colonial Office informed Paget that 
the Federal Malay States intended to construct railways to 
Kuala Legeh,in Kelantan and thence northward to the Kelantan 
frontier.The line between Patalung and Trang was most likely 
to be advantageous to Siamese interests and least likely to 
bring any advantage to the Federal Malay States.
The Siamese Government refused to consent to the
57 PRO FO 422/61 CO to FO April 23,1907 pg 115.
CO
PRO FO 422/62 Paget to Grey Feb 27,1908 pg 38.
59 Ibid pg 57.
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construction of the Peninsula line being in the hands of the 
FMS railway authorities.The Siamese rejected the offer of a 
loan at a low interest rate of 3 3/4% providing the Siamese 
handed over the construction.The Draft Agreement showed 
evidently that the Siamese preferred to pay a higher rate of 
4% to such an alternative.^T h e  Siamese Government stated that 
any obligation might hinder them from constructing the line 
in the directions which best serve Siamese interests,and might 
be made to promote British influence.^ T h e  Siamese intention 
was to construct railways between Bangkok-Singapore.However 
the existing plan contemplated construction between Patani 
on the east coast and Trang on the west.It was hoped that the 
FMS would share the same view.Paget believed the Siamese would 
consult the FMS on every point of importance,for under 
paragraph 11,the Siamese Government had agreed that the 
principal engineers were to be British.This assurance in 
itself appeared to Paget to convey security in the matter of 
the FMS being consulted. Therefore there was the prospect of 
harmony and co-operation between the FMS and the Siamese 
railway administration.
The railway and the loan requisite for its construction 
formed only part of the negotiations between Britain and
^  PRO FO 422/62 FO to Law Officers of Crown April 10,1908 pg
60.
301
Siam.The Treaty contemplated a partial surrender by the
British of her extra-territorial jurisdiction in return for
a cession of territory and for the grant of the right not
hitherto possessed by British subjects of holding land in 
6 2Siam. The Colonial Office raised its objection to the
Agreement on the lack of provision regarding the junction of
the Siamese with the FMS railway system,especially as the
Siamese Government was not committed to construct the trunk
line in which the FMS were interested.Beckett sent a telegraph
to Paget that the Siamese Government should give an assurance
that it would undertake the construction of the trunk line,and
that the decision relating to it be left to the Chief Engineer
of the Siamese portion of the line and the General Manager of
6 3the FMS railway. In response Westengard inserted a clause 
into the Railway Agreement to the effect that the following 
terms be secured;^
1) That a junction to be made between the FMS and the 
Siamese line.
2) That the region in which the junction shall be made 
is approximately fixed.
3) Indefinite postponement of the "linking up" is 
precluded by the provision that the line shall be
systematically and continuously constructed.
4) Expenditure of capital borrowed from the FMS was not 
to be used for other purposes.
Westengard was unable to add a time period (7-8 years) within
which the 2 systems should be connected.
6 2
PRO FO 422/62 Paget to Grey March 31,1908 pg 59.
^  PRO FO 422/60 Paget to Grey March 24,1908 pg 69.
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Despite the favourable terms,the Siamese were reluctant 
to commit themselves to completing their line and linking it 
with the British within a certain period.The explanation for 
this was not material reasons connected with the 
construction,but rather the political consequences arising 
between the Siamese Provinces and the territories under 
British rule.Westengard admitted that with the junction of the 
railways,the Siamese Government was aware of the possibility 
of a substantial influx of foreigners into the mining 
districts of the Siamese Malay States.^They were much 
disturbed by the idea of such a possibility,as it would prove 
a strain on the administration.Paget pointed out to Westengard 
that the Siamese Government was advised not to publicize their 
fears, ^ a s  this would be interpreted as a revelation of 
Siamese intentions to close their territory to the West.
According to Paget's report to his Foreign Office,the 
King himself was opposed to the Railway Agreement and to the 
raising of the loan,despite Damrong's support.The King refused 
to agree to any terms outside the Agreement which would bind 
the Siamese Government further.Paget and Westengard were of 
the opinion that the King was rather uncompromising as the 
Siamese Government was prepared to abide by the Agreement as
65 TV>. .Ibid.
^  PRO FO 422/62 Paget to Grey April 2,1908 pg 74.
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6 7it stood at the expense of the Malay States'interests. The
Siamese had the choice of either confirming the Agreement or
abandoning railways.Westengard commented;
"The Siamese are now terrified at the grip 
which the loan and the railway may give the 
FMS over them."
Paget added his observation on the consequences should 
negotiations collapse;^
1) The construction of the railway will be indefinitely 
postponed.
2) Time will be given to Germany to put pressure on the 
Siamese Government to oppose our veto against the 
employment of German engineers and to intrigue in
other ways.
3) Without the combination of other issues in negotiation 
we are not likely to abandon all the advantages which 
the present draft of the Railway Agreement embodies.
Anderson,of the Colonial Office,suggested that if the
Siamese refused to alter the Draft Agreement to suit British
requirements, the entire negotiations should be postponed
70until the requests were met. The Colonial Office 
underestimated the Siamese determination to counter-balance 
British interests.The British resident Minister, on the other 
hand,was clearly aware of the extent of the Siamese bargaining 
power and the willingness to exploit it,and endeavoured to 
resolve the complications .Paget warned his Government that the
67 PRO FO 422/62 Paget to Grey April 23,1908.
68 T. . .Ibid.
69 T. . .Ibid.
Ibid.
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Siamese had at their disposal means such as the denial of the
teak forest leases and the strict enforcement of the Treaty
clause concerning rights of residence and of holding land,by
which they were able to cause severe loss and annoyance to
71British companies and subjects in Siam. If the negotiations 
were to be abandoned or postponed,as favoured by the Colonial 
Office,it was likely that the Siamese Government might 
approach the Americans, Dutch,and French to establish 
themselves in the region.
The Straits Settlements authorities were finally
convinced of the consequences if the Agreement were to be
totally abandoned.lt meant the postponement of the railway
construction,and even if the construction was carried
out,there was the controversy over finance,engineers,and
supervision.The Straits Settlements authorities made the
72decision to agree to the terms. On March 10,1909,the Siamese 
and the British reached an Agreement concerning both the 
Treaty and the loan.Siam agreed to cede her Malay Vassal 
States of Trengganu,Kelantan,and Kedah to the British and to 
allow the British to supervise the entire project of the 
Southern railway.The financing of the construction was covered 
by the loan from the FMS of £380,000 to be used for the branch 
line Bandon-Patalung section over a period of two years.In
71 PRO FO 422/62 Paget to Grey April 2,1908.
72 PRO FO 422/62 PAget to Grey April 23,1908.
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addition there was a loan of £4m from the British to cover the
73third year of construction. The line was to connect with the 
FMS North East system.
Between 1909-1913,the British made no attempt to
interfere in the railway construction.In accordance with the
Agreement,it had been distinctly stated that the order in
which the different sections of the railway were to be built
was at the discretion of the Siamese.This was chiefly to allow
the Siamese Government the choice of postponing the connection
with the FMS line on the South until the connection with
74Bangkok in the North had been completed. However events began 
to change in mid-1913 (after the death of Rasada,the 
Superintendent of Phuket,who was opposed to the presence of 
the British).The British Railway Director, Gittins, 
recommended the abandoning of the line from Ootapao to 
Kelantan Boundary,and the construction of a line to connect 
with the FMS on the Kedah Boundary on account of both costs 
and strategic purposes.^
The Ootapao-Kelantan route passed through scantily 
populated districts,and involved infrastructural work on the
73 NA KT 5.5/7 Gittins to Wongsanupraphand,Minister of 
Agriculture. April 24,1913.
74
NA KT 5.5/8 Westengard to Devawongse Aug 8,1913.
^  NA KT 5.5/7 Gittins to Wongsanupraphand April 24,1913.
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Chana pass as it was vulnerable to floods,and the terrain
being rough.By contrast the Oatapao-Kedah Boundary ran through
comparatively easy country, thereby reducing costs by 11 
7 6million tcs. Moreover,as the Straits Government had not
commenced its railway construction from Singapore,the line to
the Kelantan Boundary would not serve the initial purpose of
77promoting trade. Not only was the route within the Siamese 
budget and in accordance with the Loan Agreement,but it would 
divert trade to Penang.Such a route would disrupt Siamese 
intentions of establishing Trang as a thriving port.
The British Minister,Peel,advised Devawongse to "defer"
rather than "abandon" the route because it was in the
interests of the British mercantile firms for rapid
7 8communication with Europe. Devawongse hesitated to
substitute the word "defer" in the agreement as it implied the
79possibility of taking up the work at a future date, and the 
financial provision had to be arranged.The Siamese eventually 
accepted the British terms,being granted another loan of 
£750,000 for the construction of the line Ootapao-Kedah,and
Ibid.
77 NA KT 5.5/7 WOngsa Nupraphand to King April 28,1913.
7 8
NA KT 5.5/7 Peel to Devawongse June 9,1913. 
^  NA KT 5.5/7 Devawongse to Peel June 10,1913.
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8 0Ootapao-Kelantan. Other new sections were also completed 
during 1913-1916.The sections of Trang-Thungsong (in Nakorn 
Srithamarat) and Songkla-Patalung opened in October 1913,and 
other sections above Songkla were completely constructed in 
1916.
The events leading up to the Railway Agreement and its 
aftermath shows the confidence inherent amongst the Siamese 
administration of protecting their own interests. The fact that 
the Siamese were allowed to construct the line at their 
discretion,was significant in creating a Siamese identity for 
the Southern region.From the British perspective,a British 
Railway Director was security for FMS interests,as indicated 
in the Ootapao-Kedah railway proposal.Whether the Siamese had 
any intentions of approaching a Third Power for the 
construction of the Southern line as the British Legation was 
led to believe,remains inconclusive. What is clear is that the 
Siamese intended to comply with the "Most Favoured Nation 
Clause" which perhaps suggests that the region was to be 
classified as a neutral zone.The next section endeavours to 
show the Siamese approach in responding to the tenderers for 
railway material.
80
NA KT 5.5/8 Westengard to Devawongse Sept 30,1913.
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Tender System For Railway Material 1900-1914
The provision for railway material was another 
contentious issue which aroused British suspicions of Siamese 
favouritism towards the Germans.From the start of railway 
construction in Siam,Germany had been the main source for 
railway material.lt was only in 1906 that Britain was able to 
penetrate the Siamese market despite the monopolistic position 
of the Germans.The key factor which allowed the British to 
penetrate the Siamese market was the adoption of an open 
tender system.Throughout the 1890s and the early 1900s,the 
Railway Department became German orientated, despite the 
Consulting Engineer being a Briton.When Phya Sukum assumed the 
position as Minister of Public Works in 1907,the latter was 
able to exert more influence over the Department's policy of 
purchasing material.Though the position of Director continued 
to be occupied by a German,both the Public Works and the 
Finance Ministers were able to exert some control over railway 
expenditure.
Throughout the construction of the Nakorn Rachasima 
line,it has been pointed out how the German Director,Bethge, 
overshadowed the British Consulting Engineer in adopting a 
closed tender system and insisting upon German 
specifications.In 1899 a Ministerial discussion was held
309
81concerning the practise of Bethge and how he managed to adopt
82such a procedure.Bethge informed the panel that in Germany 
the Railway Director possessed absolute decision in railway 
expenditure. Damrong pointed out that this was not in 
accordance with Siamese law.Damrong then questioned the extent 
of the Public Works'involvement in the purchase of railway 
material. Bethge replied that when Bidyalabh was Minister 
(1894-99),Bethge merely informed the Minister of the various 
purchases,but for purchases exceeding 80,000 baht,Bethge 
claimed that he sought official permission.Such a practise was 
also adopted during Phya Thewet's tenure as Minister of Public 
Works (1899-1900).83
The British Charge d'Affairs,Beckett,claimed that
Bethge's procedure was inclined towards German interests at
the expense of the Siamese.Beckett based his accusation on the
Financial Adviser's Report of 1901 explaining the excess costs
of the Siamese railway compared to the Burmese which was six
84times the distance. Rivett-Carnac pointed out that railway 
material and stores were not purchased in the cheapest
O 1
NA 5 YO 5/1-8 Ministerial Discussion July 15,1899.
82
NA 5 YO 1-8 July 11,1899.Panel included Devawongse, 
Damrong, Bidyalabh (Minister of the Palace),Mahit 
(Finance),Thewet (Public Works)spanel was set up to 
discuss the extravangance of the RRD.
83 T. . -Ibid
84 ,Ibid.
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market.Similarly,the British engineers of the Railway
Department claimed that tenders were called for in a few
European newspapers,but did not appear in the Bangkok
newspapers,thereby preventing the merchants in Siam,who were
agents for the manufacturing firms in Europe,to advise their
respective clients as to the best means of meeting the
85Department's requirements. Moreover the Report asserted that
the tender system was confined to Leipzig by Mr.Renbein,the
Department's agent in Germany.Renbein had opened an account
for the Department with the Leipziger Bank,depositing £30,000
8 6without the knowledge of the Finance Ministry. The Finance
Ministry only became aware of this procedure when the Bank
8 7defaulted,and no less than £20,000 remained in the bank.
This is then linked to the next issue of the Finance
Ministry's role,namely that the latter did not appear to have
control over the Department's expenditure.Bethge informed the
panel that within the past 7 years (1892-1899),the Finance
88Minister had only twice checked the accounts. It was not till 
1898 that the Finance Ministry insisted that all receipts of 
railway purchase be sent to the Ministry on a monthly
O c
NA 5 YO 5.1/32 Report of the Financial Adviser,Rivett- 
Carnac Dec 27,1901.
86 T V . .Ibid.
87 , . ,Ibid.
pp
NA 5 YO 1-8 Ministerial Discussion July 15,1899.
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8 9basis. According to Rivett-Carnac's report,the Railway
Department refused to take notice nor to reply to the
90objections on Audit raised by the Comptroller-General. In the 
ordering of railway material,the Director had arranged the 
matter himself prior to any Ministerial consent.
Rivett-Carnac's report clearly indicates the
discriminatory procedure of the Railway Department.To assess
the report,it is worth comparing the tenderers for the supply
of railway material. Such an assessment serves to explain the
predominance of the Germans as the chief supplier of railway
material to Siam.Between 1900-1914 various American firms
tendered for the supply of railway material,but without much
success.One case,in particular,was the failure of the
prominent American firm,Baldwin Locomotive Works of
Philadelphia,to obtain the supply of locomotive for the 
91Petchburi line. The contract was awarded to a German firm.The
American Minister,Hamilton,complained to Devawongse of the
unfair supervision of the tender system,concerning which
92Devawongse denied all allegations.
NA 5 YO 5.1/32 Rivett-Carnac Financial Advisor 
Report.Dec 27,1901.
91 NA 5 YO 5.5/17 L.E.Bennet to US Minister Hamilton 
King.Jan 10,1900.
92 NA 5 YO 5.5/17 Devawongse to Hamilton King March
4,1900.
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The Siamese needed to find a formula whereby government
expenditure on railway material was to her advantage and at
93the same time assured satisfaction to all bidders. The
principle held by the Siamese was to use funds to obtain the
most suitable materials at the most reasonable price.In
1903,the Siamese dealt successfully in accepting rails from
the British firm,Dorman Long & Co,and accessories from the
94Belgian firm Cockerill,the two lowest bidders. However in the
case for an open tender system on the construction of the
railway bridge over the Menam near Uttradit,the German Railway
Director,L.Weiler,intended not to call for public tenders,and
instead limited the tenders to three firms in Germany. The
American,Belgian,and British representatives in Bangkok
protested,following which Weiler gave technical reasons for
95the limited tender system.
In response to the pressure for an open tender system,the
Assistant General Adviser,Westengard,consulted with the
9 6Minister of Public Works and forwarded three proposals;
1)Tenders will be public.
93 NA 5 YO 5.5/40 Phya Pipat Kosa,Permanent Secretary at 
the Foreign Office,to Von de Goltz,German Minister.June 
15,1911.
94
NA 5 YO 5.9/12 Devawongse to Suriya July 5,1903.
^  PRO FO 371/132 Paget to Grey April 4,1906.
Q C
PRO FO 371/132 Beckett to Grey Aug 17,1906.
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2)The decision as to tenders when received, 
shall rest with the Minister of Public Works.
3)The Minister will then take steps.
Phya Sukum,the Minister of Public Works,admitted that it was
not the acceptance of the lowest tender that was important,but
acceptance of the tender which was most likely to fulfill the
conditions of workmanship.Beckett went a step further by
proposing the establishment of an International Committee to
judge all cases of tenders for railway material;
"Unless we insist on the International Commitee.. 
the choice of railway material in future,will,I 
fear fall entirely the hands of the German
Railway Department."
The proposal was a reaction to the Department's specification
that the Uttradit Bridge must conform to the standard laid
9 8down by the German Ministry of Public Works. The British 
Government felt that the insistence on German standard was 
discriminating against other nationalities.
The German administration of the Railway Department 
persisted in endeavouring to perpetuate the type of 
locomotives and the same measurements of detailed 
specifications.This bestowed a twofold advantage upon the 
German manufacturer. Firstly,the standards,the 
measurements,and the types of various parts specified were 
German.Secondly,as the Department had in stock a certain
^  PRO FO 371/132 Beckett to Grey July 17,1906.
Q O
PRO FO 371/132 Beckett to Westengard June 29,1906.
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quantity of spare parts manufactured in Germany,Weiler
asserted that German locomotives should have preference in
order that the spare parts in stock may be put to use.Paget
informed his Foreign Office that this system of competition
99was at the expense of other manufacturers.
The Siamese attitude towards the Germans'endeavouring to
gain the upperhand can be described as passive.The Siamese
Government was indeed in favour of an open tender system,but
made no effort to ensure its implementation.Paget described
the Siamese reaction;
"They (Siamese) allow matters to drift on 
under the system of closed orders...The 
main object of a great number of Siamese 
officials is to get throijig|j life with the 
least possible trouble."
Paget had several Ministers in mind but in particular there
was Narit,whom Paget described as being "more concerned with
avoiding any discussion and controversies with Weiler than he
was with saving a few £100 to the Siamese Government."^*
However when Sukum was Minister of Public Works (1907-08),the
tender system became more organised in that the Railway
Department became increasingly subservient to the Ministry,and
in turn was inclined towards British manufacturers.
99
PRO FO 422/64 Paget to Grey June 17,1908.
Ibid.
Ibid.Narit was Minister for Public Works in 1893 and
between 1900-06.
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In 1910 the Department passed over all the German firms
tendering for locomotives and instead accepted the British
tender from Brusch Manufacturing Co which was more
102expensive,but of reputable quality. The German Minister,Von
Goltz,accused the Siamese of unfair open competition in
103passing over the lowest tender. Even the American Charge
d'Affairs,Tatler,complained to Devawongse;
"There has been an apparent discrimination 
against American manufacturers...because of 
the fact that departmental advisors in 
directing purchases of such supplies have 
apparently favoured the markets with which 
they are best acquainted.(The) Result of 
this policy of favouritism means tha^Q^iam 
is closed to the market of America."
Again in 1912,a German firm,Henschel & Co,in Kassel was
rejected in favour of a British firm,North British Locomotive
Co,whose price was higher.
The General Adviser,Westengard,pointed out that as long 
as the Chief of Mechanical Engineering was of British 
nationality, the specifications would best suit British 
firms,and this would then discriminate against other
102
NA KT 5.5/40 Gittins to Von Prollius Feb 24,1910.
103
NA KT 5.5/40 Von de Goltz to Pipat Kosa June 6,1911.
104
NA KT 5.2/84 Tatler to Devawongse June 2,1910.
105 NA KT 5.5/40 Westengard to Devawongse Jan 29,1912.
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nationalities.^^Westengard did not attack the Siamese,but
made a general point that contracts were thrown to the
nationality of the engineer who drew the specifications,and
in 1912 it happened to be a Briton.This implied that such
action was unavoidable until the Siamese had her own standard
107specifications and her own engineers.
Despite the German complaints,the Germans still
monopolised the supply of railway material.In the open tender
awards on the Southern railway 1909-1911,awards to German
firms amounted to nearly eight times the value of those to 
108British firms. Von Goltz justified Germany's predominant
position on the basis of the quality and price of the German 
109workshops. Such a justification was,m  Devawongse' view
ironic
"It is amusing to think that we should have 
to be pressed by the German Government to 
show them strict impartiality in our decision 
concerningthe tenders.The true meaning of 
this hope is that we should show them the 
a n t i t h e s i s - p a r t i a l t o the German firm 
above all others."
106 . ,Ibid.
107 _.. .Ibid.
1 Ofi
NA KT 5.5/40 Devawongse to Goltz Jan 30,1912.
1 09
NA KT 5.5/40 Goltz to Devawongse Feb 2,1912.
NA KT 5.5/40 Devawongse to Westengard Feb 2,1912.
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Chapter 8
British Interest in Minina
Various studies have been undertaken on the role of 
Western tin enterprise in Southern Siam (J.Cushman and 
M.E.Falkus), concentrating on the Australian Khaw-Melbourne 
enterprise and the Straits Trading Co.1However these 
historians tend to direct their discussion on mainland 
Southern Siam in the vicinity of Phuket where Western 
enterprise was rather limited due to the Chinese 
monopoly.These studies have overlooked the growth of British 
mining in the Siamese Malay vassal states of Kelantan, 
Trengganu,and Kedah.The influx of British enterprise in the 
Malay Peninsula raised political complications concerning 
Siam's control over these States.For this reason,the Siamese 
authorities became wary and sceptical of British activity in 
the region,and in response,embarked upon a programme of 
limiting British mining operations. The purpose of this chapter 
is to discuss the Siamese attitude and response to the growth 
of British enterprise in both mainland Southern Siam and the 
Malay Peninsula.
British Mining in Precious Stones and Gold
 ^ J.W.Cushman:"The Khaw Group:Chinese Business in Early 19th 
Century".JSEAS Vol.XVII No.l March.
M.E.Falkus "British Business in Thailand".
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British Mining m Precious Stones and Gold
Contemporary Western observers such as Malloch and
Crawfurd described Siam as being rich in mineral resources
possessing tin,lignite,iron ore,gold,and precious stones.This
drew the attention of western speculators to prospect for such
minerals in Siam throughout the closing decades of the 19th
century.As it turned out,the chief mineral worked by the
British was tin,followed by precious stones and a little
gold.Precious stones and gold were the first minerals to have
attracted British concession hunters to Siam.Rubies and
sapphires were found in the eastern provinces of Chantaboon
and Battambong,whilst the gold mines in Monthon Chumporn on
the northeast coast of the Southern Peninsula.The extraction
of precious stones was undertaken by 3 British companies:The
Gold Fields of Siam Ltd 1888;The Siam Exploration Co 1894;and
the Siam Syndicate Ltd 1904.The French also made an attempt
being represented by the French Societe Annoyme des Mines d'Or
2
de Wattana,but collapsed in 1905. The problems confronting the 
Western activity was operating in an unexplored region and the 
difficulties in co-operating with the natives.For this 
reason,British involvement was limited and short-lived.
The first sign of British interest in Siam's minerals 
was that of W.Barne in 1888.Barne was a British gold 
speculator who was denied a mining lease having prospected
 ^ NA 5 KS 6.6 Damrong to King Jan 30,1905.
/
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3
the region of Kabin. By clause 7 of the prospecting 
agreement,Barne was entitled to work any point connected with
4
the concession. Instead the prospectus was transferred to a 
Briton named F.Clarke,who formed a company in London with a
5
working capital of £8000.
The Barne experience raises several points about the 
nature of undertaking mining activity in Siam;firstly the 
inadequacy of a Mining Agreement due to the lack of mining 
regulations to enforce the terms,secondly,the attitude of the 
British Consulate in Bangkok.The British Consul,Jones,shared 
the Siamese view that the case was inappropriate for 
arbitration.^The British Consul was not concerned as to which 
company possessed the concesion as long as it was of British 
nationality.Thirdly there was a certain consideration which 
deterred Devawongse from granting a mining lease to 
Barne.Barne applied for a lease which was in the process of 
being prospected by an Italian,Signor Angelo Luzzati,who sold 
his prospectus to a British company called the Gold Fields of 
Siam Ltd 1888.The mining concession was in Bangtaphan covering
3
PRO FO 69/14 8 Barne to Devawongse Dec 5,1888.
Barne applied to Devawongse for the lease,who,at the time was 
responsible for all issues concerning foreign concessions.
 ^ Ibid.
 ^NA 5 KS 6.7/4 H.G.Scott to Messrs CLarke & Co March 10,1903.
 ^ PRO FO 69/148 Phya Pipat Kosa,Permanent Secretary at the 
Foreign Office,to Barne.April 26,1890.
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an area of 15,000 acres.The authorised capital was £250,000; 
the Company Chairman was Lord Thurlow;and both Devawongse and 
the British Counsellor at the Siamese Legation in London,
7
F .Verney,were appointed honorary directors. This perhaps 
indicated that the Siamese preferred a British company whose 
reputation and financial status was secure,and which respected 
the Siamese,rather than a gold speculator whose status and 
working capital was insecure.This point remained evident in 
the Siamese consideration in granting tin mining leases to the 
British.
The sapphire and ruby mines of Siam are situated in the 
provinces of Chantaboon,Krat,and Battambong.The sapphire mines 
of Phailin were at Battambong,whilst the ruby mines of Nawong 
were at Chantaboon and Krat.These mines were discovered in the 
1860s and had been worked by the Shans and Lao.Towards the end 
of the 1880s, Westerners began to prospect for such mines and 
by 1895,three British companies were formed in London to work 
the leases:The Sapphires and Rubies of Siam Ltd 1890;and the 
Siam Exploration Co 1894,and the Siam Syndicate 1904.The 
Sapphires and Rubies of Siam Ltd had its origins in 1889 when 
the King granted the right of working the sapphire and ruby 
mines in Chantaboon and Krat to the Italian Luggati, 
representative of the Anglo-Italian Exploring Association
7 The Minina Manual 1889-90 "Gold Fields of Siam Ltd 1888" pg 
138.
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Ltd.Luggati floated a company in London "Sapphires and Rubies 
of Siam Ltd" in 1890.The concession was for 25 years covering
o
an area of 40 miles with an authorised capital of £300,000.
The Sapphires and Rubies of Siam carried out business 
through the practise of purchasing precious stones from the 
natives.The Company announced a measure that all stones found 
in the area were to be sold to them,at a value fixed by the 
Company.The Burmese miners interpreted the measure as an 
exploitative action and thus resulted in their outflow causing
9
a severe shortage of labour. In due time the Sapphires and 
Rubies of Siam became ousted by another British company,The 
Siam Exploration Co 1894.The company was formed with a capital 
of £100,000 to work the mines of Phailin and to purchase the 
rights of the Sapphire and Rubies of Siam for £55,000.^The  
Siam Exploration Co Ltd possessed both the concessions of the 
gem-bearing area and the gambling,spirit and opium farms.It 
was these farms which induced the influx of Burman labour.The 
company was aware that it needed to co-operate with the 
Burmese diggers to facilitate their operation.The method used 
to place the diggers under their control was by leasing the 
various farms to a British subject named Mong Keng,who was
o
The Mining Manual 1894 "Sapphires & Rubies of Siam" pg 336.
9
PRO FO 422/42 Report by Acting Vice-Consul Black "Sapphires 
and Rubies Mine" March 17,1895.
/
322
responsible for controlling the Burmese mining community.^
Mong Keng's overwhelming authority gradually diminished
in 1896 when the company decided to sublet the entire farms
at Phailin and Nawong to a Syndicate on account of Mong Keng's
12unsatisfactory progress. In accordance with the Agreement
made between the Siam Exploration Co and the Phailin-Nawong
Syndicate in March 1896,the Syndicate was made responsible for
working the duty farms and collecting the mining licences.
However the members of the Syndicate were dissatisfied with
the management of their Headman,Mong Sia.The cause for the
members'dissatisfaction remains unexplained,but The British
Acting Consul,Stringer,presumed that the Syndicate under Mong
Sia had failed to pay the Company half the share of profits
upon the working of the Company's duty farms let to the
Syndicate in accordance with clause 3 of the Agreement.Mong
Sia left for Bangkok where he proceded to take legal action
13against the Company and Mr.Hall,the Company agent.
In 1904 the Siam Exploration Co sold their concession in 
Phailin and Chantaboon,and the Nawong-Phailin Syndicate to 
another British Company,the Siam Syndicate.The Siam Syndicate
^  PRO FO 422/45 de Bunsen to Salisbury May 26,1896.
12 Ibid.
13 Paragraph based on Stringer report to Greville March 
23,1898 enclosed in PRO FO 422/49 Greville to Salisbury April 
10,1898.
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was registered in London with an authorized capital of £2000
and also purchased the gold concession at Kabin.The
Syndicate's director was F.Clarke.As in earlier operations,the
Syndicate did not work the mines directly.The Syndicate
granted licences to the miners in return for a small annual
payment.The Syndicate also controlled the opium monopoly of
the district and the sole right to grant licences for the sale
14of liquour and for gambling.
The change in the international environment was a 
significant consideration in the continuing existence of the 
Siam Syndicate's activities in the region.When the Franco- 
Siamese Treaty 1907 was announced whereby the east bank of 
the Mekong area came under French sphere of 
influence,Mr.Blech,the manager of Messrs.Clarke and Co (agent 
of the Syndicate in Bangkok),felt disturbed by the French 
intentions .Any French intervention with the Shan community and 
the gem trade might induce the Shans to migrate which would 
cripple the gem trade.However the French authorities 
recognised the existing state of affairs at the Phailin 
mines,and disclaimed any intention of exerting their influence 
over the Shan community.On the contrary,the French 
Minister,Collin de Plancy,suggested that it would be advisable 
for the British Consul at Hanoi to visit the Phailin mines on 
an annual basis as had been practised by the Consular officer
Ibid.
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15from Bangkok.
It was clear that the French had no intention in 
interfering with Messrs Clarke & Co's concession concerning 
the mining rights,gambling,opium,and the spirit monopolies .Nor 
did the French introduce fiscal measures which would have 
proved detrimental to the gem trade.^Perhaps an explanation 
for this conciliatory French attitude was because they saw the 
essence of the British presence in controlling the British 
Shan community.By the terms of the 1907 Treaty between Siam 
and France,the population of the British Shan subjects now 
came under French jurisdiction.The Company possessed the 
mining lease till 1915.
Background to Tin Mining in Siam.
The tin deposits known and worked in Siam by both the 
Chinese and Western capital up till 1914 were found in the 
Southern Peninsula provinces.The nature of the tin mines in 
this region was that of alluvial deposits which are shallow 
and easily worked through the labour intensive method of open 
cast mining. These deposits formed part of a chain network 
stretching from the alluvial deposits of cassiterite (tin 
oxide) associated with the granite ranges of the Sumatran
^  PRO FO 422/61 Paget to Grey April 26,1907 pg 141.
PRO FO 371/331 Paget to Grey April 23,1907 pg 7.
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islands of Banca and Belitung, through the Malay and Siamese
Peninsulas,and reaching into Central Siam near the Burmese
Border.In contrast to Bolivia,where the existence of rich tin
lodes encouraged large-scal enterprises using western capital
and technology,the easily worked alluvial deposits of
Southeast Asia were suited to the more primitive labour-
17intensive methods of extraction. The tin mining region of 
Siam can be divided into 2 regions: firstly on the western side 
of the Peninsula especially in the vicinity of Phuket;secondly 
in the Siamese-Malay vassal States of Perlis,Kedah,Kelantan, 
and Trengganu which deposits contributed to the British 
imports of Straits tin.
Until the last quarter of the 19th century,the Bangkok 
government exercised limited control over the Southern 
Peninsula provinces.These semi-autonomous States were 
therefore largely under the control of the local governors,or 
"Rajahs".Although in theory the governors were appointed by 
the King and were not hereditary, yet in practice powerful 
families came to govern the major tin regions.Significantly, 
nearly all the Rajahs in the tin areas were Chinese who were 
granted noble titles by the King.Most of them were Hokkien 
Chinese,and many had climbed the social ladder from humble 
beginnings in trade.They were therefore suited by background
17 Based on M.E.Falkus "Aspects of the Development of Tin 
Output in Siam and Malaya,1870-1914.",unpublished seminar 
paper 1985.
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and inclination to act as merchant-entrepreneurs and to
18participate in the development of the Siamese tin resources.
An example of a Chinese governor whose family assimilated
into the Siamese aristocratic society was a Hokkien merchant
named Kaw Su Chiang.He had migrated to Penang around 1810,
starting as a coolie labourer and having accumulated adequate
savings,began trading between Penang and Siam.He became
actively engaged in developing the tin trade of Takaupa under
the patronage of the local rajah,and eventually founded a
mining enterprise in the environs of Ranong.From this
enterprise,he built up and administered his own mining
community at Ranong.He was appointed Rajah of Ranong and was
granted the noble title of "Phya".His family the "Na Ranong”
became one of Southern Siam's most powerful cliques,and four
of his sons became provincial governors. The most distinguished
was Phya Rasada (formely Khaw Sim Bee) Rajah of Trang,who in
1900 was appointed Commissioner of Monthon Phuket and remained
in firm control,preventing the influx of British enterprise
19until his death in 1913.
The interesting point about these "rajahs" was their 
authority over the provincial network.The system by which the 
local rajahs exercised their economic control was called the
18 t k ^Ibid.
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"Mao Muang",a name described by Damrong to explain the rajah's
power.Such a system gave the rajahs full prerogative in the
collection of tax and royalty on tin.Unlike the "Chaos" in
Northern Siam who depended on teak as their major source of
income,the local Chinese rajahs based their income upon the
duty farms of liquour,opium and rice.Due to the fluctuating
nature of tin prices,the income from the duty farms was used
to finance the rajah's mining activities.Butcher has discussed
the link between the farming system and mining.Basically the
revenue farmer could offset the loss incurred in operating his
20mines by selling to his workers food and opium on credit. The
intention of the local rajahs was to increase the market for
their duty farms,and it was the mining industry which induced
the influx of Chinese coolie labour.As Wong Lin Ken puts
it;"the farming system was an integral part of Chinese 
21mining". The positive effect of the "Mao Muang" system was
the incentive given to the rajah to develop the region so as
22to generate revenue.
The Movement To Control The South:The Mining Administration.
20 John G.Butcher "Demise of Revenue Farm System in Federal 
Malay States" in Modern Asian Studies 17,3 (1983) pp 387-412.
21 Wong "Malayan Tin Industry" pg 81 quoted in ibid pg 395.
22 Pannee Ounsakul;"Tin Mining and Economic Change in the 
South 1868-1932".pp 400-445 (Thai Text) in Economic History 
of Siam,edit by Sompob Manarangsawan and Chartthip Nartsupha. 
Thammasart U,1984.
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A series of steps were conducted by the Bangkok 
administration to strenghten their control over the Southern 
economy.The first development took place in 1875 with the 
appointment of a Commissioner from Bangkok to control the tin 
revenues.The Siamese administration endeavoured to control the 
rapidly growing Chinese communities,who were in perpetual 
state of disturbance (perhaps the Bangkok authorities were 
fearful of British intervention to control the disturbances 
as happened in Perak and Selangor);and to enhance its own 
revenue from the flourishing tin trade.
The most significant movement in controlling the Southern
economy was the establishment of a mining administration in
1891.Formerly,the granting of mining leases to foreign
subjects was handled by the Foreign Office,whilst applicants
from Siamese subjects were directed by the various local
authorities.Such a system raised several difficulties.Firstly
the Foreign Office lacked the technical expertise,nor was it
acquainted with the local conditions of the particular
area.Secondly Bangkok had insufficient control over the leases
granted by the local authorities.There was no clause in the
lease agreement which committed the concessionaire to work the 
23mines. This induced concession hunters to hold leases in hope 
of transferring them to a company.Such a practise had been
2 3 John H.Heal "Mines and Mining Administration" in Political 
Economy of Siam pg 216-217.
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witnessed in the gold concession. Thirdly there were no
established procedures for setting the boundaries of mining
concessions.Neither were there regulations to prevent miners
from diverting water channels (which were essential for mining
24operations) to the severe disadvantage of others. As Brown
pointed out,conflict over mine boundaries and water rights was
25therefore endemic. Towards the end of the 19th
century,Western interest became more apparent; British
interest in the tin mines of Siam was developing. In 1890,Henry
Norman a British tin concessionaire explained to Devawongse
the increasing British awareness of the rich mineral resources
in the Southern Peninsula especially in the State of Kelantan;
"European residents in Singapore are drawn to 
the Siamese State of Kelantan to work the 
supposed deposits of gold and other minerals. 
However the Sultan of Kelantan is unwilling 
to grant concessions to Europeans fearing the 
fate of Pahang.Yet Kelantan cannot be kept 
closed.The river Kelantan is the highway to 
many ports jg the interior of the Malay 
Peninsula."
The development of Western interest in the extraction of 
Straits tin was accompanied by the extension of Western 
control over the smelting of the region's ore.Until the end 
of the 19th century, the ore from Chinese mines had been
24
NA 5 KS 6.2/1 Meeting of Special Committee April 1,1896 
quoted in I.G.Brown The Elite and the Economy in Siam pg 98.
25 I.G.Brown The Elite and the Economy in Siam pg 98.
2 6 NA 5 KS 6.3/3 Memorandum for Devawongse by Henry Norman,
Jan 14,1890.
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smelted locally in "little iron-bound mud blast­
furnaces " fuelled by charcoal taken from the nearby 
27forests. Brown points out that comparable technique was also
employed in the British territory to the South until the end
of the 1880s when the newly established Straits Trading Co
challenged the Chinese monopoly by erecting a modern smelter
2 8on the Palau Brani,a small island just off Singapore.
The Straits Trading Co held exclusive rights over
purchasing tin ore for exports in the States of Selangor and
SungeiUjong.The manager,J.A.Sword,endeavoured to obtain
similar rights in the Siamese States and the adjacent islands
on the western coast of the Malay Peninsula for a period of
10 years.The manager cited two advantages for such mining
rights.Firstly the company would provide a new outlet for the
Siamese mineral.Secondly the company's adoption of technology
would extract from the ore a larger return of metallic tin
than by the primitive method adopted by the natives.Such
advantages in the cost of production would in turn lead to
29improved wages for the miners.
There were several factors in existence which may have
27 Warington Smyth pg 328 quoted in I.G.Brown The 
Elite and.. pg 102.
7 8
I.G.Brown The Elite and... pg 102.
29 NA 5 KS 6.5/3 Straits Trading Co General Manager,J.A.Sword,
to Devawongse Nov 28,1890.
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dissuaded British capitalists from embarking upon any
significant movement in the mid 1890s.The infrastructure was
inimical to the influx of Western enterprise on a large
scale.For instance in 1895,the Ratburi Tin Mining Co under
the management of Heggie complained that the Company was
unable to commence work at the Nau Rou mines due to the dense 
30jungle. In response,the Agriculture Ministry was advised by
the British Director of Mines,Warington-Smyth,to assist the
31company in road works. By contrast with Siam,the British
authorities embarked in developing the Malayan tin.The British
cleared the jungles,constructed roads and bridges,so that by
1891 every important mining area in the Kinta valley had a
road linked with the Kinta river where transhipment points 
32existed. The Chinese were encouraged to migrate through 
liberal taxation policies and grants of the revenue 
farms .Whereas in Siam heavy dues resulted in the migration of 
Chinese coolie to the British Protected States of the 
Peninsula.
The Siamese administration was aware of the backward 
condition of the tin industry in the Peninsula provinces and 
the progress that had been achieved in the British Malay
30
NA 5 KS 6.1/9 A.Berli to Warington-Smyth Feb 2,1895.
^  NA 5 KS 6.1/9 Warington-Smyth to Phya Sursak Montri, 
Minister of Agriculture.Feb 4,1895.
32 M.E.Falkus Tin Paper.
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States.The awareness originated from the King,which concern
he expressed in a letter to the Minister of Agriculture,Chao
Phya Thewet,in late 1890.The King maintained that the tin
resources of Siam exceeded those of the Malay States,and
attributed the rapid development of the Malayan industry to
33the vigorous commitment of the British administration.
Indeed the Siamese had already shown a response
anticipating the influx of western capital in 1891 as
indicated by the programme for regulating the Siamese tin
industry.Attention was directed towards the absence of an
effective legal and administrative structure by establishing
a Mining Department in June 1891 placed under the Ministry of
Agriculture.The government engaged the services of two
Westerners to assist the orgaization of the department:W de
34Muller (German) and H.Warington-Smyth (British). A Western 
educated Siamese Yam Saeng-Xuto acted as engineer to the 
department.35
The immediate duty in organizing the Department was the 
drafting of the Mining Regulations.W de Muller proposed that 
the royalty was to be collected only on the profits of tin
^  NA 5 KS 6.2/1 King to Chao Phya Thewet Nov 29,1896.Quoted 
in I.G.Brown The Elite and.. pg 98.
34 Heal article "Mines and Mining Adm..." pg 216.
35 Phya Pracheep Boribal was the first Siamese student to have 
studied Mining Engineering in France.
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production so as to provide an incentive to mining
investors.However the Cabinet viewed such a procedure as
impractical due to the difficulty of inspection.Instead the
Cabinet introduced a 16% taxation on tin extracted.In reaction
to this,Warington-Smyth argued that a 16% rate was excessive
due to the existing high cost of production. Expenditure on
extraction and transportation combined with the tax would
outweigh the investor's expected profit.Warington-Smyth did
not gain ground in his argument,and the Cabinet adhered to 
3 6their terms. It seems clear that both Advisers endeavoured 
to encourage the influx of Western enterprise as a means of 
developing the South.
The Mining Regulations were first drafted in 1895 and 
finally passed into law in 1901.There were 84 clauses covering 
all matters of the mining industry.The Department came under 
the supervision of the Interior Ministry in 1899,allowing the 
Interior Minister, Damrong,to exert his authority in the 
Southern States through the Superintendent of Mines (the chief 
officer of the Mines Department appointed to a Monthon).In a 
situation where the Department had no representative,the 
Provincial High Commissioner made the appointment.All 
applica tions were sent to the Central Government for 
consent.Such regulation gave the Siamese greater authority
3 6 Paragraph based on NA 5 KS 6.2/2 Discussion on Lowering 
Royalty on Tin.
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over their tin mines,and in Damrong's opinion;
"I've always distrusted foreign officials in 
the Royal Mining Department because all of 
them are determined to regulate the mining 
laws for the benefit of British investors.For 
this reason I exercised my power as the 
Minister to change parts of their first draft."
The regulations also provided means of guaranteeing the
working of mines.A prospecting licence was first to be applied
for at the Mining Department.Such a licence was valid for 1
year and was not to exceed an area of 300 rai. Having
prospected the mines,the investor needed to apply for a
working concession.The procedure involved the submission to
the Mining Department of the surveys and estimates.lt must be
noted that in carrying out a prospecting licence,this involved
a substantial amount of capital in surveying and land
demarcation.The determining factor on the part of the Siamese
in granting a Mining Licence was the possession of capital
held by the applicant as specified in Article 23;
"In applying for a Mining Lease,the 
applicant must show to the satisfaction 
of the Government that he has suffic^gnt 
capital to properly work the mines."
This reflects the Siamese policy of preventing rapacious
concession hunters from applying for leases merely for
speculative purposes. The Siamese perceived that any social
disturbance emanating from conflict between the locals and
^  NA 5 T 2.12/2 3 Damrong to King June 2,Undated.
^  NA Kh 0301.1 11/1 Siam Mining Act 1901.Article 23.
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Western concessionaires was a prerequisite to political 
intervention on the part of the British government.This issue 
becomes clear throughout the discussion.
In 1894 the Mining Department established a branch office
in Phuket,and by 1908 there were branches at Ranong,Pangna,
39Pattani,and Betong in lower Rahman. The first Director of the
Department was de Muller (German) till 1895 being replaced by
his British Deputy,Warington-Smyth. In November 1896,the latter
resigned on ill-health and was replaced by another British
Director,H.G.Scott.After Scott's retirement,a new position of
Inspector-General of Mines was created and was assigned to a
40Briton named John H.Heal. The continual appointment of 
British Directors was presumably to facilitate the 
Department's relations with the concessionaires who were 
primariliy British.Like the Forestry Department,its purpose 
was to prevent any conflict from arising between foreign 
(British) mineral concessionaires and the local authorities 
or the Chinese labourers.
The Nature Of British Mining Enterprise In Siam.
The nature of British mining enterprise took the form of
39 Heal article "Mines and Mining Adm.." pg 218.
40 ibid.
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41free-standing companies. The first British company to work 
the mines was the Pattani Concession Ltd in the Siamese vassal 
States.The Company was registered in 1889 to acquire the work 
and mining concessions in Pattani,Kelantan,and Trengganu.Most 
of the British firms established themselves after 1900 when 
the Mining Law of 1901 had come into effect.The encouragement 
created by the legislation to British prospecting concessions 
is illustrated in the following table,whereby 16 prospecting 
licences were primarily granted to British applicants from 
Penang in 1903.
Table I
British Applicants from Penang 1903.
Date Name Type of Mine Place
May D .J .Collin Normal NakornSawan.
July D.Heggie Tin Takaupa
Sept H.Maxwell Tin Reman
Sept J.Marcelis Gold Saiburi
Oct S .Ellsborough Tin Ranong
Oct Campbell & 
Osmond
Normal Srithamarat
Oct S.G.Brischna Tin Saiburi
Nov Karagan
Hydraulic
Tin Saiburi
Dec Mong Bli ii Nakorn-Sawan
Dec J.S.Mick Guelyan Various Reman
Mar C .Phrom Tin Srithamarat
Mar Borneo C i i Reman
Mar Thomas-Jones it Priwen
Apri Lafuichen Normal Saiburi
Apri C .Stevens it i i
Apri Phillips ii Phuket
Source: NA 5 R ks 6 .1/11 Phya Sittisongkram Phakdi and
Phya Saiburi to King. Sept 25,1903.
41 Mira Wilkins:"The Free-Standing Company,1870-1914:An 
important type of British foreign direct investment." in 
Economic History Review XLI,2 (1988) pp 259-282.
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It was normal procedure for British subjects holding a
prospecting licence to sell their leases to companies due to
the shortage of capital to work the mines.This benefit the
companies as it meant that they need not waste time and
42expenditure on prospecting. From table II it can be seen that 
the nationality holding the mining lease did not necessarily 
correspond with the prospector.
Table II
Transfer Of British Prospecting Licence 1902.
Name Amount Place Passed on to
(rai)
Clarke-Kabi - Petchburi Societe de Mine
(French)
A.Heggie 300 Chumporn Gulberg (Dane)
Mckay & 4292 " Langsuan Tin Mining
Macarthur Co(GB)
J.D.Camp 542 Peninsula Reman Tin Syn (GB).
Cecil Burst 1685 Pattani Reman Hydro Ltd(GB).
Source:NA 5 KS 6.1/32 Damrong to King Jan 8,1902.
The pattern of transfer tended to be from an individual 
to a company.The obvious reason for the transfer was due to 
the shortage of capital.The fact was that these subjects who 
had been granted a prospecting licence tended to possess 
inadequate capital to undertake the extraction or had failed 
to float a company.This explanation correlates with Damrong's
49
NA 5 KS 6.3/8 Mahit (Finance Minister) to King Jan 13,1898.
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opinion that the nature of British interest in tin mining was
that "they were not interested in working the tin itself but
43rather in establishing a company to sell shares".
Such a pattern began to change whereby companies 
undertook the prospecting themselves.The reason was because 
these companies possessed the capital to prospect extensive 
area exceeding those laid down in the Mining Regulations.The 
area prospected ranged from 800 to 10,238 rai,whereas 
prospecting licences carried out by individuals averaged only 
1500 rai.
Table III 
Table Of Prospectus 1908
Date Name 
1905 Siam Trading Co 
19 05 Mckay & MaCarthur 
1905 Ibid
1905 Nather Lambert Co
1906 Lichdon,Selchun Syn 
(10,238)
1906 Siam Prospecting
1907 Ply & Siam Corp.
1908 Wyamtin Ltd 
1908 ibid
1908 ibid
Place.
Vicinity of Phuket.
Chumpawn
Langsuan (3400 rai) 
Saiburi
Nakorn Srithamarat
Koh Samui 
Saiburi
Trang (1800 rai)
Trang (3000 ")
Phuket (800 ")
Source:NA 5 ks 6.3 Prospect Mine.
The extent of British enterprise in the extraction of 
Siamese tin was predominant amongst western capital.The
^  NA 5 KS 6/2 Damrong to King Aug 15,1909.
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British Minister submitted the following report on the mining
leases in the Malay Peninsula held by westerners;
Table IV
British 20 leases 9233 rai
Dutch 4 1140
USA 1 " 300 "
and the list of prospecting licences;
British 48 leases Swiss 2 leases
Dutch 16 " USA 2
German 6 " Italian 4
Total: 76 leases.
Source:PRO FO 371/523 Paget to Grey Feb 28,1908 Annual 
Report 1907.
By 19 09 when the Siamese vassal States were ceded to Britain, 
there were 10 prominent companies engaged in the tin mines of 
Siam and the Malay-Peninsula:1 Dutch;1 Danish;1 German;1 
Australian;! American;and 7 British:
Table V.
Pattani Concession Ltd 1889
Straits Trading Co 
Duff Development Co 1903
Rahman Tin Co Ltd 1905
Renong Dredging Co Ltd 1908
Siamese Tin Syndicate 1906
Kelantan Exploration Syndicate 
Tungkah Harbour 
Danish East Asiatic Co 
Sinkep Ltd (Dutch)
Hutenbach & Bros (German) 
Wyamtin (USA)
The prospects for tin mining in Siam were discussed by 
K.Van Dort,of Bangkok,in an article published in the 
Engineering and Mining Journal in 1907.He stated that there
t
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"seems to be a very slight appreciation of the potentiality
of the Siamese States " and that "it is only recently that
44active steps have been taken to investigate this source". The
driving force can be accounted for by the introduction of a
sea mining dredge by an Australian trader named Captain
E.T.Miles,who precipitated the formation of two British
companies.The great advantage of the bucket dredges was that
they could work large areas with limited labour,and that they
were not dependent on water courses since they pumped their
own water.The heavy capital outlay involved and the technology
they used put them beyond the reach of the Chinese who
continued to work the deposits by their traditional
methods.The two London companies which operated sea mining
dredge in Ranong were the Renong Tin Dredging Co and the
Siamese Tin Syndicate,both floated in 1906.An extract from The
Mineral Industry described the prosperous tin environment;
"The Monthon of Phuket has lately been attracting 
the attention of European prospectors.A large 
Company has obtained a concession in Renong,and 
there are several Englishmen spec ting in the 
neighbourhood of Junk Ceylon."
The Siamese Tin Syndicate was founded by Henry G.Scott,an 
official of the Siamese Mining Department who had served as 
its Director.He became impressed with the possibilities 
presented to European mining engineers to explore and develop
44 The Mineral Industry During 1907,Vol XVI.Edited by W.R. 
Ingalls.pg 87.
45 Ibid.
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the alluvial tin bearing areas.Owing to the various physical 
difficulties such as the excess of water and unstable 
ground,the Chinese miners were unable to adopt their usual 
opencast or shallow underground methods.H.G.Scott discussed 
a dredging project with his brother,T .G .Scott (a stockbroker), 
and eventually the Siamese Tin Syndicate was floated in Nov 
1906.46
The Renong Tin was founded by Sir John Anderson of 
Guthrie & Co;E.T.McCarthey;and Louis Leonowens in 1906 under 
the auspices of Guthrie & Co.The Company grew out of the Temoh 
Gold Hills Ltd which had been formed in the 1890s by T.Scott 
(a senior partner in Guthries and the financier Chachick Paul 
Chater).The subscribed capital was £125,000 though not much 
is known of the activities of the Company. In 1904 when the 
gold mines were becoming exhausted,the Company began 
prospecting in the Renong district and discovered tin.On the 
advice of E .T.McCarthey,the mining engineer,it was decided to 
exploit the tin by the use of bucket dredges. In 1906 the 
Renong Mines was formed as purely an exploratory and 
prospecting Company.As a result of favourable prospects,the 
Renong Dredging Co was incorporated in London in July 1908 
with a paid up capital of £30,000.The Directors included
46
PRO FO 371/1751 Peel to Grey Nov 22,1911 pg 35.
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47Captain F.B.Lawson,J.Anderson,and Louis Leonowens. Their 
first dredge,the first land-dredge to be used in Southeast 
Asia,began work in March 1910.The Company soon ordered two 
more dredges,and in 1913 a new company,the Renong Tin Dredging
Co,was formed to enlarge operations and assume control of the
* 48former concern.
According to the British Consular Report 1907,the
exportation of tin,including metal and the metallic content
of ore from Monthon Phuket was approximately 4000 tons per
annum.In 1906 the export from Tongkah alone amounted to 18,476
piculs (1109 tons) of smelted tin,and 1839 tons of tin ore of
which the Straits Trading Co exported 1270 tons to its
smelting works in Penang.By 1913 the Siamese Tin Syndicate and
the Renong Dredging Co became the chief tin-producing firms
in Siam.Of the output of tin in 1913,the Siamese Tin Syndicate
exported 4 616 piculs whilst the Renong Dredging Co exported
3874 piculs,approximately 2/3 of the total tin exported from
49Siam being from these 2 British firms.
The Siamese Response To British Mining Activity.
The scale of British activity in the tin mines of Siam
^  Minina Manual 1910.pg 972.
4 8 M.E.Falkus "British Business in Thailand" pg 152/153.
4Q
PRO FO 371/1751 Peel to Grey Nov 22,1911 pg 35.
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was rather limited and was concentrated in the Siamese Malay
Peninsula rather than in the district of Phuket.British mining
enterprise was confronted with a Siamese administration which
was suspicious of western intentions and endeavoured to
restrict British operation. The Mining Department was placed
under Damrong's Ministry of the Interior between the years
1896-1909.Throughout these years, Damrong conducted a
"cautious and restrictive" policy towards mining
leases.Firstly the Siamese administration feared the
complications which might arise from Western enterprise
operating in a region where the Provincial administration was
not seen as adequate to accommodate the influx of western
investors.Secondly,Damrong had a strong distrust of rapacious
Western concession hunters whom he regarded as an
50"objectionable type of adventurer". Damrong held the 
impression that concessionaires sought leases for purely 
speculative purposes,floating companies comprising of 
investors who were naive of the mining industry.
There were two particular procedures which the Siamese 
adopted to restrict Western enterprise in Siam.Firstly in the 
district of Phuket,the administration responded to the 
operation of the Straits Trading Co by collaborating with the 
prominent figure in the region,namely Phya Rasada.The second 
means was the Secret Agreement of 1897,whereby Southern Siam
so I.G.Brown The Elite and.♦..pg 104.
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became a British sphere of influence which excluded non-
British capital.In a despatch to the British Foreign
Secretary,Lansdowne,in 1901,the British Charge d'Affairs,
Archer,described the Siamese attitude to Western enterprise
in Southern Siam;
"The difficulty is that the Siamese
Government seem reluctant to grant
even reasonable concessions to British
subjects,preferring to keep the Malay
States closed..to foreign enterprises
altogether."
Archer's observation is perhaps an exaggeration of Siamese 
policy for there were a number of British prospecting licences 
in 1901. However the Siamese administration, especially 
Damrong embarked upon means to restrict British enterprise in 
the tin mines of Siam both in the Peninsula and the Siamese 
vassal States.The first instance of such policy was seen in 
the experience of the Straits Trading Co.
The Straits Trading Co established a branch in Phuket in 
1902.The operation of the Company was not in the extraction 
of tin but the purchasing of tin ore for smelting in Penang 
and Singapore.lt may appear that such limited activity by 
the Company offered no competition to the local Governor's 
monopoly of the tin trade.Yet various restrictions were 
imposed upon the Company's operations especially by the 
Commissioner of Trang,Phya Rasada of the Khaw family,who was
5 ‘1 PRO FO 422/54 Archer to Lansdowne March 26,1901.Quoted
in Cushman "The Khaw Group....".pg 63.
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also engaged in the business of tin smelting.The Penang 
smelter which belonged to the Straits Trading Co successfully 
competed with the local smelters operated by the Khaw 
family.The Chinese had formerly smelted most of Phuket's 
tin,but by 1907,most of the 3,228 tons of the ore exported 
from the region was being shipped to the Straits Trading Co's 
smelter in Penang.^
The Straits Trading Co had its head office in
Singapore,and had been engaged as buyers and smelters of tin
ore since 1887.The Company pointed out to Damrong that they
carried out about 55% of the total tin exported from the
53Straits Settlements. The Company had opened a new smelting
work at Province Wellesley Penang which in their view "offered
greater facilities for dealing with ore coming from Siamese 
54territory . " In 1902 the Siamese Government granted the
Company permission to establish agencies in Saiburi
(Kedah) ,Phuket,Nakorn-Srithamarat,and Chumporn.However Rasada
allowed the Company to establish only one office and warehouse
55in Phuket under a lease of 33 years. The significant 
limitation which Rasada imposed upon the Company was to deny
52 BCR 1907 Trade of Saraburi and Phuket pg 7.Quoted in Ibid 
pg 66.
NA 5 T 2.12/17 Straits Trading Co to Damrong Jan 23,1902.
54 Ibid.
^  NA 5 T 2.12/17 Sri Sahadhep (Vice Minister of Interior) to
Straits Trading Co June 6,1902.
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the Company's proposal that it be allowed to use property as 
collateral in advancing credit to the miners. This was part 
of the Company's programme in developing their business at 
Tongkah and the tin mines in West Siam.*^
In co-operation with Rasada,Damrong advised the King to
deny the Company's request for the right to confiscate
land.The Mining Director,Scott,pointed out to the Company that
the confiscation of property by a Treaty Power possessing
extraterritorial rights was a sensitive issue as it involved
the Siamese Law of Mortgages and the question of land
tenure.The regulations stipulated that foreign subjects were
prohibited from being issued land mortgages.Scott recommended
the company arrange the security advances through a Chinese
compradore.Chinese compradoreswere used by British subjects
in Penang for advancing capital to the miners in Phuket and
57pepper planters in Trang.
Damrong imposed his own policy on the Company by 
establishing a list of rules weakening the process of 
financial deals between the Company and its clients.Under the 
provisions,the Company was prohibited from confiscating any 
property belonging to the debtors,whilst the previous
NA 5 T 2.12/23 Damrong to King Nov 29, 1902 .
NA 5 T 2.12/23 Straits Trading Co to Scott June 17,1904.
NA 5 T 2.12/23 Scott to Straits Trading Co June 27,1904.
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confiscated property had to be put up to auction,in which the
5 8mortgagee was not permitted to participate. Moreover,the
auction system was directed by Rasada who also acted as the
59representative of each debtor. It was not till 1906 that the 
shortage of capital was resolved as a result of the 
establishment of the Chartered Bank from Penang.^
It appears that amongst the British mining interests in 
mainland Southern Siam,the Straits Trading Co was regarded as 
a potential threat to both Rasada and Damrong.The fact that 
the nature of the Company's business involved the provision 
of capital to the Chinese mining community was perhaps in 
Damrong's view seen as inflammable.Any conflict between the 
Company and the Chinese would inevitably result in 
intervention on the part of the British Government.As for 
Rasada,the presence of the Company imposed a direct challenge 
to the Khaw monopoly of the trade in tin ore.The Khaw family 
controlled the Penang-based Koh Guan Shipping and Trading 
Co. The Koh Guan Co had in 1902 purchased 4 New Zealand 
steamships through the agency of Capt Edward Miles 
(Australian) for the purpose of transporting tin ores to their
58 T. . .Ibid.
59
NA 5 T 2.12/17 Damrong to King Sept 1,1904.
^  NA 5 M 53/10 Economy of Phuket Feb 27,1906.
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smelter in P e n a n g . B y  1906,the Khaw family felt the effects
of the Straits Trading Co's operations.The total tin ore
exported from Tongkah was 1839 tons,out of which 1270 tons was
6 2carried by the Straits Steamship Co fleet to Penang.
The Siamese administration was aware that they were in
no position to obstruct the Straits Trading Co in an outright
manner because of the 1904 Anglo-French Declaration,whereby
the region south of Bangtaphan was recognised as a British
sphere of influence.Moreover the Siamese took into
consideration the Company's political influence in London as
warned by the Assistant General Adviser,Westengard;
"The Straits Trading Co is too important a 
concern to be passed over without notice.
It is a very powerful company which has 
much influence throughout the British 
territory in the Peninsula.Shares in it are 
said to be owned by many officials.lt smelts 
a large proportion of all the tin mined,and 
so figures largely in the commerce of the 
country.lt is therefore advisable to exercj^e 
care in dealing with so strong a concern."
Damrong proceeded in containing the Straits Trading Co 
by co-operating with Rasada.In 1907 the Koh Guan Co increased 
its fleet and was renamed the Eastern Shipping Co.Among the 
directors of the Company were members of the Khaw family,its
^  K.G.Trengonning Home Port Singapore.. pg 56.
^  The Mineral Industry During 1907 Vol XVI pg 870. 
^  NA 5 M 2.14/15 Westengard's Report Sept 6/7 1906.
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64business associates m  Penang,and a European,H.Jessen. In 
1908 the Khaw family established their own smelting firm in 
Penang called the Eastern Smelting Co.This placed the Koh Guan 
Syndicate in the position to challenge the Straits Trading Co 
but by 1913,the Khaw empire collapsed.
Mining In The Malay Peninsula.
It has been widely accepted by historians,namely Cushman 
and Brown,that the Siamese Minister of the 
Interior,Damrong,had a strong distrust of Western intentions 
in working the Siamese tin mines.Damrong regarded the Western 
concession hunters as detrimental to the international 
reputation of the Kingdom.This view held by Damrong tended to 
influence his policy towards Western concessionaires,namely 
a "cautious and restrictive" attitude. Damrong's intentions 
of excluding Western enterprise was complemented by the Secret 
Convention of 1897 concluded between Britain and Siam.
Under this Convention,Siam undertook not to cede to a 
Third Power any part of her territory south of Bangtaphan.For 
Britain the Agreement secured her strategic position in the 
Straits of Malacca,while for Siam,Britian recognised Siamese 
sovereignty over the States of Kedah,Kelantan,Trengganu,and 
Perlis.The key point of the Agreement was its specification
64 K.G.Trengonning Home Port Singapore., pg 56.
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that Siam was not to grant "special privilege or advantage 
whether as regards land or trade" in the Peninsula to the 
subject of a Third Power "without the written consent of the 
British Government.The British intention to enforce the terms 
of the Convention was clearly emphasised by Archer;
"To draw a line between large and small 
concessions would be impossible and for 
Siam to grant any concession to a foreigner 
whether large or small,without the knowledge 
of the British Government,would be tofiI- 
defeat the object of the Convention."
The Secret Convention was a means by which Britain could 
secure her hegemony amongst Western capital in the Southern 
Provinces of Siam.For the Siamese,the erection of such a 
barrier served to protect the southern region from the influx 
of Western concession hunters. Inevitably complications emerged 
for the Siamese Foreign Office under Devawongse in denying 
applicants from a Third power,in particular the Germans.
Based on the British Foreign Office despatches, 
references are continuously made to the factors which the 
British took into consideration when confirming concessions 
to foreign powers.The British Foreign Office did not place 
any emphasis on applicants for prospecting licences.The Dutch 
Company Sinkep Tin Mining was granted a prospecting licence
^  NA 5 KS 6.5/13 Archer to Devawongse April 2,1897.
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6 6in the State of Trengganu, and so was a
6 7Frenchman,Lebelief. By the end of 1905,there were 11 mining
leases held within the Malay Peninsula,and only one was held
by a non-British,issued to an Italian Cerruti granted on May
1905. Cerruti,an Italian,formerly Superintendent of the Sakai 
6 8tribes, applied for a hydraulic tin mining lease of 2300
acres in the Liong district of Kwala Muda,Kedah.He was
supported by 2 Penang based firms;Martyn & Co (Dutch),and
Golden & Zeitlin (German). Cerruti held a prospecting licence
issued by the Sultan of Kedah and had the approval of
Damrong.^The British Foreign Office gave their consent
providing that Cerruti obtained an assurance that precautions
would be taken to obviate damage to localities from floods in
70the British territory caused by the hydraulic mining. The 
Siamese agreed to grant the concession as they were not 
prepared to adopt a policy of excluding non-British capital.
Two other cases;Kaulfuss and Stoltz,exposes the 
underlying factor that the British were not concerned with 
the nationality to which the mining concession was to be
^  PRO FO 422/47 Devawongse to de Bunsen Nov 12,1896
^7 PRO FO 422/47 Archer to Salisbury Jan 7,1897. 
fi 8 PRO FO 69/255 Beckett to Governor Sir J.Anderson Nov 
8,1904.
^  PRO FO 422/59 Scott to Stroebel Nov 11,1905.
70 PRO FO 422/59 FO to CO April 29,1905 pg 63.
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worked by as long as it was financed by British
capital.Kaulfuss,a German subject from Penang, applied for a
hydraulic tin mining lease in the same district of Kwala Muda
covering 10 sq.miles.Anderson (from the Colonial Office) had
strong views against the introduction of German capital and
enterprise in the Peninsula;
"The German Government are fully alive to the 
strategic and commercial importance of the 
half-way house to the East,and...they are not 
unlikely to take a^ipore active interest in 
Siam before long."
The General Adviser,H.Stroebel,advised the Siamese Government
72to refuse the application. The difficulty was that Kaulfuss
had the support of the German Legation.However Kaulfuss failed
to raise his capital from the Germans and instead obtained
British capital. He came into partnership with Messrs Adams
& Allen,solicitors in Penang.They floated a Syndicate with an
authorised capital of 30,000 dollars, called the Cherok Klian
Co.The aim was to prospect the lease and then to dispose the
property to another company, either in England or the Straits 
73Settlement. Such terms became acceptable to both the Siamese 
and the British.
A Dane,N.Stoltz,applied to the Rajah of Kelantan for a 
mining concession which covered all the mining rights between
^  PRO FO 422/59 Anderson to Lyttelton Feb 16,1905 pg 49.
^  PRO FO 422/59 Beckett to Lansdowne Dec 2,1904 pg 15 
^  PRO FO 422/59 Paget to Lansdowne July 18,1905 pg 117.
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the river Kelantan and the Trengganu border for 40 years of
which the proposed transfer was for the remaining 38 
74years. Stoltz,who was a Kelantan agent for the Danish East
Asiatic Co,had already disconnected himself from the Danish 
75Company and intended to get the Borneo Co branch at
7 6Singapore to raise the capital. Beckett reported to
Lansdowne that;
"Should this British firm eventually decide 
in favour of the concession and be willing to 
provide Stoltz with the working capital,the 
British Government may not be averse to the 
latter obtaining the transfer.If however,the 
Borneo Co withdrew from all connections with 
the matter,your Lordship may consider the 
introduction of coital other than British 
...undesirable."
However the Borneo Co was not disposed to take up
Stoltz's concession.The Company sent 2 of their agents to make
preliminary examination from which there was no discovery of 
7 8value. Yet by 1907 Stoltz formed a British company in London
79called the Kelantan Exploration Syndicate Ltd. The authorised 
capital was £10,000 for the purpose of working the concession 
in addition to certain gold dredging in the State.As the
^  PRO FO 422/58 Graham to Damrong Jan 14,1904 pg 111.
75 PRO FO 422/58 Memorandum of Conversation between Scott and 
Stoltz June 12,1904 pg 114.
^  PRO FO 422/58 Graham to Beckett July 1,1904 pg 114.
^  PRO FO 422/58 Beckett to Lansdowne Aug 15,1904 pg 109.
7 8 PRO FO 422/58 Borneo Co to Lansdowne Oct 27,1904 pg 121.
^  Mining Manual 1909.pg 823.
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Company was registered in London, Westengard pointed out that
"there cannot be any objection in the ground of 
80nationality."
An important early concern of the Mining Department was 
to secure detailed knowledge of the mining concessions then 
being worked in the Peninsula,and to this end inspecting towns 
were undertaken in the south by the Interior Ministry.Yet 
these visits did not appear to have had the administrative 
effect intended,for frequently the local authorities withheld 
assistance from the Bangkok officials.Moreover there were 
instances whereby western applications were made direct to the 
local Rajahs thereby by-passing the Bangkok 
administration.Such procedure inevitably stirred political 
complications involving the British government. An interesting 
case was the Leech and Duff concession which dominated the 
scene between the years 1899-1908.
In 1895 the Managing Director of Liang Exploration
Co,Massey Leech,concluded an agreement with the Rajah of Legeh
to grant him 6 months option purchasing the concession for a 
81sum of £1500. Warington-Smyth replied that the Siamese 
Government was unable to recognise such a concession as it
o n
PRO FO 371/332 Westengard to Paget March 22,1907 pg 285.
PRO FO 69/276 Rajah Legeh to Rajah Idris Sept 23,1892 pg
104.
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82would be contrary to precedent. The other Rajahs might adopt
such a procedure,but more important was the fact that the
Siamese refused to agree to the clause agreement as pointed
out by Damrong that "we want no chartered companies in 
83Legeh". Instead,Leech was granted a prospecting licence.
In 1901 Leech left Bangkok for Europe with the
prospecting licence to float a Syndicate in London.Yet the
Siamese Government was reluctant to grant him the mining 
84lease. Devawongse put forward two reasons for the Siamese 
sceptism.Firstly,according to the Anglo-Siamese Boundary 
Agreement 1899,Britain maintained Siamese suzerainty over the 
Northern Malay States.This meant that "if Phyas and Rajahs in 
the Malay Peninsula are free to grant concessions", such 
precedent was an infringement of the Agreement. The second 
reason was that other foreign powers would appeal to their 
governments for intervention by asserting that the Siamese 
favoured Britain at the expense of excluding other Treaty 
Powers thereby being in breach of the "most favoured nation 
clause."
The financial group supporting Leech had registered
o t
PRO FO 69/276 Warington-Smyth to Leech April 24,1896 pg 
100. 
o o
NA 5 KS 6.4/5 Warington-Smyth to Verney Aug 1,1897.
84 PRO FO 69/27 6 Archer to Lansdowne Aug 26,1901,pg 54.
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itself as the Legeh Concession Syndicate with Leech as 
Chairman;
"The Syndicate formed is a very strong one 
financially,and therefore there is no fear 
but that work will be properly carried out."
Amongst the members of the Syndicate were;Henderson of the
Borneo Co;Kenneth James of Messrs James & Shakespeare (a
prominent metal merchant of the City);and Stanley Baldwin of
Messrs Baldwin (Tin PLate Manufacturing in South Wales).The
Syndicate subscribed £30,000 to carry out the work,which was
more than the Siamese government required,namely
£10,000.H.C.White was sent to Bangkok to obtain authority to
commence work and to arrange the details in which the British
8 6Minister,Paget,was to assist him.
o c
PRO FO 371/131 Sudeley to Whitehall Feb 16,1906,pg 219. 
86 PRO FO 371/131 FO to Leech Feb 24,1906.
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The Duff Concession.
The most prominent British enterprise operating in the
Siamese Malay vassal States was the Duff Development
Co.D.K.Wyatt has discussed the activity of this Company in
the context of the political development of K e l a n t a n . m o r e
relevant study is an article by L.R.Robert "The Duff Syndicate
2
in Kelantan 1900-1902". Robert traces the nature and 
objectives of the Duff Syndicate in relation to British policy 
in the Malay Peninsula.What has been overlooked is the Siamese 
attitude towards the Duff concession.The purpose of this study 
is to examine the Siamese perception of and response to the 
operation undertaken by Duff up till 1908.The Company's 
experience in Kelantan played a significant part in Anglo- 
Siamese economic relations.Firstly the Company stirred up 
confrontation between the British Foreign Office and the 
Siamese Government.Secondly it witnessed the intervention of 
the Colonial Office in pressing forward British interests in 
the region.Thirdly the rivalry exposed the nature and extent 
of Siamese attitude towards British economic activity in 
Southern Siam,which previous studies have not been able to 
determine.
 ^ D .K.Wyatt:"Nineteenth Century KelantansA Thai View" in 
Kelantan-Reliqion,Society.and Politics in the Malay 
States. Edited by William R.Roff OUP 1974.
 ^ Leslie R.Robert "The Duff Syndicate in Kelantan 1900-1902" 
in JMBRAS Vol.45,Pt 1,1972.Pages 81-110.
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Historians have based their assessment of British policy
towards Siam primarily on Foreign and Colonial Office records
due to the limited availability of Thai sources.The Duff
concession was a sensitive issue concerning the administrative
and foreign policy.Records of these accounts are primarily in
the Siamese Foreign Office despatches as the issue was handled
by Devawongse rather than the Mining Department.These records
had hitherto been kept at the Ministry Of Foreign
Affairs,Saranrom Palace where it was opened for research and
3
has been referred to by a Thai thesis. However these documents 
have now been transferred to the National Archives under the 
category of Thai-Malay Border and have been classified as 
confidential.Access to these documents can be obtained through 
the Thai National Security Council. Fortunately with the 
permission from the mentioned institution,such documents have 
been consulted for the purpose of this study.These documents 
comprise correspondence between Devawongse and the Siamese 
Legation in London;the Siamese Consul in Singapore;Damrong; 
and the King himself.
R.W.Duff was a retired British official who had once 
served in the British Malay States.He had initially been 
employed by the Public Works Department in Perak,but later
3
Wanchalee Boonmee "Some Aspects of Relations with Britain 
in the Reign of King Chulalongkorn:A Case Study of 
Forestry and Mining".MA diss.,Sri Nakharinwirot U.1977.
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volunteered to work in Pahang where he was granted an
appointment in the Police force and served as Chief Police
4
Officer 1894-97. Duff took an active part in the suppression 
of the Pahang rebellion and in 1895 participated in an 
expedition led by Hugh Clifford which pursued the remnants of 
the rebels deep into Kelantan and Trengganu. There Duff became 
impressed with the mineral wealth in those States,and in 1900 
retired from the Civil Service and formed a Syndicate to 
prospect the two States for minerals.^The Duff Syndicate was 
registered in London with a preliminary capital of
7
£10,000, and was composed of representatives from respectable
commercial houses in the Far East namely :
T .E.Vickers,Chairman of Vickers Maxim & Co.
F.Pratt Barlow,Chairman of Messrs John Dickson CO.
C .Ingram,Director of the Illustrated London News.
C .Sugden,Manager of the Borneo Co.
A.P.Adams,gartner in Messrs Mansfield &
Co,Singapore.
The Syndicate despatched Duff to Bangkok on April 1900
4
W.J.P .Hume:"The Federation of Malaya and its Police 
Force". Quoted in Wyatt article pg 36.
5
Wyatt article pg 36.
 ^ Duff retired officially from the regular FMS service after 
exactly seven years and nine months service in the Malay 
Peninsula on March 2,1900 on medical grounds.In L.R.Robert 
article pg 84.
7
PRO FO 371/523 Memorandum respecting the Mining Concession 
of the Duff Syndicate and Duff Co in Trengannu and 
Kelantan.Jan 1,1908.
o
PRO FO 69/224 Secretary of Duff Syndicate to British 
Permanent Secretary Foreign Office Oct 5,1901.
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in order to obtain letters of recommendation from the Siamese
Government to the Rajahs of the States.These States were the
vassal States of Siam and any concession needed Siamese
approval.However Duff was confronted with a Siamese
administration which was wary and skeptical of British
intentions.Duff first approached the British Director of
Mines,and reported to his government;
"I (Duff) called on the Director of Mines who 
was willing to assist but said that "he could 
not run his head against a brick wall" and feared 
that it would be impossible to get my request 
granted.He said that the Siamese Government are 
not prepared to admit Europeans owing to 
the unsettled state of Kelantan and 
Trengganu."
The Mining Director was placed in a difficult position as it 
was in Damrong's authority to grant the concessions,and 
according to the British Charge d'Affairs,Stringer,Damrong 
had a reputation for being prejudiced against British economic 
activity in Southern Siam.^Damrong's attitude is reflected 
in his refusal to see Duff and instead left a note "the 
British are now in Pretoria,tell him (Duff) to go there for 
a concession,..send him away."^ I t  was only Duff's threatening 
to approach Damrong through the British Foreign Office that 
determined him to explain his policy directly to Duff,and 
granted him a visiting pass to Kelantan;
9 Ibid.
10 T. . .Ibid.
Ibid.
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"He (Damrong) said that he was not the one who 
wished to keep the country shut up,but that on 
the contrary he was most desirous to open it 
up so that Siam might benefit by an increase of 
revenue.But he told me that so many people of 
doubtful character applied to him for concession^ 
that he was obliged to be firm in his refusals."
An important principle of Damrong was that large scale mining
should take place only in those districts where there was
strong local administration.Adequate provincial administration
was essential for two purposes.Firstly,it would provide a
stable environment conducive to mining activity.Secondly (as
emphasised by Brown) it would ensure that the disruptive
elements commonly associated with mining could be firmly
13controlled,namely riots amongst the Chinese coolie labour.
From the correspondence between Devawongse and Damrong,it
appeared that it was the King's policy to exclude western
capital from Kelantan,fearing that a concession to Duff might
come into conflict with the existing leases which the Rajah
of Kelantan had granted;
"The King expressed his opinion that it was not 
appropriate to grant Duff the concession.For the 
Rajah of Kelantan had granted various prospecting 
licences in the tambons (district).A prospecting 
licence to Duff^yould merely create difficulties 
and obstacles."
The existing leases referred to were those alienated to a
^  I.G.Brown The Elite...pg 103.
14 NA KT 99.4/1 Devawongse to Damrong Feb 2,1901.
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Chinaman,Seek Tan Lim,covering 600-1000 sq.miles.The 
concession was a deed of partnership with Siamese officials 
stationed in Kota Baru.lt appears that the King anticipated 
any concession granted to Duff would stir conflict with those 
of the Chinaman.
When Duff arrived at Kelantan,several more issues came
to his knowledge which determined him to exert his
intentions.He learnt that the Rajah exercised the right to
alienate land without the consent of the Siamese
Government.Furthermore the Rajah's concession to the Chinaman
would have the effect of closing Kelantan to British
enterprise.In response,Duff proceeded to persuade the Rajah
not to complete the transaction with the Chinaman by promising
15him assistance"in doing the Siamese out of his country". As 
a result a Deed of Partnership was concluded between the Rajah 
and Duff by which the Syndicate acquired "an absolute monopoly 
of all mineral,trading,and other rights" within half of 
Kelantan estimated at 2500 sq.miles for a period of 40 
years.^The terms of partnership also granted the Company 
"administrative power throughout its territory..in
15 PRO FO 69/224 Report on Rights Acquired by Duff Syndicate 
Ltd in Kelantan.
^  PRO FO 69/275 Facts Concerning Malay Peninsula pg 242-256.
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17consultation with the Raja." The Deed was signed on October 
10,1900.
The Siamese were unaware of the Deed of Partnership.The 
Siamese Commissioner in Kelantan,Phya Sunthorn,assumed that 
Duff intended to work a gold mining concession in Kelantan.The 
Commissioner gave the following report to Damrong in April 
1901,6 months after the Deed of Partnership had been 
concluded;
"(There are) rumours that the Raja of Kelantan 
has granted Duff a gold concession.When I 
asked the Raja,he gave me his word that he 
has no intention in doing so.I will try by 
all means to prevent the Raja from granting 
the gold concession,by insjgting the Raja 
not listen to persuasion."
Duff was confident with his Deed of Partnership.The fact
that the terms gave him administrative control in the
territory would facilitate his operations.Duff justified his
concession by pointing out that "mining and trading was 
19synonymous", which was in accordance to the 1826 Treaty;
"Siam shall not go and obstruct or interrupt 
commerce in the two states of Trengganu and 
Kelantan,English merchants and subjects shall 
have trade and intercourse in future with the 
same facility and freedom as they have 
heretofore;and the English shall not go and 
molest,attack or disturb those states upon
Terms of Partnership Deed,see appendix of L.R.Robert 
article.
1 Q
NA KT 99.4/1 Phya Sunthorn Report to Damrong April 24,1901. 
^  NA KT 99.4/2 Sri Sahadhep to Devawongse June 8,1901.
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20any pretence whatever."
Duff believed that the British Foreign Office would support 
his concession as a means of countering the Siamese 
exclusionist policy.^
The arrival of Duff in London was followed by political
complications.The Duff Syndicate endeavoured to gain
government support for the concession to prevent the Siamese
authorities from hindering any of their operation in
Kelantan.The Duff Syndicate asserted the validity of the
concession and their intention to ignore Siamese claims to
suzerainty.However the British Government had formally
recognised Siamese claims to suzerainty in the Boundary
Agreement of 1899.On account of the Foreign Office reluctance
to assist Duff,the Syndicate bargained with the British
Government that unless the latter protected them from Siamese
interference in working the concession,they would seek the
support of a certain western power which was anxious for a
22footing in the Malay Peninsula. To this effect,the British 
Foreign Office recognised the arrangement made between Duff 
and the Rajah,and requested the Siamese not to delay their
20 Burney Treaty 1826 Article 3H
^  NA KT 99.4/2 Mining Dept Memo on Duff May 22,1901.
22 PRO FO 69/224 Reports on Rights acquired by Duff Syndicate.
23approval.
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Such requests made by the British Government were felt
by the Siamese administration to be an imposition upon Siamese
policy. Damrong felt that the British were exerting their
24influence upon the Siamese to ratify the Duff Concession. The
Consul for Siam in Singapore,John Anderson,advised Damrong
that the Siamese could justifiably refuse the concession by
asserting that "Kelantan is not yet ready or ripe,nor safe,for
Europeans to speculate with their capital in the interior of
that country." Anderson referred to Sumatra whereby the Dutch
25had excluded certain areas from European investment.
The Siamese decided to ratify the Duff Concession upon
the condition that certain clauses of the Agreement were to
be modified.The British Government had proposed that any
2 6sublease of the concession needed Siamese ratification.
Such a proposal was compatible with Siamese political concern
for the region as Damrong pointed out to Devawongse;
"We are frightened that the Duff Company may 
transfer itslease to another company of 
a different nationality,and this would cause 
greater confusion.Such a situation would in 
the British view,be seen as a loss of British
^  NA KT 99.4/1 Archer to Devawongse May 21,1901.
24 NA KT 99.4/2 Sahadhep to Devawongse June 10,1901.
2 5 NA KT 99.4/2 J.Anderson to Damrong June 8,1901.
2 6 NA KT 99.4/2 Archer to Devawongse Oct 2,1901.
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interest in Kelantan and Trengganu.lt would 
provide an excuse for the British to assume 
control of the Peninsula as their region of 
influence.Therefore it is in our interest to 27 
carry out the Duff issue as soon as possible."
The British proposal on the sublease was perceived by the
Directors of the Syndicate as a hindrance to their operation
in Kelantan as pointed out by Duff;
"Objection to the insertion is due to the 
desire to exploit our concession to the 
best advantage,and is based on a firm 
conviction that such a condition would 
very materially affect the value of our 
right besides very much increasing the 
difficulties of workjgg the property to 
the best advantage."
In essence it meant that the effective development of the
concession required the employment of a large amount of
capital and decentralisation of effort by means of subsidiary
companies. Without the restrictive clause,the directors of
the Syndicate were confident of raising capital without
difficulty.However,if the condition of Siamese confirmation
on every transfer or sublease were imposed,then it would
29hinder the Syndicate's procedure in raising capital.
Both the British Foreign Office and Duff resolved their 
different interests with the proposal that sub-leases were to 
be limited to British subjects with the consent of the
27 NA KT 99.4/3 Damrong to Devawongse Nov 27,1901.
7 8
NA KT 99.4/2 Duff to Archer Oct 20,1901.
29 L.R.Robert article pg 91.
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30Rajah. This meant a new principle that the local Rajahs
possessed the sole authority to dispose of land.The British
Minister,Tower,informed his Government that such terms of
agreement on the transfer clause were unacceptable to the 
31King. The King insisted that a clause be inserted so as to
32make transfers dependent upon his consent, namely to
replace the words "Rajah of Kelantan" with the "Government of
33the King of Siam. " The Counsellor at the Siamese
Legation,Verney,explained to the British Foreign Secretary,
Lansdowne,the Siamese concern on the clause;
"(The Siamese Government) were not asking 
anything which was unreasonable.They needed 
to know with whom the Syndicate was dealing 
to prevent the concession from being 
transferred to persons not in a position t ^  
fulfill their obligations satisfactorily."
It seemed evident that the Siamese were not concerned with 
the nationality,but rather the financial credibility of the 
company.The Siamese Charge d'Affairs in London,Ratanayapti, 
emphasised the point to Lansdowne that the Siamese were not 
prejudiced against western capital,but rather that they 
endeavoured to exclude speculative hunters from damaging the 
reputation of Siam;
30
NA KT 99.4/3 Archer to Devawongse Nov 18,1901.
31 PRO FO 69/275 CO to Fo Jan 24,1902.
32 PRO FO 69/275 CO to FO March 1,1902 pg 54.
33 PRO FO 69/275 Verney to Bertie March 6,1902 pg 74.
34 PRO FO 69/275 Duff Syndicate to Fo March 21,1902.
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"My Government are fully aware that it 
is for their interest that their Malay 
Provinces should be developed by European, 
and especially by British energy and 
capital.They have no wish whatever to 
prevent this being done,but,unfortunately, 
the experience of past years show that 
men who go to Eastern countries for the 
purpose of making money are by no means 
always scrupulous in the methods they 
adopt...and therefore it is very 
necessary for the Government to maintain 
an effective control where they carry on 
their operations."
The British Foreign Office appeared to undermine the
Siamese concern by asserting that the insertion desired by
the King would serve no effective purpose in the form of
ratification as Duff had already signed the Agreement,and
3 6commenced working in Kelantan. Lansdowne also pointed out
that the British authorities would take caution in the
transfer of sub-leases by examining the financial standing of
the proposed transferees.Lansdowne requested the King's
confirmation for the concession,which astonished both
Ratanayapti and Devawongse;
"This answer is a surprise after the 
British Foreign Secretary has given 
us to understand that there would be 
no difficulty w i ^  regard to this 
insertion."
Ratanayapti attributed the change in Lansdownef s attitude
35 NA KT 99.4/4 Luang Rattanayapti to Lansdowne March 
12,1902.
3 6
NA KT 99.4/3 Lansdowne to Ratanayapti March 6,1902. 
^  NA KT 99.4/4 Ratanayapti to Devawongse March 8,1902.
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to Duff's influence in the Treasury and the Colonial Office
headed by Joseph Chamber lain. According to Ratanayapti, Duff had
been receiving information on the issue from the Treasury 
38Department. In addition,Verney was convinced that Chamberlain 
had made a direct effort in influencing Lansdowne.Indeed,from 
the British Foreign Office despatches correspondence between 
Duff and Chamberlain revolved round the presence of the 
Syndicate being synonymous with British influence in the Malay 
Peninsula;
"In advancing the interests of my Syndicate 
I am,in a small way,advancing British interests 
in a corner Asia which has been too long
neglected..."
Duff placed emphasis on the prospect of foreign
intervention.The Syndicate informed the Foreign Office that
the Germans were working through the Danish and Chinese
40botanical expedition supposed to be then in Kelantan.
It appears that the Syndicate had a dual motive 
concerning the concession.On the one hand,a motive of 
preserving Kelantan for British trade,and on the other,the 
economic ambitions of the Syndicate.The latter motive is 
reflected in the terms inherent in the Deed of 
Partnership,namely that of possessing extensive authority
3 8 NA KT 99.4/4 Ratanayapti to Devawongse March 20,1902.
39 PRO FO 69/275 Duff to Chamberlain March 21,1902.
40 L.R.Robert article pg 89.
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within the concession. Such privilege would allow the Syndicate
to work the concession to its full advantage.By upholding the
independence of the Rajah,Duff was in the position to exert
his influence in the region.To secure the terms specified in
the Deed of Partnership,the approach to the Colonial Office
as opposed to the Foreign Office was an effective initiative
adopted by Duff. Unlike the Foreign Office,the Colonial Office
believed in d re c t intervention.This was a positive outlook
for Duff as he endeavoured to gain the ratification by the
Siamese before any barrier was raised against British
interests in the Malay Peninsula.In particular,any barrier
erected against French encroachment in the northeast could
justify the Siamese in conducting such an exclusionist policy
against the British in the Malay Peninsula.The Siamese were
already attempting to undermine Duff's concession by delaying
41the ratification. The Siamese considered that their "most
effective weapon is the powerlessness of the British
42Government to insist on the ratification of the concession."
The Siamese delayed the ratification by asserting the 
legal issues,namely the Mining Regulations which specified 
Government consent for all concessions.The Siamese Minister 
in London pointed out to Lansdowne that any proposal to enable
41 PRO FO 69/275 Siamese Minister,Prassidhi,to Lansdowne 
March 26,1902.
42 PRO FO 69/275 Duff to FO April 2,1902.
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Duff to acquire land within Siamese territory by a concession
was contrary to the Mining Regulations,thereby breaching one
43of the Laws of Siam. Duff counter-argued this by asserting
that the Rajah had exercised the right to grant concessions
within his State,and that the Siamese Government had never
claimed to interfere with his right until a concession was
44being granted to a British subject.
It was highly probable that Chamberlain's policy was
influenced by the British Governor-General in Singapore,Sir
Frank Swettenham.Swettenham,from 1901 Governor of the Straits
Settlements and High Commissioner for the Malay States,was at
the forefront of British expansionism and regularly engaged
in persuading London of the advisability of a further forward
movement.In his despatches,Swettenham reported on the
deteriorating political situation in the northern States,
especially Kelantan,and pointed out the dangers for Britain
inherent in the existing state of affairs.In particular,he
45
referred to imminent German and American intervention. 
Swettenham endeavoured to conciliate the rivalry between the 
Siamese Government and the Duff Concession,and his proposals 
culminated to the Anglo-Siamese Treaty of 1902.
a r>
NA KT 99.4/5 Prassidhi to Lansdowne March 26,1902.
44 PRO FO 69/275 Facts concerning Malay Peninsula.
45 Wyatt article pg 40.
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The Treaty contained two fundamental clauses as a means
of reconciling the interest of both the Siamese and the 
46British. Firstly,Siam was recognised by Britain as the
suzerain power over the northern Malay States.As a safeguard
to British interests was the appointment of a British Adviser
to the Raja of Kelantan.The appointment was to be made by the
Siamese Government,and an Adviser was sought to facilitate the
free intercourse and trade of British subjects in Kelantan an
area in which the Treaty of 1826 had proved inadequate. In
Duff's opinion,the Treaty was in favour of securing British
interests and he was confident of its implications,as
reflected in Duff's letter to the Syndicate;
"From the Syndicate's point of view,nothing 
could be more satisfactory than tjj^  Agreement 
which has now been arrived at..."
The issue over the ratification of the Duff concession
exposes the factors influencing British and Siamese policy.The
British Foreign Office under Lansdowne conducted a "wait and
see" policy in that they played for time especially on the
transfer clause.The British Minister in Bangkok,Tower,showed
sympathy for the Siamese as reported by the Financial Adviser;
"Mr.Tower is in sympathy with my views on 
this question but he said that the British 
Foreign Office is being pushed by a wealthy 
City Syndicate and that he must,as in duty 
bound,be the mouth piece of the Foreign Office
46 PRO FO 69/275 Facts concerning Malay Peninsula.
^  PRO FO 69/275 Duff to Secretary of Syndicate Nov 
4,1902.Enclosed in Duff to FO April 25,1903.
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48in this matter."
It appears that the Foreign Office was pressed by the Colonial
Office to adopt an interventionist policy.The character of the
Colonial Office is depicted in Verney's statement;
"I share the conviction which many Englishmen 
feel that if South Africa had been under our 
Foreign Office and not under our Colonial Office, 
we never shouldghave had this deplorable war in 
South Africa."
From the Siamese perspective,the presence of British
activity in the Malay Peninsula was not the threatening
factor.The King was aware of the commercial prospects offered
50to Siam by opening the South to British enterprise. It was
the lack of an effective administration to accommodate the
operation of such enterprise and its subsidiaries.The Siamese
regarded the inhabitants of the vassal states as "barbaric " 
51and uncivilised,and thus any conflict with the British 
investors could result in direct intervention on the part of 
the British Government.The presence of the Duff Syndicate was 
perceived by the Siamese administration as a flammable 
project.
The British Financial Adviser,Rivett-Carnac,intended to
4ft
NA Kh 0301.1 34/1 Rivett-Carnac to Damrong April 24,1902.
49 NA KT 99.4/4 Verney to Devawongse March 21,1902.
50
NA 5 M 62/1 King to Damrong June 26,1901.
Ibid.
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"expose the Buccaneer (Duff) in his true colours" and was
inducing the King to despatch him to England to convince the
52Foreign Office of the unworthiness of the entire concession.
Devawongse pointed out to Tower that the King's intention was
to co-operate with the British Government in strengthening
Siamese control in Kelantan and Trengganu so as to facilitate
the influx of foreign capital;
"...aim of bringing the administration 
of those States on a modern and effective 
footing,so as to obviate the possibility 
of any obstruction being placed in the way ^  
of foreign capitalists and their enterprises."
Such a policy was continuously stressed in Verney's 
correspondence with Devawongse,and Ratanayapti's letters to
Lansdowne.The implications of a foreign enterprise operating
under a disorganized administration and in an environment
inimical to the conduct of business, was pointed out by
Devawongse to Tower;
"...how reluctant his Majesty the King was 
hitherto to ratify the concession of such 
magnitude in a country quite undeveloped 
and under most primitive system of government, 
the possibilities and wealth of which as 
regards successful development are very 
doubtful.Fears are entertained that a large 
number of subsidiary companies may be 
floated on the Stock Exchange in consequence 
of the enormous area and reputed richness of
concessions.Should it not turn out to be 
as valuable as supposed,it is feared that 
the unfortunate investors whose money is lost 
will raise an outcry against his Majesty's 
Government which will depreciate
Siam as an area for the future investment of
PRO FO 69/275 Tower to Lansdowne May 4,1902.
53 NA KT 99.4/5/1 Devawongse to Tower May 14,1902.
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54British capital."
The Anglo-Siamese Agreement October 1902 temporarily
closed the breach between Duff and the Siamese Government.The
Siamese appointed W.Graham as their adviser to the Raja of
Kelantan. Graham had had administrative experience in British
55Burma and in the Siamese Land Department. Graham's arrival
in Kelantan on July 25.1903 was a period where the Duff
Development Co held extensive commercial and administrative
rights within their concession.In response to the privileged
position of the Duff Syndicate,Graham persuaded the Rajah to
impose an "Exploratory Document" on the company in August
1903.The Document removed the Company's administrative
authority in Kelantan and in particular the Company's taxation
rights enjoyed within its concession.From here emanated
conflict between Graham and Duff.According to Duff, Graham was
still dissatisfied with the effectiveness of the Document in
controlling the Company's activities,and thus began to proceed
to hinder the Company's operations,as pointed out by Duff to
the Colonial Secretary of State;
"...thereupon (Graham) instituted a policy 
of systematic opposition to the Company's 
interests and desires,thus thwarting all 
their attempts at developing the territory
54 NA KT 99.4/5/3 Devawongse to Tower June 9,1902.
55 PRO FO 69/248 Candidates for the Posts of Advisers and 
Assistants in Kelantan and Trengganu Feb 24,1902.
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which they held.."^
In assessing the comments made by Duff on Graham's 
policies,two cases need to be discussed:Duff's railway 
scheme,and his proposal for land regulations.
Duff endeavoured to link his Kelantan concession with
57those at Legeh and Reman. This Involved the construction of
a railway from the sea-board at the mouth of the Kelantan
River extending across the Peninsula through the States of
Kedah and Reman thereby joining with the FMS railway system
on the western coast.Such a scheme would enable the Company
to transport minerals to and from the boundaries of the
concession and the East coast.Duff submitted his proposal to
Graham,laying stress on the prospects of commercial
development;
"The construction of this line would be the 
surest way to hasten and promote the development 
of the commercial resources of the State of 
Kelantan,by offering inducements for the 
introduction of capital and thereby improving 
the condition of the native^gby affording 
them incentives to labour."
Duff prepared a budget of £400,000 for the entire scheme and
proposed the privileges of free import duty on railway
56 PRO FO 371/523 Duff to Earl of Crewe,Secretary of State 
for Colonies,April 2,1908.
57 Duff had also acquired mineral rights from the Rajahs of 
Legeh,Reman,and Johore.PRO FO 422/56 FO to CO Jan 13,1901 pg 
111 .
5 8
NA KT 99.4/17 Duff to Graham Undated.
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59materials,foodstuffs and other materials.
Both Damrong and Graham feared the consequences of such
a scheme.Damrong viewed the proposal as damaging to the
Siamese administration in Kelantan;
"Duff would transport goods from Kelantan 
to his established market thereby causing 
the people to migrate out of Kelantan,to 
the Eastern States, an^thus reducing 
Kelantan's tax base."
Graham was convinced of the Company's goal as "purely and
simply the development of trade".^^What Graham feared was that
such concession would consolidate Duff's position in the
region,as he pointed out to the Rajah;
"This Company already holds so very large an 
interest in the State...and to grant to it 
the concession now applied for,must inevitably 
greatly increase that influence,as the merest 
glance at the excessive privileges asked for 
to accompany the g2ncessi°n if given,must at 
once make clear."
Graham informed Duff that the Rajah had temporarily refused
the application on the grounds of the "present rudimentary
fi 3
condition" of the State. The Duff Company sought the 
intervention of the British Government claiming that Graham
59
PRO FO 422/58 Paget to Lansdowne Dec 4,1903.
^  NA KT 99.4/17 Damrong to Devawongse June 30,1903.
^  NA KT 99.4/17 Graham to Rajah Kelantan Oct 14,1903.
62 T. . .Ibid.
^  NA KT 99.4/17 Graham to Duff Undated.
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was using his influence with the Rajah against the Company
which was a breach of the Agreement;
"..embued with a feeling of distrust which was 
necessarily with any desire to promote the 
Company's interest or encourage its success... 
whilst conducting all business in the name of 
the Raja,the Advisor is now the actual ruler 
of the State."
The Company's Chairman in London,Major Wemyss,pointed out to 
the British Foreign Office that "once the concession was 
lost,the Company's confidence would be destroyed, thus ending 
British enterprise in Kelantan."^The Company also pointed out 
to the Colonial Office that the "Kelantan Government had 
either intentionally ignored the Company's interests or had 
so designed their new administrative measures as to reduce the
• U- 66company's rights.
The British Government supported the Company's claims in 
Kelantan and in 1905 embarked upon another Agreement in 
Bangkok involving Graham,Duff,and Stroebel,the General 
Adviser.The dispute revolved round the issue of import 
dues.Duff accused Graham of having breached an agreement made 
concerning free import dues. Graham denied the existence of 
such agreement and said that the Company was liable to import 
dues,despite Duff's claim that the Rajah had exempted the
64
PRO FO 422/61 Duff to Paget Dec 3,1904.
^  PRO FO 422/61 Paget to Lansdowne April 14,1905 pg 84.
^  PRO CO 273/333 Enel in despatches July 3, 1907.Quoted in 
Wyatt article pg 49.
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6 7Company from import dues. The negotiations lasted for 10 days 
resulting in the signing of a new agreement,executed on May 
28,1905.This abrogated practically all administrative rights 
held by the Company,thereby reducing it to a purely commercial 
concern.
The 1905 Agreement did not settle the conflict between
Duff and Graham,which continued to develop in
intensity.Constant representations were made by the Company
to the Siamese Government through the British Minister in
Bangkok regarding Graham's unsatisfactory conduct and hostile
attitude.The issue at dispute concerned the land
regulations.The issue of land regulations marked the last
phase of the disagreement between Duff and Graham.The Company
had interests in developing planting rights which required
definite land regulations to induce merchants in Singapore to
assist the Company.The Company despatched Duff to Kelantan to
reach an agreement.Duff approached Graham on the subject of
these regulations on April 1906.The purpose of such
regulations was to enable the Company to "alienate and to
6 8administer the land situated within the concession.
Graham gave no assistance to Duff in drawing up these
^  PRO FO 422/61 Beckett to Grey Jan 19,1907 pg 58.
^  PRO FO 422/61 Beckett to Duff Aug 24,1906.
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land regulations.Duff then drafted a set of regulations based
on the torrens land system of the Federated Malay 
6 9States. Duff was given the impression that Graham approved
the draft and was obliged to submit them to the Siamese
Government in Bangkok.However when Duff arrived in Bangkok,the
Vice-Minister of Interior had no knowledge of such a draft.Not
only did Graham postpone the drafting of the regulations,but
wrote to Wemyss (Chairman of the Company) insinuating that
Duff's motives were political, whilst those of the Chairman
were commercial,thus pointing out that Duff had failed to
assist the Chairman's policy.In reaction to this,Duff
requested Beckett;
"to urge on the Siamese Government the 
desirability of appointing an Adviser 
to the Government of Kelantan who will 
more readily support the established 
interests of those British subjects... 
to develop the commercial interests of 
the State.."
Graham pointed out to Beckett that any impediment to Duff's 
interest was not a policy of hindering British interests.On 
the contrary,Graham indicated that he was fostering British 
interests. Graham asserted that he had granted 5 mining 
concessions to British subjects,and other planting rights 
notably rubber and coconut.In 1905 the Kelantan Corporation 
Ltd was registered in Singapore to acquire coconut exports in
^  PRO FO 422/61 Beckett to Grey Jan 19,1907 pg 61.
70 Ibid pg 61.
381
71Kelantan. In addition over 100 shops for wholesale or retail
of general merchandise had been opened in Kota Baru all owned
by British subjects of which half the stocks were supplied by 
72the Borneo Co.
Beckett suggested,as a solution,the removal of Graham.
Yet it appeared that Damrong was protecting Graham.Firstly
Damrong overruled Westengard's command to summon Graham to
Bangkok for questioning.Secondly there was Damrong's response
to any threat of dismissing Graham;
"Is it Graham's dismissal that you want? Very 
well,I say that if Mr.Graham is dismissed,I 
will resign my office of Minister of I^^erior.
I will not have Mr.Graham humiliated."
It was clear that the proposed land regulation was a direct
breach of the terms laid down in the Duff concession.Clause
13 stipulated that the Kelantan administration undertook not
to enforce any new law relating to land or mining within the
concession.For this reason,Damrong showed firm support for
Graham,as the latter was upholding the principles of the
Agreement so as to restrict the authority of the Syndicate.The
issue subsided once the Siamese and British embarked on
preparations for the secession of Kelantan to Britain which
took effect in 1909.
^  NA Kh 0301.1 34/2 Prospectus of Kelantan Corp Ltd 1905.
^  PRO FO 422/61 Graham to Beckett Aug 13,1906 pg 1.
^  PRO FO 422/61 Beckett to Grey Jan 19,1907 pg 62.
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The interesting point about the dispute over the land
issue was the Company's attention to plantation rather than
mining activities.This point perhaps justified the Siamese
fear of a Western enterprise becoming disillusioned with the
mining prospects of Southern Siam,and hence needing to
diversify its activities. Indeed by the end of 1907,the
Company endeavoured to close all work in the State as pointed
out by Stroebel;
"The present condition of the Company results 
from the failure of its mining enterprises to 
meet the expectation held out to the share­
holders. (It) Appears that the Company would 
be compelled to depend upon the slow returns 
of agriculture instead of the rapid profits 
of successful mining.This means dividends 
long deferred and further sacrifices on the 
part of the shareholders.In other words,the 
cause of the present crisis in the Company's 
affairs grows out of difficulties far more 
deeply rooted th^ jj any question of 
administration."
Stroebel's observation can be substantiated by the Company's
sublease of its gold concession in Kelantan in 1905.
As early as 1903,there were already reports made by the 
Siamese administration on the Company's diminishing returns 
from the gold concession.The Siamese Permanent Secretary,Pipat 
Kosa, reported that the Duff Company had only exported 8000 
dollars worth of gold having invested 600,000
^  NA KT 99.4/18 Stroebel to Beckett Nov 30,1907.
383
75dollars. Damrong also reported that the Company had lost 2
months profit on gold mining due to drought,and had
experienced theft on 6 occasions causing a loss of 1500 
7 6dollars. In 1905 the Kelantan Gold Dredging Co was formed to
acquire from the Duff Development Co the gold dredging
concession along the River Kelantan covering 2000
77sq.miles. In June 1908 the Company was prepared for
liquidation.Duff attributed the financial crisis to the lack
of funds and the payment of interest.The Company's working
capital of £12,000 had been used to pay the interest due on
the debenture stock;
"The Company's financial position was very 
critical,that owing to the uncertain condition 
of affairs which existed,we could not see our 
way to recommend the provision of more working
capital... For the past 6 months the Company
have only been able to conduct their work on 
7ft a very reduced scale,owing to the lack of
funds."
Tin Mining 1909-1913
The 19 09 Agreement marked the re-establishment of Siamese 
economic sovereignty in mainland Southern Siam.The Siamese 
administration was still in the process of consolidating its
7  ^ NA KT 99.4/16 Pipat Kosa to Sri Sahadhep June 28,1903.
7 6
NA KT 99.4/17 Damrong to Devawongse July 7,1903.
77 NA Kh 0301.1 34/2 Prospectus of Kelantan Corp Ltd 1905.
78 PRO FO 371/523 Duff to Duff Co June 16,1908.
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control over the Southern region especially in Trang.The 
political administration had not become effective in this 
zone,and certain mining areas were reserved for Chinese 
capital.Complications followed as these areas were applied for 
by foreign concessionaires and consequently involved the 
British Foreign Office,as seen in the Pearson Concession.
The firm Pearson and Co was a well established mining 
company a great portion of whose capital was held by British 
subjects.lt had offices in Kedah and Trang and intended to 
expand its operation into southern Siam.In December 1910 the 
Siamese Mining Department issued the Company with a licence 
to prospect for minerals in the province of Nakorn 
Srithamarat.The Document specified that prospecting was 
forbidden for a distance of 5 miles on each side of the 
Southern railways which was in the process of construction 
and which would pass through the province concerned.The 
Company's prospector ignored the endorsement and commenced 
operation in the reserved zone.When the Siamese became aware 
of this,the Company withdrew its prospector and made serious 
efforts to induce the Siamese Government to cancel the clause 
in question,and for a fresh application for a new licence to 
be made.The Company did not succeed in obtaining such a 
licence,and was informed by Heal,the Inspector-General of 
Mines,that there were certain difficulties in the way of it 
being granted.Messrs. Pearson & Co had already invested in a
385
preliminary survey,in expectation that the entire province of
Nakorn Srithamarat would be opened up for prospecting.The
Company further alleged that local Chinese were to be
permitted to pursue mining operations within the reserved
zone,and,under these circumstances,they appealed to the
British Consul,Dunn,for assistance in procuring the issue of
79a more generous prospecting licence.
The issue was taken up with the British Foreign
Office,and the Siamese Government proposed to create a
reserved zone on each side of the Southern railway
line,thereby restricting the operations of foreign capital,and
the consequent introduction of foreign political interests
within their dominions in the Malay Peninsula.The British
Minister,Peel,pointed out that such policy was detrimental to
both the Siamese and British Governments;
"Siamese interests would also suffer by 
such a policy as it would retard development 
of their Peninsula provinces and render it 
impossible for the Southern railway ever to 
become a profitable undertaking.British 
interest would also suffer since it was 
hoped that the Siamese Peninsula provinces 
would offer possibilities for the investment 
of British capital."
Peel wrote a private letter to Devawongse concerning
79 PRO FO 422/66 Peel to Grey Nov 22,1911 Entire paragraph.
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81Pearson's licence to be adjusted. Peel asserted that if
British subjects in Siam were faced with difficulty in being
granted land while Siamese subjects were treated differently,
"our extra-territorial privileges..have been taken 
away;we are placed on the same footing as the Siamese in. 
regard to the payment of tax and liability to 
services,but we are told that as compensation we should 
enjoy the same rights in regard to the ownership of 
land;as this is not the case..then let uSg^ave our 
extra-territorial privileges back again."
The Mining Department considered Pearson's application for an
8 3exclusive prospecting licence, but the Siamese Government 
asserted that the Siam Mining Act had not been applied to 
Trang as Trang was being reserved for agriculture.This 
therefore determined the denial of the application from the 
Pearson Co in August 1910.
In Peel's opinion the land was a "government reserve" 
and parts of its area were being acquired by influential 
Siamese for rubber plantations.Pearson and Co then applied to 
Fitzmaurice (Vice-Consul at Phuket) to request the Siamese 
authorities to open Trang for mining,and give the British 
priority for a prospecting licence.Yet Damrong insisted upon 
the closure of the mines despite the presence of Chinese
8  ^ PRO FO 422/66 Peel to Grey Jan 3,1912 pg 5.
82 TK. .Ibid.
83 PRO FO 422/67 Peel to Grey March 27,1912 pg 26.
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• 4-u . 8 4miners operating in the region.
The fact that the Chinese were still working the mines
in Trang shows that the Siamese had other motives in denying
Pearson the prospecting licence.One explanation was that
reforms in the provincial administration had not reached Trang
nor was there a representative from the Mining
Department.Earlier in 1907 a British subject Luang Pipat
85Nichkarn had been denied a prospecting licence in Trang. The
Interior Vice-Minister,Sri Sahadhep,was strongly against the
opening up of mines where the administrative infrastructure
8 6was not fully developed. Sri Sahadhep believed that if 
westerners were granted licences in such provinces and where 
there was no representative from the Mining Department,this 
would give the westerners the excuse of being ignorant of the 
Mining regulations and would in turn lead to political 
difficulties.The underlying reason for the closure of Trang 
was that in August 1909,the Cabinet had agreed that no further 
prospecting licences or mining licences be issued for Monthon 
Chumphorn,Nakorn Srithamarat,and Pattani.The decision was 
carried out on account of the railway construction down the 
East Coast which would have substantial affects on the tin
84 PRO FO 371/1751 Pearson Co to British Consul at Trang Jan 
12,1913.
o c
NA 5 KS 6.5/82 Sri Sahadhep to King Nov 30,1907.
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deposits.In Damrong's view,such a railway would result in 
concession hunters.^
The restrictive Siamese attitude towards western mining
enterprise reached its turning point when the Mining
Department was transferred from the Ministry of Interior to
that of Agriculture under the new Minister Chao Phya
Wongsanupraphand.Unlike Damrong,who was cautious and
restrictive of western investors,Wongsanupraphand saw the
importance of foreign capital to the Siamese economy.This is
reflected in his analogy of foreign capital to the action of
a river inflood;
"Although dikes and dams might be built to 
protect an area from flooding,water (foreign 
capital)would always ggeate a passage through 
which it would flow."
In 1912 the Minister's proposal to remove the prohibition on
the issue of prospecting licences and mining leases for the
East Coast provinces became effective.
The character of British infiltration into the Siamese 
mining districts may be described in two ways.Firstly,for 
political reasons,the Siamese government was anxious to avoid 
the pattern of rapid development and influx of foreign capital 
which might jeopardise Southern autonomy.The Siamese perceived
87 I.G.Brown The Elite... pg 106.
8 8 NA 6 KS 6/2 Wongsanuprapandh Memorandum on Prospecting 
for coal Oct 1911.Quoted in I.G.Brown The Elite....pg 108.
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the presence of speculative concession hunters as a potential 
threat to the social order.Secondly,economic development also 
brought dangers of intervention,extra-territorial privileges 
for foreigners,and foreign capital in resources and 
communications. Under these circumstances,the Siamese 
especially Damrong had to form an equilibrium between the two 
extremes,by a policy of control and after 1904 an element of 
challenge.The Siamese endeavoured to challenge the British in 
their co-operation with Rasada in containing the activities 
of the Straits Trading Company.However the policy of direct 
challenge was dangerous as it was likely to spark intervention 
by the British government.Therefore in response to the influx 
of British enterprise,the Siamese conducted a policy of 
control as reflected in the Mining Code of 1901.Both policies 
were complemented by the Siamese erection of a barrier in 
their vassal States,namely the Secret Convention of 1897.This 
had the effect of restricting western enterprise to British 
dominance and for the Siamese it guaranteed the mining 
industry be undertaken by credible enterprises like the Duff 
Syndicate rather than by speculative concessionaires.
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Chapter 9
Analo-Siamese Economic Relations 1856-1914 in Perspective.
The history of British business in Siam is an important 
element in the modern economic history of South-East Asia, 
revealing a number of distinctive features; firstly, the conduct 
of British economic activity in a non-colonised country; 
secondly,the reaction from the Siamese administration;and 
thirdly,the contribution to Siam's modernisation.At the 
opening of Siam to free trade in 1856,Siam was regarded as a 
"backward" country.The administration was fragmented,with the 
governing of the Provinces decentralized and communications 
with the interior confronted with impediments due to the lack 
of proper roads and a postal service.The inadequate 
infrastructure together with the lack of capital and expertise
I
proved inimical to economic progress.
More important was the cautious Siamese attitude towards
the West as reflected in Rama Ill's last words;
"The Vietnamese and Burmese are no longer 
a threat,it is the Farangs (Westerners).Be 
cautious (of western intentions);do not 
concede to them.Employ their system where 
necessary,but do not think too highly of 
them."
The Siamese Embassy to England in 1857 is an indication of the
 ^ Pongsawadan No.51 "Closing Years of Rama III", pg 5.
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Siamese attempt to understand British intentions as the
mission involved an observation of the nature of British
economic activity in their homeland.The mission involved a
tour of the leading manufacturing centers in Britain;
Liverpool,ManchesterBirmingham,and Sheffield.The head of the
mission,Phya Montri,took an interest in machinery,and made
purchases of the various manufactures,which the Illustrated
Times described as;
"..Not for the purpose of trade,but for the 
King,who is anxious to famialiarise his people 
with the various productions of Great Britain, 
and to encourage and improve their manufacturing 
abilities,by displayingjto them the results of 
European civilization."
The influx of British capital and enterprise aroused 
suspicion amongst the Siamese of British intentions .There were 
several factors which precipitated Siamese suspicions of the 
British.First was the British involvement in the political 
upheaval of neighbouring countries.The annexation of Upper 
Burma in 1886 determined the Siamese to exert their authority 
over the Northern autonomous States.The Siamese held the view 
that the Bombay-Burmah Trading Corporation had been 
responsible for the intervention of the British government. 
Similarly,in the Southern States,the Siamese perceived any 
disorder in the environment of the tin mines could precipitate 
a British forward movement to be directed towards the Siamese
2
The Illustrated Times Nov 28,1858 quoted in "Press comments 
on the Siamese Embassy to England 1857-58." Ponasawadan 
No.45 pg 76.
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Malay vassal States. The reputation of Britain as an 
expansionist power was a constant threat to Siam.Apart from 
the consideration of political independence,there was the 
question of economic sovereignty.The threat of Western railway 
companies dominating the Siamese infrastructure influenced the 
Siamese response towards Western enterprise.The Siamese needed 
to secure their interests but simultaneously to be dependent 
on western capital and expertise.
The Siamese were aware of the need for Western enterprise 
to overcome their economic "backwardness",but yet had to avoid 
the political consequences of Western domination.In response, 
the Siamese conducted a series of policies to regulate and 
control British economic activity as opposed to challenging. 
This involved the employment of foreign advisers,in particular 
the British,to establish and organise the necessary 
institutions.These agencies were fundamental to the Siamese 
programme for modernisation as they provided the 
administrative infrastructure to accommodate Western 
activity.This in turn was to prevent the disruptive elements 
inherent in the Siamese political system from developing into 
a political crisis.
The Role of British Advisers
A number of studies have been undertaken on the role of
393
foreign advisers.Thamsook Nunmonda,Kenneth T.Young,and
Chompunut Nakiraks have assessed the role of the General
3
Advisers in the context of diplomatic negotiations. More
relevant here is the work of I.G.Brown,who has discussed the
4
role of the British Financial advisers. The purpose of this 
study is to assess the role of the British advisers in
relation to the granting of concessions.The crucial question 
revolves round the attitude of the various British advisers 
towards the granting of concessions to their own nationality.
Amongst the foreign advisers,the British were the most 
prominent in both numbers and importance.The Siamese applied 
for these advisers through the Indian Office.As the resources 
of Siam resembled those of the British Colonies,it was found 
most appropriate to employ such experienced officers.Another 
factor which influenced the choice of British advisers was
that British economic activity was predominant.To this
effect,British advisers would be dealing with their own 
nationality,thereby providing a favourable environment for 
concessionaires.
3
Chompunut Nakiraks:"The Role of Foreign Advisers during the 
Reign of Rama V 1868-1910",MA.diss.,(Thai Text) Chulalongkorn 
U,1974.Thamsook Numnonda,"The First American Advisers in Thai 
History",in JSS Vol.62,Pt 2.Kenneth T.Young,"The Special Role 
of American Advisers in Thailand 1902-1949".Asia No.14.
4
I .G.Brown, "British Financial Advisers in Siam in the Reign 
of King Chulalongkorn",Modern Asian Studies,Vol 12,Pt 2 (April 
1978),pg 193-215.
394
The nature of British advisers employed by the Siamese 
administration changed as Siam became increasingly confronted 
with British enterprise.Up till the 1890s,the British advisers 
were confined to trading establishments,namely the Harbour and 
the Customs Departments.The first British official employed 
was Captain John Bush as Harbour Master in 1857.In addition 
there was S.Bateman as Commissioner of Customs.lt was found 
appropriate to employ officials of British nationality on 
account of the English language being widely conversant 
amongst the Western shipping crews.The increasingly wide range 
of British activity in Siam was accompanied by a 
diversification in the employment of British advisers.These 
advisers were not only confined to direct activities in 
government,but also brought the benefit of their experience 
to the Siamese,thereby gradually becoming less dependent on 
them.By 1900,British subjects held important posts in the 
Departments of Inland Revenue, Customs, Survey, Forests, Mines, and 
Police,and in the Ministry of Education.In 1902,the British 
Financial Adviser submitted the numbers of foreign officials 
employed in Siam,of which the British were by far the most 
predominant.
395
Table I
Table of British and German Employees in 1902 with 
a Salary over 1000 baht
British
Rivett-Carnac 
A.J.A.Jardine 
W . J . L .Tottenham 
R.W.Giblin 
F.H.Giles 
W.A.Graham
E.Ambrose 
A.C.Carter 
W.O.Johson 
W.A.B.Tilleke
H.Campbell Highet
F.W.Verney 
E.St J.Lawson 
H.G.Scott
Financial Adviser and Comptroller-General
Inspector-General of Police
Conservator of Forests
Director of Surveys
Director of Land Revenue
Official in Ministry of Agriculture
Director of Customs
Headmaster of King's College
Chief Inspector of Schools
Attorney General
Health Officer
Counsellor at Siamese Legation in London. 
Superintendent of Police 
Director of Mines
Germans
H.Gehrts 
C .Sundrecski 
E.Kioke 
T.H.Colman
Director of Railways
Chief Architect
Railway Engineer
Adviser to Post and Telegraph
Source: NA 5 B 8.2/39 Rivett-Carnac Minute upon the 
Political Situation in Siam.
The following table shows the significant departments 
concerned with British economic activity in Siam established 
by 1908.
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Table II
Office of the 
Financial Adviser
A.Mitchell-Innes 
C .J .Rivett-Carnac 
J.F.Williamson
Forestry
1896-99 H.Slade 1897-1902
1899-1903 F.W.Tottenham 1902-05 
1903-24 W.F.Lloyd 1906-1924
Mining Dept Southern Railway
de Muller (German) H.Gittins
H.Warington-Smyth. 1895-96
H.G.Scott 1896-1902
J.H.Heal 1902-
Railway Department
(German Directors)
K.Bethge 1895-1901
H.Gehrts 1901-1906 
L.Weiler 1906-
Engineers of the 
Department.
April 1896
GB 9
German 8
Siamese 19
Danes 3
March 1898 
28 
15 
25 
6
Source:NA 5 YO 5.6/17 Reports From April 1896- 
March 31,1898.
The Singapore and Straits Directory.
It is worth noticing the dominance of the British in the 
Office of the Financial Adviser;the Forestry;and the Mining 
Departments. Though the Railway Directors were continuously 
held by the Germans,the engineers were primarily British.
It is evident from the various official reports that a 
large faction of Siamese officials held the impression that 
British advisers were naturally biased towards their 
nationality.The British Consulate even held the impression
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that "Prince Devawongse ..has always had a profound distrust
5
of all foreigners". Similarly,British Ministers in Bangkok 
expressed their views on the advisers' disregard for British 
interests,especially that of Rivett-Carnac,the most prominent 
amongst the British Advisers. In order to assess the two 
opposing views,the role of certain British advisers is worth 
considering, namely J.C.Rivett-Carnac,H.Slade,and H.G.Scott.
I.G.Brown has made a comprehensive study of the British 
Financial Advisers in particular Rivett-Carnac.Brown concludes 
that these advisers played a limited role in determining the 
Siamese economic and financial policy.Brown based his 
assessment on the various issues which confronted Rivett- 
Carnac , namely the adoption of the gold standard and the 
raising of the 1905 loan.It is evident that Rivett-Carnac 
performed an advisory and consultative role,and guided Siam 
through monetary policy.^ However it is worth adding to Brown's 
assessment the speculation that Rivett-Carnac endeavoured to 
become the General Adviser.
The idea of Rivett-Carnac wanting to be appointed as 
General Adviser was put forward by the British Minister in 
1902,based on Rivett-Carnac's handling of the gold
 ^ PRO FO 422/39 Scott to Rosebery Jan 28,1894.It has been 
suggested that Devawongse' distrust of foreigners originated 
from the Paknam incident in 1893.
 ^ Ibid.
7
standard. To recall,Rivett-Carnac refused the banks' claims
for compensation,and to this effect,the British Minister
regarded Rivett-Carnac's action as prejudiced against British
interests in Siam.Indeed,as early as 1899,there were already
signs of Rivett-Carnac exerting his authority beyond his area
of concern.The Director of Survey, J.Macarthy,complained to
the King of Rivett-Carnac's interference with his department;
"Rivett-Carnac tends to ignore the rules of 
the Indian Government,notably not to interfere 
with officers of the Survey Department.He 
encourages subordinate officers of the Survey 
Department to consult him on matters pending 
before the Minister.."
Despite the accusation forwarded by the British Minister,
there are indicators to show that Rivett-Carnac did not
neglect British economic interests in Siam.His approach to the
British merchant bank,Baring Bros,in 1903,and his criticism
of Mahit's procedure in establishing an indigenous National
Bank in 1906 are strong indicators of Rivett-Carnac's support
for British interests. Yet in 1906,Rivett-Carnac recommended
the introduction of the tical as the monetary unit in Southern
Siam,warning that;
"..if Siam were to adopt in the Province of
Phuket the currency unit of the Straits
Settlement Governments either wholly or in 
part,she would inevitably tend to increase 
British political and commercial influence
7
I.G.Brown,"British Financial Advisers in Siam in the Reign 
of King Chulalonakorn" .Modern Asian Studies.Vol 12,Pt 2 (April 
1978).pg 200.PRO FO 800/142 Tower to Lansdowne March 10,1902.
® NA 5 T 5.1/87 James Macarthy to King Sept 17,1899.
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9
at the expense of that of Siam."
It appears that Rivett-Carnac's conduct of affairs was full 
of contradictions,which in turn makes it difficult to 
determine whether he had plans to be appointed as General 
Adviser.The King himself was fully aware that the nature of 
Rivett-Carnac's role would involve issues relating to British 
interests,and that it was only natural for him to maintain the 
balance;
"Though Rivett-Carnac is hired by the 
Siamese Government,his duty is to be 
loyal to the Siamese,but yet not to 
work against the interests of the 
British ."
Indeed his loyalty to the King was shown in late 1906 when
Rivett-Carnac offered to put his duty to the affairs of Siam
before his personal committment to be with his dying wife. **ln
turn,the King's gratitude for Rivett-Carnac's loyalty to Siam
was shown in 1908 when the King granted Rivett-Carnac' s newly
12born son from his second wife,the name "Chula".
One of Rivett-Carnac's roles which has been overlooked 
by Brown was that of financial agent.The Office of Financial 
Agent in London was established in February 1904 by the
 ^ PRO FO 371/133 Pt 1 Report by Rivett-Carnac to Mahit May 
31,1906 enclosed in Colonial Office Minute;Currency in 
Phuket,June 15,1906 pg 21.
^  SRL K 6/4/4 King to Devawongse Feb 4,1898.
^  NA 5 B 82/40 Rivett-Carnac to King Undated.
^  NA 5 B 82/40 Sommot to Rivett-Carnac April 25,1908.
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Finance Ministry.The purpose was to relieve the Siamese
Ministers in Europe of their responsibility of dealing with
financial matters unconnected with diplomatic affairs.The task
13was to arrange payments in Europe for railway purposes. The 
position was undertaken by Rivett-Carnac,and his procedure 
tended to undermine the influence of the Siamese Minister's 
role in financial affairs.Rivett-Carnac took direct orders 
from the Director of the Railway Department in making payments 
for railway material.
The Siamese Minister in London forwarded a series of
complaints concerning the authority of the Financial Agent.The
Minister warned the Finance Minister of the dangers of
entrusting such privileges to a foreign adviser;
"The Minister appears to think it is wrong for 
the Director of railways to give orders to the 
Financial Agent to pay large sums,and for the 
Siamese Representative to have no v o i ^  in the 
matter beyond finishing the cheques."
The Finance Minister,Prince Chantaburi,explained to the
Siamese Minister,Phya Visutr Kosa,that the authority granted
to Rivett-Carnac and the Railway Director was to avoid delays
which would occur if orders were sent through the Minister of
^  NA Kh 0301.1 16/3 Rivett-Carnac Memorandum Nov 27,1909.
14 NA Kh 0301.1 16/3 Rivett-Carnac to Prince Chantaburi,
Minister of Finance Feb 14,1910.
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15Public Works to the Siamese Legation in London. The duty of 
the Siamese Representative would be confined to the 
administrative task of ensuring that payments made were 
supported by the required documents.Chantaburi initiated a 
new system of payments for the construction of the Southern 
line.The principal alteration excluded the Financial Agent 
from any transaction concerning the Southern line,and instead 
placing it with the Director,Gittins,and the Inspector 
Engineer in London,Sandberg.^
The importance attached to the role of the Financial 
Agent demonstrates the continuing dependence on foreign 
advisers in economic affairs.Indeed railway material was a 
specialised and technical issue which the Finance Ministry 
presumably regarded as appropriate to be handled by foreign 
employees.At the same time,the transactions being conducted 
by someone of British nationality was inevitably to facilitate 
the arrangements and to establish Siamese credibility with 
British engineering firms.The fact that the Siamese 
Representative was excluded from such affairs shows the 
confidence of the Siamese administration in foreign officials.
The Forestry Department was continuously headed by a
NA Kh 0301.1 16/3 Chantaburi to Visutr Kosa,Siamese 
Minister in London March 16,1910.
^  NA Kh 0301.1 16/3 Visutr Kosa to Rivett-Carnac Feb 9,1910.
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British Director up till 1930.From the Siamese perspective,the
British offered both the expertise and the co-ordination in
the administration of the Department.At the appointment of
Herbert Slade to establish the Forestry Department and to
become its Director in 1897,the King pointed out to the Chaos
the advantages to be gained;
"Slade is an expert in forestry,having had 
experience in Burma.Being of British nationality 
this ought to facilitate negotiations with 
the Europe*^,British,and Burmese British 
subjects."
The King reassured the Chaos of Slade's position being an
asset to Siamese interests;
"Though he is British,he is employed by our 
Government and takes orders from me and not 
the British authorities.Therefore there are 
no grounds to suspect Slade of being a 
British agent."
However in 1903,Prince Penphat submitted a report indicating
the privileged position Slade had given to British firms in
particular the Bombay-Burmah Trading Corporation.The report
was based upon the witness of an official from the Forestry
Department that private correspondence between Slade and the
Bombay-Burmah Corporation was frequent,and that Slade had
given priority to the Company concerning leases;
"Any forestry lease which the Bombay-Burmah 
desires...or any logs which the Company is 
interested in..are given first priority.The 
Director (Slade) shows favouritism to 
Western enterprise due to its substantial
17
Ibid.
NA 5 M 16.3/5 King to Chao Chiengmai April 9,1897
18
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capital outlays which guaranteethe 
operation of the teak foreats."
On the other hand,the Forestry Annual Reports gave a different
impression of Slade.These reports were published by the
Forestry Department (though only a few copies can be found at
the Archives), and are thus likely to have presented a
favourable assessment of Slade's work.
The opposing views on Slade stemmed from his
controversial proposal of establishing the Departmental
Headquarters at Chiengmai;
"Until the Forestry Department is sufficiently 
large and important to have a senior officer 
in Bangkok who would be a sort of Secretary on 
Forest matters to the Minister of Interior,it 
is important for the headquarters to be near 
the work."
Such a scheme was regarded by Damrong as a dangerous challenge 
to his administrative authority in the North,a view most 
likely to have been shared amongst his colleagues.From the 
aspect of the Department,the proposal would enhance the 
effectiveness and the authority of forestry conservation. 
Damrong was probably doubtful of the Department's inclination 
towards British interests,and to this effect needed to place 
the Department under close supervision.
19 NA 5 M 16/10 Prince Penphat Report on Forestry Febl,1903. 
Penphat was Assistant Minister of Agriculture.
20
NA 5 M 16/7 Slade to Damrong Nov 4,1896.
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There is no substantial evidence to support Penphat's
observations.One explanation is perhaps that Slade's
association with the British community may have stirred
suspicion of Slade's attitude towards his own nationality.The
British Sports Club,the "Chiengmai Gymkhana Club",included
officials from the British Consulate,staff from the teak
21firms,and Slade. On the other hand,it has already been 
discussed how Slade's policy revolved round conservationist 
considerations rather than any inclination towards British 
firms.Another ambiguous point was the extent of the conflict 
between Damrong and Slade.Evidence has shown that the lack of 
co-operation had allowed the British teak firms to manoeuvre 
in acquiring leases.Yet the King indicated to Rolin-Jacquemyns 
the shallowness of the conflict;
"Damrong said that the former (Slade) 
and himself (Damrong)have been on friendly 
terms and that there has never been any 
cause for ill-feeling between them.There 
has only been a diffej^nce of opinion in 
an important point.."
Likewise,the British dominated Mining Department 
consistently came into conflict with Damrong.Damrong was 
opposed to the Department's policy of opening up Southern Siam 
to Western enterprise at an abrupt pace. Damrong was not 
totally against the idea of opening up the South as reflected
21 Bristowe:Louis and the Kina of Siam.pq 96-97.
22 NA KT 101/8 Rolin-Jacquemyns'Private Papers:King to Rolin- 
Jacquemyns Dec 31,1900.
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in his decision to permit the construction of the Southern 
railway.He preferred to allow Western activity to be conducted 
in areas where the administrative infrastructure was adequate 
to accommodate the presence of large-scale mining firms.
It is interesting to note that though the Mining 
Department was headed by a British Director,yet various 
correspondence indicate the inclination towards Siamese 
interests.In 1902 H.Scott recommended various means of 
facilitating the growth of Chinese capital.He pointed out to 
Damrong that the reserves of tin ore in Phuket was greater 
than those in Perak and Selangor.Scott suggested;
"..in order to achieve this result,the 
Government merely need to make all 
working of the mines easy for the 
Chinese..which will encourage them 
to invest large amounts of capital,23 
and enable them to make a profit."
Scott tends to raise two significant points on the tin mines. 
Firstly there was the commercial advantage of tin ore.The fact 
that the deposits in the British Protected States were 
becoming exhausted by 1900,this inevitably raised the world 
price of Straits tin.The second and more important issue was 
the political implications.The idea that the Siamese needed 
to develop the Southern region was linked to the question of 
political sovereignty;
^  NA 5 YO 5.1/25 Scott to Damrong Dec 19,1902.
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"It is only a question of whether the 
Siamese Government will take the bull 
by the horns,and leading it by easy 
paths to succulent pastures,allow it 
to gorge itself into happy contentment, 
or whether,on the other hand,by 
restraining its natural appetites,it 
will allow it to grow so furious from 
hunger,that bursting all bounds,and 
making a clear sweep of all trammels, 
it will bring disaster og^the Government 
in its furious on rush."
The opening of the South was not necessarily to Western 
enterprise.Yet it is not clear whether Scott intended to 
restrict Western enterprise for his own interests.Scott 
eventually disengaged himself from the administrative work to 
begin a career in the mining business.He floated two British 
firms in 1906 to work the mines,the first British enterprise 
in the region of Trang.His credibility with the Siamese 
administration was obviously the crucial element in 
establishing any operation in the region.Damrong was not 
prejudiced against Western enterprise but rather the 
speculative concession hunters.There may have been an element 
of self-interest in that Scott was aware of prospects in the 
tin business. As the nature of mining became increasingly 
capital intensive,this provided the opportunity for Western 
firms to establish their presence and to apply their 
technology.
24 T. . .Ibid.
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Between 1909-1912,a series of Western applicants for
mining licences were denied in the region of Trang.The British
Vice-Consul,Wood,considered such a policy as "a very blind and
25foolish policy". The Bangkok administration had instructed
the Mining Department at Phuket to exclude British
applicants.Wood observed that the Siamese identified the
influx of British capital as a movement towards "further
2 6interference and ultimate annexation", which he regarded as
a "foolish policy".Wood tried to convince the Siamese that it
was the contrary;British capital and enterprise would afford
27the British much less excuse for annexation.
The differing views and the lack of co-operation between
Damrong and the two British advisers can be attributed to
Damrong's failure to adjust to the economic progress in
Siam.Damrong's vision of both the Forestry and the Mining
Department was to conduct the routine administrative work:the
Forestry Department to collect the revenue and protect teak
theft.This is reflected in the employment of four British
forestry revenue officials by the Siamese from the Indian 
2 8Government. The employment of Slade was to conduct a 
programme of forest conservation,and to organise a system in
^  PRO FO 371/985 Acting Consul Wood to Peel Oct 11,1910.
26 T. . .Ibid.
27 Ibid.
7 Q
NA KT 35.9/2 de Bunsen to Devawongse Oct 31,1896.
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the collection of teak revenue .Likewise the task of the Mining
29Department was to survey and assay the land. However,such 
administrative work raised complicated issues which required 
substantial intervention on the part of the British 
Directors.In the case of forestry,Slade needed to establish 
the headquarters in the teak region.The British Directors were 
concerned with the economic progress associated with the 
presence of Western enterprise.The revenue collected and the 
infrastructure required were qualitative changes to the 
economy.However Damrong's main priority was the political 
considerations .Concessions were granted to satisfy the British 
so as to prevent any intervention from the Government.
The Role of the Third Power.
The Siamese response to British economic activity can be 
described in two phases.In the first phase,the Siamese 
administration encouraged the influx of British enterprise as 
part of her policy of modernisation.The second phase was 
marked by a policy of involving a Third Power,in particular 
Germany.Such a policy has been referred by historians as a 
political move "of playing one Power against another".This 
view of counter-balancing the British is a general description 
based on the observations made by the British at the time.In 
1899 the British Minister,Greville,informed his Foreign Office
2 9 NA KT 35.9/12 Damrong to Devawongse Dec 6,1904.
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of the Siamese intention of involving the Germans;
"The policy of Siam is to maintain its 
independence by offering special facilities 
to the European powers to acquire large 
interests in Siam,and then when these 
interests are acquired to play off the 
powers against each other."
There are various cases that demonstrate the involvement of 
a Third Power was based upon economic considerations,and at 
times upon political factors.The involvement of the Germans 
in railways is a clear example of the concern for both 
political and economic interests.
The decision for departmental construction of railways
under a German Director was partly due to the technical
reputation of the Germans, but more so to avoid the
construction of the Moulmein-Chiengmai-Yunnan line.The
political consideration was that such a line implied a linkage
between Northern Siam and British Burma.At the same time the
line would have diverted the China trade to British Burma at
the expense of Bangkok.The concern for economic interests
becomes evident in the construction of the Southern line.The
Straits Settlement authorities held a different view regarding
departmental construction as part of Siam's policy in
involving a Third Power;
"I would urge that any proposal for departmental 
construction should be firmly refused.lt would 
mean that German influence and interests would
PRO FO 422/52 Greville to Salisbury March 16,1899.
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exceed ours in the north of the Peninsula..This 
is the Siamese Government's real aim;they desire 
to bring in Germany as a supporter ..against the 
pressure of France and England.."
The Siamese endeavoured to undertake the construction to 
ensure that the route be built out in accordance with Siamese 
economic interests in promoting the Port of Trang,rather than 
in accordance with British interests in promoting Singapore;
"The Siamese administration has no intention 
to commit a project to a certain nationality, 
but rather to those who seem suitable.We 
intend to employ British,German,and Italian 
engineers to supervise the construction of 
the Southern line."
Yet in the case of teak, the Siamese persuasion in 
encouraging the Bombay-Burmah Corp to operate in Nan was 
induced by the need to counter-balance the French. It is 
perhaps fair to conclude that throughout the 189Os,the Siamese
i
were primarily motivated by political considerations,
especially after 1893;
"We learned our lesson in 1893,and in the 
events which followed,namely,that England 
intends to exploit us,all the time conducting 
herself in a courteous and helpful manner.But 
to this day she still has not really helped 
us....The idea that Britain would go to war 
with France over Siam is to us unthinkable, 
but to those two (Damrong and Devawongse) it
31 PRO FO 422/61 Governor Sir J.Anderson to Earl Elgin,Jan 
7,1907.
32 NA 5 YO 5.2/24 Sukum to King Sept 17,1906.
33is credible."
The 1896 Convention did not secure Siam's independence as was 
made to believe.lt was the 1904 Entente Cordiale which placed 
Siam's political independence on a secure footing.lt is worth 
noticing that after 1904,the Siamese pursued a policy of 
challenge rather than control in her response to Western 
economic activity.This is indicated in the Siamese intentions 
to limit the operation of the Straits Trading Co,and the 
establishment of an indigenous bank.Both cases are an 
indication of the growth in Siam's self-confidence in its 
dealings with Britain,and its willingness to stand up for what 
it regards as its own interests.The entire spectrum of Siam's 
response to British economic activity was driven by the need 
to preserve both political and economic sovereignty.In doing 
so,the Siamese were torn between their fundamental attachment 
to the "Most Favoured Nation Clause" and pressure to place 
Britain in a predominant position.
An Assessment of British Economic Performance in Siam.
Business historians have generally agreed that attempts 
to measure the performance of British business in Asia raises 
fundamental empirical and theoretical difficulties.The most 
satisfactory criteria in determining economic performance is
NA 5 F 35/3 King telegram to Suriya,April 7,1903 .Quoted in 
Holm Phd pg 124.
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an assessment of the "market share".The distinct element about 
British investment in Siam was that it never dominated the 
Siamese economy, but was predominant amongst western 
capital.To this effect the "market share" criteria is perhaps 
inadequate to measure British performance.What is perhaps 
sufficient is to assess how the British maintained their 
predominance considering the constraints within which the 
British conducted their business,and the qualitative changes 
brought about by their presence.
The pattern of British economic activity in Siam was 
markedly similar to that which emerged in Southeast Asia.The 
growth of British trading houses,banks,extractive companies, 
and shipping lines operating in Siam were British Asian based 
enterprises. This may be explained by the limited opportunities 
for investment.The main export staple,rice,was produced by 
village peasants working with traditional technology.The lack 
of an effective consumer market was inimical to manufacturing. 
The extractive industries operated within the framework of an 
ethnic structure as found elsewhere in Southeast Asia,namely 
Burmese foresters in Northern Siam,and Straits Chinese labour 
and capital in Southern Siam.The final processing of the bulky 
products was dependent on British technology (smelting and 
saw-milling),and distributed throughout the British Asian 
economy.
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The distinct element about British business in Siam was 
that business was conducted in a non-colonised country 
suspicious of British economic activity.The British were 
confronted with several constraints.Firstly,in Siam there was 
no Colonial Government legislation as in Malaya and Burma to 
facilitate British activity.Moreover the British were 
confronted with an administration which sought to restrict 
British enterprise.Secondly,neither the infrastructure nor the 
political administration were conducive to economic 
activity.The system of regulation and control,and 
communications with the interior were still in the developing 
stages.Thirdly,there was the competition from other Western 
Powers.This allowed the Siamese to manoeuvre against the 
expansion of British influence.Fourthly,the challenge from the 
Siamese proved more constructive as Siam's political 
independence became secure.However,British entrepreneurs were 
able to confront such problems with support from their 
government.
Diplomatic historians of the late 19th and early 20th 
centuries have described the growing association between 
British diplomats and business in areas of international 
diplomatic rivalry such as China and Iran between 1890- 
1914.This issue is also evident in Siam during the same
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period.British entrepreneurs turned to their Foreign Office 
for support declaring that their presence was synonymous with 
British influence.lt is evident that the British legation 
continuously showed official support for those of their own 
nationality,whereas in India,Sir William Ramsay commented in 
1910;
"the English Ambassador does not care ... 
what happens to any English enterprise,so 
long as he can get his shooting and his 
golf,and avoid being pestered with.... 
business.1,34
It may be claimed that the British Foreign Office adopted 
a non-interventionist attitude in its support for British 
entrepreneurs.For this reason,the Colonial Office was often 
consulted,and it was the latter that pressed the British 
Government for intervention.The reason for the reluctance on
the part of the British Foreign Office to meddle with
political affairs in Siam is indicated by the case of Duff
concession.The Foreign Office proceded in resolving the 
situation without creating hostility on the part of the
Siamese,whereas the Colonial Office was more insistent in its 
approach of trying to affiliate British economic interests in 
Siam with those in the Malay Peninsula.Again,the Duff episode 
reveals the interventionist attitude of Joseph Chamberlain and 
Sir Frank Swettenham.lt can be asserted that the Straits
34 British Business in Asia since 1860.Edited by 
R.P.T.Davenport-Hines and G.Jones.CUP 1989.pg 23.
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authorities endeavoured to exert their influence in the Malay 
vassal States as part of their forward movement.
However,in Northern Siam,the attitude of the Indian 
authorities can be described in two phases.Firstly,they did 
not show any intention of exerting political control over the 
region,but rather were anxious for the Siamese to regulate and 
protect British teak concessionaires from molestation through 
the establishment of a British Consular Office in Chiengmai. 
Secondly,the Indian authorities perceived the North as a 
gateway in securing the Yunnan trade.It was in the Siamese 
interest to co-operate with the British as part of the King's 
policy of centralization,as pointed out by the latter to the 
British Foreign Office?
"A foreign representative might support me in 
certain changes,his support would not be enough 
if I could not depend on his support 
throughout. "35
The significance of Colonial Office and Foreign Office support 
was that British entrepreneurs were able to alleviate,to a 
degree,the restrictive attitude of the Siamese 
administration.
35 PRO FO 69/67 King to His Lordship,Aug 10,1877.
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Britain's position became vulnerable as Britain faced 
competition from the Germans.This is evident in the increasing 
German share of the carrying trade.Yet this did not mark an 
overall decline in Britain's position in Siam,but rather only 
on one particular sector.Both the extractive enterprises and 
trading houses remained predominantly British,and trade itself 
was primarily conducted with the British Asian ports,namely 
Hongkong and Singapore.lt is fair to say that in relative 
terms,the Germans were challenging Britain's position.The 
outbreak of the First World War reduced German enterprise and 
influence in Siam at a time when it was growing strongly, 
thereby sustaining British pre-eminence.
Given the background of difficulties confronting British 
entrepreneurs,British economic performance in Siam between 
1856-1914 may be described as successful in its own right. The 
"cautious and restrictive" Siamese response towards the 
British inevitably inhibited the degree and direction of 
British enterprise.Despite official support from the British 
government, the Siamese determination to protect Siam's 
sovereignty meant that British economic activity had to work 
within the framework provided by the Siamese.In this sense,the 
British needed to conduct their business activity without 
creating hostility from the Siamese or precipitating any 
social disorder.
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In this thesis,we have examined the development and role 
of British capital in Siam before 1914.By no means all the 
various aspects of this subject have been explored in equal 
depth.One obvious question still remains,namely the impact of 
British capital on the Siamese economy itself.An analysis of 
this remains beyond the scope of this thesis, but a few 
underlying remarks may be made.
Two points seem of significance.Firstly,for all its 
attempted modernisation,social change,and economic progress, 
Siam did not experience structural change.Economic historians 
such as Ingram and Feeny,and prominent Thai scholars,Suthy 
Prasartset and Chatthip Nartsupha,have argued that the Siamese 
economy has not experienced "much progress" or "much 
development" in relation to the factors of production.36 
These studies have focused their attention on the role of the 
Siamese elite as being responsible for the absence of 
substantial economic change.More recent is the work of
I.G .Brown,who has examined these views from a different 
perspective by considering the economic vigour and vitality
36 Ingram pg 216-217.
David FeenyrThe Political Economy of Productivity;Thai 
Agricultural Development#1880-1975.pg 5.
Suthy Prasartset and Chatthip Nartsupha "The Rise of 
Dependent Commodity Production in Siam" in Political 
Economy of Siam.1851-1910.
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in Siam.37 Brown traces the establishment of several prominent 
commercial and industrial enterprises before 1920,showing the 
emergence of a business alliance between the Siamese elite and 
Sino-Siamese entrepreneurs.He concludes that the economic 
structure was subject to the internal constraints and the 
influence of the international economy.
Secondly,it is worth pointing out that the nature and
scope of British investment and activity did not seem to have
been wholly directed towards changing the structure of the
Siamese economy.British investment in the two extractive
industries,the northern teak forests and the southern tin
deposits,did not provide any substantial linkages.The teak
logs were sent to British saw-mills in Bangkok,whilst tin
output was smelted by two British companies in Penang.British
interest in Bangkok was primarily for commerce,leaving the
construction of tramways and the provision for electricity to
be undertaken by the Danes.Siamese joint ventures were formed
■the,
with the Germans andADanes;the Deutsch-Asiatische bank had 
substantial shares in the Siam Commercial Bank until 
1910,whilst the Danish East Asiatic Co participated in the 
establishment of the Siam Cement Co in mid-1913.
37 I.G.Brown "The Siamese Administrative Elite in the 
Early Twentieth Century and Historical Origins of 
Underdevelopment in Siam.", pp.151-190 in Lai Su Thai: 
Essavs in honour of E.H.S.Simmonds.Edited by J.H.C.S. 
Davidson.School of Oriental and African Studies.1987.
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It is evident that Siam benefited in many ways from the 
British transfer of enterprise and technology.The growth of 
modern banking, shipping companies,business management and 
expertise,were qualitative benefits which the Chinese 
community adopted,and in this sense the British may be 
described as "agents of modernisation".But for all its 
significance and presence,British capital may be seen as 
cementing an economic pattern inimical to structural 
change.
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APPENDIX
1.Teak Region of Northern Siam.
2.Coastal Shipping Routes,Pre-1914.
3.North and North-Eastern Railway Line,1909.
4.Southern Railway Line,1914.
5.Structure of the Borneo Co.Investment Group,Pre-1914.
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